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Dorab Bomanji Ghadiali v. Jamshed Kanga And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenged a “trade refuse charge” imposed on small tradesmen by Respondent No. 1 (the Administrator) on behalf of the Municipal Corporation for Greater Bombay (the 2nd respondent). The Municipal Corporation is governed by the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (BMC Act). The Act defines “trade refuse” (section 3(yy)) and contains provisions dealing with provision of public receptacles and duties of owners/occupiers (sections 367 and 368).
Some years earlier the State Legislature enacted Maharashtra Act 7 of 1984, adding section 7A to the BMC Act to provide for the appointment of an Administrator to exercise the powers and duties of the Corporation during contingencies. During the Administrator’s tenure, a proposal (Exhibit D) was approved to levy a trade refuse charge on small establishments equal to the annual registration fee under the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948 (the Shops Act). The stated reason was that small trades were receiving collection and disposal services from the Corporation without paying, unlike certain other establishments.
The petitioner, a watch-repair partnership, sought to quash Exhibit D and restrain its recovery. The petitioner argued (inter alia) that they already paid a sewerage charge and that the new impost was a double levy, that little or no trade refuse in Bombay required municipal collection, that a uniform charge was arbitrary, and that the Administrator lacked power to take such policy decisions. The Corporation filed a return denying these assertions and relying on sections 367 and 368 and, alternatively, section 479 of the BMC Act as authorising the levy.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trade refuse charge imposed by the Administrator by Exhibit D was lawfully imposed under the BMC Act or other law.
- Whether section 7A of the BMC Act (appointment of an Administrator) permitted Respondent No. 1 to take the policy decision to impose the trade refuse charge.
- Whether the concept of “trade refuse” (as defined in section 3(yy)) includes refuse generated by businesses such as a watch-repair shop, and whether such refuse justifies municipal collection and a uniform charge.
- Whether sections 367, 368 (including subsection (5)), section 479(2), or section 390 of the BMC Act provided legal sanction for imposing the trade refuse charge on the small establishments identified in Exhibit D.
- Whether imposition of the trade refuse charge amounted to an impermissible double levy (having regard to sewerage charges) or arbitrary taxation.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner already pays a sewerage charge; imposing a trade refuse charge amounts to paying twice for substantially the same service (double levy).
- There is effectively no “trade refuse” in Bombay because most waste from trades is recycled and has resale value; the Corporation is not required to collect or dispose of such recyclable material.
- Applying a uniform rate irrespective of the quantity or quality of refuse generated is arbitrarily discriminatory and impermissible.
- The Administrator was not empowered to take policy decisions of this nature; assurances given during the introduction of section 7A (that policy decisions would not be taken by the Administrator without legislative assent) are not reflected in the enacted provision.
- Exhibit D (the resolution imposing the charge) should be quashed and recovery restrained.
Corporation's Arguments (Respondents)
- The Corporation denied the petitioner's averments and relied on sections 367 and 368 of the BMC Act as justifying the levy of the trade refuse charge.
- In the alternative, the Corporation relied on section 479 as a source of power to charge a fee in relation to licences or written permissions.
- The Corporation asserted the petitioner's claims of double levy, arbitrariness, and excess of the Administrator’s powers were baseless.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court’s analysis proceeded in ordered steps addressing the principal contentions raised in the petition:
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Power of the Administrator under section 7A:
The court examined the contention that section 7A did not authorise the Administrator to take policy decisions. It noted that assurances allegedly given at the time the Bill was introduced were not reflected in the enacted text of section 7A and that no record was placed of any statutory fetter on the Administrator’s powers. The court concluded that section 7A as enacted conferred the powers and duties of the Corporation on the Administrator and contained no express restriction requiring prior legislative assent for policy changes. The court also rejected the submission that the levy had to be ratified by the elected body after elections, observing there was no legal requirement to that effect.
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Whether “trade refuse” requires municipal collection and whether watch-repair shops generate it:
The court accepted that a significant portion of what might be called trade refuse is recycled and has commercial value, but found this not to be universally true. It held that some refuse generated by trades may be non-recyclable and require municipal collection or disposal. The definition of “trade refuse” in section 3(yy) was not confined narrowly to particular places of trade; there is a distinction between refuse “generated by a trade” and refuse “resulting from the running of the trade,” with the latter being a broader concept. Concerning watch-repair shops, the court rejected the absolute claim that such businesses generate no refuse: wrappers, unusable or worn-out parts, and customer discards can constitute refuse that must be swept and removed by municipal staff. Although quantification is difficult and quantities vary between establishments, that difficulty does not render inclusion of such trades necessarily arbitrary. The court observed that bringing small tradesmen into the charge was an exercise of municipal fiscal policy aimed at including those previously escaping levy.
