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Deputy Director Of Health Services, Nasik, Mandal Nasik, And Others v. Latabai Rajdhar Paturkar
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This writ petition under Article 226 challenges an award of the Industrial Court, Nasik dated 1 March 1989 in Revision Application (ULP) No. 141 of 1988 under S. 44 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971.
The respondent had been employed in the Health Department as an auxiliary nurse and midwife at Dhule. She retired on medical grounds on 6 March 1978 and was paid an invalid pension. After medical treatment and recovery, she was reappointed effective from 19 October 1985 and received a letter of appointment dated 18/21 July 1986 on a temporary basis with a probation period of one year and continuation dependent on assessment of her work.
On 27 May 1987 she was served with an order terminating her services effective 30 June 1987 on the ground that her services were no longer required. She filed Complaint (ULP) No. 106 of 1987 before the Labour Court, Dhule, alleging unfair labour practice under item (1) of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Act. The Labour Court, by order dated 19 May 1988, dismissed the complaint holding that the respondent's service was governed by the Maharashtra Civil Service Rules (rules under the proviso to Article 309), that Chapter VA of the Industrial Disputes Act did not apply, and that S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act was therefore not available to her.
The respondent appealed to the Industrial Court under S. 44. The Industrial Court treated the petitioners' activities as an "industry" and the respondent as a "workman", found the termination to be retrenchment within the meaning of S. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, held that S. 25F had not been complied with and therefore the termination was void, and also treated the termination as an unfair labour practice under item (1) of Schedule IV. The Industrial Court set aside the termination and directed reinstatement with continuity and full back wages. The petitioners then filed the present writ petition to challenge that Industrial Court order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the termination of the respondent's service amounted to "retrenchment" within the meaning of S. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act in light of the amendment introducing clause (bb) by Act 49 of 1984.
- Whether termination effected in accordance with service rules and/or stipulations in the contract of employment (probationary termination under Maharashtra Civil Service Rules and the appointment letter) falls within the exception in clause (bb) of S. 2(oo) and thus avoids the requirements of S. 25F.
- Whether the termination was mala fide or a colorable device to avoid regularisation (i.e., whether courts below should have found mala fides despite the appointment letter and stated reasons).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments (Sri Pai)
- The Industrial Court erred in law by misreading the definition of "retrenchment" and by applying the pre-18 August 1984 definition rather than recognizing the amendment (clause (bb) inserted by Act 49 of 1984).
- Because clause (bb) of S. 2(oo) applies, termination in accordance with the contractual stipulation (probation and performance-based continuation) does not amount to retrenchment and the mandatory requirements of S. 25F are not applicable.
- The petitioners relied on the Supreme Court decision in M. Venugopal v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, Andhra Pradesh [1994 (1) L.L.N 545] to support the proposition that termination under contractual/regulatory stipulations during probation is covered by clause (bb) and not retrenchment.
Respondent's Arguments (Sri Kochar)
- Clause (bb) has been judicially interpreted by several High Courts and should be read down so as not to enable misuse by unscrupulous employers — it should not cover cases where the job continues and periodic renewals are used to avoid regular status.
- Judicial consensus (High Court decisions cited) restricts clause (bb) to genuine fixed-term or bona fide non-renewal situations; if the employment continues and work is satisfactory, non-renewal may be mala fide and not fall within clause (bb).
