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Barrister Prasad v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation, Ltd., And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
These two appeals arise from a common order dated September 29, 1994, passed by a learned Single Judge in two writ petitions—one filed by Bharat Petroleum Corporation, Ltd. (the employer) and the other by Barrister Prasad (the employee). The employee was employed as a security watchman by the employer since November 13, 1980. On June 8, 1981, while on night duty, he was charged with misconduct for allegedly sleeping on duty on two occasions during the night. A chargesheet was issued on August 20, 1981, based on reports from two officers who found him asleep at 1:30 A.M. and 4:30 A.M. The employee initially admitted to sleeping but requested leniency on grounds of illness. An inquiry was held where the employee pleaded not guilty, but on April 6, 1982, he was dismissed based on the inquiry findings.
The employee challenged his dismissal before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, which upheld the disciplinary proceedings as fair. The employee filed a writ petition which was rejected with liberty to raise contentions at the final award stage. The Tribunal's final award held the employee guilty of misconduct under Standing Order 26(1) but ruled that dismissal was not justified, ordering reinstatement with 50% back wages. The employer challenged this order before the Court, leading to the common order under appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Tribunal was justified in taking a lenient view by reducing the punishment from dismissal to reinstatement with partial back wages despite finding the employee guilty of gross misconduct.
- Whether sleeping on duty by a security watchman responsible for guarding a highly inflammable installation constitutes gross misconduct justifying dismissal.
- Whether the Single Judge was correct in upholding the dismissal and rejecting the Tribunal’s leniency.
Arguments of the Parties
Employee's Arguments
- The employee admitted sleeping but requested leniency on the ground of illness and prior intimation to a superior.
- The employee denied guilt during the inquiry despite the chargesheet.
- The employee contended that the misconduct was not severe enough to warrant dismissal.
Employer's Arguments
- The employer argued that sleeping on duty, especially as a watchman guarding a vital installation, was a serious breach of discipline.
- The employer challenged the Tribunal’s lenient order of reinstatement with partial back wages, contending that dismissal was justified.
- The employer supported the Single Judge’s conclusion that no circumstances justified leniency.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed the facts and found that the employee’s role as a security watchman was critical, requiring continuous alertness to safeguard a highly inflammable installation. The Court emphasized that falling asleep on duty was a grave dereliction of responsibility. It noted that the Tribunal’s acceptance of the employee’s explanation of illness was an afterthought not supported by contemporaneous evidence. The Court highlighted that the Tribunal’s finding regarding the employee’s alertness at 2:00 A.M. was not based on evidence and contradicted by the fact that the employee was found sleeping again at 4:00 A.M. without waking up when disturbed.
The Court agreed with the Single Judge’s conclusion that the employee’s conduct amounted to gross misconduct rather than a minor misdemeanour. It held that once gross misconduct was established, the Tribunal should have exercised its discretion judicially and not taken a lenient view. The Court found no infirmity in the Single Judge’s order dismissing the employee’s challenge and upheld the dismissal as justified and not harsh in the circumstances.
Holding and Implications
The appeals are dismissed.
The Court upheld the dismissal of the employee for sleeping on duty, affirming that such conduct in a critical security role constitutes gross misconduct justifying termination. The decision directly affects the parties by confirming the employer’s disciplinary action and rejecting the employee’s reinstatement with back wages as ordered by the Tribunal. No new legal precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles regarding misconduct and disciplinary discretion.
By the Court:— These two appeals arise out of common order passed by the learned Judge on September 29, 1994. This common order was given by the learned Single Judge in two writ petitions, one of which was filed by the employer — Bharat Petroleum Corporation, Ltd., vide Writ Petition No. 3613 of 1991, and the another petition was filed by the Barrister Prasad, the employee, vide Writ Petition No. 3669 of 1991.
