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Maharashtra State Electricity Board v. Suresh Vaidyanath Pagar And Another

Bombay High Court
Sep 20, 1995
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

These two writ petitions arise from substantially identical facts. The petitioner in both matters is the Maharashtra State Electricity Board (the "Board"). Each respondent was employed by the Board as an artisan "D". Initially each respondent was engaged on 18 August 1983 for a period of four months. On 14 August 1984 each respondent was again appointed as an artisan "D" on a purely temporary basis and posted to work at T.R.W., Manmad, pursuant to letters of appointment dated 14 August 1984. The letters expressly contained Clauses 3, 4 and 6, which stated that the appointment was purely temporary, that services could be terminated after a three month period or earlier by short notice or payment in lieu, and that further continuance beyond the temporary period was subject to three conditions: (I) recommendation by the Employment Exchange; (II) selection by the competent selection committee of the Board; and (III) availability of a vacancy.

The Board terminated the respondents' appointments on 14 November 1984 on the ground that these three stipulations had not been fulfilled (no recommendation by Employment Exchange, no selection by the committee, no vacancy). The respondents filed complaints (ULP No. 47 of 1985 and ULP No. 46 of 1995) before the Labour Court, Nasik. The Labour Court held the terminations contrary to S.25F of the Industrial Disputes Act and amounting to unfair labour practice under items (1)(a), (1)(b) and (1)(f) of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, and directed reinstatement with full back wages from 15 November 1984 (common order dated 9 May 1989).

The Board filed Revision Applications (ULP Nos. 71 & 72 of 1989) before the Industrial Court. By a common order dated 13 December 1989 the Industrial Court dismissed the revisions and confirmed the order of reinstatement (directing the Board to allow the complainants to join duty within one month). The Board challenged that order before this Court by the present writ petitions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the termination of the respondents' temporary appointments amounted to "retrenchment" within the meaning of S.2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  2. Whether the exception contained in Clause (bb) of S.2(oo) (as added by Amending Act 49 of 1984) applies where continuance in service is subject to stipulated conditions in the appointment letter which are not fulfilled.
  3. If the termination did amount to retrenchment, whether the mandatory provisions of S.25F of the Industrial Disputes Act were complied with and, if not, whether that non-compliance rendered the termination illegal and an unfair labour practice under Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (Maharashtra State Electricity Board)

  • The Board contended that the termination did not amount to "retrenchment" because it fell within the exception contained in Clause (bb) of S.2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act — i.e., the termination resulted from the non-fulfilment of express stipulated conditions of the temporary appointment and therefore was excluded from the definition of retrenchment.

Respondents (Workmen)

  • The respondents (as reflected by the Labour Court's findings) contended (or their complaints were founded on the contention) that the terminations were retrenchments within the meaning of S.2(oo), that the Board did not comply with S.25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, and that the terminations therefore were illegal and constituted unfair labour practice under items (1)(a), (1)(b) and (1)(f) of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Principal, Mayo College, Ajmer v. Labour Court [1988 (1) L.L.N. 724] Held (Rajasthan High Court) that the newly added Clause (bb) to S.2(oo) had no retrospective effect. The Labour Court relied on this judgment. The High Court in the present opinion considered this reliance to be misplaced because the terminations occurred on 14 November 1984, after Clause (bb) came into force (effective 18 August 1984), and therefore the question of non-retroactivity was irrelevant to these facts.
Dilip Hanumantrao Shirke v. Zilla Parishad, Yavatmal [1989 (2) L.L.N. 590] Held that Clause (bb) would not be attracted unless the post or the work itself had come to an end; otherwise employers could evade protections by inserting artificial stipulations in employment contracts. The Industrial Court relied on this judgment to reject the Board's contention. The High Court noted that Dilip Shirke held the field at the material time but concluded that its reasoning was subsequently impliedly overruled by the Supreme Court in M. Venugopal.
M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Machilipatnam [1994 (1) L.L.N. 545] Supreme Court decision which, according to the opinion, impliedly overruled the view taken in Dilip Shirke. The High Court followed the law as laid down in Venugopal and held that, in consequence, the exception in Clause (bb) applied to the present terminations. The court treated Venugopal as changing the legal position such that Dilip Shirke could no longer be followed.
Deputy Director of Health Services, Nasik Mandal, Nasik v. Sau. Latabai Rajdhar Paturkar [Writ Petition No. 2517 of 1989, dated 21 March 1995] Referenced as a judgment in which the author of the present opinion participated; it accepted that Venugopal impliedly overruled Dilip Shirke. The opinion invoked this decision to support the proposition that the view in Dilip Shirke had been implicitly overruled and to justify applying Venugopal to the instant matters.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in the following steps, strictly following the materials and reasoning reproduced in the opinion:

