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Gangaram Atmaram Vishwasrao v. The National Textile Corpn. (Sn) Ltd., And Another

Bombay High Court
Jul 21, 1995
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Comprehensive Summary of the Opinion — B.N. Srikrishna, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was employed as a fitter in the Ring Department of New Hind Textile Mills (first respondent). His service was terminated effective 1 January 1981. He filed Application (BIR) No. 7 of 1981 before the Labour Court alleging wrongful retrenchment contrary to section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, seeking reinstatement with full back-wages. The Labour Court allowed the application and directed reinstatement with continuity and full back-wages.

The first respondent appealed to the Industrial Court, Maharashtra (Appeal (IC) No. 60 of 1986) under section 84 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (BIR Act). The Industrial Court dismissed the appeal by order dated 30 January 1987, rejecting the first respondent’s contention that the petitioner was a temporary worker engaged only for erection of machinery.

The petitioner was called back to service from 6 April 1987. He contended he was not taken back as a permanent employee and continued to be treated as a temporary workman. On 15 February 1988 he filed Complaint (ULP) No. 342 of 1988 before the Industrial Court under section 28 read with Items 9 & 10 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions & Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (the Act), seeking a declaration of permanency after completion of 240 days and reliefs consequent thereon.

In its written statement the first respondent again pleaded that the petitioner had been employed temporarily for erection work and that after the work ended his service terminated; it admitted, however, that the Labour Court order had been implemented by reinstating the petitioner as a temporary fitter and paying back wages. The Industrial Court ultimately dismissed Complaint (ULP) No. 342 of 1988 by order dated 22 October 1993. The petitioner challenged that order by writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Industrial Court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that the petitioner had not presented the complaint through the representative union (i.e., a maintainability question).
  2. Whether the petitioner was entitled to be treated as a permanent employee after completion of the requisite period (240 days in non-seasonal establishments / 190 days for seasonal establishments) under Model Standing Order 4-C and applicable rules.
  3. Whether the Industrial Court misinterpreted or misapplied Model Standing Order 4-C (including whether there was a drafting defect requiring remedial construction).
  4. Whether the first respondent's failure to grant permanency and consequential benefits constituted an "unfair labour practice" within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act.
  5. Whether the complaint was barred by limitation (as framed by the Industrial Court's issues).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner argued that, having completed 240 days' aggregate service, he ought to be deemed permanent under Model Standing Order 4-C and related standing orders/rules.
  • He relied on the Industrial Court's earlier appellate order dated 30 January 1987 (which rejected the employer's contention of temporary engagement) and said that permanency followed as a direct implication of that order.
  • He contended that there existed an agreement between the representative union and Millowners' Association to make temporaries and badlis permanent after 240 days' service (this contention was later not pressed as a registered agreement was not shown).

First Respondent's Arguments

  • The first respondent maintained that the petitioner had been engaged temporarily "in connection with the erection of machinery in the Warp Ring Frame Section" and that the engagement ended when that specific work ended; the termination was therefore not retrenchment.
  • It admitted that, after disposal of the earlier appeal, the respondent implemented the Labour Court order by reinstating the complainant "in his post of Temporary Fitter" and paying back wages.
  • In its written statement and draft issues before the Industrial Court, the first respondent contested the merits (temporary employment defense) but did not appear to raise a ground as to the maintainability of the complaint under the Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Anjani Kumar Co. Ltd. v. Manubai Kashinath (1989) II L.L.N. 154 Interpreting effect of section 40-a of the BIR Act and applicability of Model Standing Orders; the opinion referred to this case to show what the correct legal position under section 40-a is. The court held that the Industrial Court had misunderstood the observations in Anjani Kumar’s case and had applied them contrary to what was decided; the present Court relied on Anjani Kumar to explain the correct scope of section 40-a and Model Standing Orders.
Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher (1949) 2 All E.R. 155 Authority for the proposition that a judge should seek the intention of the legislature and, when faced with drafting defects, supplement the language to give effect to legislative intent (Denning, L.J.'s dictum). The court quoted Denning’s dictum from Seaford to justify a constructive approach in rectifying an obvious drafting slip in Model Standing Order 4-C so as to avoid an absurd result and to effectuate the legislature's intention.
Bangalore Water Supply v. Rajappa (1978) 2 SCC 213 : AIR 1978 SC 548 Approval of the judicial duty to ascertain legislative intent and remedy drafting defects so that statutes are not rendered futile by poor drafting. The court cited Rajappa as approving the approach of Seaford/Denning and applied that principle in interpreting and correcting the defective text of Model Standing Order 4-C under the BIR Act.
Salmon v. Duncombe (1886) II A.C. 627 (P.C.) Principle permitting courts, in exceptional cases, to reject surplus words or rectify drafting defects to make statutes effective where necessary (privy council / House of Lords authorities). The court invoked Salmon (and the Privy Council reasoning) to support the proposition that where drafting unskillfulness would render a statute ineffective, courts may adopt remedial construction to give effect to the legislative purpose.
McMonagle v. Westminster City Council (1990) 1 All E.R. 993 Further authority concerning purposive construction and dealing with drafting defects (cited as part of the line of authorities). The court listed McMonagle among authorities that justify remedial construction and purposive interpretation where necessary to effect legislative intent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in several connected strands, each grounded in the evidence, the record of prior judicial findings, and interpretive principles:

