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Dinkar Dada Mahadik v. Shrirang Dada Mahadik And Others

Bombay High Court
Oct 21, 1991
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Second Appeal at the Instance of Original Plaintiff No. 2)

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit properties were originally owned by Jagubai (wife of Yeshwant Jadhav), who had adopted Jayvant Yeshwant Jadhav as her son. After Jagubai's death, Jayvant succeeded to her estate. The suit lands had previously been mortgaged and were in the possession of Bala Krishan and Dada Krishan; Jayvant redeemed the mortgage in 1963 and obtained possession through Court.

On June 24, 1965 Jayvant executed a registered agreement of sale in favour of plaintiff No. 1 and on November 30, 1965 executed a sale deed in his favour. On October 12, 1965 the defendant filed a tenancy application under section 70‑B of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, claiming induction as a tenant in 1963; the purchaser (plaintiff) was not made a party to those tenancy proceedings. The Tenancy Authority declared the defendant to be the tenant on April 30, 1969. Jayvant's appeal and revision against that declaration were dismissed (appeal dismissed on September 19, 1970; revision dismissed on September 7, 1972).

On November 15, 1975 the plaintiffs (including plaintiff No. 2, who claimed as Karta of the family) filed a suit for a declaration and injunction, seeking a declaration of ownership based on the sale deed dated November 30, 1965 and an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with their ownership, possession and enjoyment.

The defendant contested the suit, asserting (inter alia) that he was a tenant in possession and that the sale deed did not affect his right; further he contended that the sale deed was executed during the pendency of the tenancy proceedings and was therefore affected by lis pendens. The Trial Court accepted the defendant's contentions and dismissed the suit on March 22, 1979. The District Court (Assistant Judge) dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal on October 27, 1980, concurring with the Trial Judge.

The second appeal was admitted on July 24, 1981 on the specific question whether a civil court has jurisdiction to decide the validity of the sale deed in view of the restrictions in sections 63 and 64 of the Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the civil courts had jurisdiction to decide the validity of the sale deed in view of the restrictions in sections 63 and 64 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act and the remedial procedure under section 84‑C (and related provisions), or whether the matter fell to be decided by the competent authority (Mamlatdar) under section 84‑C and section 85A (requiring reference)?
  2. Whether the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff was affected or rendered ineffective by the doctrine of lis pendens because it was executed during the pendency of the tenancy proceedings?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Plaintiff No. 2) — Principal Arguments

  • The civil Courts below erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' suit on the ground that the transfer contravened sections 63‑A and 64 of the Act; instead, section 84‑C empowers the Mamlatdar to hold an inquiry (as provided in section 84‑B) and to decide whether a transfer is invalid, so the question falls within the authority of the Mamlatdar.
  • Consequently, the issue of validity of the transfer is within the scope of section 84‑C and must be referred to the Competent Authority under the provisions of section 85A, thereby ousting civil court jurisdiction on that question.
  • The lower Courts wrongly applied the doctrine of lis pendens to defeat the plaintiff's title. Reliance was placed on the cited authority (Nathaji Anandrav Paul v. Nana Sarjerao Patil) to submit that lis pendens does not annul a conveyance but only renders it subservient to the rights of parties to the litigation.

Defendant / Respondent — Contentions and Positions

  • The defendant asserted he was a tenant in possession and that the sale deed in favour of plaintiff No. 1 would not affect his rights.
  • The defendant contended the sale deed was executed during the pendency of the tenancy proceedings and therefore was hit by lis pendens.
  • The respondent's counsel (Shri Naik) conceded that the statutory restrictions on transfer in sections 63 and 64 should be read with the provisions of section 84‑C of the Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nathaji Anandrav Paul v. Nana Sarjerao Patil, 9 BLR 1173 The doctrine of lis pendens does not annul a conveyance made in contravention of it; rather it renders such conveyance subservient to the rights of the parties to the litigation (title derived pendente lite becomes subject to outcome), and the doctrine is not founded solely on equitable notice. The Court observed that the lower Courts had overlooked this principle when they treated the transfer as void by reason of lis pendens. The Court set aside the lis pendens‑based finding of the Courts below, holding that it had been misapplied in a manner that affected the alienee's title beyond what the doctrine contemplates.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in two principal strands: jurisdiction under the Act's transfer‑control provisions, and the correct application of the doctrine of lis pendens.