- The termination in the present case was mala fide or colorable: evidence (allegedly) existed that the petitioners replaced the respondent with another person and that the termination was to give employment to the petitioners' persons; the courts below should have made findings of mala fides based on this evidence.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| M. Venugopal v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, Andhra Pradesh [1994 (1) L.L.N 545] | Holds that where termination is in accordance with contractual/regulatory stipulations (e.g., probationary terms including performance targets) such termination falls within exception (bb) of S. 2(oo) and is not "retrenchment"; the rules/regulations can be statutory terms of employment. | The court relied principally on Venugopal to conclude that termination under the terms of the respondent's appointment and the Maharashtra Civil Service Rules was covered by clause (bb) and therefore not retrenchment; Venugopal foreclosed accepting the respondent's argument of retrenchment absent a finding of mala fides. |
| State Bank of India v. N. Sundaramony [1976 (2) L.L.N 5] | Earlier authority establishing the wide scope of "retrenchment" under S. 2(oo) prior to the 1984 amendment. | Referred to as part of the historical line of authority showing the broad pre-amendment interpretation; used in reasoning about the effect of the 1984 amendment and the nature of clause (bb). |
| Santosh Gupta v. State Bank Of Patiala [1980 (2) L.L.N 170] | Another authority illustrating that pre-amendment definition of "retrenchment" was wide enough to include discharge simpliciter. | Referred to in the context of the legislative change caused by Act 49 of 1984 and to contrast earlier expansive readings of "retrenchment" with the post-amendment exception (bb). |
| Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation, Ltd., Chandigarh v. Labour Court, Chandigarh [1990 (1) L.L.N 1054] | Part of the chain of Supreme Court decisions reiterating the broad pre-amendment meaning of "retrenchment". | Cited as part of the background showing the evolution of judicial interpretation prior to the 1984 amendment. |
| Dilip Hanumantrao Shirke v. Zilla Parishad, Yavatmal [1989 (2) L.L.N 590] (Single Judge, this Court) | Holds that clause (bb) applies only where the work or post ceases or the contract of employment is fair, proper and bona fide; suggests limits on clause (bb). | Noted by the court as an influential High Court view that limits the scope of clause (bb); the petitioner's counsel relied on Venugopal to distinguish/overcome these limitations in the present facts. |
| S.S Sambro v. Chief Regional Manager, State Bank of India, Nagpur [1991 (1) L.L.N 281] (Division Bench) | Expressly approved the Single Judge decision in Dilip Shirke, endorsing limits on clause (bb). | Cited by respondent's counsel to support the reading-down approach to clause (bb); the court acknowledged these authorities but held Venugopal decisive for the present facts. |
| Balbir Singh v. Kurukshetra Central Co-operative Bank, Ltd. [1990 (2) L.L.N 576] (Punjab High Court) | States clause (bb) should be limited to genuine fixed-term engagements where work ceases; non-renewal in continuing work is mala fide. | Referenced as part of the High Court authorities advocating restriction of clause (bb); considered by the court but not held controlling against Venugopal. |
| K. Rajendran v. Director (Personnel), Project and Equipment Corporation of India, Ltd., New Delhi [1992 (1) L.L.N 150] (Madras High Court) | Adopts the view in Dilip Shirke and Balbir Singh that clause (bb) must be confined to bona fide contractual terminations. | Cited by respondent to argue clause (bb) should be read down; court noted but applied Venugopal instead. |
| Jayabharat Printers and Publishers (Private), Ltd. v. Labour Court, Kozhikode [82 F.J.R 622] (Kerala High Court) | Approves the view that clause (bb) should be strictly interpreted and cannot be extended to cases where contractual form is a camouflage to evade ID Act protections. | Cited among High Court authorities limiting clause (bb); acknowledged by the court when considering the mala fides argument but found no material to establish mala fides here. |
| State Bank of India v. N. Sundaramonoy and Santosh Gupta (earlier referred cases) | Illustrate judicial tendency pre-amendment to read "retrenchment" widely; used in Venugopal's reasoning. | Referred to by the court in explaining Venugopal's observations and how the 1984 amendment (clause (bb)) changed the legal landscape. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeds in these principal steps, based exclusively on the material in the opinion:
- Identification of governing law and facts: It is undisputed that the respondent's service was governed by the Maharashtra Civil Service Regulations enacted under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and that the reappointment letter referred to those Rules. The letter expressly characterized the appointment as temporary and on probation (one year) with continuation dependent on assessment of work; it also stated the service was liable to be terminated without advance notice.
- Evaluation of the Industrial Court's conclusion of retrenchment: The Industrial Court had found the termination to be retrenchment under S. 2(oo) and held S. 25F non-compliance rendered termination void. The present court examined whether that conclusion was correct in law in light of the amendment to S. 2(oo) by Act 49 of 1984 which inserted clause (bb).
- Reliance on Supreme Court authority (Venugopal): The court regarded M. Venugopal (Supreme Court) as decisive. Venugopal held that where termination occurs in accordance with contractually or statutorily stipulated terms (for example, probation with performance targets embodied in appointment terms and regulations), such termination falls within exception (bb) of S. 2(oo) and is not retrenchment; consequently non-compliance with S. 25F does not invalidate such termination. The court reproduced and followed the observations in Venugopal that regulation/appointment terms can be statutory terms of the contract and that clause (bb) exempts such termination from the definition of retrenchment.
