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Union Of India v. M/S. Anand Builders
Structured Summary of the Court Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner is the Union of India (Railway Administration). The respondent is the contractor awarded a contract by Contract Agreement No. C & S/482 dated 11th February, 1981 for construction of sub-structure works (abutments, piles, bed block) for a Road Over Bridge in lieu of level crossing No. 17 at Mahim (the said work). The original completion date was 26th November, 1981, extended to 15th September, 1982, and the work was completed on 15th September, 1982.
Disputes arose between the parties. The respondent demanded arbitration but the Railway declined reference, so the respondent instituted an Arbitration Suit in this Court under section 20 of The Arbitration Act, 1940 to have the arbitration agreement filed and for a reference to arbitration. By an order dated 7th January, 1988 the Court disposed of that suit and directions led to appointment of joint arbitrators by the General Manager, Western Railway by reference letters dated 30th March, 1988 and 20th February, 1989.
Delay in proceeding with the reference led the respondent to file Arbitration Petition No. 81 of 1991 seeking removal of those arbitrators. By an order (recorded in the opinion as dated 30th November, 1984) in Arbitration Petition No. 81 of 1991, the joint arbitrators were removed and S.C. Pandian was appointed Sole Arbitrator, with a direction to make the Award within four months of entering upon the reference. The Sole Arbitrator made an Award which the opinion identifies as dated 7th June, 1995 and filed in this Court as “Award No. 209 of 1995” (hereafter, the said Award).
The petitioner challenged the Award only to the extent that the Sole Arbitrator awarded interest at the rate of 8% per annum from 30th March, 1988 on a principal sum of Rs. 1,52,052/- until the date of decree or payment whichever is earlier. The petitioner contended that Clause 16(3) of the contract prohibited payment of interest on amounts payable to the contractor and that the arbitrator had thus acted beyond the contract terms. The respondent defended the Award and the grant of pendente lite interest.
Note: the opinion contains an internal inconsistency in dates — the Award is earlier identified as dated 7th June, 1995 (filed as Award No. 209 of 1995) while a later paragraph refers to an Award dated 7th June, 1985. The summary follows the dates as they appear in the opinion without attempting to resolve the inconsistency.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Sole Arbitrator acted beyond his jurisdiction or in breach of the express terms of the contract by awarding interest pendente lite (post-reference interest) from 30th March, 1988 on the adjudged principal sum.
- Whether Clause 16(3) of the General Conditions of Contract, which states that no interest is payable upon the earnest money, security deposit or amounts payable to the contractor under the contract, prohibits the arbitrator from awarding interest pendente lite.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (Ms. Shah)
- The Sole Arbitrator failed to appreciate documentary evidence and the contract terms (including special conditions) and therefore exceeded the contract in awarding interest from 30th March, 1988.
- Clause 16(3) expressly provides that no interest is payable on earnest money, security deposit or amounts payable to the contractor under the contract; this clause prohibits the grant of interest and the arbitrator could not have awarded interest contrary to that express prohibition.
- Relied upon the Supreme Court decision in Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa v. G.C. Roy ((1992) 1 SCC 508 : AIR 1992 SC 732) in support of the contention that the arbitrator cannot award interest contrary to express contractual prohibition.
Respondent's Arguments (Mr. Kamdar)
- The Sole Arbitrator correctly awarded pendente lite interest from 30th March, 1988 because Clause 16(3) did not fall within the ambit of a prohibition against an arbitrator awarding pendente lite interest.
- The arbitrator did not ignore the contract nor travel beyond its terms by awarding such interest; rather, the arbitrator exercised jurisdiction to decide claims including interest.
- Relied upon the Supreme Court decision in Board of Trustees for the Port of Calcutta v. Engineers-De-Space-Age (reported in (1996) 1 S.C. Cases 516) to support the position that a clause prohibiting the contracting authority from entertaining interest claims does not necessarily prohibit an arbitrator from awarding pendente lite interest.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa v. G.C. Roy, (1992) 1 SCC 508 : AIR 1992 SC 732 | Held that an arbitrator has the power to award pendente lite interest as compensation for deprivation of money to which a party is entitled; the principle of Section 34 CPC supports this power; arbitrator must decide disputes in accordance with general law and the agreement. | The court relied on the constitutional-bench reasoning in G.C. Roy to confirm that pendente lite interest can be awarded by an arbitrator unless expressly prohibited by the agreement; the opinion quotes and follows the principle that arbitrators may award interest pendente lite to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and to do complete justice. |
| Board Of Trustees For The Port Of Calcutta v. Engineers-De-Space-Age, (1996) 1 S.C. Cases 516 | Considered whether a clause prohibiting the contracting authority from entertaining claims for interest prevents an arbitrator from awarding pendente lite interest; held that such a clause did not prohibit the arbitrator from awarding interest pendente lite. | The court applied the reasoning of this case by analogy to Clause 16(3) of the present contract, concluding that Clause 16(3) did not prevent the arbitrator from awarding pendente lite interest and therefore the Award was not invalid for that reason. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeds in several steps, grounded in the Award and the cited Supreme Court authorities:
- Characterisation of Award: The Award was non-speaking and awarded the respondent interest at 8% per annum from 30th March, 1988 on the adjudged principal of Rs. 1,52,052/-, until decree or payment. The arbitrator awarded interest only for the post-reference (pendente lite) period; there was no award for the pre-reference period.
