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R. Ganeshan v. Union Of India And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This petition challenges an order dated 11 January 1989 by the Presiding Officer of the National Industrial Tribunal, Bombay under section 10(1)(c) read with section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act refusing to make a reference.
The petitioner joined Air India (third respondent) on 10 March 1978 as an Assistant Flight Purser. An incident allegedly involving molestation of a minor passenger occurred on 5 January 1980. A chargesheet was submitted on 5 February 1980 and the petitioner was dismissed on 8 October 1980. The employer filed an approval application under section 33(2)(b) on the day of dismissal; approval was granted on 24 May 1984. The petitioner appealed the departmental order; that appeal was dismissed on 3 January 1981.
The petitioner raised an industrial dispute under section 10 read with section 12 on 12 November 1987. The Conciliation Officer (Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Bombay) submitted a failure report on 30 December 1988. By order dated 11 January 1989 the Government declined to make a reference on the ground that the dispute was belated (raised after seven years) and no justification for the delay was furnished. The petitioner filed the present writ petition on 3 February 1989 challenging the Government's refusal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Appropriate Government erred in refusing to make a reference under section 10(1)(c) read with section 12(5) on the ground that the industrial dispute was raised after an inordinate delay.
- Whether the pendency of the employer's approval application under section 33(2)(b) between 8 October 1980 and 24 May 1984 precluded the petitioner from raising an industrial dispute before approval was granted.
- Whether, under sub‑section (5) of section 12, the Government is confined to reasons contained in the Conciliation Officer's failure report when deciding whether to make a reference (i.e., can the Government rely on a ground not mentioned in the failure report).
- Whether the absence of a statutory period of limitation in the Industrial Disputes Act prevents the Government from refusing to make a reference on grounds of delay or laches.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Kochar)
- The Government was factually wrong to refuse a reference on the basis of a seven‑year delay because the approval under section 33(2)(b) was pending from 8 October 1980 until 24 May 1984; until approval was granted the dismissal could not be said to be finally confirmed, so the limitation period should run from 24 May 1984.
- The petitioner made numerous representations to higher authorities (including Minister for Aviation, Prime Minister and President), which reflected his attempts to obtain redress and explained delay.
- There is no statutory period of limitation for raising an industrial dispute; the Government's task is to determine whether an industrial dispute exists. If it does, the Government should ordinarily make a reference — reliance placed on Balubhai J. Panchal v. State of Maharashtra.
- Under section 12(5) the Government must consider the failure report; accordingly it cannot rely on a ground (delay) not mentioned in the failure report when declining to make a reference.
- The petitioner was not given notice that the Government would refuse reference on grounds of delay and thus was deprived of an opportunity to place material in explanation, contrary to principles of natural justice.
Government / Respondent Position (as recorded in the opinion)
- The Government refused to make a reference because the dispute was raised after the lapse of seven years and no justification for the delay was provided.
- The opinion records that the Government treated the order of dismissal as taking effect on 8 October 1980 and found no adequate explanation for the long inaction leading up to the raising of the dispute on 12 November 1987.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Balubhai J. Panchal v. State of Maharashtra, 1983 (46) F.L.R. 207 | Proposition that the Appropriate Government's function on a failure report is to see whether an industrial dispute exists; Government was held not justified in refusing reference on ground of limitation in that case. | The court considered this authority relied upon by the petitioner but distinguished it on facts: in Balubhai, immediate civil proceedings and prompt pursuit of conciliation followed dismissal, whereas in the present case there was a long inaction (including a nearly 3½ year gap after approval) and no satisfactory explanation. |
| Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay, 1964 (1) LLJ 351 | Authority for the proposition that the Appropriate Government may, when deciding whether to make a reference under section 10(1) read with section 12(5), consider the prima facie merits and refuse reference if a claim is patently frivolous or clearly belated. | The court relied on this Supreme Court observation to support the view that the Government may refuse a reference where the claim is clearly belated; it applied this principle to the present facts to justify refusal on grounds of inordinate delay. |
| Shaw Wallace and Co. Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1988 (1) LLJ 177 | Held that if admitted facts are glaringly against workmen or the claim is patently frivolous or belated, the Government is justified in refusing to make a reference; a belated claim need not be referred for adjudication. | The court cited this Madras High Court authority to reinforce the principle that inordinate delay can justify refusal to make a reference and applied it to conclude the Government's refusal was proper on the material before it. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court addressed each of the petitioner's contentions and proceeded by reference to the chronology and statutory scheme:
- Effective date of dismissal and the right to raise a dispute: The court held that the order of dismissal operated from 8 October 1980 and that nothing prevented the petitioner from raising the dispute soon thereafter. The existence of an employer's application for approval under section 33(2)(b) (filed on the date of dismissal and granted on 24 May 1984) was treated as a formal requirement of the employer and not a legal bar preventing the employee from initiating conciliation or raising a dispute.