  1. Maintainability and procedural history: The Court noted that the first respondent had not raised, either in its written statement or in draft issues before the Industrial Court, any objection as to the maintainability of the complaint under the Act. The Industrial Court nevertheless dismissed the complaint on the ground that the petitioner had not filed the complaint through the representative union. The High Court found this reasoning to be a misreading or misunderstanding of the case before the Industrial Court.
  2. Effect of the earlier appellate order (30 January 1987): The Industrial Court's earlier appellate order had expressly rejected the first respondent's defence that the petitioner was engaged only as a temporary hand for a specific work. The High Court observed that the Industrial Court in the complaint proceedings either ignored or misapplied that earlier finding—evidenced by its statements that the status of the complainant was not decided and that the Production Manager's affidavit showed the complainant was a temporary fitter.
  3. Model Standing Order 4-C — textual analysis and corrective construction: The Court carefully compared the Model Standing Order 4-C as notified under the BIR Act with the corresponding Model Standing Order under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. It identified an obvious drafting lacuna in the BIR Act version: the substantive part referred only to "240 days ... in any other undertaking" while the Explanation referred to computing "190 days" as well, producing an internal inconsistency that would defeat the legislative scheme (i.e., 190 days for seasonal establishments and 240 days for other establishments).
  4. Interpretive approach adopted: Adopting the remedial and purposive approach endorsed in authorities (Seaford/Denning, Rajappa, Salmon, McMonagle), the Court declined to adopt an overly literal construction that would produce an absurdity or nullify legislative intent. The Court concluded that the missing reference to "any establishment of seasonal character" in the substantive portion was a drafting slip and that the text should be construed to carry the intended meaning (so that 190 days applies to seasonal establishments and 240 days to other establishments).
  5. Application to the facts and findings: Considering that the Industrial Court had already rejected the employer's contention of temporary employment in its earlier order, and that the petitioner had completed the required aggregate period for permanency, the High Court found the impugned order of the Industrial Court (dismissing the complaint) to be erroneous and based on a misdirection in law. The High Court further accepted that no registered agreement existed as to permanency after 240 days, so that particular contention did not assist the petitioner, but the core relief flowed from the proper construction of the Model Standing Order together with the earlier appellate finding.
  6. Conclusion on unfair labour practice: On these bases the Court concluded that by not giving the petitioner permanency and consequential benefits, the first respondent had engaged in an "unfair labour practice" within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The writ petition was allowed. The Court quashed and set aside the Industrial Court's impugned order dated 22 October 1993 made in Complaint (ULP) No. 342 of 1988. It was held that the petitioner was entitled to reinstatement as a permanent employee as a consequence of the Industrial Court's earlier Order dated 30 January 1987 (Appeal (IC) No. 60 of 1986), and that the first respondent's failure to grant permanency and consequential benefits constituted an "unfair labour practice" under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act.

Direct consequences and remedial directions:

  • The petitioner is entitled to monetary benefits, if any, which may accrue as a result of being treated as a permanent employee from 30 January 1987.
  • Those benefits are to be made available to the petitioner within three months from the date of the High Court’s order; failure to do so will attract simple interest at 12% per annum.
  • The first respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the writ petition quantified at Rs. 500/-. The Court noted the petitioner had retired on 15 July 1991, and thus directed monetary entitlements only.

Broader implications: The Court corrected the Industrial Court's misapplication of the Model Standing Order and adopted a remedial construction to give effect to legislative intent. The opinion focused on correcting the error in interpreting Model Standing Order 4-C and vindicating the effect of the earlier appellate finding; the decision's direct effect is the relief ordered to the petitioner. The opinion does not expressly state that it establishes a novel binding precedent beyond applying established principles of purposive/statutory interpretation to the facts.