The court also addressed the double-levy argument in this context: sewerage tax covers removal of sewage (liquid/fluid refuse carried off by sewers), whereas trade refuse is broadly solid garbage — a distinction the court accepted as broadly correct for present purposes.
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Whether statutory provisions authorise the trade refuse charge (legal sanction):
The court scrutinised the BMC Act provisions relied upon by the Corporation:
- Sections 367 and 368: Section 367 obliges the Commissioner to provide receptacles, depots and places for temporary deposit or final disposal of categories of garbage including trade refuse, but contains no provision for imposing a charge. Section 368 sets duties of owners/occupiers to deposit refuse at appointed receptacles and contains subsection (5) which permits the Commissioner, on application and payment of charges fixed by him, to allow an owner or occupier to deposit trade refuse temporarily at a place appointed by the Commissioner. The court held that s.368(5) permits a charge only in relation to applicants seeking permission to use a municipal place for temporary deposit and thus does not extend to impose a general charge on the class of small tradesmen covered by Exhibit D.
- Section 479 (and subsection (2)): Section 479(1) and (2) concern licences or written permissions required by the Act, and authorise the Commissioner, with the corporation’s sanction, to fix fees for such licences or permissions. The court held that fees under s.479(2) must relate to licences or written permissions required by s.479(1), and this did not furnish a basis for the general trade refuse charge imposed by Exhibit D.
- Section 390: Although not relied upon by the Corporation in its return, the court considered s.390 (prohibiting commencement of factories, workshops or workplaces using steam, water, electrical or other mechanical power without written permission). The court found s.390 directed at activities likely to be a nuisance or hazard to neighbours and requiring permission where mechanical power is intended to be employed; the provision was not applicable to ordinary watch-repair shops (use of electric light for illumination being incidental and not the sort of mechanical power contemplated).
After examining these provisions, the court concluded that no provision in the Act, apart from the limited power in s.368(5) (which did not apply to the tradesmen targeted by Exhibit D), authorised the imposition of the trade refuse charge in the fashion enacted by the Administrator.
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Conclusion from analysis:
Because Exhibit D reflected the Administrator exercising a power believed to be vested in the Corporation or other municipal authorities but no valid statutory provision authorized a general trade refuse charge as imposed, the court found an absence of legal sanction for the levy. That absence of legal authority was decisive.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Petition allowed.
The court made the rule absolute in terms that the petitioners are entitled to the reliefs claimed in prayers (a) and (b) of the petition and are entitled to a refund of the charge from the fiscal year 1985–86. The parties were left to bear their own costs.
Implications: The direct effect of the decision is that the trade refuse charge, insofar as it was imposed by Exhibit D on the small establishments covered in the petition, is invalid and the petitioners are entitled to a refund for the stated period. The opinion does not state any broader precedent or new legal principle beyond the application of the existing statutory scheme to the facts; it rests on the conclusion that the Act contains no general power to impose the levy in the manner adopted, except for the limited circumstance in section 368(5), which did not apply to the tradesmen in Exhibit D.
Disposition: Petition allowed. Rule made absolute. Parties to bear their own costs.
1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution impugns the trade refuse charge imposed upon small tradesmen by Respondent No. 1 for and on behalf of the 2nd Respondent.
2. The 2nd respondent being the Municipal Corporation for Greater Bombay is governed by the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act — Bombay Act III of 1888. Section 3(yy) of this Act defines “trade refuse” as meaning and including “the refuse of any trade, manufacture or business”. Sections 367 and 368 to the extent relevant vis-a-vis trade refuse or a charge read thus:—
“367. The Commissioner shall provide or appoint in proper and convenient situations public receptacles, depots and places for the temporary deposit or final disposal of—
(a) ………
(b) trade refuse;”
“368. (1) It shall be incumbent on the owners and occupiers of all premises to cause all trade refuse to be collected from their respective premises and to be deposited at such time as the Commissioner, by public notice, from time to time prescribes in the public receptacle, depot or place provided or appointed under the last preceding section for the temporary deposits or final disposal thereof:
(2) Provided that the Commissioner may, if he thinks fit. by written notice require the occupier and owner or either of them of any premises, to cause all..........but not trade refuse to be collected daily, or otherwise periodically, from the said premises and deposited temporarily upon any place forming the part of the said premises which the Commissioner appoints in this behalf, and it shall be incumbent on the said occupier and owner or either of them to cause the said matters to be collected and deposited accordingly.
(3) It shall be incumbent on the owners of all premises to provide receptacles of a size to be prescribed by the Commissioner for the collection therein of all….. and trade refuse to be collected from such premises. Such receptacles shall at all times be kept in good repair and condition and shall be provided in such number and place and retained in such position as the Commissioner may, from time to time, by written notice direct.
