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Kallappa Pundalik Reddi v. Laxmibai Dattoba Vellaram And Others

Bombay High Court
Jun 15, 1994
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The original plaintiff filed Special Civil Suit No. 80 of 1975 on or about 19 April 1975 seeking recovery of Rs. 10,000 with interest and costs, alleging defendants had executed a promissory note dated 19 April 1972 for that amount and had failed to pay. The plaint was amended with leave of the Court to plead an alternate case: that if the promissory note were held inadmissible, the plaintiff would still be entitled to recover the amount on the basis of original consideration — that the plaintiff advanced Rs. 10,000 in cash to the defendants on 19 April 1972.

The trial Court, the Court of the Joint Civil Judge, S.D., Solapur at Solapur, by decree dated 28 August 1977, dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs. The plaintiff preferred the present appeal against that decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial Court was justified in holding that the promissory note dated 19 April 1972 was inadmissible in evidence because it was not duly stamped, specifically whether it fell under Article 49(b) ("when payable otherwise than on demand") of Schedule I to the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.
  2. Whether, despite the promissory note's inadmissibility, the plaintiff could succeed on the alternate plea of original consideration (that Rs. 10,000 was advanced in cash on 19 April 1972) pleaded in the amended plaint.
  3. Whether the instrument should be treated as a mere receipt or an agreement rather than a promissory note.
  4. Whether the promissory note was obtained by coercion or duress (a factual issue raised by the defendants and addressed by the trial Court).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant produced a compilation including the promissory note (in Marathi) and its translation and accepted the translation as correct; contended the instrument was a promissory note executed by the defendants.
  • The appellant argued that even if the promissory note were inadmissible for want of proper stamping, the plaintiff should be entitled to recover on the basis of the original consideration pleaded in para 1-A of the plaint (cash advanced on 19 April 1972).
  • The appellant alternatively submitted that the instrument could be regarded as a mere receipt or an agreement rather than a promissory note and thus might not attract the higher stamp duty/disallowance consequences applicable to promissory notes payable otherwise than on demand.
  • The appellant contended the trial Judge should not have accepted the defendants' plea that the promissory note was executed as a result of coercion or duress.

Respondent/Defendant Position (as recorded)

  • The defendants had executed the instrument described on its face as a promissory note and (as held by the trial Court) the note was not duly stamped in accordance with Article 49(b) because it was not payable on demand but payable by instalments.
  • The defendants put forward a plea that the promissory note was executed as a result of coercion or duress; the trial Court accepted this plea on the factual record.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Thenappa Chettiar v. Andiyappa Chettiar, AIR 1971 Mad. 290 Held that a promissory note that required payment after two years on demand was not payable on demand and thus was payable otherwise than on demand; such a document could not be validated by payment of penalty and was inadmissible if unstamped. The Court followed the Madras High Court's view that a note payable after a period (and not immediately on demand) is payable otherwise than on demand and therefore attracts Article 49(b); this authority supported the finding that the suit promissory note was inadmissible as unstamped.
Alamelu Ammal v. Rangai Gounder, AIR 1945 Mad. 42 Promissory note stating "I shall pay ... within two years" was not enforceable within the two-year period and was not payable on demand; liable to stamp duty under Article 49(b) (i.e., as on a bond); unstamped such a note is inadmissible. The Court cited Horwill, J.'s reasoning approvingly to support that a note not payable on demand is liable under Article 49(b) and is inadmissible if unstamped.
Muthu Gounder v. Perumayammal, AIR 1961 Mad. 347 Recorded a view that if a promissory note is not payable on demand it falls under Article 49(b) rather than Article 49(a). The Court referred to this decision as aligning with the view that the suit promissory note fell under Article 49(b) and was therefore inadmissible when unstamped.
Bhanwar Lal v. Firm Mangalji Chhoteylal, AIR 1981 Raj. 157 Discussed classification of instruments and contrasted with other decisions; observed distinctions where a hundi was payable on a future specified date. The Court considered the Rajasthan High Court's reasoning but held that its ratio was not relevant because the present promissory note was not payable on a future specified date; the Court agreed with that decision only to the limited extent of endorsing use of Act's definitions when interpreting "bill of exchange payable on demand."
Sukaj Kam Khur Ana… v. Hari Rattan… (1973) 75 Pun. LR(D) 88 (Delhi High Court) The Delhi High Court held that a hundi promising payment after 180 days could not be treated as a bill of exchange payable on demand. The Court recorded respectful agreement with the High Court of Delhi's view and treated it as supportive of the conclusion that instruments payable after a period are not "payable on demand."

