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Standard Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax
High Court Opinion Summary — Reference under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
Factual and Procedural Background
The assessee, a limited company engaged in manufacturing textiles, filed its return for assessment year 1979-80 (previous year ending 31 March 1979) claiming a deduction of a sum stated in the opinion as Rs. 46,86,431 on account of excise duty. This deduction was claimed on the basis of show-cause-cum-demand notices received during the relevant previous year from the Central Excise Department relating to the years 1976-77, 1977-78 and 1978-79. The assessee replied to the notices denying any liability. No order was passed by the excise authorities rejecting the assessee's replies or making a demand, and the assessee made no payment nor created a provision in its accounts for the amounts in question. The assessee, however, noted the amount in its balance-sheet and profit-and-loss account as a "contingent liability representing the disputed amount of central excise" and claimed the amount as an excise duty liability deductible under section 37 of the Income-tax Act.
The Income-tax Officer disallowed the claim on the ground that the show-cause notices did not create any present or crystallised liability; the assessee had not accepted liability, had not paid, nor made provision in its accounts for the amounts claimed. The disallowance was confirmed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal, at the instance of the assessee, referred the following question of law to the High Court under section 256(1) of the Act:
“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the show-cause notice received from the Central Excise Department cannot be equated with or considered to be a demand notice and thus erred in not allowing the claim of excise duty amounting to Rs. 46,86,431?”
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a show-cause notice served by excise authorities can be equated with or treated as a demand notice for purposes of allowing a deduction under section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, where the assessee maintains accounts on the mercantile basis.
- Whether the amounts stated in the show-cause notices (relating to accounting years 1976-77, 1977-78 and 1978-79) constituted an accrued liability in the relevant previous year so as to be deductible, as opposed to being mere contingent liabilities.
Arguments of the Parties
Assessee's Arguments
- Because the show-cause notices were received during the relevant previous year and the assessee keeps accounts on the mercantile basis, the assessee was entitled to deduct the amount mentioned in those notices as an accrued liability.
- It was not relevant that no order rejecting the cause shown had been passed by the excise authorities; the mere existence of the notice received in the accounting year sufficed for deduction under mercantile accounting.
- Relied on the Supreme Court decision in Kedamath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. CIT, [1971] 82 ITR 363, to support the proposition that deduction cannot be denied merely because the assessee disputes the liability.
Revenue's Arguments
- The Income-tax Officer was justified in disallowing the claim because no liability had actually arisen: the assessee neither incurred nor admitted any liability in pursuance of the show-cause notices and had made no payment or provision.
- The notices served on the assessee were only show-cause notices and not demand notices; a show-cause notice does not have the effect of creating an accrued liability.
- The amounts related to more than one accounting year (1976-77 and 1977-78 in addition to 1978-79) and so could not be treated as a liability accruing in the relevant previous year for deduction purposes.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Indian Molasses Co. (P.) Ltd. v. CIT, [1959] 37 ITR 66 (SC) | Distinction between a present liability (liability in praesenti) which is deductible and a liability de futuro or contingent liability which is not deductible even under the mercantile system of accounting. | The Court relied on this principle to hold that contingent liabilities cannot be treated as deductible expenditure; the key question is whether a present liability had actually accrued. |
| Kedamath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. CIT, [1971] 82 ITR 363 (SC) | Where liability clearly exists under statute (or a demand of tax/duty is served), deduction cannot be denied merely because the assessee disputes the liability; an accrued statutory liability is deductible under mercantile accounting. | The Court distinguished Kedamath on the facts: in Kedamath there was a statutory liability/demand; in the present case there was no such statutory/demanded liability, only show-cause notices and an express treatment by the assessee as a contingent liability. |
| Pope the Kingh Match Factory v. CIT, [1963] 50 ITR 495 (Madras High Court) | Where a demand for excise duty was served, the assessee incurred an enforceable legal liability from the date of the demand, and debiting the amount in accounts on mercantile basis was appropriate even though the assessee was contesting the demand by appeal. | The Court noted that this decision (approved by the Supreme Court in Kedamath) is not applicable here because in the present case no demand was served and there was no enforceable legal liability; hence the ratio does not support the assessee's claim. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by stating the settled legal principle that only expenditure representing an actual liability existing in the year of account is deductible for income-tax purposes; contingent liabilities are not deductible even under the mercantile system. Relying on Indian Molasses, the court emphasised the distinction between a present liability (liability in praesenti) and a liability de futuro (contingent), and indicated that the central question is whether a present liability had accrued, to be decided by taking all circumstances into account.
The court recognised exceptions where liability "clearly exists under a statute" or where a demand of tax/duty is served on an assessee keeping mercantile accounts — in such cases the amount demanded would be deductible as an accrued liability even if the assessee objects, subject to any statutory provision to the contrary (the court referred to the later insertion of section 43B by way of example of such a statutory provision, though that insertion post-dates the facts here and was noted only by way of illustration).
