- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Rashtriya Chemicals And Fertilizers Limited v. State Of Maharashtra And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This writ petition arises from a dispute between a Central Government Company (the company) and the State of Maharashtra concerning the State's demand for a cess (and penalty) for the earth ("Mathi") excavated from land leased to the company.
The company was granted land measuring 72.02.66 hectares by a document exhibited as Exhibit 'A' dated 5-9-1979. The grant required payment of occupancy price and included specific conditions of use; clause (vii) reserved to the Government "the right of Government to all mines and mineral products and quarries in the land" and liberty of access for working quarries and searching therefor in accordance with the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966.
Procedurally, a show-cause notice was initially issued and later proceedings were dropped by the Collector on Government instructions. The Government subsequently directed reopening of the issue. A fresh order was passed by the Collector on 4-10-1983 finding unlawful removal of earth shown by a panchnama dated 18-4-1980, assessing the market value at Rs. 15,48,420 and imposing a penalty of Rs. 5,48,420 under Section 48(7) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 (which deals with penalty for extracting/removing minerals without lawful authority).
The company's appeals were dismissed by the Additional Commissioner and later by the Government (order dated 7-8-1987). Complaints were made about the adequacy of hearing at the Government stage.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the earth excavated and removed from the granted land qualifies as a "mineral product" for the purposes of the reservation in the grant and Section 48(7) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966.
- Whether the Government circular dated 16-9-1980, which stated that earth removed for levelling of land would not fall within Section 48(7), was applicable to the company's activities (i.e., whether reliance on that circular could exempt the company from liability and penalty).
Arguments of the Parties
Company's Arguments (as recorded)
- The company relied substantially on a Government circular dated 16-9-1980 which, according to the company, clarified that earth removed for levelling of land would not be covered by Section 48(7) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and therefore no levy or penalty was due for such removal.
- It was asserted (implicitly) that the earth was used for building operations and for making roads, activities that involved levelling and thus fell within the circular's clarification.
State / Collector / Government's Arguments (as recorded)
- The Collector treated the earth as a mineral product and held there had been unlawful removal, imposing a penalty under Section 48(7) based on the market value disclosed in the panchnama.
- The Collector and subsequent authorities rejected the applicability of the 16-9-1980 circular (one ground of rejection mentioned was that the circular was not retrospective), and observed that the condition in the grant had been overlooked by the company and that the company was not the authority empowered under the Code or Rules to permit contractors to use the materials.
- The Government, on disposing the further appeal, observed that construction of roads could not be construed as mere levelling and thus sustained the finding that minor minerals were utilised for filling work or for roads; the Government also noted procedural shortcomings in the hearing but nevertheless upheld the substance of the lower authorities' findings.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| B. Dass v. State of U.P., AIR 1976 SC 1393 | Discussion of the scope and ambit of the term "mines and minerals" in judicial decisions. | Used to support the proposition that interpretation of "mineral" depends on context and that central enactments and their definitions cannot be mechanically applied to determine the meaning in a grant/Code context. |
| Todd, Birleston and Co. v. The North Eastern Railway Company, (1903) 1 KB 603 | Authority (Court of Appeal) indicating that brick-earth and similar earth would not be regarded as "minerals" in that context. | Cited to show historical authority for excluding certain kinds of earth (like brick-earth) from the category of minerals, supporting contextual interpretation that earth used in construction/levelling may not be a mineral for proprietary-reservation purposes. |
| Banarsi Dass Chadha and Bros. v. Lt. Governor, Delhi Admn., AIR 1978 SC 1587 | Observation that the word "mineral" is elastic and its meaning depends upon the setting in which it is used. | Applied to underscore that the meaning of "mineral product" in the grant and the Land Revenue Code must be determined by context rather than by importing a broad definition from central mining legislation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded along contextual and purposive lines, confined to the terms of the grant and the provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code rather than to the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (the Central enactment).
Key points of the reasoning as recorded in the opinion:
- The central question was whether the earth removed from the granted land answered the description of a "mineral product" within the meaning of the reservation in the grant and Section 48(7) of the Code.
- The court rejected reliance on the wide definition of "mineral" contained in the Central enactment for deciding the present dispute because the Central enactment serves a different purpose and adopting its definition would be inappropriate in the context of proprietary reservations in a grant of land.
- Where a grant confers possession and the grant is for specific uses (here, erecting substantial structures such as for a chemical factory), interpreting the reservation clause to include every particle of earth would frustrate the purpose of the grant and make normal enjoyment of the land subject to unreasonable interference.
- In the absence of a definition in the Land Revenue Code or in the grant, the term must be interpreted with reference to its meaning in the specific situational context; judicial authorities have held that "mineral" is an elastic word and its meaning depends on context.