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded from a close textual reading of the promissory note and statutory provisions:

  1. Characterisation of the Instrument: The promissory note (translated) explicitly stated that the defendants received Rs. 10,000 in cash and would "repay the same to you first within 6 months and thereafter within further 6 months — any time or at any place as may be demanded by you." The Court observed the note required payment in two instalments, the first within six months and the remainder within a further six months upon demand; thus payment could not be demanded immediately upon execution.
  2. Construction under the Stamp Act: The Court identified Article 49 of Schedule I to the Indian Stamp Act. Article 49(a) gives nominal duty for promissory notes payable on demand; Article 49(b) prescribes "the same duty as a Bill of Exchange No. 13 for the same amount payable otherwise than on demand" for notes payable otherwise than on demand. Because the suit promissory note was not payable immediately on demand, the Court concluded Article 49(b) applied.
  3. Legal Consequence of Non-Stamping: The Court relied on Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 which contains an absolute prohibition on the admissibility of bills of exchange or promissory notes that are not duly stamped. Section 36 was held inapplicable to unstamped promissory notes/bills of exchange. Therefore, an unstamped promissory note payable otherwise than on demand is inadmissible in evidence and cannot be validated by payment of stamp duty plus penalty.
  4. Precedential Support: The Court examined Madras High Court authorities (Thenappa Chettiar; Alamelu Ammal; Muthu Gounder) and the Delhi High Court authority (Sukaj Kam ...) which supported the proposition that an instrument payable after a specified period (not payable immediately) is payable otherwise than on demand and therefore attracts Article 49(b). The Court distinguished the Rajasthan High Court decision (Bhanwar Lal) to the extent it concerned instruments payable on a specified future date and found that decision not directly relevant to the present facts. On balance the Court adopted the Madras/Delhi approach.
  5. Rejection of Alternative Characterisations: The Court held the instrument, on its face and as pleaded by the plaintiff, was a promissory note and not a mere receipt or agreement; therefore the appellant's attempt to recharacterise the instrument was not acceptable.
  6. Assessment of the Alternate Plea (Original Consideration): The Court examined the plaint and the plaintiff's evidence. The plaintiff's deposition included an admission that he did not in fact pay Rs. 10,000 in cash to the defendants and that the amount in question was related to a land transaction; the plaintiff could not explain the discrepancy between the pleadings and his testimony. The Court concluded the plaintiff had failed to prove the alternate cause of action based on original consideration pleaded in the plaint and observed a party cannot travel beyond its pleadings to shift the nature of the cause of action.
  7. Coercion/Duress Issue: The Court acknowledged the appellant's contention that the trial Judge should not have accepted the defendants' plea of coercion or duress. The Court stated that had the promissory note been admissible, it would have reversed the trial Court's finding on coercion. However, because the instrument was inadmissible on stamping grounds, there was no practical utility in pronouncing a positive finding on coercion and no need to adjudicate that issue further.
  8. Conclusion from Analysis: On the combined basis of the characterization of the instrument, the statutory prohibition against admitting unstamped promissory notes payable otherwise than on demand, and the plaintiff's failure to prove the alternate consideration, the Court confirmed the trial Court's finding that the promissory note was inadmissible in evidence and that the plaintiff had not established the alternate cause of action.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The Court confirmed that the suit promissory note was not admissible in evidence because it was not duly stamped in accordance with Article 49(b) of Schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, and the plaintiff failed to prove the original consideration as pleaded.