Disposition: Rule made absolute. Petition allowed. Certified copy expedited.

Show all summary ...

B.N Srikrishna, J.:— In this writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has impugned an order dated 22nd October, 1993 made by the Industrial Court at Bombay in Complaint (ULP) No. 342 of 1988 under the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions & Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).

2. The petitioner was working as a Fitter in the Ring Department of the New Hind Textile Mills, Bombay, belonging to the first respondent. His service came to be terminated on 1st January, 1981. He filed an application before the Labour Court alleging that he was a permanent employee and that his service had been dispensed with by way of retrenchment contrary to the provisions of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The petitioner sought the relief of reinstatement in service with full back-wages. His Application (BIR) No. 7 of 1981 before the Labour Court was allowed by the Labour Court, which directed reinstatement of the petitioner in service with continuity and full back-wages.

3. Being aggrieved by the said order, the first respondent challenged the order by its Appeal (IC) No. 60 of 1986 before the Industrial Court, Maharashtra, Bombay, under section 84 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as “the BIR Act”). The said appeal was dismissed by the Industrial Court by its order dated 30th January, 1987. In the order dismissing the appeal, the Industrial Court specifically came to the conclusion that the contention of the first respondent that the petitioner had been employed in service only as a temporary workman in connection with the work of erection of Warp Ring Frames and Weft Frames, was untenable and rejected it. The learned Judge of the Industrial Court noticed that a copy of the appointment letter of the petitioner had not been placed on record to substantiate the defence of the first respondent that the petitioner was employed as a temporary employee. He also considered the totality of the evidence on record. After assessing all relevant circumstances, the Industrial Court recorded a clear finding and observed (vide paragraph 10):—

“…After making a re-appraisal of evidence on record, I have come to the conclusion that the appellant's (first respondent) defence viz. applicant (petitioner) was appointed as a temporary hand for a specific work is without any basis. At least there is no evidence having the character of compelling acceptance to substantiate the said defence.”

4. Thereafter, the learned Judge of the Industrial Court came to the conclusion that the termination of the petitioners' service with effect from 1st January, 1981 was illegal, being violative of the mandatory requirements of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Industrial Court, therefore, confirmed the order of the Labour Court and dismissed the appeal. It is to be noticed here that the contention raised by the first respondent before the Industrial Court in appeal was that the petitioner has been engaged as a temporary hand for carrying out the specific job of erection of certain machinery and, the said job having come to an end, the petitioner's service had come to an end by the expiry of the work, for which he was engaged. This defence put forward by the first respondent was considered and categorically rejected by the Industrial Court. In other words, the Industrial Court was of the view that the first respondent was not a temporary employee and, therefore, the manner in which his service had been discharged was contrary to law. It is on account of this reasoning that the Industrial Court upheld the order of reinstatement of the petitioner in service with continuity and full back-wages.

5. After the said order of the Industrial Court dated 30th January, 1987, the petitioner was called and taken back in service with effect from 6th April, 1987. It is the case of the petitioner that, though he was taken back in employment, he was not taken back as a permanent employee and that the first respondent continued to treat him as a temporary workman.

6. The petitioner continued to work for some time, and his entreaties to treat him as a permanent employee having failed, on 15th February, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint (ULP) No. 342 of 1988 before the Industrial Court under section 28 read with Items 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Act. The case made out in the complaint was that the petitioner ought to be deemed to be a permanent employee from the date on which he had completed 240 days. It was contended that his status as a permanent employee had already been adjudicated and decided by the Industrial Court by its order dated 30th January, 1987 made in Appeal (IC) No. 60 of 1986. It was also contended in the complaint that there was an agreement between the representative union and the Millowners' Association, acting on behalf of the textile mills in Bombay, under which temporaries and badlies were to be made permanent after completion of 240 days of work.

7. Once again, in its written statement filed by the first respondent, the story that the petitioner had been engaged temporarily “in connection with the erection of machinery in the Warp Ring Frame Section”, was pleaded. It was further pleaded that the petitioner's service was terminated on 13th December, 1980 because the said work had come to an end. It was admitted in the written statement that the Petitioner's Application (BIR) No. 170 of 1981 had been allowed by the Labour Court by its order dated 14th April, 1986 and that the first respondent's Appeal (IC) No. 60 of 1986 had been dismissed by the order of the Industrial Court dated 30th January, 1987. The first respondent pleaded,

“….The respondent states that after disposal of the said appeal, the respondent have decided to implement the order dated 15-4-1986 of the Hon'ble Ninth Labour Court, Bombay and accordingly, the complainant was reinstated in his post of Temporary Fitter and he was also paid the back wages as per the said order.