- The court noted authorities (including the case holding that brick-earth and the like are not minerals) to demonstrate that not all earth or soil necessarily qualifies as a mineral for the purposes of proprietary reservation or the Code.
- Applying these principles to the facts — namely, that the land was granted for heavy industrial uses and that much of the removed earth was used for building operations and road-making (levelling) — the court concluded that equating every sod or particle of soil with a mineral product would be untenable and would defeat the grant's purpose.
- Consequently, the court held that the orders of the Collector, Additional Commissioner and the Government were vitiated by errors of law apparent on the face of the record and thus liable to be quashed.
The court also observed that it was unnecessary to make a definitive finding on whether the company clearly fell within the exemption in the 16-9-1980 circular, although it indicated that the company could come within the circular. The core determination made was about the meaning of "mineral product" in context.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition is allowed; the orders of the authorities are quashed and the rule is made absolute.
Implications and immediate effects:
- The court quashed the impugned orders of the Collector, the Additional Commissioner and the Government decision which had sustained the levy/penalty under Section 48(7) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code in respect of the earth removed from the granted land.
- The decision rests on the contextual interpretation that, in the circumstances of this grant and under the Land Revenue Code, the earth in question could not be treated as a "mineral product" so as to sustain the penalty assessments; therefore, the statutory penalty as imposed was legally unsustainable.
- The opinion applies existing principles and cited authorities to resolve the matter; it does not purport to lay down a novel rule of law beyond applying context-specific interpretation of "mineral" to the facts of this grant. No broader new precedent is announced beyond the application of the established approach that the term "mineral" is elastic and context-dependent.
Petition allowed.
1. This writ petition discloses a legal fight between a Central Government Company and the State of Maharashtra. The controversy is about the demand of the State Government for cess, for the ‘Mathi’ (Earth) dug up by the Company from the land leased to it.
2. The controversy had been discussed and decided upon by three orders, both (sic) adverse, to the company. The company has come to the Court.
3. The grant of the land admeasuring 72.02.66 hectares is evidenced by Exhibit ‘A’ dated 5-9-1979. Occupancy price was to be paid for to the State Government. The conditions of use and utilisation of the land had been specifically provided for. Clause (vii) is particularly important. It reads:
“the grant is subject to the reservation of the right of Government to all mines and mineral products and quarries in the land and the Government shall have full liberty to access for the purpose of working quarries and searching for the same with all reasonable convenience, as provided by the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966.”
(Emphasis supplied)
4. The crucial question is whether the earth that had been taken is a mineral product.
5. A show cause notice was initially issued. The Collector of Kulaba dropped further proceedings on the basis of instructions received from the Government. The Govt. had then the advice of the law and judicial department. However, the Government had a second look at the question, some time later. The Government directed the reopening of the closed issue. (Whether that was a permissible exercise may be a debatable point, it is not necessary to consider that question, as no such contention was urged in the case).
6. A fresh order passed by the Collector, on 4/10/1983. The panchnama of 18-4-1980 disclosed the quantity of earth extracted/excavated and removed from the land. The market rate came to Rs. 15,48,420/-. The Collector took the view that there was an unlawful removal of the earth and that a penalty amounting to Rs. 5,48,420/- should be paid. A reference was made to Section 48(7) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, which provided for the penalty on a person “who without lawful authority extracat/removes……. any mineral…..”.
7. The company mostly based its defence on a circular dated 16/9/1980 issued by the Government whereunder, earth removed for levelling of the land would not come within the ambit of Section 48(7). Arguments tenuous and strained were found for holding that the circular was not applicable. One such fragile reasoning was about the circular not being retrospective. The circular is intended to clarify the Government stand. It is not a new law. If under the clarification no levy was permissible, the Collector would not be justified in levying it. Certain circulars confer rights on a citizen. They are binding on the authorities administering the fiscal enactment (Circulars curtailing or taking away the rights of the citizens would not, however, operate to the prejudice of the citizen). Looked that way, the circular would appear to be applicable in the present case. If that be so, the company would not be liable for any payment or penalty. There was no case that the company had used the materials otherwise than for its building operations, most of which was for making roads which would involve, necessarily, levelling operations. The Collector observed that “the condition in the grant was overlooked by the company “and that the company was not the authority empowered by the Code or the Rules to permit the contractors the use of said materials.” The query of the Collector: Who was the company to interpret the circular? — is not a proper approach to the question. As noted earlier, the company was entitled to rely on the circular, in as much as it had conferred on it very valuable rights recognised under law, which could be invoked by it relying on the principles laid down by the Apex Court. The observation is without adequate attention to the basic question whether the earth would answer the description of mineral products.