Direct Consequences for the Parties:

  • The decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit is affirmed.
  • The order of costs passed by the trial Court against the appellant is set aside; costs of the suit and the appeal are to be borne by the respective parties (i.e., each party shall bear its own costs as incurred).
  • Issue of certified copy expedited (administrative direction recorded).

Broader Implications and Precedential Effect:

The opinion applies and reaffirms existing authorities on classification of promissory notes as payable on demand versus payable otherwise than on demand and the consequences of non-compliance with stamping requirements under the Indian Stamp Act. The judgment does not purport to create a new legal principle beyond the application of the cited precedents and statutory provisions; its practical effect is confined to the outcome between the parties.

Appeal dismissed.
Show all summary ...

1. This appeal is preferred by the original plaintiff against decree dated 28th August, 1977 passed by the Court of the Joint Civil Judge, S.D, Solapur at Solapur in Special Civil Suit No. 80 of 1975. By the said decree, the trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff with costs.

2. On or about 19th April, 1975, the plaintiff filed the above referred suit against the defendant seeking to recover from the defendants a sum of Rs. 10,000/- with further interest and cost of the suit. It was averred in the plaint that the defendants had executed a promissory note in favour of the plaintiffs being promissory note dated 19th April, 1972 for valuable consideration and defendants had failed to pay the amount due and payable on the said promissory note. With the leave of the Court, the plaintiff amended the plaint. By the said amendment, it was pleased by the plaintiff that if the said promissory note was held to be non-admissible in evidence, the plaintiff was nevertheless entitled to recover the said amount from the defendants on the basis of the original consideration as the plaintiff had advanced the said amount to the defendants in cash on 19th April, 1972 and the defendants had received the said amount in cash from the plaintiff.

3. The first question which is required to be decided in this appeal is as to whether the trial Court was justified in taking the view that the said promissory note was inadmissible in evidence on the ground that the said promissory note was not duly stamped as required by law. The learned counsel for the appellant has been good enough to prepare a compilation consisting of a copy of the said promissory note dated 19th April, 1972, the same being in Marathi and also the translation thereof. There is no dispute about the correctness of the translation of the said document. The executants of the said document have described the said document as a promissory note. It is provided in the said promissory note that the defendants shall be liable to pay the sum of Rs. 10,000/- to the plaintiffs first within six months and thereafter within further six months at any time on demand. The amount of the said promissory note was payable by two instalments as aforesaid. The relevant portion of the promissory note as translated by the learned Advocate for the appellant reads as under:—

“We the promisors are executing this Promissory Note as we have received from you for our business a sum of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) in cash and we will repay the same to you first within 6 months and thereafter within further 6 months — any time or at any place as may be demanded by you without any dispute and without making any pretext, with interest in full satisfaction.”

The amount of the said promissory note was not made payable immediately on demand but was made payable first within six months of the execution of the promissory note and thereafter within further six months as stated above.

4. Article 49 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act which is as follows:—

“Description of instrument Proper stamp duty 49. Promissory note [as defined in section 2(22)] (a)(i) When the amount of value does hot exceed Rs. 250/- Ten naya paise. (ii) When the amount or value exceeds Rs. 250 but does hot exceed Rs. 1,000 Fifteen naya paise. (iii) In any other case. Twenty five naya paise. (b) When payable otherwise than on demand. The same duty as a Bill of Exchange No. 13 for the same amount payable otherwise than on demand.”