1. Jurisdiction and Statutory Procedure:

  1. The Court noted that sections 63, 63‑A and 64 of the Act impose restrictions and procedures on sale and transfer of agricultural land (including the need to determine reasonable price and obtain prescribed permissions or follow statutory procedure). It was common ground that the statutory procedure under these provisions had not been complied with prior to the transfer to the appellant.
  2. Section 84‑C (introduced by the Amending Act, 1955) authorises the Mamlatdar, suo motu or on application, to issue notice, hold an inquiry (as provided in section 84‑B) and decide whether a transfer or acquisition is invalid under the Act; subsection (2) allows the Mamlatdar to declare the transfer invalid subject to specified contingencies (including limited exceptions when a landlord transfers to a tenant and ceiling limits are respected under certain conditions).
  3. Section 85A requires that if a civil suit involves issues that are required to be settled by an authority competent under the Act, the civil court shall stay the suit and refer such issues to the competent authority; the competent authority must decide and communicate its decision back to the civil court, which will then dispose of the suit accordingly.
  4. Applying those provisions, the Court concluded that the primary question—whether Jayvant's transfer to the appellant was valid under the Act—was one required to be decided by the Mamlatdar under section 84‑C. Accordingly, the issue should have been referred to the Competent Authority under section 85A, and the civil courts erred in assuming jurisdiction to decide that question.

2. Doctrine of Lis Pendens:

  1. The Court examined the treatment of lis pendens by the lower Courts. It observed the cited authority's principle that lis pendens does not annul a conveyance but makes it subject to the outcome of the pending litigation.
  2. The Court concluded the lower Courts had misapplied the doctrine so as to affect the title of the alienee beyond the doctrine's proper scope; that finding by the Courts below therefore required setting aside.

3. Remedy and Directions:

Because the crucial statutory question fell within the Mamlatdar's competence, the Court set aside the judgments and decrees of the Courts below, remanded the suit to the Trial Court for fresh decision on issues generally, and directed the Trial Court to refer the specified issue (Issue No. 6) to the Competent Authority under section 85A. The Trial Court is to dispose of the suit according to law after receiving the Competent Authority's finding. The Court also excluded issues Nos. 7, 8, 9 and 10 from the fresh adjudication order (i.e., the remand did not encompass those issues).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL ALLOWED

The Court allowed the second appeal, set aside the judgments and decrees of the Trial Court and the District Court (Assistant Judge), and remanded the suit to the Trial Court for fresh decision on the issues except Nos. 7, 8, 9 and 10. The Trial Court was directed to make a reference on Issue No. 6 to the Competent Authority under section 85A (so as to have the Mamlatdar determine whether the transfer is invalid under the Act) and thereafter to dispose of the suit in accordance with the law. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Implications:

  • The direct practical consequence is that the prior dismissals (based on the civil courts' determination) have been set aside and the suit will proceed in the Trial Court after a statutory reference to the Competent Authority regarding the transfer's validity.
  • The opinion requires that where a civil suit involves issues falling within the Mamlatdar's statutory competence under section 84‑C, the civil court must follow the referral procedure under section 85A rather than decide the matter itself. This constrained the jurisdiction of the civil courts in this case.
  • The Court found that the doctrine of lis pendens had been misapplied by the lower Courts; it clarified (per the cited authority) that lis pendens does not annul a conveyance but renders it subject to the rights established by the pending litigation, and thus the lower Courts' lis pendens‑based ruling was set aside.
  • The opinion does not expressly state that it establishes any novel precedent beyond application of the cited authority and statutory scheme; the immediate effect is limited to the parties and remand procedure directed here.
Appeal allowed.

This summary is strictly limited to and derived from the content of the provided opinion text.

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1. This second appeal, at the instance of original plaintiff No. 2, arises on the following facts:— The properties in suit originally owned by one Jagubai wd/o Yeshwant Jadhav. She had adopted one Jayvant Yeshwant Jadhav as her son. After the death of Jagubai, Jayvant succeeded to her estate in the suit lands. The suit lands were mortgaged to and in possession of Bala Krishan and Dada Krishan. In 1963 Jayvant however redeemed the mortgage and obtained possession of the lands through Court.