- Authoritative principle from G.C. Roy: The court recites the G.C. Roy principle that a person deprived of money to which he is entitled has a right to be compensated for that deprivation — by whatever name — and that this principle applies to the period the dispute is pending before the arbitrator. The court emphasises that an arbitrator is an alternative forum and must be able to decide all disputes, including pendente lite interest, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.
- Discretion and implied terms: The court notes the established principle (as explained in the decisions) that where the agreement does not prohibit a claim for interest, it is reasonable to infer that interest is an implied term and the arbitrator has the power to award pendente lite interest. Even where not compulsory, awarding interest pendente lite is within the arbitrator's discretion to be exercised in light of all facts and the ends of justice.
- Construction of Clause 16(3): The court strictly construes Clause 16(3), which provides that "No interest will be payable upon the earnest money and the security deposit or amounts payable to the contractor under the contract, but Government securities ... will be repayable with interest accrued thereon." The court concludes that this clause, strictly read, prohibits the Railway Authority from paying interest on earnest money, security deposit or amounts payable under the contract, but it does not stifle or oust the arbitrator's discretion to consider and award pendente lite interest once the matter is referred.
- Application of Board of Trustees decision: The court draws directly on the Board of Trustees decision where a clause prohibiting the Commissioners from entertaining interest claims did not prevent the arbitrator from awarding interest pendente lite. The court finds the reasoning there analogous and persuasive for drawing the same conclusion in the present case.
- Jurisdictional point: Even if the meaning and effect of Clause 16(3) were disputed, that dispute fell within the arbitrator's jurisdiction to interpret the clause. Thus, it cannot be said the Sole Arbitrator wandered beyond the contract or denied himself jurisdiction by deciding the issue of pendente lite interest.
On these bases, the court found no infirmity in the Sole Arbitrator's grant of pendente lite interest and rejected the petitioner's challenge.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The petition challenging Award No. 209 of 1995 is dismissed; the Award is upheld and a decree is passed in terms of the Award.
Direct consequences and orders:
- The petition to set aside the Award insofar as it awards interest from 30th March, 1988 was dismissed.
- There shall be no order as to costs of the petition.
- Pursuant to the respondent's application and rule 787(5) as applicable on the Court's Original Side, the respondent is entitled to a decree in terms of the Award dated 7th June (the opinion contains both 1995 and 1985 dates at different places); the Court passed judgment and decree accordingly.
- The petitioner is ordered and decreed to pay further interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the principal sum of Rs. 1,52,052/- from the date of the Court's order until payment or realisation, whichever is earlier.
Broader implications:
The opinion applies established Supreme Court principles (notably G.C. Roy and Board of Trustees) that an arbitrator generally has the power to award pendente lite interest unless the agreement expressly and unambiguously prohibits such an award. The court did not purport to lay down a novel principle; it followed existing authority and applied it to the contractual clause in issue. Accordingly, the decision upholds the arbitrator's discretion to award pendente lite interest in circumstances where the contract's prohibition does not expressly or effectively bar the arbitrator from so doing.
End of summary.
S.M Jhunjhunuwala, J.:— By this petition, the petitioner Union of India seeks to have the Award dated 7th June, 1995 filed in this Court and numbered as ‘Award No. 209 of 1995’ set aside.