The suit promissory note was hot made payable immediately on demand. The amount of the said promissory note was recoverable by instalments. No demand could be made immediately for execution of the promissory note. No demand could be made in respect of the amount due and payable under the said promissory note till the expiry of a particular period. The learned trial Judge took the view that the said promissory note was liable to be stamped as required by Article 49(b) of Schedule I. The suit promissory note was not admittedly stamped in accordance with the mandate of Article 49(b) of Schedule I of the Stamp Act. Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 contains an absolute prohibition in respect of non-admissibility of bills of exchange or promissory notes which are not duly stamped. Section 36 of the Act is not applicable to the cases of bills of exchange or promissory notes which are not duly stamped. In other words, if the suit promissory note is found to be unstamped, it would be inadmissible in evidence and the said document cannot be received in evidence even on payment of deficit stamp duty and penalty.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant has very fairly invited attention of the Court to the relevant case law on the subject. In Thenappa Chettiar v. Andiyappa Chettiar, reported in AIR 1971 Mad. 290, the suit document provided that the executant shall pay the amount in question to the creditor after two years on demand by the creditor with interest. In para 8 of the judgment, Venkataraman, J. speaking for the Court held that the suit promissory note could not be considered as a promissory note payable on demand. The Court came to the conclusion that the suit promissory note was a promissory note payable otherwise than on demand and the document could not be validated by payment of penalty and the same was inadmissible for all purposes. In para 5 of his judgment, Venkataraman, J. referred to the case of Alamelu Ammal v. Rangai Gounder, reported in AIR 1945 Mad. 42. In the prpmissory note which was subject matter of the case reported in AIR 1945 Mad. 42 provided as under:

“I shall pay to you or to your order within two years the said sum.”

Horwill, J. speaking for the Court held that within the time of two years the promisee could not enforce the debt and the promissory note was not one payable on demand. The learned Judge held that the promissory note was therefore liable to stamp duty under Article 49(b) of Schedule I of the Stamp Act i.e the duty payable as on a bond. The learned Judge held that the said promissory note was inadmissible in evidence, as it was not stamped on the footing of a Bond. In para 6 of the said judgment, Venkataraman, J. referred to another Madras case decided by Ramchandra Iyer, J. reported in AIR 1961 Mad. 347, Muthu Gounder v. Perumayammal, where the executant made a promise to pay to the creditor the amount covered by the promissory note was payable after a period of two years on demand. In the case reported in AIR 1961 Mad. 347, Ramchandra Iyer J. recorded that the parties were agreed that if the document was held to be a promissory note, it would fall under Article 49(b) of Schedule I of the Stamp Act and not Article 49(a) of the Stamp Act. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by the High Court of Madras in the above referred case reported in AIR 1971 Mad. 290 as well as the view taken by Horwill, J. in the case reported in AIR 1945 Mad. 42. I also agree with the view taken by Ramchandra Iyer, J. in the above referred Madras case. If the ratio of the above referred cases is to be applied to the suit promissory note which is the subject matter of this appeal, it shall have to be held that the executants of the said promissory note were at liberty to pay part of the amount of the said promissory note within six months from the date of the execution of the promissory note and the remaining part thereof within further six months at any time on demand. If so, the suit promissory note cannot be held as a promissory note payable on demand and it shall have to be held that the suit promissory note was payable otherwise than on demand was inadmissible in evidence as the same was admittedly not stamped as required by Article 49(b) of the Schedule appended to the Act.

