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Technova Graphic Systems Private Limited v. Commissioner Of Sales Tax
Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The assessee, Technova Graphic Systems, purchased polyester film and sold it after subjecting it to a lacquering process. On 26 November 1987 the assessee applied under section 52(1)(b) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 to the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Admn.) seeking a determination whether lacquering of polyester film constituted "manufacture" under section 2(17) of the Act. The Deputy Commissioner held that lacquering amounted to manufacture because lacquered polyester film was a different commercial commodity. The assessee appealed to the Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal, which accepted the revenue's contention and held the process to be manufacture. At the assessee's instance the Tribunal referred the question of law under section 61(1) of the Act to this Court:
“Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that lacquering of polyester film amounts to manufacture within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 and it results into a different commercial commodity?”
The Court considered the Tribunal's order, the parties' submissions, documentary and expert evidence, and applicable precedents before answering the referred question.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether lacquering of polyester film amounts to "manufacture" within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, i.e., whether the process produces a different and distinct commercial commodity.
Arguments of the Parties
Assessee's Arguments
- The process of lacquering does not amount to manufacture because polyester film retains its original character and quality after lacquering and no new commercial commodity emerges.
- Expert evidence (affidavit and tests by Dr. S.P. Potnis, Professor of Polymer Technology) establishes that lacquering is a non-convertible, physical coating: drying occurs only by solvent evaporation, the lacquer can be removed by solvents, and there is no chemical change to the polyester film.
- Empirical test results showed near-identical melting points, tensile strength, elongation, hardness, thickness and identical infra-red spectra between uncoated film and film from which coating was removed, indicating no chemical alteration.
Revenue's Arguments
- The definition of "manufacture" in section 2(17) is broad and embraces lacquering; on lacquering the nature and character of polyester film changes and a new commodity — lacquered polyester film — comes into existence.
- Reliance was placed on the Court's earlier decision in Commissioner Of Sales Tax v. Dunken Coffee Manufacturing Co. (1975) 35 STC 493 to support the view that such processes fall within the definition of manufacture.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Maharashtra v. Shiv Datt and Sons, (1992) 84 STC 497 (Supreme Court) | Only processes that have an impact on the nature or character of goods amount to "manufacture"; wide words in the definition must be limited so manufacture is only where an alteration in nature/character occurs; interpretation must be practical to avoid absurd results (e.g., mere ornamenting should not be treated as manufacture). | The Court followed this principle as the controlling test: manufacture requires alteration in nature/character such that a commercially distinct article results. The Court applied this limitation to reject a broad reading of section 2(17) and to determine that lacquering does not qualify as manufacture. |
| Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Pio Food Packers, (1980) 46 STC 63 | Part of a line of authority establishing that although manufacture implies change, not every change is manufacture; focus is on whether a commercially distinct article emerges. | Used as part of the body of authority supporting the test that a continuing substantial identity means no manufacture; applied to conclude lacquering left the substance commercially the same. |
| Chowgule and Co. P. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1981) 47 STC 124 | Same general principle: a series of cases clarifying that only changes producing a distinct commercial article are manufacture. | Cited among authorities establishing the commercial-distinctness test; reinforced the Court's application of that test to the facts. |
| Sterling Foods v. State of Karnataka, (1986) 63 STC 239 | Further authority in the same line that change alone is insufficient; requirement that processing produce a different commercial commodity. | Relied upon as part of settled principles guiding the Court to ask whether lacquered film is commercially distinct from polyester film — the Court found it was not. |
| Commissioner Of Sales Tax v. Dunken Coffee Manufacturing Co., (1975) 35 STC 493 (this Court) | Decision relied upon by the revenue to support a broad view of "manufacture" under the Act (as applied in that particular set of facts). | The Court observed Dunken dealt with different facts and must be read in light of the Supreme Court's later decision in Shiv Datt; the Court concluded the Tribunal misapplied Dunken and that it cannot be taken as universally applicable to the present facts. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by framing the established legal test from higher authority: although the definition of "manufacture" in section 2(17) contains wide language, the Supreme Court in Shiv Datt limited that language. Manufacture occurs only when a process applied to goods effects an alteration in their nature or character so substantial that a commercially distinct article comes into existence; mere changes that leave the commodity's continuing substantial identity intact do not constitute manufacture.
The Court cited and treated as settled a line of decisions (including Pio Food Packers, Chowgule, Sterling Foods) that elucidate this test — the focus is on commercial distinctness and the view held by trade users of the article.
Applying these principles to the facts, the Court analyzed:
- The lacquering process itself, as described: placing polyester film on a coating machine, passing through a chemical tank, removing excess chemical by rollers, and drying in a heating chamber.
- Expert evidence from Dr. S.P. Potnis, who stated lacquering is a non-convertible physical coating that dries by solvent evaporation; lacquers can be removed by solvents; polyester film remains unaffected and retains original characteristics; polyester film is insoluble in common lacquer solvents; and polyester is chosen for certain applications because of such stability.
