S.M Jhunjhunuwala, J.:— By this reference made under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the following question has been referred to this court for opinion at the instance of the Revenue:

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the activities of the assessee in dyeing, printing and processing grey cloth produced by others amounted to manufacture or production of textiles as specified under item No. 21 of the List in, the Ninth Schedule of the Income-tax Act, 1961, so as to entitle it to additional depreciation under section 32(1)(vi) of the Act?”

2. The assessee is a limited company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. The assessment years involved are 1976-77 and 1977-78. The assessee was engaged in the business of dyeing, printing and processing textile goods and for that purpose, the assessee used to purchase grey cloth and sell the same on its own account after dyeing, printing and processing. The assessee was also doing job work of dyeing, printing and processing on grey cloth belonging to others. The claim of the assessee before the Income-tax Officer was that since the assessee was engaged in the manufacture and production of dyed, printed and processed textiles within the meaning of item No. 21 of the Ninth Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short, “the Act”), the assessee was entitled to higher depreciation under section 32(1)(vi) of the Act.

3. The Income-tax Officer held that the activities carried by the assessee did not fall within the scope and ambit of the said item No. 21 as the assessee itself did not produce the grey cloth but had merely dyed, printed or processed the same. According to the Income-tax Officer, in the facts of the case, the assessee could not be said to be a manufacturer or producer of cotton textiles. The Income-tax Officer rejected the claim of the assessee. The assessee appealed to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) who held that the assessee was engaged in manufacture and production of textiles since in the opinion of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), the grey cloth acquired by the assessee was different from the dyed, printed and finished cloth produced by the assessee. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) allowed the claim of the assessee. The Department appealed to the Tribunal. The Tribunal accepted the claim of the assessee and upheld the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). It is in these circumstances, the above question has been referred to this court for opinion at the instance of the Revenue.

4. In the assessment year 1976-77, the assessee had installed a boiler in respect of which the assessee claimed initial depreciation under section 32(1)(vi) of the Act contending that processing of textiles is covered under the said item No. 21 of the List mentioned in Ninth Schedule to the Act. Under section 32(1)(vi) of the Act, the assessee was entitled to deduction of depreciation in respect of the said boiler installed for the purpose of business of the assessee, subject, however, to section 34 of the Act provided the assessee manufactured textiles as specified in the said item No. 21. The said item No. 21 in the List of articles or things mentioned in the Ninth Schedule to the Act reads as follows:

“21. Textiles (including those dyed, printed or otherwise processed) made wholly or mainly of cotton, including cotton yarn, hosiery and rope.”

5. Mr. Arun Sathe, learned counsel appearing for the assessee, has submitted that in the concerned assessment year, the assessee carried on the business of manufacture of textiles specified in the said item No. 21 as the assessee used to purchase grey cloth and after dyeing, printing and processing, sell the same on its own account and was also doing job work of dyeing, printing and processing grey cloth belonging to others. Mr. Arun Sathe further submitted that as the grey cloth acquired by the assessee was different from the dyed, printed and finished cloth produced by the assessee, the assessee was entitled to deduction of depreciation as claimed. In the submission of learned counsel, when the assessee subjected grey cloth to dyeing, printing and/or any other processing, it produced a distinct article having distinct use as distinguished from the grey cloth and by this transformation, grey cloth became a different commodity which was sufficient to hold that there was manufacturing or production of article within the meaning of clause (vi) of sub-section (1) of section 32 of the Act. In support of his submissions, learned counsel has put reliance on the judgments in the following cases:

(1) Empire Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, [1977] 40 STC 1 (Bom);

(2) CIT v. J.B Kharwar and Sons, [1987] 163 ITR 394 (Guj);

(3) Empire Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, [1986] 162 ITR 846 (SC); and

(4) CIT v. Yavatmal Co-operative Ginning and Pressing Factory Ltd., [1993] 203 ITR 874 (Bom).

6. Dr. Balasubramaniam, learned counsel for the Revenue, has submitted that the assessee had merely printed the textile goods already manufactured by others and, as such, in the facts of the case, the assessee could not be ‘said to be engaged in the manufacture or production of textiles within the meaning of clause (vi) of sub-section (1) of section 32 of the Act read with the said item No. 21 in the Ninth Schedule to the Act.