- Consideration of High Court jurisprudence that reads down clause (bb): The court acknowledged a line of High Court decisions (Dilip Shirke, S.S. Sambro, Balbir Singh, K. Rajendran, Jayabharat Printers) which have interpreted clause (bb) narrowly to prevent misuse where employment continues and periodic renewals are used to avoid permanency. The court understood these authorities as efforts to contain potential mischief in clause (bb).
- Application to the present facts and mala fides question: The court examined whether mala fides could be imputed here. It found there was no finding of mala fides by the courts below, and on the record before it there was no clear, contemporaneous or decisive material to establish mala fides. The evidence pointed to termination for unsatisfactory performance during probation and not misconduct or a colorable device. The alleged indicia of mala fides (a later appointment of Smt. B.R. Chavan and a vague deposition by the respondent) were insufficient to establish mala fides.
- Conclusion on legal error below: Because the termination was effected under stipulations in the appointment and applicable service rules and because Venugopal treats such situations as falling within clause (bb), the court concluded the Industrial Court's finding of retrenchment and its consequent relief (reinstatement with back wages) was legally erroneous.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The writ petition is allowed. The order of the Industrial Court, made in Revision Application (ULP) No. 141 of 1988 dated 1 March 1989, is quashed and set aside; rule made absolute accordingly.
Implications (direct effects and limits stated in the opinion):
- Direct effect on the parties: The Industrial Court's order directing reinstatement with continuity and full back wages is set aside; the respondent will not receive the reinstatement or back wages awarded by the Industrial Court as a consequence of this decision.
- On broader legal principle: The court applied and followed the Supreme Court's reasoning in M. Venugopal that terminations effected in accordance with contractual/regulatory stipulations (such as probationary terms with performance conditions) fall within clause (bb) of S. 2(oo) and are not "retrenchment" for purposes of S. 25F. The opinion recognizes High Court authorities that read down clause (bb) to prevent misuse, but found Venugopal decisive on the facts before it.
- Costs: No order as to costs.
- New precedent: The opinion does not state that it is establishing a new legal principle; it primarily applies existing Supreme Court authority (Venugopal) to the facts. The court did not purport to expand or limit precedent beyond the application to the present facts.
Note: This summary reflects only the content and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or arguments that are not present therein.
1. By this writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is impugned an award of the Industrial Court, Nasik, dated 1 March 1989, made in Revision Application (ULP) No. 141 of 1988, under S. 44 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
2. The respondent was employed in the Health Department and working as auxiliary nurse and midwife at Dhule. She retired from service on 6 March 1978 on the medical ground that she was unfit to continue to work. She was also paid invalid pension by the Dhule Zilla Parishad, Dhule. In July 1986 the respondent was given reappointment with effect from 19 October 1985 as by that time she had taken medical treatment and was cured of the reason which had made her invalid for further service.
3. By a letter of appointment, dated 18/21 July 1986, the respondent was appointed as auxiliary nurse and midwife on temporary basis. Strangely, the letter of appointment also informs her that she would be on probation for a period of one year and her further continuation in service would depend on the assessment of her work. On 27 May 1987 she was served with an order of the said date which informed her that her services were terminated with effect from 30 June 1987, as her service was no longer required. The respondent by her service was no longer required. The respondent by her Complaint (ULP) No. 106 of 1987, challenged the order of termination of her service before the Labour Court, Dhule, as an unfair labour practice within the meaning of item (1) Sch. IV of the Act. By an order, dated 19 May 1988, the Labour Court, Dhule, held that since the respondent had been appointed under the Maharashtra Civil Service Rules, which were the rules framed under the provisions to Art. 309 of the Constitution, the provisions of Chap. VA of the Industrial Disputes Act would not be applicable to her case and, therefore, she was not entitled to the benefit of S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court also held that her service had been terminated in accordance with the provisions of the Maharashtra Civil Service Rules and, therefore, there was nothing illegal in the termination of her service and it did not amount to an unfair labour practice. In this view of the matter, the Labour Court dismissed the complaint. The respondent moved the Industrial Court under S. 44 of the Act. The Industrial Court by the impugned order took the view that the activities of the petitioners were included within the meaning of “industry” as defined in S. 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that the respondent was a “workman” within the meaning of S. 2(s) of the said Act. After considering the circumstances leading to the termination of her service, the Industrial Court recorded a clear finding that it amounted to retrenchment within the meaning of S. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and, as the mandatory provision of S. 25F of the said Act has not been complied with, the termination of the respondent's service was void and ineffective. The Industrial Court also took the view that the termination of service of the respondent, without complying the provisions of S. 25F, also amounted to unfair labour practice under item (1) of Sch. IV of the Act. In this view of the matter, the Industrial Court set aside the order of termination of the respondent's service and directed her reinstatement with continuity and full back-wages. Hence this writ petition.