- Delay and explanation: The court emphasized that the petitioner filed and lost a departmental appeal (dismissed 3 January 1981) and yet did not raise a dispute immediately thereafter. Even assuming the dismissal was finally confirmed on 24 May 1984 when approval was granted, the court found no satisfactory explanation for the period from that date until 12 November 1987 (almost 3½ years). The petitioner’s correspondence and representations to higher authorities were considered and found inadequate as an explanation for this inaction.
- Interpretation of section 12(5): The court rejected the petitioner's argument that section 12(5) confines the Government to reasons contained in the Conciliation Officer's failure report. The court read sub‑section (5) as requiring only that the Government consider the failure report; it did not interpret the provision as limiting the scope of the Government's inquiry or preventing the Government from relying on other relevant grounds (such as inordinate delay) when deciding whether to make a reference.
- Natural justice / notice on grounds of delay: Although the petitioner argued he was not given notice that refusal would be based on delay and therefore could not present explanations, the court observed that it had itself heard the petitioner's counsel and perused the material the petitioner relied on; on that basis the court concluded that lack of notice did not result in injustice in the present case.
- Role of absence of statutory limitation: The court acknowledged that the Industrial Disputes Act does not prescribe a period of limitation for raising disputes but held that the absence of a statutory limitation does not mean disputes can be raised at any time without consequence. The court accepted authorities permitting the Government to refuse reference where the claim is patently frivolous or clearly belated and concluded that inordinate delay may legitimately lead the Government to determine that no present industrial dispute exists.
- Reliance on authorities: The court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Bombay Union of Journalists and the Madras High Court decision in Shaw Wallace to support the proposition that a patently frivolous or clearly belated claim can be refused reference. The court considered Balubhai, but distinguished it on the facts.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The petition is dismissed; the impugned order refusing to make a reference on the ground of inordinate delay is upheld.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The Government's refusal to make a reference under section 10(1)(c) read with section 12(5) stands.
- The petitioner’s challenge to that refusal fails and the writ petition is dismissed; the rule is discharged and there is no order as to costs (as recorded in the opinion).
Wider implications:
The opinion applies established principles authorizing the Appropriate Government to consider prima facie merit and belatedness when deciding whether to make a reference under the Act. The court explicitly distinguished the cited authority relied upon by the petitioner (Balubhai) on its facts. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal rule beyond applying the cited authorities; therefore, no broader new precedent is claimed in the text beyond the application of the existing principles to the facts of this case.
Petition dismissed.
1. An order, passed on the 11th of January, 1989, by the Presiding Officer of the National Industrial Tribunal, Bombay under section 10(1)(c) read with section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter, for the sake of brevity, referred to as ‘the Act’) refusing to make a reference, is impugned in the present petition.
2. The petitioner joined the service of Air India, the third respondent herein, with effect from the 10th of March, 1978 as an Assistant Flight Purser. An incident took place on the 5th of January, 1980 while the petitioner was on duty on a flight proceeding from Bombay to London via Quwait. It is alleged that the petitioner molested a minor girl Miss Jain, a passenger on the flight. On the 5th of February, 1980 a chargesheet was submitted against the petitioner. On 8th of October, 1980 an order of dismissal from service was passed against the petitioner. On the very day the third respondent filed an application under section 33(2)(b) of the Act for grant of approval to the order of dismissal. On 24th of May, 1984 the approval was granted. In the meantime the petitioner filed a departmental appeal which also was dismissed on the 3rd of January, 1981.