6. The learned counsel for the appellant invited the attention of the Court to the judgment of High Court of Rajasthan in the case of Bhanwar Lal v. Firm Mangalji Chhoteylal, Baran, reported in AIR 1981 Raj. 157. In para 9 of the said judgment, K.S Sidhu, J. speaking for the Court observed that the learned Judge did not concur with the reasoning of the High Court of Delhi in the case of Sukaj Kam Khur Ana… v. Hari Rattan…., (1973) 75 Pun. LR(D) 88. In the above referred Delhi case it was held by the High Court of Delhi that a hundi containing a promise of payment after 180 days after the date of its execution could not be held to be a bill of exchange payable on demand. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by the High Court of Delhi as well as the view taken by the High Court of Madras in the cases referred to in earlier part of this judgment. In the above referred case before the High Court of Rajasthan the Shahjog hundi under consideration was payable on future specified date. The promissory note which is subject matter of dispute in this appeal is not payable “on future specified date”. The ratio of the above referred decision of High Court of Rajasthan has no relevance for deciding the controversy which is subject matter of this appeal. I am persuaded to agree with the view taken by the High Court of Madras and by the High Court of Delhi in the above referred cases and not with the view taken by the High Court of Rajasthan as indicated above. I agree with the view taken by the High Court of Rajasthan only to the extent that the expression “bill of exchange payable on demand” used in the Schedule to the Stamp Act should be interpreted by applying the relevant definitions contained in the Stamp Act. The definitions contained in section 2(3) and section 2(22) of the expressions ‘bill of exchange payable on demand’ and ‘promissory note’ contained in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 do not assist the learned counsel for the appellant in this case. I have therefore no hesitation in confirming the finding of the trial Court on this aspect. In my opinion, the trial Court rightly held that the suit promissory note was not a promissory note payable on demand, the same was not duly stamped as required by the Indian Stamp Act and the same was inadmissible in evidence.

7. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the suit promissory note may be considered by the Court as a mere receipt or as an agreement. Having regard to the language of the instrument under consideration and the contents thereof, it is not possible to accept this submission. The plaintiff has rightly described the instrument in dispute as promissory note in the plaint itself and the instrument in dispute is on the face of it a “promissory note” and not a mere receipt or an agreement.

8. The learned counsel for the appellant then submitted that even if the promissory note was not admissible in evidence, the appellant is entitled to succeed before this Court on the basis of alternate plea of original consideration as set out in para 1-A of the plaint. I have gone through the plaint with the help of the learned counsel for the appellant. The original consideration pleaded by the plaintiff in the plaint was that the defendant had borrowed a sum of Rs. 10,000/- in cash from the plaintiff for the purpose of their business. In his deposition, the plaintiff, inter alia, stated as under:—

“Question :— Is it a fact that you did not pay Rs. 10,000/- in cash to defendants?

Ans. :— The said amount was due in respect of land transaction.

It is true that I did not pay the amount of Rs. 10,000/- in cash to the defendants. I cannot say as to why I have stated in my plaint that the defendants obtained cash amount of Rs. 10,000/- from me on 19-4-1972 for their trade purpose.”

In my opinion, the learned trial Court was right in holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove the alternate cause of action in respect of the original consideration as laid in the plaint. It was not the case of the plaintiff in the plaint that the plaintiff was claiming the said sum of Rs. 10,000/- as balance of unpaid price in respect of land transaction between the parties. It is not permissible for the Court to permit the plaintiff to travel beyond the pleading in the suit and shift his cause of action in respect of nature of original consideration as attempted to be done by or on behalf of the plaintiff.

9. The learned counsel for the appellant is right to a limited extent when she contends that the learned trial Judge ought not to have accepted the plea of the defendants to the effect that the defendants had executed the said promissory note as a result of coercion or duress. If the said promissory note was admissible in evidence, I would have reversed the finding of the trial Court on this aspect of the case. The above referred submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is of no practical utility to the plaintiffs as the suit promissory note is found to be inadmissible in evidence. Once the impugned document is inadmissible in evidence, it is unnecessary to record a positive finding on the issue as to whether the plaintiff had obtained the said promissory note from the defendants as a result of coercion or duress. If the promissory note would have been admitted in evidence, I would have perhaps held that the said promissory note was not obtained as a result of coercion. If the promissory note would have been admissible in evidence, consideration for the promissory note would have been presumed and the evidence of the parties would have been examined in a different perspective.

10. In the result, I confirm the finding of the trial Court to the effect that the suit promissory note was not admissible in evidence as the same was not duly stamped. I also hold that the plaintiff failed to prove the original consideration as stated in the plaint.

11. In the result, the appeal fails. The order of cost passed by the trial Court against the appellant is set aside. Each party shall bear cost of the suit as well as the appeal as incurred.

12. Issue of certified copy expedited.

Appeal dismissed.