- Empirical laboratory tests comparing uncoated film and coated film after removal of coating: near-identical melting points, tensile strengths, elongation, hardness, thickness and identical infra-red spectra, leading the expert to conclude there was no chemical change during lacquering.
The Court noted the Tribunal had recorded that the polyester film did not lose its original character but nevertheless concluded there was manufacture based on the wide words of section 2(17) and the Dunken Coffee decision. The Court rejected that approach: Dunken was fact-specific and must be read in light of the Supreme Court's restriction in Shiv Datt. The Tribunal therefore erred in treating Dunken as universally controlling.
Considering the nature of the lacquering process and its demonstrable effect — or absence of effect — on the film's nature, use and trade description, the Court concluded the lacquered film does not become a different and distinct commercial commodity. Polyester film retains its essential identity despite the lacquering process.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The referred question is answered in the negative: lacquering of polyester film does not amount to "manufacture" within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. Polyester film remains polyester film despite lacquering.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The decision is in favour of the assessee (Technova Graphic Systems); the Tribunal's conclusion that lacquering amounted to manufacture was rejected.
- Costs: The Court made no order as to costs.
- Precedential effect: The Court applied and reiterated the Supreme Court's limiting interpretation of "manufacture" (Shiv Datt) and clarified that an earlier decision of this Court (Dunken Coffee) is fact-specific and must be read in the light of the Supreme Court's authority. The opinion does not state that it is laying down a new precedent beyond applying the established tests; its ruling follows the existing authoritative principle that manufacture requires a substantive change resulting in a commercially distinct commodity.
Order accordingly.
Dr. B.P Saraf, J.:— By this reference under section 61(1) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, the Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal has referred the following question of law to this Court for opinion at the instance of the assessee:
“Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that lacquering of polyester film amounts to manufacture within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 and it results into a different commercial commodity?”
2. The assessee Technova Graphic Systems carries on the business of buying polyester films and selling the same after subjecting it to the process of lacquering. On 26th November, 1987, the assessee made an application under section 52(1)(b) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 (“the Act”) to the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Admn.) seeking determination of the question whether subjecting the polyester film to the chemical process of lacquering amounts to manufacture within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act. The contention of the assessee before the Deputy Commissioner was that the process of lacquering did not amount to manufacture. The Deputy Commissioner (Admn.) however did not accept this contention of the assessee and held that the said process amounted to manufacture as, according to him, lacquered polyester film was a different commercial commodity than polyester film. Aggrieved by the above order of the Deputy Commissioner, the assessee appealed to the Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal (“Tribunal”). The case of the assessee before the Tribunal was that despite the process of lacquering, polyester film remained polyester film and no new commercial commodity emerged as a result thereof. Hence, the process of lacquering could not be held to be “manufacture”. The contention of the revenue, on the other hand, was that the definition of “manufacture” contained in section 2(17) of the Act was wide enough to embrace within its scope and ambit the process of lacquering. According to the revenue, on being subjected to the process of lacquering, the nature and character of polyester film underwent a change, and a new commodity known as lacquered polyester film emerged as a result thereof. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Commissioner Of Sales Tax v. Dunken Coffee Manufacturing Co., (1975) 35 STC 493. The Tribunal accepted the contention of the revenue and held that the process of lacquering amounted to “manufacture” within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act. Hence this reference at the instance of the assessee.
3. We have carefully perused the order of the Tribunal and considered the rival submissions of the counsel for the parties. So far as the interpretation of the definition of “manufacture” contained in section 2(17) of the Act is concerned, it is now well-settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Shiv Datt and Sons, (1992) 84 STC 497 that only such of the processes referred to in the definition of “manufacture” given in section 2(17) of the Act and applied to the goods as are of such a character as to have an impact on the nature of the goods would amount to “manufacture”. In the above decision, the Supreme Court made it clear that though the words used in the definition of “manufacture” were wide enough, limitation has to be put on the said words so that manufacture can be said to take place only when there is some alteration in the nature or character of the goods as a result of the process applied to the same. It was observed that if the definition of manufacture is given such wide interpretation as is sought to be given by the revenue, absurd results may flow therefrom. For instance, the definition includes ornamenting. If a dealer purchases certain goods and merely adds some decorative material thereto, according to the State's interpretation, there will be a manufacture. Similarly, if a car is purchased and some latest or some special gadgets are added thereto, the interpretation will result is the resale of a different commodity. This clearly is not the intention of the Legislature. This provision has, therefore, to be interpreted in a practical and a workable manner. For the purpose of the definition of “manufacture”, there should be some alteration in the nature or character of the goods.
4. The question as to when the manufacture can be said to take place also came to be considered by the Supreme Court in a catena of cases including Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Pio Food Packers, (1980) 46 STC 63, Chowgule and Co. P. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1981) 47 STC 124 and Sterling Foods v. State of Karnataka, (1986) 63 STC 239. As a result thereof, it is now well-settled that though manufacture implies a change, every change is not manufacture. It is only when the change or a series of changes take a commodity to a point where commercially it can no longer be regarded as the original commodity but instead recognised as a distinct article that a manufacture can be said to take place. Where the commodity retains a continuing substantial identity through the processing stage, no manufacture can be said to have taken place. The principle that has to be applied in all such cases is whether a commercially different and distinct article has come into existence as a result of the processing of the original commodity. In other words, whether the article produced is regarded in the trade by those who deal in it as distinct in identity from the commodity involved in processing.