Applying those principles to the present facts, the court found that:
- There was no actual liability in praesenti: no demand was raised against the assessee by the excise authorities; only a show-cause notice had been served.
- The assessee did not admit any liability and had actively shown cause refuting the excise allegations; the assessee itself treated the amount as a "contingent liability" in its accounts.
- Given the absence of a demand or any enforceable statutory liability, the amounts could only be contingent and might or might not arise; therefore they could not constitute deductible expenditure for income-tax purposes.
- The precedents relied upon by the assessee (Kedamath and the Madras High Court decision in Pope the Kingh Match Factory) were distinguished on the ground that in those cases there was a statutory or enforceable demand/ liability; their ratios did not apply to the present factual matrix where no demand or statutory liability existed.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The court answered the referred question in the affirmative and held in favour of the Revenue: the Tribunal was right in holding that a show-cause notice cannot be equated with or treated as a demand notice so as to permit deduction of the amounts in question.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The assessee's claim to deduct the excise duty amounts shown in the show-cause-cum-demand notices was disallowed; the decision of the Income-tax Officer, confirmed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and the Tribunal, is upheld.
- The reference under section 256(1) is disposed of accordingly, and the court made no order as to costs.
Broader implications: The court did not purport to create a new legal precedent; it applied established principles distinguishing present (accrued) liabilities from contingent liabilities and limited the application of precedents (such as Kedamath and the Madras High Court decision) to their factual contexts where statutory or demand-based liabilities existed.
Dr. B.P Saraf, J.:— By this reference under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, at the instance of the assessee, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has referred the following question of law to this court for opinion:
“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the show-cause notice received from the Central Excise Department cannot be equated with or considered to be a demand notice and thus erred in not allowing the claim of excise duty amounting to Rs. 46,86,431?”
2. The assessee is a limited company engaged in the business of manufacturing textiles. This reference pertains to the assessment year 1979- 80, the relevant previous year being the financial year ending on March 31, 1979. In its return of income for the above assessment year under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short “the Act”), the assessee claimed deduction of a sum of Rs. 46,86,431 on account of excise duty on the basis of show-cause-cum-demand notices for the years 1976-77, 1977-78 and 1978-79 received by the assessee during the relevant previous year from the excise authorities. The assessee replied to the show cause and denied any liability on account of excise duty as alleged in the show-cause notice. No order was passed by the concerned excise authorities rejecting the above claim of the assessee and/or demanding any amount in pursuance of the above show-cause notice. Nothing was paid by the assessee in pursuance of the above show-cause notices, nor any provision was made for the same in the accounts of the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration.
3. The amount of excise duty mentioned in the show-cause notice was however shown by the assessee by way of a note in the balance-sheet and profit and loss account as “contingent liabilities representing the disputed amount of central excise”. On the basis of the above, the assessee claimed deduction of the amount mentioned in the show-cause notices in the computation of its income as “excise duty liability” under section 37 of the Act. The Income-tax Officer, first of all noticed that the amount stated in the show-cause notice, for which deduction had been claimed, did not relate only to the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, but also to two earlier assessment years. The bifurcation of the amount specified in the show-cause notices yearwise is as follows:
Accounting year Amount demanded (Rs.) 1976- 77 2,32,891.20 1977- 78 25,91,480.40 1978- 79 18,62,059.50 (current year) Total 46,86,451.10
4. The Income-tax Officer found that the show-cause notice did not create any liability against the assessee. According to him, in the instant case, neither was there a crystallised liability nor had the assessee accepted any part of it. The Income-tax Officer also noticed that the assessee had neither made any payment in pursuance of the show-cause notice nor made any provision for the same or any part thereof in its accounts for the relevant previous year because, according to the assessee itself, it was not liable to pay any amount as excise duty as alleged in the show-cause notices. The assessee accordingly denied the same. As earlier stated, neither was the cause shown by the assessee rejected by the excise authorities nor was any demand made on the assessee after the assessee showed cause. The Income-tax Officer, therefore rejected the claim of the assessee for deduction of the above amount under section 37 of the Act as excise duty liability. The appeal of the assessee against the above disallowance was rejected both by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal. Hence, this reference under section 256(1) of the Act at the instance of the assessee.