2. The work of construction of sub-structure such as Abutments, Piles, Bed Block of proposed Road Over Bridge in lieu of level crossing No. 17 at Mahim (for short, ‘the said work’) was awarded to the respondent on the terms and conditions mentioned in Contract Agreement No. C & S/482 dated 11th February, 1981. Though the stipulated date for completion of the said work was 26th November, 1981, it was extended upto 15th September, 1982. The said work completed on 15th September, 1982. In respect of the said work executed by the respondent, the disputes and differences arose by and between the petitioner and the respondent and in view of existence of arbitration agreement by and between the parties, the respondent demanded reference thereof to arbitration. However, the Railway Administration declined to make reference to arbitration. The respondent, therefore, filed an Arbitration Suit in thus Court under section 20 of The Arbitration Act, 1940 (for short, ‘the Act’) for filing the arbitration agreement in Court and for order of reference to arbitration in accordance therewith. By an order passed on 7th January, 1988, the said Arbitration Suit was disposed of and pursuant to the directions of this Court, the general Mapper, Western Railway appointed one G. Rammohan, Chief Engineer (Survey), Western Railway and one Smt. Sunita Awasthi, Financial Adviser and Chief Accounts Officer (WST) as joint arbitrators vide reference letters dated 30th March, 1988 and 20th February, 1989. Since delay was caused in proceeding with the reference, the respondent filed Arbitration Petition No. 81 of 1991 in this Court for removal of the said arbitrators and appointment of another arbitrator in place thereof. By the order dated 30th November, 1984 passed by this Court in the said Arbitration Petition No. 81 of 1991, the said G. Rammohan and Smt. Sunita Awasthi were removed as arbitrators and one S.C Pandian, Chief Engineer (TP), Central Railway was appointed as the Sole Arbitrator in their place. The Court directed the Arbitrator to make the Award within four months from the date of entering upon the reference. The Sole Arbitrator has made the Award on 7th June, 1995 which has been filed in this Court and numbered as ‘Award No. 209 of 1995’ (for short, ‘the said Award’). By this petition, the petitioner has challenged the said Award only to the extent of award of interest by the Sole Arbitrator from 30th March, 1988 till the date of the decree of the Court or payment by the petitioner, which ever is earlier. Ms. Shah, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, has submitted that the Sole Arbitrator failed to appreciate documentary evidence on record as well as terms and conditions of the said contract including the special conditions thereof and while awarding interest as awarded, travelled beyond such terms and conditions and as such, the said Award pertaining to the interest awarded with effect from 30th March, 1988 being bad in law is liable to be set aside. Ms. Shah further submitted that Clause 16(3) of the terms and conditions of the said contract specifically provided that no interest would be payable by the petitioner upon the earnest money and the security deposit or amounts payable to the respondent under the Contract and in view of specific prohibition for grant of interest as contained in Clause 16(3), the Sole-Arbitrator could not have awarded interest to the respondent and since the interest has been awarded in contravention and/or breach of the express term of the Contract, the said Award to that extent is bad in law. In support of her submission, Ms. Shah has put reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa v. G.C Roy)1, reported in (1992) 1 SCC 508 : A.I.R 1992 S.C 732.
3. Mr. Kamdar, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, has supported the said Award and submitted that the Sole Arbitrator has rightly awarded interest pendente lite from 30th March, 1988 since awarding of such interest by the Sole - Arbitrator did not fall within the ambit and scope of said Clause 16(3) of the General Conditions of Contract forming part of the terms and conditions of the said contract and as such, the Sole Arbitrator has neither ignored the express terms and conditions of the said Contract nor travelled beyond the same nor acted in contravention or breach thereof. In support of his submission, Mr. Kamdar has put reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Board Of Trustees For The Port Of Calcutta v. Engineers-De-Space-Age)2, reported in (1996) 1 S.C Cases 516.
4. The said Award is non-speaking award. The Sole Arbitrator has awarded respondent's claim for interest at the rate of 8% per annum from 30th March, 1988 on the principal sum of Rs. 1,52,052/- adjudged as payable by the petitioner to the respondent. Such interest has been awarded till the date of decree of the Competent Court or payment by the petitioner whichever is earlier. In view of the appointment of the arbitrators by the General - Manager, Western Railway vide the above referred reference letters dated 30th March, 1988 and 20th February, 1989, there is no doubt that the Sole Arbitrator did not award any interest for pre-reference period but has awarded pendente lite interest i.e for post reference period only. Even in the case of G.C Roy, on which reliance has been placed by Ms. Shah, the Supreme Court, white dealing with powers of an arbitrator to award pendente lite interest has held:—
“A person deprived of money to which he is legitimately entitled has a right to be compensated for the deprivation, call it by any name. It may be called interest, compensation or damages. This basic consideration is as valid for the period the dispute is pending before the arbitrator as it is for the period prior to the arbitrator entering upon the reference. This is the principle of section 34, C.P.C, and there is no reason or principle to hold otherwise in the case of arbitrator.”
5. The Supreme Court has further held:
“An Arbitrator is an alternative form for resolution of disputes arising between the parties. If so, he must have the power to decide all the disputes or differences arising between the parties, if the arbitrator has no power to award interest pendente lite, the party claiming it would have to approach the Court for that purpose, even though he may have obtained satisfaction in respect of other claims from the arbitrator. This would lead to multiplicity of proceedings. An arbitrator is the creature of an agreement. It is open to the parties to confer upon him such powers and prescribe such procedure for him to follow, as they think fit, as along as they are not opposed to law. The arbitrator must also act and make his award in accordance with the general law of the land and the agreement.”