5. We may now consider the facts of the present case in the light of the tests set out above. The assessee purchased polyester films and subjected the same to a process which can be described as below:
“Polyester film is coated by using chemicals to impart certain properties depending on the application envisaged. The polyester film is placed on the coating machine and the same is passed through a tank containing chemicals. A levelling device viz. 2 rollers remove the excess chemical and smoothen the coating. The film is thereafter passed through a heating chamber where it dries up.”
6. The polyester film subjected to the above process, which is called “process of lacquering”, is described as “lacquered polyester film”. The question that arises for consideration is whether as a result of the process of lacquering, polyester film ceases to be polyester film and can be regarded as a different and distinct commercial commodity.
7. According to the assessee, despite the above chemical process applied to the polyester film purchased by it, polyester film did not lose its original character and quality. No new commercial commodity emerged as a result of the said process. In support of this contention, our attention was drawn to the affidavit filed by one Dr. S.P Potnis, who is Professor of Polymer Technology, Head of Plastics and Paints Division, Department of Chemical Technology, University of Bombay, wherein, he has stated that:
“Lacquer is a term used for denoting coatings which dry only by evaporation of the solvents giving a continuous film on the surface without any type of chemical change occurring in the film. Because of this these are also known as non convertible coatings.
As the drying is only a physical process the lacquers are soluble in the original solvents and can be removed very readily by the same solvents from the surface on which they are coated.
Lacquering is a process of coating/covering a surface with a lacquer and does not involve any chemical process as the drying is only by evaporation of the solvents.
Polyester film is absolutely insoluble in any commonly used lacquer solvents and as such remains totally unaffected and maintains its original characteristics after lacquering/coating with any coating solution.
Polyester film is also unaffected by photosensitive chemicals used for preparation of duplicating or tracing papers and this is the major reason why polyester film is chosen for such application.”
8. Dr. Potnis also examined the uncoated polyester films and the lacquered polyester films and recorded the following findings:
“…the coating is only a physical one which can be readily removed by means of solvent leaving behind original polyester film.
… the coating given on the polyester film has not changed any characteristics of original polyester film….”
9. Dr. Potnis also took the uncoated polyester film and the polyester film from which the coating had been removed by use of solvents and checked their melting points, mechanical properties and infra-red etc. and found the following results:
“CHARACTERISTICS OF POLYESTER FILM”
Properties Uncoated Coated and then coating removed 1. Melting point C 272 270 2. Tensile strength Kg/Cm 1457 1454 3. % Elongation 62 63 4. Share Hareness (A) 93 94 5. Thickness of film (mm) .071 .072 6. Infra-red spectra All peaks are identical in both cases.
10. He summed his findings in the following words:
“The results of the tests and particularly infra-red spectra of the coated and the film from which coating is removed confirm beyond doubt that the polyester film has not undergone any chemical change during the process of lacquering/coating with solution containing some photosensitive chemicals and the process is only physical coating given to polyester film which retains all its original characteristics.
The products under question are in no way different than a polyester film coated with adhesive in pressure sensitive tape or polyester film covered with coat of metallic aluminium and protected with a lacquer in case of metallised polyester film.
On the basis of the results of examination conducted by me and my experience and knowledge in the field, I confirm that the products in question … are nothing but polyester films coated with lacquer containing some photosensitive chemicals which has deposited a film after drying up the solvents in purely physical way without any chemical reaction whatsoever.”
11. From the above discussion, it is clear that the polyester films did not lose its original character despite the process of lacquering. In fact, the Tribunal has also recorded a categorical finding to the very same effect but held the lacquered polyester film to be different and distinct from the original polyester film only in view of the definition of “manufacture” in section 2(17) of the Act which is couched in very wide terms and the decision of this Court in Commissioner Of Sales Tax v. Dunken Coffee Manufacturing Co. (supra). We have already dealt with the interpretation of section 2(17) of the Act as given by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Shiv Datt and Co. (supra). So far as the decision of this Court in Dunken Coffee Manufacturing Co. (supra) is concerned, it has to be read in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Shiv Datt and Co. (supra). Referring to the above decision, the Supreme Court itself has observed that the said decision dealt with a different set of facts. We find that the Tribunal failed to appreciate the import of that judgment correctly. The said judgment cannot be construed to be of universal application. In any event it has now to be read in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Shiv Datt's case.
12. Considering the nature of the process undertaken by the assessee on the polyester film in the instant case and the effect thereof on the nature, use and description of the commodity in the trade, we are of the clear opinion that the lacquering of polyester films does not amount to “manufacture” within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. There is no essential difference in identity between polyester film and the lacquered polyester film. Polyester film remains polyester film despite application of the process of lacquering.
13. The question referred to us is, therefore, answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee.
14. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
Order accordingly.
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