(4) It shall also be incumbent on the owners and occupiers or either of them of all premises required by the Commissioner by written notice so to do, to employ servants for the purpose of carrying out and complying with the requirements of sub-sections (1) and (2) of this section.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, if the owner or occupier of any trade premises desires permission to deposit trade refuse, collected daily or periodically from the premises, temporarily upon any place appointed by the Commissioner in this behalf, the Commissioner may, on the application, and on payment of such charges as the Commissioner may, from time to time, fix, allow the applicant to deposit the trade refuse accordingly.”
Some years ago the State Legislature passed maharashtra act 7 of 1984 with a view to provide for the appointment of an Administrator to exercise the powers and duties of the Corporation and all other municipal authorities under the Act or any other law for the time being in force. This was to meet certain contingencies and became part of the Act as section 7A. During the tenure of the Administrator — Respondent No. 1 — a proposal (Exh. D) was put up to him which sought to levy a ‘trade refuse charge’ equal to the registration fee payable per year by every establishment under the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948 (Shops Act). The reason given out was that small trades were generating a refuse which was being collected and disposed by the Corporation without the conductors of such trades paying any charge. This was in sharp contrast to the charges levied on and paid by eating houses and sugarcane stalls etc. To do away with the free service enjoyed by small businesses a trade refuse charge was proposed. The said proposal was sanctioned and since that time small establishments in the city have to pay this charge.
3. Petitioner, a watch repair business, run in partnership by two brothers challenges the validity of the impost. It is contended that the petitioner already pays a sewerage charge. Imposing on them a trade refuse charge is to make them pay twice for the same service. There is no such thing as trade refuse in Bombay. Whatever scrap or waste is generated by a trade or business in this city is recycled and fetches a handsome price. The Corporation is not required to collect or dispose it. Imposition of a uniform rate as such a charge on all establishments regardless of the quantity and quality of refuse generated is impermissible arbitrariness. The Administrator was not empowered to make policy decisions. In fact when introducing the enactment in the Legislature, an assurance had been given that policy decisions would not be taken by him except with the previous assent of the Legislature. There was no provision in the Act to levy a trade refuse charge. Exhibit ‘D’ deserved to be quashed and an injunction was sought to prevent its recovery.
4. The Corporation's return denies the correctness of the averments summarised above. They point to sections 367 and 368 of the Act as justifying the levy. In the alternative section 479 is relied upon as being the source of power justifying the levy. Petitioner's accusations of the charge being a double levy, arbitrary or in excess of the powers of the Administrator are all baseless.
4A. First to be considered is the plea that section 7A did not confer on respondent No. 1 the power to take policy decisions. In fact at the time of introducing the bill to incorporate section 7a into the bmc act, a solemn assurance had been given that the Administrator could not effect any policy changes without the consent of the Legislature. Section 7A is the enacted provision and there is nothing therein to suggest the existence of fetters on the powers of the Administrator. As to assurances given, the same is not reflected in the final product. That apart, no such statement incorporating the assurance has been placed on record. Mr. Joshi submits that the charge should have been got ratified by the elected body after the election. No such requirement is indicated by the law.
5. Second comes the plea that trade refuse does not require collection and disposal by the Corporation. Every form of refuse generated by trade underwent a recycling. Its collection and disposal was itself a gigantic business. No tradesman dumped the refuse generated by his trade into dumps. That which was totally useless or unretainable constituted sewage and for the removal thereof, the traders were, directly or indierectly, already paying a sewerage tax. That some kind of trade refuse has a saleable value and that it does not go into the municipal dumps is undeniable. But this cannot be said of refuse of all types or even of all refuse generated by any single trade. Some part of the generated refuse may be recyclable, the remainder may not be. Further the definition of “trade refuse” in the BMC Act [see section 3(yy)] cannot be said to be restricted to refuse generated by a trade being plied at various places. There is a difference between refuse generated by a trade and that resulting from the running of the trade. The latter would embrace a wider sphere than that covered by the words “refuse generated by the trade, manufacture or business”. Mr. Joshi submits that a watch repair business neither generates nor can be said to incur any refuse. Applying the charge to all traders irrespective of whether or not their trade germinates or results in any refuse is a case of impermissible arbitrariness. A certain latitude has to be given to the State and its instrumentalities in the matter of imposition of fiscal levies. It is well nigh impossible to measure the refuse of every trade, manufacture or business. Quantification in some varieties of trade may lead to floundering because of the haziness surrounding the trade. It is not correct to say that the trade of watch repair does not germinate any refuse. Wrappers over parts used to replace worn out parts and unusable or worn out parts are refuse generated by that trade. The quantity would differ from watch repairer to watch repairer and it would not be possible to measure the same with exactitude. Next customers coming into watch repair establishments would while coming in or slaying there discard odds and bits in the said premises. The quantity of refuse thus left would have to be swept out and dumped somewhere. Even if dumped on the road facing the establishment as is likely to be the ease where the quantity is negligible, the Municipal staff would have to remove it to the dumps — temporary or permanent. Therefore, it is not correct to say that a watch repairer's trade is ipso facto a guarantee against the creation of trade refuse. Indiscriminate over inclusion may be interdictable by exercise of the writ jurisdiction. But the present is not a case of that sort. Here, small tradesmen who were escaping a levy were brought into the net. The argument that tradesmen required to pay a trade refuse charge are charged twice for the same service as they are already paying a sewerage tax remains to be considered. Sewerage tax is levied for disposal of sewage and that is refuse carried off by sewers. This form of garbage is in liquid or fluid condition. Trade refuse is in a different, i.e solid form. The distinction aforestated may not be accurate, but is, broadly correct.