  1. Temporal and statutory context: The court observed that Clause (bb) of S.2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act was added by Amending Act 49 of 1984 and came into force on 18 August 1984. The respondents' services were terminated on 14 November 1984, i.e., after Clause (bb) came into force. Therefore questions of retrospective effect (as raised by the Rajasthan High Court decision in Mayo College) were not pertinent to these facts.
  2. Evaluation of lower courts' reliance on precedents: The Labour Court relied on the Mayo College decision; the Industrial Court relied on the High Court's decision in Dilip Shirke. The High Court found the Labour Court's reliance on Mayo College to be inapplicable because Mayo College addressed non-retroactivity, whereas the present terminations occurred after Clause (bb) was effective.
  3. Effect of subsequent Supreme Court authority: The court observed that Dilip Shirke, which had been followed by the Industrial Court, was later effectively overruled by the Supreme Court's decision in M. Venugopal. The court accepted the view (endorsed in a later writ petition decision cited by the author) that Venugopal impliedly overruled the restrictive approach of Dilip Shirke.
  4. Application of Clause (bb) to the facts: The court applied the law as understood after Venugopal and concluded that the terminations in these cases were consequences of the non-fulfilment of conditions expressly set out in the temporary appointment letters (recommendation by Employment Exchange; selection by the selection committee; availability of a vacancy). Because the termination resulted from the non-fulfilment of these stipulated conditions, it fell within the exception contained in Clause (bb) of S.2(oo) and therefore did not amount to "retrenchment" as defined in S.2(oo).
  5. Consequence for S.25F and unfair labour practice findings: Since, in the court's view, the terminations were not retrenchments, the mandatory provisions of S.25F were not triggered. Consequently, the Labour Court's finding that S.25F had been breached and its consequential finding of unfair labour practice under item (1) of Schedule IV were erroneous.
  6. Equitable disposition regarding deposited back-wages: The court addressed prior interlocutory orders of this Court (an initial order declining to interfere, but confining the writ to back-wages and directing a deposit; and a subsequent order permitting the Board to withdraw 50% of the deposit while permitting the workmen to withdraw the remaining 50% on personal undertakings). The court considered it would be harsh and unjust to require workmen to return amounts they had already withdrawn by way of the 50% permitted earlier. The court therefore ordered that if the deposited amounts remained in the trial Court (i.e., not withdrawn by the workmen), those amounts should be refunded to the Board; but if the workmen had already withdrawn their permitted 50% on personal undertakings, the Board would not be permitted to recover those withdrawn amounts and the personal undertakings would be discharged.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petitions (Writ Petition No. 1133 of 1990 and Writ Petition No. 1134 of 1990) are allowed; the rules granted are made absolute; the orders of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court in these matters are quashed and set aside.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • If the amounts of back-wages deposited in the trial Court pursuant to this Court's earlier order (dated 23 October 1991) have not been withdrawn by the respondent-workmen, those amounts shall be refunded to the petitioner-Board.
  • If the respondent-workmen have already withdrawn the amounts (the 50% permitted by the earlier order) on the basis of personal undertakings, then the petitioner-Board shall not recover those withdrawn amounts and the personal undertakings shall stand discharged forthwith.
  • No order as to costs was made.

The opinion does not state that it is laying down a novel precedent beyond applying the Supreme Court decision in M. Venugopal; it confines its disposition to the facts of these two writ petitions and their direct consequences for the parties.

Show all summary ...

1. These two writ petitions arise under almost similar circumstances and raise an identical issue of law; hence, they can be coveniently disposed of by a common judgment.

2. The petitioner in both writ petitions is the Maharashtra State Electricity Board and the respondents in each writ petition was a workman employed in the service of the petitioner-Board.