3. On the 12th of November, 1987 the petitioner raised a dispute under section 10 read with section 12 of the Act. On 30th of December, 1988 the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Bombay, being the Conciliation Officer, submitted his failure report. A copy of the proceedings in conciliation is annexed at Exhibit-B and a copy of the failure report is annexed at Exhibit-C to the petition. Thereafter, the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, by an order dated 11th of January, 1989 declined to make a reference for adjudication of the dispute on the ground that the dispute is highly belated inasmuch as it has been raised after lapse of a period of seven years and no justification has been given for the delay. The copy of the order is annexed at Exhibit-D to the petition. Taking exception to the said order, the petitioner, on the 3rd of February, 1989 has preferred the present writ petition.
4. Mr. Kochar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has strenuously urged that the Government has erred in declining to make a reference. He submitted that the Government is factually in error while refusing to make a reference on the ground that the dispute has been raised after a lapse of seven years. He pointed out that the approval application filed by the third respondent was pending for the period between 8th of October, 1980 and the 24th of May, 1984. Hence, till such time that the approval was granted the order of dismissal cannot be said to have been confirmed. It is only after the approval was granted on the 24th of May, 1984 that the petitioner can be expected to raise a dispute. Mr. Kochar pointed out that the petitioner was ill-advised and he, therefore, continued making representations to the higher authorities which included the Minister for Aviation, the Prime Minister and also the President of India. After the petitioner realised that no justice was done despite the representations, he, on the 12th of November, 1987, raised the present dispute.
5. Mr. Kochar further submitted that there was no period of limitation prescribed for raising an industrial dispute. All that the Government was required to find out is whether an industrial dispute exists. Once this issue is answered in the affirmative the Government is ordinarily expected to make a reference. Since there is no limitation prescribed the reference cannot be declined on the ground of delay as has been done in the present case. Reliance is placed on the case of Balubhai J. Panchal v. State of Maharashtra, 1983 (46) F.L.R 207 wherein it is observed:
“Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Section 12(2), (5), 10(1) — Conciliation Officer making failure report — Appropriate Government not making reference under section 12(2) on ground that demand is barred by limitation — Appropriate Government was not justified in not making reference on ground of limitation — Only question before respondent No. 2 was to see whether industrial dispute exists or is apprehended.”
6. Mr. Kochar submitted that this is a proper case where an appropriate direction should be issued calling upon the Government to make a reference.
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions advanced by Mr. Kochar but I am unable to accede to the prayer advanced on behalf of the petitioner. The petitioner has been dismissed way back on the 8th of October, 1980. As far as the petitioner is concerned the order of dismissal came into effect on the 8th of October, 1980. Nothing prevented the petitioner from raising the dispute soon thereafter. It is true that an application under section 33(2)(b) for approval was filed by the third respondent. That, however, in my view, is no bar for the petitioner to raise the dispute. The approval is a formality which is required to be undergone by the third respondent. That, however, would not be a just ground for the petitioner to wait for raising the dispute. The petitioner had filed a departmental appeal which appeal came to be dismissed on the 3rd of January, 1981. Even at this stage, the petitioner took no action of raising a dispute. In the circumstances, in my view, the Government is justified in holding that there has been a delay of seven years for which no justification is forthcoming. Even if one were to hold that the order of dismissal was finally confirmed when the approval was granted on the 24th of May, 1984 there is no cogent and satisfactory explanation for the inaction for the period between the 24th of May, 1984 to the 12th of November, 1987. A reference to an additional argument advanced by Mr. Kochar may be made at this stage. According to Mr. Kochar, the ground of delay was not one of the grounds which was mentioned by the Conciliation Officer in his failure report. According to Mr. Kochar the Government cannot rely on a ground which does not find a place in the failure report while declining to make a reference. He placed reliance on the provisions of sub-section (5) of section 12 which reads as under:—
Sec. 12(5): “If, on a consideration of the report referred to in sub-section (4), the appropriate Government is satisfied that there is a case for reference to a Board (Labour Court, Tribunal or National tribunal), it may make such reference. Where the appropriate Government does not make such a reference it shall record and communicate to the parties concerned its reasons therefor.”