6. Third comes the contention that the impost does not have the sanction of law. Exh. D incorporates the resolution imposing trade refuse charges upon small establishments covered by the Shops Act. A reading of Exh. D shows that the Administrator in imposing the trade refuse charge was exercising a power believed to be vested in the Corporation or some other municipal authority. Section 7A(2) of the Act conferred on the Administrator all powers and duties of the Corporation and all other municipal authorites under the Act or any other law for the time being in force. Therefore the Administrator could exercise only a power conferred on the Corporation or its committees and officers by the Act or any other law then in force. The Act does not in specific terms empower the imposition of the trade refuse charge. The Corporation justifies the charge as falling under sections 367 and 368. The first section obliges the Commissioner to provide public receptacles, depots and places for the temporary deposit or final disposal of different types of garbage inclusive of trade refuse. It makes no reference to the imposition of a charge. Section 368 specifies the duty of owners and occupiers of all premises to collect duest and refuse etc. from such premises and deposit the same at appointed public receptacles. Only sub-section (5) of this section empowers the levy of a charge and that is for according to permission to an owner or occupier for making temporary use of any place for dumping their refuse. This sub section empowers a charge upon those applying and cannot cover the case of small tradesmen spoken of in Exh. D. As an alternative the Corporation relies on section 479(2) of the Act. Section 479-A relevant for our purposes reads thus:—
“479. (1) Whenever it is provided in this Act that a licence or a written permission may be given for any purpose, such licence or written permission shall specify the period for which, and the restrictions and conditions subject to which, the same is granted, and shall be given under the signature of the Commissioner or of a Municipal Officer empowered under section 68 to grant the same.
(2) For every such licence or written permission a fee may be charged at such rate as shall from time to time be fixed by the Commissioner, with the sanction of the Corporation.”
The fee imposable by this provision must relate to a licence or written permission for any purpose required in the Act vide sub-section (1) of section 479. We have already seen that sections 367 and 368 provide for only one charge and that is vide sub-section (5) of section 368. That is a charge for permission to deposit trade refuse temporarily at a particular place and will not apply to tradesmen not seeking permission to dump their trade refuse at any place. Mr. Bharucha seeks succour from section 390. Though this section is not pleaded in the BMC's return, the contention is one of law and has to be considered. It is as under:—
“390. (1) No person shall newly establish in any premises any factory, workshop or workplace in which it is intended that steam, water, electrical or other mechanical power shall be employed, without the previous written permission of the Commissioner, nor shall any person work, or allow to be worked, any such factory, workshop or workplace without such permission.
(2) The Commissioner may refuse to give such permission if he shall be of opinion that the establishment of such factory, workshop or workplace in the proposed position is objectionable by reason of the density of the population in the neighbourhood thereof, or will be a nuisance to the inhabitants of the neighbourhood.
(3) If any written permission for the establishment of a factory, workshop or workplace granted under sub-section (1) be revoked by the Commissioner in the exercise of his powers under sub-section (3) of section 479, no person shall continue or resume the working or use of such factory, workshop or workplace until such written permission is renewed or a fresh written permission is granted by the Commissioner.”
Section 390(1) prohibits the commencement of any factory, workshop or workplace, where steam, water, electrical or other mechanical power is to be employed to work such factory, workshop or workplace without the written permission of the Commissioner. sub-section (2) of this section makes clear the purpose behind the prohibition except with permission. The purpose is to prevent a strain or nuisance being caused to the neighbourhood inhabitants because of the starting of the factory, workshop or workplace. It is difficult to conceive of a watch repairer's shop or like businesses as being obnoxious in any manner whatsoever to the neighbourhood. