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Prakash S. Akotkar And Others v. Mansoorkha Gulabkha And Others
Case Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
The suit property originally belonged to Smt. Noor Jahan who died in 1987. She had four sons who were defendants 1 to 4 before the trial court. Defendant No. 1 executed an agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff on 23-12-1994 and, according to the plaintiff, put the plaintiff in possession of the entire property on the same day. The plaintiff filed a suit for specific enforcement of that agreement against all four children of Noor Jahan and also against their alienees, defendants 5 and 6.
The Civil Judge, Senior Division, Buldana, allowed an application under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, Code of Civil Procedure, granting an injunction restraining the appellants from interfering with the respondents' possession and enjoyment of the suit property. The appellants challenged that order by way of the present appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff (respondent) who claims exclusive possession under an agreement to sell executed by one co-owner has a prima facie case to obtain an injunction under Order XXXIX, Rule 1 and 2, CPC against the other co-owners and their alienees.
- Whether the three conditions for grant of an injunction under Order XXXIX — prima facie case, irreparable loss, and balance of convenience — coexist in the circumstances of this case.
- Whether possession said to have been given under an agreement to sell by one co-owner can be treated as hostile possession (or confer against other co-owners such a right) so as to justify exclusion of other co-owners or their transferees by injunctive relief.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The plaintiff's claim of exclusive possession of the entire property is incorrect.
- The co-owners (defendants 1 to 4) were in possession and some of them executed sale-deeds in favour of defendants 5 and 6 and handed over possession to those alienees.
- Defendants 5 and 6 (alienees) are in possession of the property.
Respondent / Plaintiff's Arguments (as represented in the lower court)
- The plaintiff was put in exclusive possession of the entire property on 23-12-1994 pursuant to an agreement to sell executed by defendant No. 1.
- Counsel for the 1st respondent relied on authorities (such as AIR 1971 MP 23 and other decisions) and on the proposition that a person in possession under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act is entitled to maintain an application for injunction under Order XXXIX, Rule 1.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| AIR 1971 MP 23 (Tikam Chand Lunia v. Rahim Khan Ishak Khan) | Relied on to contend entitlement to maintain injunction where plaintiff claims possession under an agreement to sell. | The court observed that this decision does not hold that a stranger who obtained an agreement to sell from one of the co-sharers stands in the same position as a co-owner; thus it does not support treating the plaintiff as having exclusive possessory rights vis-à-vis other co-owners. |
| 1984 Mah LJ 915 (Nandkumar v. Laxmibai) | Holdings that a person in possession under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act is entitled to maintain an application for injunction under Order XXXIX, Rule 1. | The court accepted the proposition as correct but observed that, in the present case, even if possession is assumed, it is possession as a co-owner and not hostile possession under Section 53A that would justify such relief. |
| AIR 1960 Ker 27 (Joseph v. John) | When a co-owner transfers the entire property as owner to a stranger, the stranger's possession becomes hostile to that of the non-alienating co-owner. | The court cited the decision but noted there is no case here that the first defendant was ever in hostile possession; therefore Joseph v. John does not support an injunction excluding other co-owners on the facts presented. |
| Karbalai Begum v. Mohd. Sayeed, (1980) 4 SCC 396 : AIR 1981 SC 77 | Legal position that a co-owner in possession is a constructive trustee for non-possessing co-sharers and cannot, without more, change the character of possession to confer a better title on an assignee (much less by an agreement to sell). | The court relied on this apex court authority as a key principle: possession by a co-owner is trustee-like and cannot prima facie be converted into hostile possession or a title to exclude other co-owners merely by executing an agreement to sell. |
| AIR 1958 Cal 614 (Paresh Nath Biswas v. Kamal Krishna Choudhary) | Upon transfer to a stranger of an undivided house by a co-owner, the other co-owner cannot claim joint possession; other co-sharers can seek injunction to restrain the stranger transferee from exercising joint possession over the share transferred. | The court held that this decision does not assist the respondents in the present facts and reasoning because it does not justify the plaintiff's claim to exclude co-owners or their alienees here. |
| Sant Ram Nagina Ram v. Daya Ram Nagina Ram, AIR 1961 Punj 528 | Discusses rights and liabilities of co-owners and presumption regarding ouster; holds that possession of joint property by one co-owner is, in law, possession of all unless ouster is proved. | The court relied on this authority to reinforce that one co-owner's possession is, in law, possession of all co-owners unless ouster is demonstrated — supporting the conclusion that the plaintiff's claimed exclusive possession was not shown. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the nature of the injunction sought: an order restraining all defendants (including co-owners and their alienees) from interfering with the plaintiff's claimed exclusive possession. The court emphasized that the defendants included the other co-owners (defendants 2 to 4) as well as alienees (defendants 5 and 6).