(Emphasis supplied)”.

8. A careful perusal of the written statement dated 14th September, 1988 filed by the first respondent does not show that any legal objection as to the tenability of the complaint was raised, though, on merits, the claim was contested by the defence indicated in the written statement. On 17th February, 1989, the first respondent's advocate filed Draft of Issues to be framed for the trial of the complaint. The said Draft Issues are at pages 76 and 77 of the writ petition and, even therein, no issue as to the tenability of the complaint was raised.

9. The Industrial Court tried the complaint and dismissed the complaint by its order dated 30th January, 1987, which is impugned in the present writ petition.

10. The Industrial Court appears to have framed the following points for its determination and answered them as under:

“1) Does the complainant (petitioner) prove that the respondent has shown favouritism or partiality to one set of workers regardless of merits within the meaning of Item 5 of Schedule IV of MRTU & PULP Act?

2) Does the complainant prove that the respondent employs the employees as badlil casual and temporary and continue them as such for years with the object of depriving them of their status and privileges of permanent employees and thereby committed unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 6 of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act?

3) Does the complainant prove that the respondents have failed to implement award, settlement, agreement or standing orders and thereby committed unfair labour practices within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act?

4) Whether the complaint is entitled to premanency with retrospective effect as soon as he has completed 240 days of continuous service and the difference of wages and entitled to file the complaint?

5) Does the complainant prove that the respondents have indulged in lot of force or violence and thereby committed unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 10 of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act?

6) Whether the complaint is barred by limitation?

7) What orders?

“11. My findings on the aforesaid points are as under for the following reasons:

1) No. 2) No. 3) No. 4) No. 5) Does not prove; 6) No. and 7) As per the final orders”.

11. A perusal of the issues framed by the Industrial Court does not indicate that it was trying the issue as to the maintainability of the complaint on any ground whatsoever. I am informed by Dr. Kulkarni, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, and there appears to be no reason not to accept his statement, for none has appeared on behalf of the first respondent, that the parties had filed written arguments in support of their respective cases before the Industrial Court, and that, in the written arguments filed by the first respondent also, there was no ground urged as to the maintainability of the complaint under the provisions of the Act. Dr. Kulkarni brought to my attention a grievance to this effect made in paragraph 5 of this writ petition. There is no return denying these facts and, therefore, there is no reason why they cannot be accepted as correct.

12. It is strange that the learned Judge of the Industrial Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the claim of the petitioner for permanency was not tenable, because the complainant had not filed the complaint through the representative union. The most liberal view that can be taken in the matter is that the learned Judge misread and misunderstood the case required to be tried in the complaint before him. Although a copy of the Industrial Court's earlier order dated 30th January, 1987 had been filed at Exhibit ‘B’ to the complaint, strangely the Industrial Court observes in paragraph 12 of the impugned order:—

“…..It is not clear from the record whether the complainant is permanent or temporary. In that respect, no document is placed on record, but it is clear from the affidavit of the production Manager that the complainant was a temporary fitter and he cannot claim for permanency in the lower post of fitter mazdoor.”

13. Further, in paragraph 13 of the impugned order, dealing with Issue No. 2, the Industrial Court observes:—

“…..It means that the complainant was fully aware about the Labour Court Order dated 15-4-1986 and the Industrial Court's Order dated 30-1-1987 for reinstatement as temporary. It is observed from the Court's order that the status of the complainant is not decided.”

14. In my view, the observations of the Industrial Court in paragraph 10 of the appellate order dated 30th January, 1987 were clear and needed no gloss to understand them.

15. Put shortly, the case of the petitioner in the complaint was:

(i) that, despite completion of 240 days' working, he had not been given the status of permanency as mandatorily required under Model Standing Order No. 4-C.

(ii) that the status of permanency was not granted to him, in spite of an agreement between the representative union and the representatives of employer and Millowners' Association that temporary and badlies who had completed 240 days working should be made permanent.

(iii) that, in any event, the Industrial Court's Appellate Order dated 30th January, 1987 had clearly rejected the contention of the First respondent that the petitioner had been engaged on a temporary basis and, consequently, it must be held as a direct implication of the said Order that the petitioner was a permanent workman.