8. The order of the Additional Commissioner, does not improve the situation. Following the same stand of reasoning the appeal was dismissed. The Government did not take a different view when it disposed of the further appeal, by its order dated 7/8/1987. Amongst others, it was complained that the hearing was held on 9-2-1987, that there was hardly any time for hearing, and that the order was passed on 7-8-1987. The reading of the order indicates that there is substance in the complaint about the unsatisfactory character of the consideration of the points. As regards the arguments based on levelling it was observed:
“This is only a technical issue and should not, therefore, be a cause for levying penalty”.
According to the Government, construction of roads could not be construed as an act of levelling. Consequently, the finding of the lower authorities about the minor minerals having been utilised for filling work or for roads, was sustained.
9. It is unnecessary to express a final view whether the company could come clearly within the circular and escape from the payment of penalty. I am of the view that it could. The more fundamental question is, whether earth used for making the roads is a mineral product. It will be impermissible for understanding the term mineral product occurring in the agreement or in the Land Revenue Code with reference to the Central enactment, the Mines and Minerals Act, 1957. All the authorities misled themselves in relying on the definition, the wide definition, as contained in the Central enactment. The purpose for which the Central enactment was made, is entirely different from the objects intended to be safeguarded in relation to the proprietary rights of the Government, when it effected the grant of land.
10. Ordinarily, when a grant is made, the grantee becomes the person in possession. The exercise of permitted activities on the land, could not be ordinarily restrained. The enjoyment of the property, in accordance with the desires and decisions of the grantee, cannot be interfered with or inhibited unless the rights specifically reserved in the Government, could be rightly invoked.
11. Ordinarily, what is much below the surface of earth could not be easily divined. If there be a valuable mineral, a few feet below the earth, a grant of it would not be within the contemplation of the parties when the grant is made. The valuable mineral, was not intended to be parted with, when the grant was made. A logical corollary is that the grantee shall not have the right to use it. The Government would have the proprietary right under the reservation clause.
12. Unaided by a definition clause in the Land Revenue Code, or a descriptive one in the grant, the authorities, and ultimately the Court, will have to interpret that term with reference to the meaning it could have in such a situation.
13. Though in different context, Courts including the Supreme Court have had occasion to discuss the scope and ambit of the term mines and minerals. Such discussions are covered by decisions spanning more than a century. It is unnecessary to burden this judgment with copious quotations from all those cases. The decision of the Supreme Court in B. Dass v. State of U.P, AIR 1976 SC 1393, where Y.V Chandrachud J., spoke for the Court, is one such. The Court of Appeal has held, way back in 1903, in Todd, Birleston and Co. v. The North Eastern Railway Company (1903) 1 KB 603 that brick-earth and the like would not be minerals. Commenting on the same, Chinnappa Reddy, J. rendering the decision reported in Banarsi Dass Chadha and Bros. v. Lt. Governor, Delhi Admn., AIR 1978 SC 1587 observed (at p. 1589):
“As we said earlier the word mineral is an elastic word whose meaning depends upon the setting in which it is used.”
It is, therefore, clear that all depends upon the context, and the contents of the appropriate legal provisions or documents evidencing the transactions.
14. If it were a mere question of Mines and Minerals Act, 1957 covering the removal of earth, there cannot be possibly any doubt whatever, now, in view of the very wide definition of the term contained in the enactment itself, and as interpreted by the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court. As noted earlier, the question involved in the present case is not to be determined with reference to the Central enactment but with reference to the clauses in the grant and the provisions in the Code. When it is noted that the Company was given the land for the purpose of erecting massive structures as needed in setting up a chemical factory of the designs and dimensions of the company, the context would certainly rule out a reservation for the State Government of the earth that is found in the land. That will very much defeat the purpose of the grant itself. Every use of the sod, or piercing of the land with a pick-axe, would, in that eventuality, require sanction of the authorities. The interpretation so placed, would frustrate the intention of the grant and lead to patently absurd results. To equate the earth removed in the process of digging a foundation, or otherwise, as a mineral product, in that context, would be a murder of an alien but lovely language. The reading of the entire grant, would certainly rule out a proposition equating every pebble or particle of soil in the granted land as partaking the character of a mineral product. In the light of the above conclusion, I am clearly of the view that the orders of the authorities, are vitiated by errors of law apparent on the face of the record. They are liable to be quashed. I do so.
15. It is unnecessary, when the conclusion has been reached on the premises as indicated above, to express brashly or harshly, an impression about all the authorities appearing to have a foreclosed mind and a foregone conclusion, after the reopening process was initiated. Yet it is there.
16. The writ petition is accordingly allowed.
Rule is made absolute.
Petition allowed.
Alert