The court summarized the three well-known conditions for interlocutory injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, CPC — a prima facie case, risk of irreparable injury, and balance of convenience — and noted that all three must coexist for relief to be granted.
On the facts, the court focused on the character of the possession claimed by the plaintiff. It held that even if defendant No. 1 executed an agreement to sell and purportedly put the plaintiff in possession, that possession would, on the material before the court, be the possession of a co-owner and therefore trustee-like for other co-owners. The court reiterated the settled principles that:
- A co-owner has equal rights of enjoyment and possession in the whole property, with interest co-extensive with other co-owners.
- An agreement to sell executed by one co-owner does not create a proprietary interest in the buyer; it creates only an obligation annexed to the ownership until specific performance is decreed.
- A co-owner in possession is akin to a constructive trustee for non-possessing co-sharers and cannot, without more (such as ouster or a clear transfer to a stranger), unilaterally change the character of his possession so as to defeat the rights of other co-owners.
The court reviewed the authorities cited by the parties and explained their relevance or limitations in the present context. It observed there is no material showing that defendant No. 1 was ever in hostile possession, and that the alienees (defendants 5 and 6) must be deemed to have stepped into the shoes of at least defendants 2 to 4 for prima facie considerations, whereas defendant No. 1's rights were only those annexed to an obligation under the agreement to sell.
Given that the plaintiff's possession was properly characterized as co-ownership possession (trustee-like) rather than hostile possession conferring exclusive rights vis-à-vis other co-owners, the court concluded the plaintiff lacked a prima facie case for the type of injunction sought. On this short ground — absence of a prima facie case — the court found the Civil Judge's order granting the injunction unsustainable.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The appeal is allowed and the order of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Buldana granting the injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, CPC is set aside.
Implications:
- The injunction previously granted in favour of the plaintiff (respondent) is vacated; the plaintiff is not entitled to the interlocutory relief sought on the facts and material before the appellate court.
- The court limited its observations to disposal of the respondents' claim under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, CPC and did not purport to lay down any broader new precedent beyond the analysis necessary to decide the appeal.
Appeal allowed.
Admit. Heard counsel for the appellants and the respondents.
2. This appeal arises from the order of Civil Judge, Sr. Dn. Buldana, on an application under O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 and 2, Code of Civil Procedure, for an injunction to restrain the appellants from interfering with the respondents' possession and enjoyment of the suit property. The learned Civil Judge has allowed the said prayer. The said order is under challenge in this appeal.
3. The property in dispute belonged to one Smt. Noor Jahan who died in 1987. She had four sons who are defendants 1 to 4, before the lower Court. The defendant No. 1 alleging that he is in exclusive possession of the property executed an agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff on 23-12-1994 and according to the plaintiff he was put in possession of the entire property on the same day. He instituted the present suit for the specific enforcement of the agreement against all the children of Noor Jahan and also their alienee-defendants 5 and 6. It was contended on behalf of appellants that the claim of the plaintiff that he is in exclusive possession of entire property is not correct. They would maintain that the co-owners were in possession and they subsequently executed a sale-deed in favour of defendants 5 and 6 and handed over possession to them. According to the appellants, defendants Nos. 5 and 6 are in possession of the property. In a matter arising under O. 39, Rr. 1 and 2, Code of Civil Procedure, three conditions are to be satisfied; that the applicant has a prima facie case; that in the event of not granting injunction he would be put to an irreparable loss and injury; and that the balance of convenience is in his favour. All these three conditions must coexist so that the applicant can be entitled to injunction under O. 39, R. 1 of Civil Procedure Code.