16. Suprisingly, there seems to be non-application, or at any rate, misapplication, of mind to these three crucial aspects of the matter.

17. On the issue of Model Standing Orders being applicable, the learned Judge holds in paragraph 30 of the impugned order as it being contrary to the provisions of section 40-a of the BIR Act. He has also completely misunderstood the observations of this Court in the judgment of (Anjani Kumar Co. Ltd. v. Manubai Kashinath)1, (1989) II L.L.N 154. In fact, having referred to the said judgment and certain observations made therein, the learned Judge has held exactly contrary to what was decided therein. It is worthwhile reiterating that in Anjani Kumar's case (supra), this Court held that, because of the provisions of section 40-a of the BIR Act, Model Standing Orders made and notified by the State Government in respect of any additional matter included in Chapter I of the BIR Act or any alteration made in Schedule I on and after the date of commencement of Bombay Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 1977, shall, unless the said Model Standing Orders are held by the Commissioner of Labour to be less advantageous to the employees than the corresponding Certified Standing Orders applicable to them, also apply in relation to such employees. Schedule I was amended by addition of Item 14 by the Amending Act Maharashtra 47 of 1977 adding the words “Employment or re-employment of probationers or badlies or temporary or casual workmen, and their conditions of service” in the item. Model Standing Order 4-C provides:—

“A badli or temporary operative which has put in 240 days uninterrupted service in the aggregate in any other undertaking during the period of preceding twelve calendar months shall be made permanent in that undertaking by an order in writing signed by the Manager or any person authorised in that behalf by the Manager, irrespective of whether or not his name is on the muster roll of the undertaking throughout the period of the said twelve calendar months.

“Explanation:— For the purpose of this clause any period of interrupted service, caused by cessation of work which is not due to any fault of the operative concerned, shall not be counted for the purpose of computing 190 days or 240 days or, as the case may be, for making a badli or temporary operative permanent.”

18. Referring to the observations made by the Industrial Court in paragraphs 19 to 23 of the impugned Order, Dr. Kulkarni urged that, though the reasoning is completely misconceived, perhaps the benefit of doubt should go to the learned Judge of the Industrial Court, as the text of the Model Standing Order 4-C notified by the appropriate Government in exercise of its powers under the BIR Act, is itself defective. He, however, urges that the interpretation given to this Standing Order by the Industrial Court is likely to create confusion and distort the real intent behind the salutory provision made in framing the said Model Standing Order. He brought to my notice that some amendments were simultaneously carried out in the Central Act viz., the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and a similar Model Standing Order was also framed thereunder, a conspectus whereof makes the intention very clear. After having perused the corresponding Model Standing Order 4-C framed under the Bombay Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1959, it appears to me that the contention urged by learned Counsel is correct and needs to be upheld. In my view, this is a case where, in spite of the obvious difficulty brought to the notice of the Court, the Court should not throw up its hands in helplessness, but act decisively to resolve the difficulty. In the ringing words of Denning, L.J, the duty of a Judge is:

“When a defect appears a Judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament and then he must supplement the written words so as to give ‘force and life’ to the intention of the legislature. A Judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A Judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases.”

19. Observation of Denning, L.J, in (Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher)2, (1949) 2 All E.R 155, referred to with approval by the Supreme Court in (Bangalore Water Supply v. Rajappa)3, (1978) 2 SCC 213 : A.I.R 1978 SC. 548. The Judge has to discharge the onerous duty of ascertaining the intention of the law-maker, which may be obscure due to error in draftsmanship. In the words of the Privy Council,

“At times the intention of the legislature is clear but the unskillfulness of the draftsman in introducing certain words in the statute results in apparent ineffectiveness of the language. Since courts strongly lean against reducing a statute to a futility, it is permissible in such cases to reject the surplus words to make the statute effective and workable.”

20. (Salmon v. Duncombe)4, (1886) II A.C 627 (P.C). The House of Lords, approving the above observations of the Privy Council in Salmon's case observed:—

“It is a ‘very serious matter’, stated Lord Hobhouse, ‘to hold that when the main object of the statute is clear it shall be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskillfulness or ignorance of Law”, and proceeded to add: ‘It may be necessary for a Court of justice to come to such a conclusion, but their Lordships hold that nothing can justify it except necessity or the absolute intractability of the language used.”