2. On June 24, 1965 Jayvant executed a registered agreement of sale in favour of plaintiff No. 1 and on November 30, 1965 executed a regular sale deed in his favour. On October 12, 1965 the defendant filed a tenancy application under section 70-B of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (for short, the Act), inter alia, claiming that he was inducted as a tenant on the lands by Jayvant in the year 1963. The plaintiff-purchaser was, however, not made a party to the said proceedings. The Tenancy Authority, however, declared the defendant as the tenant on April 30, 1969. Jayvant carried the matter in appeal but the appeal was dismissed on September 19, 1970, and also the revision before the Revenue Tribunal on September 7, 1972.

3. Thereafter on November 15, 1975 the plaintiffs filed a suit against the defendant for a declaration and injunction. The declaration was sought in the form that plaintiff No. 2 being the Karta of the family is the owner of the lands on the basis of sale deed dated November 30, 1965. They also sought injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with their right of ownership, possession and enjoyment of the lands.

4. The suit was contested by the defendant. One of the contentions raised was that the defendant is a tenant with possession, and sale deed in favour of plaintiff No. 1 would not affect his right. Another contention was raised by contending that the sale deed was executed during the pendency of the tenancy proceedings between the defendant and Jayvant and, therefore, the transaction between plaintiff No. 2 and Jayvant was hit by the principle of lis pendens.

5. The learned trial Judge accepted both the contentions raised by the defendant and dismissed the suit on March 22, 1979. In appeal preferred by the plaintiffs to the District Court, the learned Assistant Judge by his judgment and decree dated October 27, 1980 dismissed the appeal by concurring with the view taken by the learned Trial Judge.

6. It may be stated that the appeal was admitted on July 24, 1981, only on the question of jurisdiction of civil Court to decide the validity of the sale deed in view of the restriction contained in sections 63 and 64 of the Act.

7. Shri Mohite, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-plaintiff No. 2 urged that the view taken by the Courts below in dismissing the plaintiff's suit on the ground that the transfer was contrary to the provisions contained in sections 63-A and 64 of the Act is not correct. In this context he invited my attention to the provisions of section 84-C of the Act, and according to the learned counsel section 84-C empowers the Magistrate to hold an enquiry as provided for in section 84-B and decide whether the transfer or acquisition is or is not invalid. Therefore it has been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that as a matter of fact the Courts below ought to have held that the question involved in the suit is directly and substantially falls within the ambit of section 84-C of the Act, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of civil Court and, hence, the impugned judgment and decree are liable to be quashed and set aside on the grounds that the Courts have no jurisdiction, by virtue of provisions contained in section 85 of the Act. The civil Court cannot decide or deal with any question which requires to be decided or dealt with by the Mamlatdar.

8. Shri Mohite learned counsel appearing for the appellant has further contended that the Courts below have erred in taking the view that the sale deed in favour of the appellant was hit by the principle of lis pendens and, therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled for any declaration, of ownership. In this context he invited my attention to a decision in the case of Nathaji Anandrav Paul v. Nana Sarjerao Patil, 9 BLR 1173 in support of his contention that the doctrine of lis pendens is not based on the equitable doctrine of notice, but on the ground that it is necessary to the administration of justice that the decision of the Court in a suit should be binding not only on the litigant parties but on those who derived title from them pendente lite whether with notice of the suit or not. The effect of the doctrine of lis pendens is not to annul the conveyance made in contravention of it, but only to render it subservient to the rights of the parties to the litigation.

9. There is merit in both the contentions of Shri Mohite, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. Shri Naik learned counsel appearing for the respondent fairly conceded that restrictions on transfers of agricultural lands as provided under sections 63 and 64 of the Act will have to be read with the provisions contained in section 84-C of the Act.