6. The Supreme Court has further held:—
“Over the years, the English and Indian Courts have acted on the assumption that where the agreement does not prohibit and a party to the reference a claim for interest, the arbitrator must have the power to award interest pendente lite, interest pendente lite is not a matter of substantive law, like interest for the period anterior to reference (pre-reference period). For doing complete justice between the parties, such power has always been inferred. Having regard to the above considerations the following principle should be followed in the matter of awarding interest pendente lite by the arbitrator:
Where the agreement between the parties does not prohibit grant of interest and where a party claims interest and that dispute (along with the claim for principal amount or independently) is referred to the arbitrator, he shall have the power to award interest pendente lite. This is for the reason that in such a case it must be presumed that interest was an implied term of the agreement between the parties and therefore when the parties refer all their disputes - or refer the dispute as to interest as such - to the arbitrator, he shall have the power to award interest. This does not mean that in every case the arbitrator should necessarily award interest pendente lite. It is a matter within his discretion to be exercised in the light of all the facts and circumstances of the case, keeping the ends of justice in view.”
7. The said Clause 16(3) of the General Conditions of Contract reads as under:
“16(3) No interest will be payable upon the earnest money and the security deposit or amounts payable to the contractor under the contract, but Government securities deposited in terms of sub-clause (1) of this clause will be repayable with interest accrued thereon.”
8. This clause of the Contract has to be strictly construed for the reasons that ordinarily a person who has legitimate claim is entitled to payment within a reasonable time and if the payment has been delayed beyond reasonable time he can legitimately claim to be compensated for that delay whatever nomenclature one may give to his claim in that behalf. Strictly construed the term of the contract merely prohibits the Railway Authorities from paying interest to the contractor upon the earnest money and security deposit or amounts payable to the contractor under the Contract but once the matter goes to arbitration the discretion of the arbitrator is not, in any manner, stifled by this term of the Contract and the arbitrator would be entitled to consider the question of grant of interest pendente lite and award interest if he finds the claim to be justified.
9. In the case of Board of Trustees for the Port of Calcutta, (supra) a question similar to the question in the instant case arose for consideration by the Supreme Court. In that case, the contract between the parties did contain prohibition against the payment of interest on delayed payments. Clause 13(g) of that Contract was as under:
“No claim for interest will be entertained by the Commissioners with respect to any money or balance which may be in their hands owing to any dispute between themselves and the Contractor or with respect to any delay as the part of the Commissioners in making interim or final payment or otherwise.”
10. In that case, the Supreme Court was also not dealing with a case in regard to award of interest for the period prior to the reference but with a case in regard to award of interest by the arbitrator post reference. The Supreme Court considered whether in view of sub-clause (g) of Clause 13 of that Contract extracted above, the arbitrator was prohibited from granting interest under the Contract. The Supreme Court held that the said Clause 13(g) merely prohibited Commissioner from entertaining any claim for interest and did not prohibit the arbitrator from awarding interest pendente lite. While referring to the decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of G.C Roy, it was held by the Supreme Court as follows:
“Clause has to be strictly construed for the simple reason that as pointed out by the Constitution Bench, ordinarily, a person who has a legitimate claim is entitled to payment within a reasonable time and if the payment has been delayed beyond reasonable time he can legitimately claim to be compensated for that delay whatever nomenclature one may give to his claim in that behalf.”
11. The Supreme Court further held that under the said clause in the contract the arbitrator was in no manner prohibited from awarding interest pendente lite.
12. Accordingly, Clause 16(3) did not prohibit the Sole Arbitrator to grant interest pendente rite and hence, I find no infirmity in the said Award made by the Sole Arbitrator.
13. Even otherwise, if there was a dispute as to whether under Clause 16(3) of the said Contract the Sole Arbitrator was prohibited from awarding interest pendente lite, that was a matter which fell within the jurisdiction of the Sole Arbitrator, as the Sole Arbitrator was to interpret the said Clause 16(3) and decide whether that clause prohibited him from awarding interest pendente lite. Hence, it cannot be said that the Sole Arbitrator had wandered outside the said Contract to deny him jurisdiction to decide the question regarding payment of interest pendente lite. In my view, the Sole Arbitrator was well within his jurisdiction in awarding interest pendente lite.
14. In view of the above, I see no merit in this petition and dismiss at this stage itself. There shall, however, be no order as to costs of the petition. In view of refusal to set aside the said Award, Mr. Kamdar applied for decree in terms of the said Award. In view of rule 787(5) of the rules of this Court as applicable on its Original Side and since the petition of the petitioner to have the said Award set aside has been dismissed, the respondent is entitled for decree in terms of the said Award. Hence, judgment is pronounced and decree passed in terms of the Award dated 7th June, 1985 filed in this Court and numbered as ‘Award No. 209 of 1995’. The petitioner is also ordered and decreed to pay further interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the principal sum of Rs. 1,52,052/- from the date hereof tilt payment or realisation, whichever is earlier.
15. C.C expedited.
16. Petition dismissed.
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