5. We have heard learned counsel for the assessee who submits that the show-cause notices having been received by the assessee in the year under consideration, the assessee was entitled to claim deduction for the amount mentioned therein as it was maintaining its account on the mercantile basis. According to learned counsel for the assessee, the fact that no order had been passed by the concerned authorities rejecting the cause shown by the assessee was not relevant in determining the allowability of deduction on account thereof. Reliance is placed in support of this contention on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kedamath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. CIT, [1971] 82 ITR 363. Learned counsel for the Revenue, on the other hand, submits that the Income-tax Officer was fully justified in this case in disallowing the claim of the assessee for deduction of the above amount as a liability on account of excise duty and the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal were justified in confirming the order of the Income-tax Officer. Learned counsel for the Revenue pointed out to us that in the instant case neither the assessee incurred any liability in pursuance of the show-cause notices nor any provision was made by the assessee for the same or any part thereof in its accounts in the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration. According to learned counsel, it is a case where merely a notice had been issued to the assessee to show cause as to why the amount mentioned therein should not be held to be due from the assessee. It was not a demand notice which could have the effect of accrual of liability. In such a situation, it is contended that no liability accrued at all for which deduction could be claimed. It was further submitted that the show-cause notices pertain not only to the year under consideration, but also to two earlier previous years. It was, therefore, contended that the assessee is not entitled to claim deduction on account of liability which did not even arise or accrue.
6. We have carefully considered the rival submissions. Law is well settled that expenditure which is deductible for income-tax purpose is towards a liability actually existing in the year of account. Contingent liabilities do not constitute expenditure and cannot be the subject-matter of deduction even under the mercantile system of accounting. The income-tax law makes a distinction between the actual liability in praesenti and a liability de futuro which, for the time being, is only contingent. The former is deductible but not the latter, (see Indian Molasses Co. (P.) Ltd. v. CIT, [1959] 37 ITR 66 (SC)). The question to be decided in each case, therefore, is whether any present liability has accrued against the assessee which has to be decided by taking into account all the circumstances of the case. There may also be cases where the liability clearly exists under a statute. In such a case, as held by the Supreme Court in Kedamath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. CIT, [1971] 82 ITR 363, deduction cannot be denied on the ground that the assessee is disputing the liability. Similarly, where a demand of tax or duty is served on the assessee maintaining the mercantile system of accounting in the accounting year, the amount so demanded would be deductible as an accrued liability even though the assessee objects to it and seeks to get the order of the concerned authority reversed, subject, however, to any statutory provision to the contrary (viz., section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as inserted by the Finance Act, 1983, with effect from April 1, 1984, which provides that certain liabilities can be deducted only on actual payment).
7. In the instant case, there was no actual liability in praesenti. No demand was raised against the assessee of any amount. What was served on the assessee by the Collector was merely a show-cause notice. The assessee did not admit any liability and showed cause refuting the allegations made in the show-cause notice. Even according to the assessee there was no accrued liability. The assessee itself regarded it as a “contingent liability”, which is evident from the fact that the amount of excise duty mentioned in the show-cause notice was shown by the assessee in its profit and loss account and balance-sheet by way of a note as “contingent liability representing the disputed amount of central excise”. Obviously, there was no liability actually existing against the assessee in the year of account. It was merely a contingent liability, which might or might not arise. That being so, the amount in question cannot constitute expenditure for the purposes of income-tax.
8. In so far as the decision of the Supreme Court in Kedamath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. CIT, [1971] 82 ITR 363, is concerned, the ratio of the above decision has no application to the facts of the present case. That was a case where liability clearly existed under the statute. The claim of the assessee for deduction of the amount of sales tax was rejected on the ground that the assessee had taken proceedings before the higher authorities for getting it reduced or wiped out. It was in this context that the Supreme Court observed (page 366):
“It is not possible to comprehend how the liability would cease to be one because the assessee had taken proceedings before higher authorities for getting it reduced or wiped out so long as the contention of the assessee did not prevail with regard to the quantum of liability, etc. An assessee who follows the mercantile system of accounting is entitled to deduct from the profits and gains of the business such liability which had accrued during the period for which the profits and gains were being computed. It can again not be disputed that the liability to payment of sales tax had accrued during the year of assessment even though it had to be discharged at a future date.”
9. We have also perused the decision of the Madras High Court in Pope the Kingh Match Factory v. CIT, [1963] 50 ITR 495, which was referred to with approval by the Supreme Court in the above case. In that case also, a demand for excise duty was served on the assessee and though he was objecting to it and seeking to get the order of the Collector of Excise reversed, he debited the amount in his accounts on the last day of his accounting year and claimed that amount as a deductible amount on the ground that he was keeping his accounts on the mercantile basis. The Madras High Court held that the assessee had incurred an enforceable legal liability on and from the date on which he received the Collector's demand for payment and that his endeavour to get out of that liability by preferring appeals could not in any way detract from or retard the efficacy of the liability which had been imposed upon him by the competent excise authority. The Supreme Court held that the above decision laid down the law correctly. Obviously, the ratio of the above decision is not applicable to the present case. The facts of the present case are completely different. In this case, there was neither a statutory liability nor any enforceable legal liability. In fact, there was no liability at all. Even if there was a liability, it was a purely contingent liability which is not deductible for income-tax purposes.
10. In view of the above, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue.
11. The reference is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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