4. Sri Pai, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners, contends that the impugned order of the Industrial Court is erroneous in law. Although on the date on which the service of the respondent was terminated (i.e, 27 May 1987), the definition of retrenchment contained in S. 2(oo) of the Act had been amended by Cl.(bb) inserted by central act 49 of 1984, with effect from 18 August 1984, the Industrial Court has misread the provisions of law and proceeded to decide the first respondent's case on the erroneous assumption that the definition of retrenchment, as it stood earlier to 18 August 1984, would still govern the case. In the submission of the learned advocate, this misdirection in the law is patent in the reasoning of the Industrial Court contained in the impugned order and needs to be interfered with. He has also brought to my attention the judgment of the Supreme Court in M. Venugopal v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, Andhra Pradesh, [1994 (1) L.L.N 545]. A careful perusal of the Supreme Court judgment in Venugopal, (vide supra) would show that the controversy in the present writ petition is covered by the ratio of the said judgment and the contention raised by the petitioners would have to be upheld, for reasons to follow.
5. In Venugopal case [1994 (1) L.L.N 545] (vide supra), a Development Officer appointed by the Life Insurance Corporation was put on probation for a period of one year from 23 May 1984 and the said period of probation was extended for further period of one year from 23 May 1985. Under the terms of employment, he was required to turn out a certain amount of minimum business which he failed to achieve. Despite advisory memos given to him to achieve the minimum target level, he failed to come up to expectation and, therefore, by an order, dated 9 May 1986, his service was terminated even before expiry of the extended period of probation. The said order of termination was challenged in writ proceedings. A Single Judge of the High Court took the view that the termination of the service amounted to “retrenchment” within the meaning of S. 2(oo) and admittedly since S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act had not been complied with, the retrenchment was illegal, null and void. On appeal to the Division Bench, the Division Bench was of the view that the case would be covered by the newly introduced Cl.(bb), which was an exception to the general rule in the main body of the definition of “retrenchment” in S. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the workman on two grounds. Firstly, the Supreme Court took the view that the service of the workman under the Life Insurance Corporation was governed by the provisions of the regulation 14 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, which were deemed to be rules framed under S. 48(2)(oo) of the Life Insurance Corporation Act and, therefore, regulation 14 had to be read as a statutory term of the contract of employment between the Corporation and the workman. Since the order of appointment had fixed a probationary period and fixed a target which the workman failed to achieve by his performance, the Corporation was entitled not to confirm his service in terms of the order of appointment and to terminate his service during the period of probation without notice in term of S. 14(4) and that such termination would not amount to “retrenchment” within the meaning of S. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, as it would be squarely covered by the exception in Cl.(b) of S. 2(oo). The other ground on which the Supreme Court held against the workman is not material to us, though it may be mentioned, en passant, that by virtue of the provisions of the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 (Act 1 of 1981), particularly S. 2C thereof, the Supreme Court was of the view that the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act was overridden by the rules validly framed in exercise of the statutory authority. Since the latter situation does not exist in our case, we may concentrate on the first ground which is completely relevant to the discussion at hand.