21. See, in this connection, (Mc Monagle v. Westminster City Council)5, (1990) 1 All E.R 993.

22. Model Standing Order 4-C added in Schedule I to the Bombay Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1959, framed under the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1946, reads as under:—

“4-C. A badli or temporary workman who has put in 190 days' uninterrupted service in the aggregate in any establishment of seasonal nature or 240 days “uninterrupted service” in the aggregate in any other establishment, during a period of preceding twelve calendar months, shall be made permanent in that establishment by order in writing signed by the Manager, or any person authorised in that behalf by the Manager, irrespective of whether or not his name is on the muster roll of the establishment throughout the period of the said twelve calendar months.

“Explanation.—For purpose of this clause any period of interrupted service, caused by cessation of work which is not due to any fault of the workman concerned, shall not be counted for the purpose of computing 190 days or 240 days, or, as the case may be, for making a badli or temporary workman permanent.”

23. A perusal of this Standing Order shows that 190 days' uninterrupted service in the aggregate in any establishment of seasonal nature is sufficient for permanency of badli or temporary workman. In the case of “other establishment”, a non-seasonal establishment, the period of service requisite to qualify for permanency is 240 days' uninterrupted service in the aggregate. I am satisfied that this was the exact result sought to be achieved by Model Standing Order 4-C under the BIR Act also. However, on account of error in drafting, an obvious lacuna is left in Model Standing Order 4-C under the BIR Act. This conclusion gets fortified by a look at the Explanation. The Explanation is identical in both cases. The Explanation in the Model Standing Order under the BIR Act makes pointed reference to computing of 190 days for making a badli or temporary operative permanent. Interestingly, in the substantive provision, there is no reference at all to 190 days. The reference is only to putting in of 240 days' uninterrupted service in the aggregate in “any other undertaking” during the period of preceding twelve calendar months. If the substantive provision does not make reference to 190 days' uninterrupted service for making a badli or temporary employee permanent, it is obvious that the Explanation cannot. This appears to be a case of a slip between the cup and the lip. Starting with the intention that both concerned Model Standing Orders should produce the same legal result, the legislative draftsman has, by an error somewhere along the line, omitted the words “in any establishment of a seasonal character”, which were material and had to be kept intact in the substantive portion of Model Standing Order 4-C under the BIR Act, as that is the only occasion for making of a badli or temporary operative permanent upon the completion of 190 days. The words “in any other undertaking” would then obviously mean an undertaking other than a seasonal undertaking, such as in the present case. In my view, therefore, the word “other” used in the existing Model Standing Order 4-C under the BIR Act should be understood in this context or be ignored totally when considering the case of a non-seasonal undertaking. This is the only rational way in which the said Model Standing Order 4-C can be construed, so that the intended benefits to the workmen are not defeated by too literal a construction. That statutes should not be construed in a manner leading to absurd results defeating the legislative intent, is a canon of interpretation widely accepted.

24. Thus, in my view, though the learned Judge erred by literally construing Model Standing Order 4-C to the point leading to an absurdity, it would not be possible to fault him, as he has carefully read the text of the Model Standing Order and applied it.

25. Dr. Kulkarni fairly conceded that there was no registered agreement between the representative union in the Cotton Textile Industry and the representative of employers, under which it was provided that the workmen would be made permanent upon the completion of 240 days' aggregate service. I, therefore need not consider the said contention.

26. Considering the matter from all angles, I am of the view that the impugned order is erroneous, arises on account of a misdirection in law and needs to be interfered with and corrected in the exercise of this Court's prerogative power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

27. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned Order of the Industrial Court dated 22nd October, 1993 made in Complaint (ULP) No. 342 of 1988 is hereby quashed and set aside. It is held that the petitioner was entitled to reinstatement as a permanent employee as a consequence of the Industrial Court's Order dated 30th January, 1987 made in Appeal (IC) No. 60 of 1986 and further that the First respondent, by not giving the petitioner the status of permanency and the consequential benefits, has engaged in an “unfair labour practice” within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. I am informed by Dr. Kulkarni that the petitioner has retired from service with effect from 15th July, 1991. He will, therefore, be entitled to the monetary benefits, if any, which may accrue as a result of his being treated as a permanent employee from 30th January, 1987. The aforesaid benefits shall be made available to the petitioner within a period of three months from today, failing which they shall carry simple interest at 12% per annum, apart from other legal consequences. Rule, accordingly, made absolute. The First respondent to pay the costs of this writ petition quantified at Rs. 500/-.

28. Certified copy expedited.

29. Petition allowed.