8. By taking resort to the phrase ‘if on consideration of the report referred to in sub-section (4)’ which relates to failure report, Mr. Kochar submitted that the Government cannot travel beyond the reasons which are to be found in the failure report. Mr. Kochar has one more limb of argument. According to him, the petitioner has been taken by surprise. Had he been given notice that his prayer for making a reference is likely to be rejected on the ground of delay he would have placed material on record to explain the delay. The petitioner not having been given an opportunity has been denied justice without following the principles of natural justice.
9. In my view, none of the above submissions can be held to be justified in law. In my view, sub-section (5) of section 12 cannot be so read as to confine or limit the jurisdiction of the Government while exercising its function of making or refusing to make a reference. All that sub-section (5) of section 12 requires is that the Government will consider the failure report. sub-section (5) of section 12 cannot be so read as to limit the ambit and scope of the inquiry which has to be held by the Government under the said provision.
10. In regard to the ground that the petitioner was not given notice of the ground of delay I have myself heard Mr. Kochar in support of the petitioner's explanation for delay. I have perused the correspondence which the petitioner has carried on with the higher ups. In my view, the same can offer no legitimate or satisfactory explanation for the inaction, either from the 8th of October, 1980 the date of order of dismissal, the 3rd of January, 1981 the date when his departmental appeal was dismissed or the 24th of May, 1984 when the approval under section 33(2)(b) was granted. I am, therefore, constrained to hold that the petitioner has failed to explain the inordinate delay in raising the dispute in question.
11. It is true that the Act does not lay down a period of limitation. This, however, does not mean that a dispute can be raised at any time, even after an inordinate delay and the Government is bound to make a reference. If there is an inordinate delay that can be legitimate ground for holding that there does not exist in praesenti an industrial dispute. The facts in the case of Balubhai (supra) are clearly distinguishable. In that case, an order of termination was passed on the 8th of January, 1965. A suit challenging the dismissal was immediately filed being suit No. 5215 of 1965 in the City Civil Court at Bombay. The suit was dismissed on the 28th of February, 1978 on the ground that the Industrial Disputes Act was a complete Code and the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in such matters was ousted. The petitioner in that case immediately on the 28th of March, 1978 which is well within one month from the date of dismissal of the suit, filed an application for conciliation. The facts in the present case are entirely different. As already pointed out the order of dismissal in the instant case is passed on 8th of October, 1980 and the departmental appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed on the 3rd of January, 1981. Even if it were to be held that the petitioner may have been justified in waiting till the approval was granted on 24th of May, 1984, there is a complete inaction up to the 12th of November, 1987 which is a period of almost 3½ years. The various representations which the petitioner has made to different authorities cannot give a satisfactory explanation for the inaction for the period of 3½ years.
12. In the case of Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay, 1964 (1) LLJ 351 the Supreme Court observed:
“But it would not be possible to accept the plea that the appropriate Government is precluded from considering even prima facie the merits of the dispute when it decides the question as to whether its power to make a reference should be exercised under section 10(1) read with section 12(5) or not. If the claim made is patently frivolous, or is clearly belated, the appropriate Government may refuse to make a reference.”
13. In the case of Shaw Wallace and Co. Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1988 (1) LLJ 177 the Madras High Court has observed:
“If the claim is patently frivolous or if the admitted facts are so glaringly against workmen not warranting trial or adjudication by Tribunal or Court, then the Government would be justified in refusing to make a reference. If the claim is state and belated it need not be referred for adjudication.”
14. It would, thus, appear that when application for making a reference is made after an inordinate delay the same can be a just and proper ground for refusing to make a reference.
15. For the foregoing reasons, I find that the impugned order refusing to make a reference on the ground that the application has been made after inordinate delay is justified on the material on record. I, therefore, find the petition without merit and the same is dismissed. Rule discharged. No order as to costs.
Petition dismissed.
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