7. Since under section 32(1)(vi) of the Act, what is required is to manufacture or produce any one or more of the articles or things specified in items Nos. 1 to 24 (both inclusive) in the list of articles or things mentioned in the Ninth Schedule to the Act, in the present case, to be entitled to initial depreciation allowance, the assessee was required to manufacture or produce textiles including those dyed, printed or otherwise processed made wholly or mainly of cotton including cotton yarn, hosiery and rope. Admittedly, it is not the case of the assessee that the assessee manufactured or produced grey cloth on which the process of dyeing or printing was carried out by the assessee. Textiles in the form of grey cloth were already manufactured or produced by some person other than the assessee before the process of dyeing or printing was carried out thereon by the assessee. By the process of dyeing or printing carried out by the assessee on the grey cloth already manufactured or produced by others, the grey cloth did not cease to be a textile. By the process of dyeing or printing carried out by the assessee on grey cloth manufactured or produced by others, such grey cloth did undergo some chemical changes but it retained the characteristics and/or property of the textiles and, as such, it cannot be said that by merely carrying out the process of dyeing or printing on grey cloth manufactured or produced by others, the assessee manufactured or produced textiles to comply with the requirements of section 32(1)(vi) of the Act read with the said item No. 21. The language or expression used in the said item No. 21 is unambiguous and clear and is capable of no two interpretations. In a taxing act, as observed by Rowlatt J. in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC, [1921] 1 KB 64, one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used. We feel, a judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven though he can and should iron out the creases. In view of wordings of section 32(1)(vi) and the said item No. 21, it is not possible for us to hold that the assessee, by applying the process of printing or dyeing on the grey cloth admittedly manufactured by others carried on the business of manufacture or production within the meaning of section 33(1)(vi) of the Act.

8. As the facts in the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the assessee are different than the controversy involved in the present case, the ratio in none of the said judgments has any applicability to the facts in the present case. In the case of Empire Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., [1977] 40 STC 1 (Bom), this court was concerned with the question of construction of clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The applicant in that case was registered as dealer both under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, and carried on the business of bleaching and printing fabrics manufactured by them for sale and also of bleaching and printing fabrics manufactured by others for sale. The real controversy in that case revolves around the interpretation required to be placed upon the phrase “for use by him in the manufacture or processing of goods for sale” in the said clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 8 of the Central Sales Act, 1956. In the case of J.B Kharwar and Sons, [1987] 163 ITR 394, the Gujarat High Court was considering the provisions of section 80J of the Act. In that case, in order to claim relief under section 80J of the Act, amongst other things, the assessee was required to prove: (i) that the undertaking was an industrial undertaking; (ii) that such undertaking was not formed by reconstruction of a business already in existence; (iii) that it was not formed by the transfer to a new business of machinery or plant previously used for any purpose; and (iv) that it manufactured or produced articles. The controversy considered was in the context of meaning of clause (iii) of sub-section (4) of section 80J of the Act. The question considered was whether the undertaking of the assessee therein was an industrial undertaking and whether any articles were manufactured or produced therein. It was in this context, the Gujarat High Court held that when the assessee subjected grey cloth to the process of dyeing and printing, the assessee carried on manufacturing activities within the meaning of clause (iii) of sub-section (4) of section 80], In the present case, what was required was to manufacture or produce textiles made wholly or mainly of cotton as specified in the said item No. 21. The emphasis in section 32(1)(vi) read with the said item No. 21 has been on manufacture or production of textiles made wholly or mainly of cotton, which, in the present case, were fully manufactured or produced by persons other than the assessee in the form of grey cloth and was in saleable condition when received by the assessee for dyeing or printing. In the case of Empire Industries Ltd., [1986] 162 ITR 846, the Supreme Court was considering the meaning of the expressions “manufacturing process” and “manufacture” used in section 2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. Section 2 of the Central Excises and Salt and Additional Duties of Excise (Amendment) Act, 1980, amended section 2(f) of the Excise Act by sub-items in the definition of “manufacture”. By the said Amending Act, in relation to goods comprised in item No. 19-1 of the First Schedule to the Excise Act, bleaching, mercerising, dyeing, printing, waterproofing, rubberising, shrink-proofing, organdie processing or any other process or any one or more of these processes were included in the definition of “manufacture”. The said Amending Act was impugned before the Supreme Court as ultra vires and it was in that context the Supreme Court has delivered the judgment, inter alia, holding that the Amending Act is valid. In the case of Yavatmal Co-operative Ginning and Pressing Factory Ltd., [1993] 203 ITR 874, this court was considering the question of investment allowance under section 32A of the Act and a claim for deduction under section 80HH of the Act in respect of machinery installed by the assessee for the purpose of use in the factory of the assessee. In that case, it was held that the process of ginning cotton resulted in the manufacture or production of articles like “ginned cotton” and “cotton seeds” since ginning is the process of separating cotton seeds from the fibre.

9. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we hold that the Tribunal was wrong in allowing the claim of the assessee. We, accordingly, answer the question in the negative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.

10. In the circumstances of the case, there shall, however, be no order as to costs.