6. While dealing with the first ground, the Supreme Court observed, in Para. 9, at page 549 of Venugopal [1994 (1) L.L.N 545] (vide supra):
“Regulation 14 aforesaid has to be read as a statutory term of the contract of employment between the Corporation and the appellant. The order of appointment had fixed a target in respect of the performance of the appellant, which admittedly the appellant failed to achieve within the period of probation which was extended up to two years. As such the Corporation was entitled not to confirm the appellant in terms of the order of appointment and to terminate his service during the period of probation without any notice in terms of regulation 14(4) aforesaid. Clauses 10 and 11 of the order of appointment along with regulation 14 shall be deemed to be stipulations of the contract of employment, under which the service of the appellant has been terminated. Any such termination, even if the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act were applicable in the case of the appellant, shall not be deemed to be ‘retrenchment’ within the meaning of S. 2(oo), having been covered by exception (bb). Before the introduction of Cl.(bb) in S. 2(oo), there were only three exceptions so far termination of the service of the workman was concerned, which had been excluded from the ambit of retrenchment—
(a) voluntary retirement;
(b) retirement on reaching age of superannuation; and
(c) on ground of continued ill-health.
This Court from time to time held that the definition of ‘retrenchment’ being very wide and comprehensive in nature shall cover, within its ambit termination of service in any manner and for any reason, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. The result was that even discharge simpliciter was held to fall within the purview of the definition of ‘retrenchment’, State Bank of India v. N. Sundaramonoy [1976 (2) L.L.N 5], Santosh Gupta v. State Bank Of Patiala [1980 (2) L.L.N 170]. Now with introduction of one more exception of S. 2(oo) under Cl.(bb), the Legislature has excluded from the purview of the ‘retrenchment’—
(i) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry;
(ii) such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment.
It need not be impressed that if in the contract of employment no such stipulation is provided or prescribed, then such contract shall not be covered by Cl.(bb) of S. 2(oo). In the present case, the termination of service of the appellant is as a result of the contract of employment having been terminated under the stipulations specifically provided under regulation 14 and the order of the appointment of the appellant. In this background, the non-compliance of the requirement of S. 25F shall not vitiate or nullify the order of termination of the appellant.”
These observations of the Supreme Court are clear, clinching and leave no manner of doubt whatsoever that the termination of service of a probationary employee in exercise of the power reserved in the contract of employment in that behalf would clearly fall within and be covered by the exception Cl.(bb) of S. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
7. Sri Kochar, learned advocate appearing for the respondent, however, contends that the newly added Cl.(bb) in S. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act has been judicially interpreted and the consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of reading down the provision so as to nip in the bud the potential for mischief contained in the proviso for misdeeds of unscrupulous and dishonest employers. Though the newly introduced Cl.(bb) does not contained any words of limitation, that the clause has been read in the manner suggested by Sri Kochar, is obvious from the view taken in judgments of several High Courts to which Sri Kochar has drawn my attention.
8. Since the matter is one of importance, it would be worthwhile reproducing the provision of law around which the case of the petitioner workman hinges. Section 2(oo), as originally contained in the statute prior to 18 August 1984, had only three Cls.(a), (b) and (c) which laid down the contingencies not amounting to “retrenchment.” The section as stood prior to 18 August 1984 read as:
“2(oo). ‘retrenchment’ means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include—
(a) voluntary retirement of die workman; or
(b) retirement of the workman of reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or
(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health.”
This section was the subject-matter of several judgments starting from the locus classicus, State Bank of India v. N. Sundaramony [1976 (2) L.L.N 5] (vide supra), and ending with in Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation, Ltd., Chandigarh, v. Labour Court, Chandigarh [1990 (1) L.L.N 1054]. The catena of the Supreme Court judgment between Sundaramony to Punjab Land Development have reiterated the interpretation that the scope of the definition of the expression “retrenchment” in S. 2(oo) was unrestricted in amplitude and, therefore, full import has to be given to the words in the section “for any reason whatsoever” and the termination of service, for any reasons whatsoever, other than those contained in Cls.(a), (b) and (c), amounted to “retrenchment”. The settled position of law as laid down in Sundaramony (vide supra), and reiterated all the way up to and in Punjab Land Development (vide supra), was radically departed from by the amendment introduced in S. 2(oo) by Act 49 of 1984, (Act 49 of 1984) introduced Cl.(bb) as one further exception to the definition of retrenchment Clauses (bb) to S. 2(oo) read as under, in Para. 62, at Page 1076:
“(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein.”