2. Both the above mentioned writ petitions came to be filed before the learned Single Judge, in the background of following circumstances:
The Barrister Prasad, hereinafter called the employee, was employed by B.P.C.L (Bharat Petroleum Corporation, Ltd.), hereinafter called as the Employer, as a security watchman in their installation in Bombay. The employee was Ex. Military-man. He was employed on November 13, 1980. He was on night duty (night duty-third shift), on June 8, 1981. The Deputy Manager, Operations, Sewree, issued a chargesheet against him, dated August 20, 1981, alleging that on the material night he was found sleeping while on duty on two occasions, firstly at 1.30 A.M by operations officer Sri Alurkar, and again around at 4.30 A.M by Havildar Sri Pilankar. The charge that was levelled against the employee was that he committed an act of misconduct subversive of discipline. This chargesheet was issued after obtaining an explanation from the employee, dated June 10, 1989, in which the employee allegedly admitted that it was true that he was found sleeping on two occasions, but, requested the authority to take lenient view on the ground that he was running temperature at the material time and had given prior intimation thereof to the Havildar. The employer appointed an enquiry officer for holding the enquiry, during which the employee pleaded not guilty to the charge. Witnesses were examined in enquiry and thereafter on the basis of findings of the enquiry officer, the employee was ordered to be dismissed from service by order, dated April 6, 1982. The employee thereafter raised the dispute regarding dismissal, and the same was referred by the Central Government to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal 1 at Bombay. The Tribunal, however, negatived all the contentions regarding the fairness and propriety of the disciplinary proceedings and held that the proceedings were not bad or were not vitiated for any reasons.
3. Being aggrieved by the award Part I, employee filed Writ Petition No. 3609 of 1990, before this Court, but the same was rejected, after granting liberty to the parties to raise all their contentions at the time of final award. The Tribunal passed award Part II on May 1, 1991, and came to the conclusion that an act of the workman/employee was the misconduct under the Standing Order 26(1) and not merely a minor misdemeanour under the Standing Order 28(k).
4. Ultimately the Tribunal upheld the finding of the disciplinary authority that the workman had committed an act subversive of discipline. On the aspect of punishment, the Tribunal, however, found that the order of dismissal was wrong and unjustified and ordered that the workman/employee be reinstated and given 50 per cent of the back-wages. Being aggrieved by this order, the Corporation filed petition before this Court. All the petitions were decided by common order of Justice Sri Tipnis on September 29, 1994, and these two appeals have been filed against the said order.
5. We heard the learned counsel for the employee Sri Anand Grover, and the learned counsel for the Corporation at length. Admittedly, the job of employee as a watchman was a responsible job requiring continuous alertness on the part of the employee. He was to look after the safety of the installation of the Corporation where highly inflammable material like petrol was stored. If a watchman during the night hours fell asleep disregarding the responsibilities, then, the same could have disastrous effect on the safety and security of the installation. There cannot be any doubt about this, and therefore in the background of this case, the question is whether the Tribunal was justified in taking the lenient view in the matter. The Single Judge has rightly come to the conclusion that there were no circumstances in the case to justify taking lenient view. The perusal of the Tribunal's order shows that the Tribunal accepted the explanation of the employee that he was unwell on the night concerned, and that Sri Pilankar found that the employee was alert at 2.00 A.M this second finding of the Tribunal is not based on evidence. There is nothing in the evidence of Sri Pilankar that at 2.00 A.M the employee was found alert. To the contrary, there is an evidence that at 4.00 A.M the employee was again found sleeping and he did not even wake-up when his stick was removed.
6. Similarly, the explanation given by the employee after two days of the incident, that he was unwell on the night concerned, is in fact, an after-thought because the same was not given by the employee when he gave his first statement.
7. The finding of the learned Single Judge that the conduct of the employee, namely, sleeping on duty at night when he was supposed to guard a very vital installation, was unpardonable, cannot be said to be improper or unjust or harsh in the circumstances of the case. It was undoubtedly therefore a gross misconduct and not a misdemeanour. Similarly, the finding of the learned Single Judge that the Tribunal did not exercise its discretion judicially, is well founded because once the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the employee was guilty of gross misconduct, then, the Tribunal should not have taken a lenient view.
8. Considering the above, we do not find any reasons to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge. There are no infirmities in the said order. Both the appeals are therefore devoid of any merits are liable to be dismissed. Hence, the following order:
9. Both the appeals are dismissed. No costs.
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