Section 63(1) provides that

“(1) Save as provided in this Act—

(a) no sale (including sales in execution of a decree of a Civil Court or for recovery of arrears of land revenue or for sums recoverable as arrears of land revenue) gift, exchange or lease of any land or interest therein, or

(b) no mortgage of any land or interest therein, in which the possession of the mortgaged property is delivered to the mortgagee, shall be valid in favour of person who is not an agriculturist (or who being an agriculturist will after such sale, gift, exchange, lease or mortgage, hold land exceeding the ceiling area determined under the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) and (Amendment) Act, 1972, or who is not an agricultural labourer:

Provided that the Collector or an officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf may grant permission for such sale, gift, exchange, lease or mortgage, on such conditions as may be prescribed..”

10. Section 63-A(1) of the Act lays down the provision for fixing a reasonable price of land for the purpose of its sale and purchase; whereas section 64 provides that where a landlord intends to sell any land, he shall apply to the Tribunal for determining the reasonable price thereof. The Tribunal shall thereupon determine the reasonable price of the land in accordance with the provisions of section 63-A.

11. It is common ground that prior to the transfer of the land in favour of the appellant procedure prescribed under the aforesaid provisions of the Act was not complied with. Nevertheless section 84-C, inter alia, provides that where in respect of the transfer or acquisition of any land made on or after the commencement of the Amending Act, 1955, the Mamlatdar suo motu or on the application of any person interested in such land has reason to believe that such transfer or acquisition is or becomes invalid under any of the provisions of this Act, the Mamlatdar shall issue a notice and hold an inquiry as provided for in section 84-B and decide whether the transfer or acquisition is or is not invalid.

12. Sub-section (2) of section 84-C further provides that if after holding such inquiry, the Mamlatdar comes to a conclusion that the transfer or acquisition of land is invalid, he shall make an order declaring the transfer or acquisition to be invalid, provided that, where the transfer of land was made by the landlord to the tenant of the land and the area of the land so transferred together with the area of other land, if any, cultivated personally by the tenant did not exceed the ceiling area, the Mamlatdar shall not declare such transfer to be invalid, in certain contingencies as provided therein.

13. It is therefore clear from the provisions of section 84-C(1) and (2), that the question as to whether the transfer of land by Jayvant in favour of appellant is or is not valid under the provisions of the Act, will have to be determined by the Authority prescribed under section 84-C of the Act. In this context reference may be made to the provisions of section 85-a. section 85-a reads as under:

“85A. (1) If any suit instituted in any Civil Court involves any issues which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by any authority competent to settle, decide or deal with such issues under this Act (hereinafter referred to as the “competent authority”) the Civil Court shall stay the suit and refer such issues to such competent authority for determination.

(2) On receipt of such reference from the Civil Court, the competent authority shall deal with and decide such issues in accordance with the provisions of this Act and shall communicate its decision to the Civil Court and such Court shall thereupon dispose of the suit in accordance with the procedure applicable thereto.

Explanation — For the purpose of this section a Civil Court shall include Mamlatdar's Court constituted under the Mamlatdar's Courts Act, 1906.”

14. The principal question in dispute is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Mamlatdar in exercise of his powers under section 84-C. Therefore the issue involved in the suit requires to be referred to the said Authority and it is only on receipt of the finding from the competent authority the suit could be disposed of in accordance with the procedure applicable thereto. In view of the above discussion, both the Courts below have committed an error in assuming jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with the question in issue as to whether the transfer is contrary to the provisions under the Act. In that view of the matter the issue involved will have to be referred to the Competent Authority which is vested with the powers under section 84-C of the Act.

15. Coming to the other contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, it cannot be disputed that both the Courts have taken the view that transfer in favour of the appellant became void by reason of doctrine of lis pendens. In the case cited (supra) the principle that the effect of the doctrine of lis pendens is not to annual the conveyance made in contravention of it, but only to render it subservient to the rights of the parties to the litigation, seems to have been overlooked. The doctrine is not applied so as to affect the title of the alienee of a landlord by virtue of a claim not interfering with the title of tenant in the pending litigation. Therefore that finding of the Courts below is however required to be set aside.

16. The result, therefore, is that appeal is allowed. The judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below are hereby set aside and the suit is remanded to the Trial Court for fresh decision on issues except issues Nos. 7, 8, 9 and 10. The Trial Court is directed to make a reference on issue No. 6 to the Competent Authority under section 85-A of the Act and on receipt of the finding from the Competent Authority dispose of the suit according to law. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.

Appeal allowed.