It will at once be seen that, just as there are no words of limitation in the main body of the definition, equally, there are no words of limitation in the exception Cl.(bb). As long as either of the two contingencies contemplated by the clause is fulfilled, the situation would not amount to “retrenchment” within the main body of the definition in S. 2(oo). However, by a series of judgments of our High Court and of other High Courts import of the words used and the amplitude of this have been whittled down and the judicial consensus on the construction of this clause appears to be that the sweep of Cl.(bb) of S. 2(oo) cannot be extended to such cases where the job continues and the employee's work is also satisfactory, and yet periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to the employee, where the circumstances indicate that the letter of appointment is a camouflage to circumvent the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act or the benefit of permanency on workers who have worked continuously for a period of more than 240 days.
9. In the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court (Patel J.), in Dilip Hanumantrao Shirke v. Zilla Parishad, Yavatmal, [1989 (2) L.L.N 590], the learned Judge observes, in Para. 7, at page 594:
“……. The amended Sub-cl.(bb) would apply only to such cases where the work ceases with the employment or the post itself ceases to exist or such other analogous cases where the contract of employment is found to be fair, proper and bona fide …..”
The judgment of the learned Single Judge in Dilip Shirke was expressly approved of by a Division Bench of this Court in S.S Sambro v. Chief Regional Manager, State Bank of India, Nagpur, [1991 (1) L.L.N 281]. In the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Punjab High Court in Balbir Singh v. Kurukshetra Central Co-operative Bank, Ltd., [1990 (2) L.L.N 576], it was observed, in Para. 8, at page 573:
“In fact Cl.(bb), which is an exception, is to be so interpreted as to limit it to cases where the work itself has been accomplished and the agreement of hiring for a specific period was genuine. If the work continues, the non-renewal of the contract on the face of it has to be dubbed as mala fide. It would be fraud in law if it is interpreted otherwise.”
Another learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in K. Rajendran v. Director (Personnel), Project and Equipment Corporation of India, Ltd., New Delhi, [1992 (1) L.L.N 150], cited with approval the observations in Dilip Shirke, (vide supra) and Balbir Singh (vide supra) and followed the same as having correctly laid down the law. A learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in Jayabharat Printers and Publishers (Private), Ltd. v. Labour Court, Kozhikode, [82 F.J.R 622], also cited with approval the observations of this Court in Dilip Shirke casp (vide supra), as the correct position in law. However the observations of the Kerala High Court are material and strike a slightly variant note. The Kerala High Courts says:
“In a similar situation, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court examined the scope of S. 2(oo)(bb). In the course of judgment, the Court observed that the nature of employment must be judged by the nature of duties performed and not on the letter issued by the employer, that if contractual employment is resorted to as a mechanism to frustrate the claim of the employee to become regular or permanent against a job which continues or the nature of duties is such that colour of contractual agreement is given to take it out from S. 2(oo), then such agreement cannot be regarded as fair or bona fide and that S. 2(oo)(bb) cannot be extended to such cases where the join continues and the employee's work is also satisfactory but periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to employees. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed in these decisions. Section 2(oo)(bb) has to be strictly interpreted that it is necessary to find out whether the letter of appointment is a camouflage to circumvent the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act which confers the benefit of permanency on workers who worked continuously for a period of more than 240 days.”
10. The above quoted observations of the Kerala High Court, echo the view of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court and hold that the termination for an unsatisfactory service may not amount to retrenchment as it would fall within the exceptional Cl.(bb).
11. A conspectus of the authorities cited by Sri Kochar no doubt indicates that considerable judicial ingenuity has been bestowed on ensuring that the potential for mischief in the newly added Cl.(bb) is contained within manageable limits and to ensure that the newly added exception to the definition of “retrenchment” is not used as magna carta by dishonest and unscrupulous employers to circumvent the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and jettison workmen at will. Perhaps the haunting fear of resurrection of the ghost of “hire and fire” doctrine, long laid to rest, was too strong to permit judicial passivism.