4. Here, the nature of injunction sought is of importance. The plaintiff sought injunction against all the defendants from interfering with his exclusive possession. It should be noted that these defendants include not only the first defendant who executed the agreement to sell but also the three other sons of Noor Jahan. It goes without saying that these sons have since alienated the property to defendants 5 and 6. Even assuming that even if the plaintiff who was put in possession by the first defendant on the execution of agreement to sell, the question in the context is as to the character of possession which the first defendant could have conveyed, for the character of possession has nexus with the prima facie case pleaded by the plaintiff. Ordinarily, a co-owner has equal right and interest in the whole property along with other co-owners. Every co-owner has right of enjoyment and possession equal to that of the other co-owners and he has interest even in every infinitesimal portion of the property. In other words, the title and possession of a co-owner is co-extensive with the interest of other co-owners. Being co-owner the first defendant cannot have any right to represent the title and possession of other co-owners. The learned counsel for their 1st respondent relied on AIR 1971 Madh Pra 23 (Tikam Chand Lunia v. Rahim Khan Ishak Khan) to contend that he is entitled to maintain the application for injunction in such circumstances. Even assuming that the first defendant has validly executed the agreement to sell, that agreement to sell cannot create any interest in the property, it can only create an obligation annexed to the ownership of the property. Therefore, the right of the respondent, if at all, is to enforce the agreement to sell. The photo copy of the plaint placed before me by Mr. Khapre, learned counsel for appellants, shows that the plaintiff seeks enforcement of the agreement to sell against all the six defendants. This certainly would mean that the plaintiff admits the title not only of the first defendant, but admits the title of defendants 2 to 4 — the brothers of 1st respondent — as well as that of the alienees defendants 5 and 6 in favour of whom defendants 1 to 4 have since executed a sale-deed. Necessarily it should follow that the plaintiff has no hostile claim except a prayer to enforce specifically the agreement to sell. Even the decision relied on by the learned counsel for respondents, AIR 1971 MP 23, cited supra, does not say that a stranger who obtained an agreement to sell from one of the co-sharers is in the same position of a co-owner. The learned counsel then relied on 1984 Mah LJ 915 (Nandkumar v. Laxmibai). There it is held, a person in possession under S. 53-A of Transfer of Property Act is entitled to maintain an application for injunction under O. 39, R. 1. There can be no dispute as to the said proposition. In the context, even if it is assumed that the plaintiff is in possession that possession can only be of a co-owner. The learned counsel also relied on a decision in AIR 1960 Ker 27 (Joseph v. John). All that is held in the said decision is that when a co-owner transfers the entire property as owner to a stranger the possession of such stranger will become hostile to that of the non-alienating co-owner. In this connection it is necessary to refer to a later decision of the apex court as to the character of possession of a co-owner in possession. In the decision in Karbalai Begum v. Mohd. Sayeed, (1980) 4 SCC 396 : AIR 1981 SC 77 : 1980 All LJ 902 the Supreme Court observed, the legal position of a co-owner in possession would be that of a constructive trustee on behalf of the other co-sharer who is not in possession and that right of the co-sharer would be deemed to be protected by the trustee. Then a person in such a position cannot prima facie without anything more unilaterally change the character of his possession so as to confer a better title to his assignee, much less on one in favour of whom he has executed only an agreement to sell. Here the agreement to sell itself was in 1994. There is no case that the first defendant — the son of Noor Jahan — was ever in hostile possession. In such circumstances, the learned counsel for respondents cannot build up an argument on the basis of such possession claiming that an alienee can maintain an application under Order XXXIX, Rule 1 against the non-alienating co-owner. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent further relied on AIR 1958 Cal 614 (Paresh Nath Biswas v. Kamal Krishna Choudhary). All that is held in that decision is, upon transfer to a stranger of an undivided house by a co-owner, the co-owner cannot claim joint possession along with other co-owners under Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is further held that upon a transfer to a stranger of an undivided share of a family dwelling-house by a co-sharer, the other co-sharer or co-sharers can maintain a suit for injunction for restraining the stranger transferee from exercising any act of joint possession in respect of the share transferred. This decision cannot help the respondents.
5. As noticed, the character of possession of the plaintiff in the circumstances can only be that of a co-owner even if the possession passed under agreement to sell. The Division Bench of Punjab High Court in the case of Sant Ram Nagina Ram v. Daya Ram Nagina Ram, AIR 1961 Punj 528 has considered the whole question as to the rights and liabilities of co-owners and also the condition under which one could presume ouster. It is held therein that a co-owner has an interest in the whole property and also in every parcel of it; and that possession of the joint property by one co-owner is, in the eye of law, possession of all even if all but one are actually out of possession. Then it proceeds to hold that this condition will prevail unless ouster is proved. With due regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances, particularly the fact that defendants 1 to 4 are governed by Mohammaden Law, there can be no doubt that their interest is that of co-owners. The first defendants has no right prima facie to bind the interest of defendants 2 to 4. Having found so, the alienees of the defendants 1 to 4 who are defendants 5 and 6 must be deemed to have stepped into shoes of at least defendants 2 to 4 though prima facie the rights of first defendant annexed with the obligation under the agreement to sell. Having found the character of possession as co-owner, as indicated above, the only question that arises for determination is, whether a co-owner in possession is entitled to an injunction of this nature against the other co-owners. Once it is found that the possession of co-owner is for and on behalf of other co-owners, the other co-owner cannot claim injunction of this nature so as to exclude the other co-owners from exercising their right as co-owners. Therefore the respondents/plaintiffs have no prima facie case. Consequently on this short ground, the order of the Civil Judge, Sr. Dn., is liable to be set aside. The order is therefore set aside and the instant appeal is allowed. It needs hardly be mentioned that the observations made in this order are only for the purposes of disposal of the claim of the respondents under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, Code of Civil Procedure.
Appeal allowed.
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