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Alexandar Yesudas Maikel v. Perfect Oil Seals And Irp And Others
1. This writ petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India impugns the order of the Second Labour Court, Pune, dated 13 March 1987, made in Complaint (ULP) No. 148 of 1986 and the Revisional Order of the Industrial Court, dated 4 August 1988 in Revision Application (ULP) No. 14 of 1987, under the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
2. The petitioner was in the employment of the first respondent for about a year, at the end of which he resigned from service. The petitioner was appointed off and on by the first respondent, which appeared to be periodically interrupting the service of the petitioner, probably with a view to disrupt continuity of service. The petitioner was given a letter of appointment that he would be employed for a period of 7 months from 20 April 1985 to 19 October 1985: After 19 October 1985, the petitioner was neither removed from service, nor was the contract of employment deemed to have run out, bringing about disruption of the employer-employee relationship. For some inscrutable reason, the first respondent continued the petitioner in service till 22 November 1985, on which date, a letter of termination of service was served on the petitioner terminating his service with effect from 22 and November 1985. After a gap of about 10 days, the petitioner was reappointed on 2 December 1985, for a fresh period of 6 months, when the six month period ended on 1 May 1986, the petitioner was allowed to continue in service till 31 May 1986, without any further ado. On 31 May 1986, he was served with a letter terminating his service with effect from the same dale. The petitioner challenged the termination of his service as arbitrary, illegal, mala fide and amounting to an unfair labour practice by his Complaint (ULP) No. 148 of 1986. By its order, dated 13 March 1987, the Labour Court held that the termination of his service did not amount to “retrenchment,” as it specifically fell within the newly added Cl. (bb) of S. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In this view of the matter, the complaint of the petitioner was dismissed by the impugned order of the Labour Court, dated 13 March 1987. The complainant moved the Industrial Court in revision by his Revision Application (ULP) No. 14 of 1987. The Industrial Court, in its impugned order, dated 4 August 1988, accepted the reasoning which appealed to the Labour Court and further held that the petitioner had failed to prove that he had completed 240 days' service and, since the burden of establishing the said fact lay on the petitioner, the petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Therefore, his application was dismissed. Hence, this writ petition.
Wednesday, 22 March 1995.
3. A reading of the orders of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court impugned in this writ petition shows that both the Courts below have concluded, firstly, that the petitioner could not be said to be in continuous service for one year and, secondly, that even if there was termination of his service, it did not amount to “retrenchment” within the meaning of S. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, as it fell within the exception to the said definition provided in Cl. (bb). In my view, both conclusions are erroneous in law. As to “continuous service.” Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act defines “continuous service,” for the purpose of Chap. V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. Since it is not in dispute that the case of the petitioner would not fall within Sub-sec. (1) of S. 25-B we need consider only Sub-sec. (2) of S. 25-B particularly Cl. (a) thereof. By a fiction of law, Cl. (b) of Sub-sec. (2) of S. 25-B provides that a workman shall be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year if, during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date with reference to which the calculation is to be made, he has actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days. The explanation to this sub-section indicates that absence on account of contingencies enumerated in Cls. (i) to (iv) shall not be treated as absence from duty. In the petitioner's case, the petitioner's service was finally terminated on 31 May 1986. During the period of 12 months prior to the said date, i.e, from 1 June 1985 to 31 May 1986, the only period during which the petitioner was not in service was the short period from 22 November 1985 to 1 December 1985. Otherwise he was continuously in service. Both Courts below have ignored the material on record which shows that the petitioner had completed more than 240 days' working during the said period. Particularly, the Industrial Court seems to have ignored the documents on record, which evidence this situation. On 2 April 1987 the petitioner made an application for production of the muster-cum wage registers of the first respondent for the period 1 September 1984 to 31 May 1986. They were actually produced for inspection, and after taking inspection, the advocate of the petitioner filed a praecipe in the Labour Court on 3 March 1987 showing the results of his inspection. It showed that, during the period January 1985 to May 1986, the total number of working days put in by the petitioner in the employment of the first respondent was 271. Surprisingly, neither Court paid attention to this document and both Courts assumed that the petitioner had failed to discharge the burden of proving “continuous service.” In my view, the petitioner did all that was legally possible for him to do and has sufficiently discharged the burden of showing that he had worked for more than 240 days during the relevant period. I am, therefore, of the view that the petitioner had one year's continuous service within the meaning of S. 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act on 31 May 1986 when his service was terminated.