12. Sri Kochar contended that in a situation like the present, where the service of the respondent was abruptly dispensed with on the ground that the establishment no longer needs here service, the Court should impute mala fides to the employer and hold that the situation was one which fell outside the newly incorporated exception in Cl.(bb). The argument, doubtless, is very inviting and, but for the crystallization of the legal position by the Supreme Court in Venugopal case [1994 (1) L.L.N 545] (vide supra), I might have yielded to the temptation of examining the argument's validity. However, I find that the decision of the Supreme Court in Venugopal forecloses such an option. The observations of the Supreme Court in Para. 9; extracted above, making combined reference to the judgments in Sundaramony and Santosh Gupta, indicate in no uncertain terms that, if the termination of service takes place as a result of the determination of the contract of employment under stipulations specifically provided under the applicable service rules/regulations and/or the order of appointment, then the requirement of S. 25F are not sine qua non.
13. In the present case, though the Labour Court did not have the benefit of the observations of the Supreme Court in Venugopal [1994 (1) L.L.N 545] (vide supra), it seems to have intuitively decided on the same lines. It is not in dispute that the respondent's service was governed by the provisions of the Maharashtra Civil Service Regulations which have been enacted in exercise of the powers under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution. Such rules continue to govern the conditions of service of persons appointed to civil service and/or post until separate provisions are made in that behalf by an Act of appropriate Legislature or by rules validly made under the provisions of such Act. The letter of reappointment of the petitioner, in terms, makes reference to the Maharashtra Civil Services Rules, 1982, and itself provides for two things:
(a) That the service was of a temporary nature, liable to be terminated without any advance notice; and
(b) that the continuation of the respondent depended on the assessment of her work during the period of probation of one year.
The letter of termination of service, dated 27 May 1987, makes reference to the letter of reappointment and expressly says that the services of the respondent would not be continued after 30 June 1987, as they were found not necessary. Even the Industrial Court came to the conclusion that the order of termination of service did not impute any misconduct or stigma to the respondent and that the employment of the respondent had been terminated because of unsatisfactory performance during the probationary period. Neither Court below has made any finding that the termination of the service of the respondent was for any reason other than what the petitioners were contending, namely, for unsatisfactory service during probation. The Industrial Court, however, accepted the alternative contention raised on behalf of the respondent that such termination would amount to retrenchment and, as the respondent had admittedly continued for more than 240 days service and the provisions of S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act had not been complied with, the order of termination was held to be bad. It is not possible to accede to the contention of Sri Kochar that the termination of service must be held to be mala fide merely because the establishment, the post and the job continued. Sri Kochar placed emphasis on the observations of the judgment of this Court in Dilip Shirke and the other judgments referred to earlier and contended that the case on hand typifies precisely the situation which the Courts were at great pains to avoid. In the absence of any finding as to mala fides by the two Courts below, it is not possible to agree with the contention of Sri Kochar. The only ground held in favour of the respondent was that the termination of service amounted to retrenchment in contravention of S. 25F and this finding in erroneous in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Venugopal (vide supra).
14. Sri Kochar then made what appears to me to be last ditch argument. He contended that both the Courts below erred in not giving a finding as to mala fides of the action of the petitioners. In his submission, the order of termination, though couched in innocuous terms and under such circumstances as to raise a probable presumption of termination on the grounds of unsatisfactory probationary service, was really one for oblique motive, being colorable exercise of the employer's powers.
He also submits that evidence had been led by the respondent to this' effect before the Labour Court, but unfortunately neither the Labour nor the Industrial Courts adverted mind to the crucial evidence on this evidence. I am afraid, it is not possible to accept this contention. Ex facie, neither judgment of the two Courts below indicates that there was any material placed on record from which the Courts below could have taken the view that the reason for termination of service of the respondent was anything other than what was contended by the petitioners. A careful reading of the complaint filed by the respondent in the Labour Court also does not give any material particulars of such an alternate case. On the strength of the fact that, about a year after the respondent was removed from service one Smt. B.R Chavan was brought to Dhule from Bhadgaon on 7 September 1988 coupled with the fact that in her deposition before the Industrial Court the respondent had vaguely stated that she had been removed as the petitioners wanted to give employment to their persons.
15. Sri Kochar faintly contended that this was a case of mala fides. Even after careful appraisal of the material pointed out by Sri Kochar, I am unable to accept the contention that removal of the respondent from service was mala fide. There is neither clear cut and clinching evidence, not any antecedent or contemporaneous circumstances indicating mala fides.
16. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The order of the Industrial Court impugned in Revision Application. (ULP) No. 141 of 1988 is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute accordingly.
17. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
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