S.N Variava, J.:— At this ad-intcrim stage Mr. Tulzapurkar restricts his relief to prayer (a). At this stage, relief on basis of infringement is not applied for.

2. Plaintiffs are registered owners of trade marks “BEPLEX” and “BEPLEX-ZEE”. They have a large sale of products under these marks. In 1968 defendants started using mark “LEEPLEX” for vitamin tablets. Plaintiffs filed suit No. 12 of 1968 in the District Court at Poona. Same was dismissed on 24th March 1970. However in First Appeal no. 472 of 1970 by a detailed Judgement it was held that “LEEPLEX” was deceptively similar and defendants were restrained from using it. It must be mentioned that defendants did not appear at the hearing of the First Appeal because as Mr. Kadam puts it defendants had on their own discontinued using the mark “LEEPLEX”. Fact remains that this shows that defendants had knowledge of plaintiffs' marks and that the two marks were deceptively similar even according to the defendants.

3. In 1994 on Yash Pharma Laboratories Private Limited adopted mark “ZEEPLEX”. Plaintiffs filed Suit No. 1351 of 1994 in this Court. By Order dated 10th August 1994 in notice of motion No. 1003 of 1994 it is held that this mark is deceptively similar to plaintiffs' mark and an injunction preventing Yash Pharma Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. from using the mark “ZEEPLEX” is granted.

4. Defendants having failed in their effort to use mark “LEEPLEX” adopted mark “ZEEPLEX”. They have this mark registered in 1995. Plaintiffs having come to know of it in 1995 filed an application for rectification of Register. That application is pending. Plaintiffs have then filed this Suit.

5. As stated earlier, by an order dated 10th August 1994 in notice of motion No. 1003 of 1994 in Suit no. 1351 of 1994 one of the Judges of this Court has already come to the conclusion that the mark “ZEEPLEX” is deceptively similar to plaintiffs' mark. I am in agreement with the view.

6. Mr. Kadam submitted that earlier decisions about “LEEPLEX” and “ZEEPLEX” being dcceptively similar were given at a time when the word “PLEX” was not so common. Mr. Kadam submits that now there are a large number of vitamin tablets in the market with the suffix “PLEX”. He submits that this suffix has now become common to the trade. He submits that once this is common to the trade, then automatically attention is drawn to the un-common parts in the two marks. He submits that thus there would be no deception. In support of this, he relies on the decision of Supreme Court in the case of F. Hoffmann La Roche & Co. Ltd. v. Geoffrey Manners and Co. Private Ltd. . 1969 2 SCC 716.

7. There can be no dispute as to the proposition of law. However, the decision in F. Hoffmann's ease was based on evidence showing that all the 57 concerned marks had extensive users. At this stage, no such evidence has been brought before this Court. Also, as stated above, in this case it is very clear that the marks, if taken as a whole are deceptively similar. Further the Order dated 10th August 1994 in notice of motion No. 1003 of 1994 in Suit No. 1351 of 1994 has been passed in 1994. By this time also “PLEX” would have been common in trade, if at all it is common as claimed. Further, as is being set out hereafter, prima facie at least the adoption by defendants of the mark “ZEEPLEX” does not appear to be honest.

8. In this behalf Mr. Kadam submitted that defendants adopted the mark “ZEEPLEX” by combining “ZEE” for Zinc and “PLEX” from B-Complex. He submitted that adoption was honest. This submission ignores the fact that defendants knew that plaintiffs are owner of “BEPLEX” and “BEPLEX-ZEE”. They failed in their attempt to use “LEEPLEX” Conveniently they now adopt “ZEEPLEX”. At this prima facie stage the adoption does not appear to be honest.

9. Mr. Kadam next relied on Judgment in the case of P.M Diesels Private Limited…Plaintiff; v. Thukral Mechanical Works…Defendant. . AIR 1988 Delhi 282., he submitted that particularly at this ad interim stage, Court must take into account the fact that defendant's mark is registered. He strongly relied upon para 8 of this judgment which reads as follows:—

In order to appreciate the aforesaid question, it is pertinent to note that before trade mark is registered by the trade mark authorities elaborate procedure has been provided. Procedure, inter alia, requires application for registration of the trade mark being made, the application being advertised, objections, if any being invited and decided and then registration granted: In the present case all these formalities presumably, must have been undertaken prior to the grant of registration in 1965 in the name of Puran Chand Jain and Kailash Chand Jain of Agra. At that time, according to the averments of the plaintiffs, they were manufacturing centrifugal pumps bearing the trade mark “Field Marshal”. The plaintiffs, admittedly, did not raise any objection before the Trade Marks Registry against the proposed grant of registration of the mark “Field Marshal” in respect of the centrifugal pumps in favour of Puran Chand Jain and Kailash Chand Jain. It may be that, as sought to be contended by learned counsel for the plaintiff, non-raising of such an objection before the Trade Marks Registry does not preclude the plaintiffs from applying to this court for rectification of the register, but the non-filing of any objections before the Trade Marks Registry is certainly a circumstance which would be relevant while considering the request of the plaintiff for the grant of a temporary injunction against a registered proprietor of the trade mark.”

10. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court had occasion to consider the above judgment. In the case of N.R Dongre & Ors. v. Whirlpool Corp. & Anr . 1996 PTC 476, the Division Bench has disagreed with the views expressed by the Learned Single Judge. This on the ground that Section 27 of the Trade Marks Act was neither considered not noticed. Also the position is now settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case reported in 1996 PTC page 583. In this case the Supreme Court has negatived a contention that no interlocutory injunction should be passed in a passing off action against a registered owner. The decision of the Supreme Court would be binding. Not possible to accept Mr. Kadam's submission that the position was conceded before the Supreme Court. Even otherwise an Obiter of the Supreme Court is also binding.

11. Relying on the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Kaviraj Pandit Durgct Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories . AIR 1965 SC 980. Mr. Kadam submitted that if the packings, in which the goods of two parties are vended, are different by reason of colour, get up and other features then no relief should be granted at the ad interim stage. He also relied upon a passage in Narayanan's “Trade Marks” 4th Ed. Pg. 525 para 25-38 and submitted that in this case the prices are also different. He submitted that defendants charges Rs. 14 for a strip whilst plaintiffs charge Rs. 10.14 per strip. He submitted that all this would ensure that there was no passing off.

12. I have seen the packings. Undoubtedly the colours are different. However, that by itself or coupled with fact that the price is slightly higher would not enable the users of such products to so distinguish as suggested by Mr. Kadam. Plaintiffs have built up a large reputation as indicated by their sales figures. Defendants' packings have displayed in bold letters the words “ZEEPLEX” wherein everything else including their name is in small, unreadable letters. As the mark “ZEEPLEX” is deceptively similar, most people would be deceived and will automatically assume that this is plaintiffs product. Also at the cost of repetition it may be mentioned that defendants have adopted the mark with full knowledge of plaintiff s mark.

13. Mr. Kadam next relied upon the Judgment of Supreme Court reported in 1990 Supp SCC 727 wherein it is held as follows:

“Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at a stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. The Court, at this stage, acts on certain well settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory remedy which is both temporary and discretionary. The object of the interlocutory injunction, it is stated:

……………is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his rights for which he could not adequately be compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The Court must weigh one need against another and determine where the balance of convenience lies.

The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status quo, the rights of parties which may appear on a prima facia case. The Court also, in restraining a defendant from exercising what he considers has legal right but what the plaintiff would like to be prevented, puts into the scales, as a relevant consideration, whether the defendant has yet to commence his enterprise or whether he has already been doing so in which latter case considerations somewhat different from those that apply to a case where the defendant is yet to commence his enterprise, are attracted.”

Mr. Kadam also relied upon an un-reported judgment of Supreme Court dated 15th May 1992 in the case of Ciha Geigy Ltd. v. Sun Pharmaceutical Ltd. . Unreported Judgment of SC dated 15.5.1992, wherein it is held that if damages are an adequate remedy then an injunction should not be granted.

14. Relying on above two judgments Mr. Kadam submitted that defendants have been selling their tablets under the name “ZEEPLEX” since 1987. He submitted that there has been no instance of deception. He submitted that defendants have built up voluminous trade in this product. He submitted that if plaintiffs ultimately succeed then they can be compensated in damages. He submitted that at this ad interim stage defendants should not be injuncted and their trade stopped as it would result in loss to the defendants.

15. There can be no dispute with the propositions of law. However now sad as it is, the reality is that notices of motion do not reach hearing for years. If therefore at the ad interim stage itself the Court is even prima facie satisfied that the marks are deceptively similar and that the adoption is dishonest, not to grant relief would amount to encouraging dishonest parties to use laws delays. If an injunction were to be refused defendants would continue to use the deceptively similar mark and the loss caused to plaintiffs would be irreparable. Also defendants have only disclosed figures showing sales from 1995. This inspite of plaintiffs calling upon them to show figures of earlier sales. No figures of advertisement costs are shown. In my view, this is a fit case where ad interim relief must be granted.

16. Accordingly, there will be an ad interim Order in terms of prayer (a).

17. Clarified that all the above are prima facie observations. Mr. Kadam applies for stay of Order for 4 weeks.

18. Mr. Tulzapurkar opposes. He submits that as the Court has given a finding that adoption is dishonest and as figures of earlier user are not given, no stay should be granted. In my view, defendants must be given an opportunity to have this Order tested. The Order is stayed for 4 weeks. Defendants to file in a sealed cover accounts for these four weeks.