4. The next question to be considered is — Whether the termination of the service of the petitioner by the order, dated 31 May 1986 did not amount to “retrenchment,” as it fell within the exclusory Cl. (bb) of S. 2(oo). The Industrial Court summarized the terms of appointment of the petitioner in Para. 12 of the impugned order and pointed out that the recital in the letters of appointment indicated that the petitioner was employed on purely temporary basis for the period 20 April 1985 to 19 October 1985 and from 2 December 1985 to 1 May 1986. From this, the Industrial Court came to the conclusion that the termination of the petitioner's service was neither the result of non-renewal of the contract of employment, nor because the contract was terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained in the contract. In my judgment, both conclusions are erroneous. In the first place, it is erroneous to say that the petitioner's service came to an end by the contract running out. The first contractor an out on the expiry to 6 months from 19 April 1985, i.e, on 18 October 1985. Admittedly, the petitioner was not removed from service contemporaneously with the expiry of 6 months, but was allowed to continue in service, as before, till his service was expressly terminated by the order of 22 November 1985, with effect from 22 November 1985.
5. Turning to the second period of service of the petitioner, it ended on 1 May 1986. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was not removed from service on 1 May 1986, but was allowed to continue till 31 May 1986, on which date, by a specific letter dated 31 May 1986, he was removed from service. The termination of the petitioner's service was effected either by the letter, dated 22 November 1985 or by the letter, dated 31 May 1986, and neither letter claimed that it was under any of the two contingencies contemplated by Cl. (bb) of S. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In “any event, one cannot lose sight of the fact that Cl. (bb) has itself been restrictively interpreted and the judicial consensus appears to be that, if the post continues and the work continues, Cl. (bb) cannot be said to operate as a charter for unscrupulous employers to jettison their workmen. [See in this connection Dilip Hanumantrao Shrike v. Zilla Parishad, Yavatmal [1989 - II L.L.N 590], State Bank of India v. N. Sudararmony [1976 - II L.L.N 5], S.S Sumbre v. Chief Regional Manager, State Bank of India, Nagpur [1991 — I L.L.N 281] and K. Rajendran v. Director (Personnel) Project and Equipment Corporation of India, Ltd., New Delhi [1992 - I L.L.N 150].
6. In my judgment, the termination of the petitioner's service on 31 May 1986 amounted to “retrenchment” as defined in S. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act as it did not fall within the exception Cl. (bb), but fell within the main body of the definition of the section. Since it is not in dispute that the provisions of S. 25-F were not complied with, the retrenchment was ab initio, illegal and invalid. The petitioner was, therefore, entitled to continue in service. The writ petition is liable to be allowed.
7. In the result, petition is allowed, the impugned order of the Labour Court, dated 13 March 1987, in Complaint (ULP) No. 148 of 1986 and that of the Industrial Court, dated 4 August 1988, in Revision Application (ULP) No. 14 of 1987, are hereby quashed and set aside. The first respondent is directed to reinstate the petitioner in service with continuity and pay him back-wages from 1 June 1986 at such rates as he would have been entitled to if his service had not been discontinued. The reinstatement and payment of back-wages shall be effected within a period of 6 weeks from today. The first respondent to pay a sum of Rs. 500 as quantified costs to the petitioner.
8. Rule made absolute accordingly.
9. Certified copy expedited.
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