3. The respondent in each case was employed with the petitioner-Board as an artisan “D” on 18 August 1983 for a period of four months. On 14 August 1984 he was appointed as an artisan “D” on purely temporary basis and posted to work at T.R.W Manmad. The letter of appointment, dated 14 August 1984.(Exhibit A to the writ petition) stipulates certain conditions of service. Particularly, Cls. 3, 4 and 6 of the letter of appointment need to be reproduced, as they are material.

“3. Your appointment is on purely temporary basis.

4. Your services will stand terminated on completion of 3 months period or earlier by giving 24 hours notice or payment of salary in lieu of notice.

6. Your appointment will be on purely temporary basis for a period not exceeding three months and further continuance in the services of the Board shall be subject to the following:

(I) Your candidature is recommended by Employment Exchange.

(II) You are selected for appointment by the competent selection committee of the Board.

(III) Vacancy becomes available.

The appointment of respondent in each petitioner was brought to an end on 14 November 1984 on the ground that the three stipulations contained in Cl. 6 hereinabove had not been fulfilled by him, viz.

(a) that his candidature had not been recommended by Employment Exchange;

(b) that he was not selected for appointment by the competent selection committee of the Board; and

(c) that there was no available vacancy.

The respondents challenged their Complaint (ULP) No. 47 of 1985, and Complaint (ULP) No. 46 of 1995 before the Labour Court at Nasik. The Labour Court after trying the complaint held that the termination of services of the respondent workmen was contrary to the provisions of S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act and amounted to unfair labour practice within the meaning of the items (1)(a), (1)(b) and (1)(f) of Sch. IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Labour Court directed reinstatement of the respondent-workmen in service with full back-wages from 15 November 1984 by a common order in both complaints made on 9 May 1989.

4. The petitioner-Board carried the matter to the Industrial Court by its Revision Applications (ULP) Nos. 71 and 72 of 1989. Revision Application (ULP) No. 71 of 1989 pertains to the respondent-workman in Writ Petition No. 1134 of 1990. While Revision Application (ULP) No. 72 of 1989 pertains to the respondent-workman in Writ Petition No. 1133 of 1990. By a common order, dated 13 December 1989, the Industrial Court dismissed the revision application and directed that the petitioner-Board should allow the complainants workmen to join their duty within a period of one month from the date of order. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner-Board is before this Court by the present writ petition.

5. The ground which weighed heavily with the Labour Court for holding that there was unfair labour practice was that the termination of the concerned workman amounted to retrenchment within the meaning of S. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1971. Since it was not disputed that the provisions of S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act have not been complied with, the Labour Court had no difficulty in holding that the termination of service was illegal and amounted to unfair labour practice within the meaning of item (1) of Sch. IV of the Act. During the trial of the complaints before the Labour Court, the petitioner-Board had urged that its action fell within the exception to the definition of “retrenchment” as contained in Cl.(bb) and that the termination of the service of the two respondents workmen for non-fulfilment of the stipulated conditions did not amount to retrenchment. This contention was repelled by the Labour Court by placing reliance on the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in Principal, Mayo College, Ajmer v. Labour Court [1988 (1) L.L.N 724], in which the view was taken that the newly added Cl.(bb) to S. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act had not retrospective effect. I am unable to see how this judgment could have been of use to the Labour Court. The termination of service of the respondent-workman, in both the cases, took place on 14 November 1984, after coming into force of Cl.(bb) of S. 2(oo), added by Amending Act 49 of 1984, with effect from 18 August 1984. In my view, the Labour Court erred in relying on the judgment of Rajasthan High Court which had no application to the facts before it. When the matter was carried to the Industrial Court in revision, once again the petitioner-Board urged the contention that the cases of the two respondents workmen were covered by Cl.(bb) of S. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act. By relying on a judgment of this Court in Dilip Hanumantrao Shirke v. Zilla Parishad, Yavatmal, [1989 (2) L.L.N 590], the Industrial Court overruled the contention. It is true that, at the material time when the Industrial Court decided the two revision applications, the judgment of Dilip Shirke held the field. The said judgment takes the view that, unless the post or the work for which the workmen had been employed had itself come to an end, Cl.(bb) would not be attracted, as otherwise, it would give a free hand to dishonest employers to scuttle the workmen by artificial stipulations introduced in the employment contract. However, as a consequence of the later judgment of the Supreme Court in M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager Life Insurance Corporation of India, Machilipatnam, Andhra Pradesh, [1994 (1) L.L.N 545], the view taken in Dilip Shirke case must be held to be overruled. In the judgment rendered in Deputy Director of Health Services, Nasik Mandal, Nasik v. Sau. Latabai Rajdhar, Paturkar [Writ Petition No. 2517 of 1989, dated 21 March 1995] (vide supra) to which I was a party, the view has been taken that after the judgment in Venugopal case the view taken in the judgment in Dilip Shirke must be held to be impliedly overruled even though the judgment of Dilip Shirke was not even cited and brought to the notice of the Supreme Court while deciding Venugopal case. I am of the view that in the instant case, following the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Venugopal (vide supra), it must be held that the termination of services of the two respondent-workmen squarely fell within the exception Cl.(bb) of S. 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act It is not in dispute that none of the three stipulations incorporated in the letters of appointment of temporary service issued on 14 August 1984, had been fulfilled by the respondent-workmen. The termination of their services was a consequence of non-fulfilment of the said stipulations incorporated in their letters of appointment. Hence, their cases squarely fall within the exception contemplated by Cl.(bb) of S. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act defining “retrenchment.” Thus, I am of the view both the Courts below erred in holding that the termination of service of each of the respondent-workmen amounted to “retrenchment” and the further finding that there was breach of mandatory provisions of S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, and the consequential finding of unfair labour practice under item (1) of Sch. IV of the Act. In my judgment the judgments of both the Courts below are liable to be quashed and set aside.

6. At the time of admission of these two writ petitions, by an order, dated 16 March 1990, this Court had declined to interfere with the direction of reinstatement granted by the Labour Court and confirmed by the Industrial Court in revisions applications. The rules issued in both writ petitions were confined to back-wages. Further, the petitioner was directed to deposit full amount of back-wages payable to the workmen concerned. By a further, order, dated 23 October 1991, this Court permitted the petitioner-Board to withdraw 50 per cent of the deposited amount and permitted the respondent-workmen to withdraw the remaining 50 per cent on furnishing personal undertakings to the trial Court. Though I am of the view that the judgments of the two Courts below are liable to be quashed and set aside, if the amounts of 50 per cent of the back-wages deposited in the trial Court have already been withdrawn by the respondent-workmen by furnishing personal undertakings, it would be harsh and unjust to permit the petitioner-Board to recover the said amounts from the two respondent-workmen. I am taking this view because, at the material time when the two Courts below gave their orders, the view taken by this Court in Dilip Shirke case [1989 (2) L.L.N 590] (vide supra), held the filed and it is only subsequently that the said view was impliedly overruled by the Supreme Court in Venugopal case [1994 (1) L.L.N 545] (vide supra). In my view, the vicissitudes of litigation should not be allowed to engulf the respondent-workmen in their wake, leading to harsh and unjust results. A just and reasonable resolution would be that, if the workmen have not withdrawn the amount, the amounts should be refunded to the petitioner-Board and, if the workman have already withdraw the amount of 50 per cent permitted by this Court by its order, dated 23 October 1991, then there should be no recovery of the amounts and the personal undertaking given by the respondent-workmen should be discharged.

7. In the result, Writ Petition No. 1133 of 1990 and Writ Petition No. 1134 of 1990 are hereby allowed. Rules granted therein are made absolute. The orders of the two Courts below in these two writ petitions are hereby quashed and set aside. If the respondent workman in each writ petition has not withdrawn the amount deposited in the trial Court pursuant to the order of this Court, dated 23 October 1991, by giving personal undertaking, then the amount lying in deposit in the trial Court shall be refunded to the petitioner-Board. If, however, any amounts have been withdrawn by the respondent-workmen by giving personal undertakings, then, notwithstanding the writ petitions being allowed, the petitioner-Board shall not recover the amounts already withdrawn by the respondent-workmen; personal undertakings, if given by the workmen, shall stand forthwith discharged.

8. Rules are accordingly made absolute in both writ petitions with no order as to costs.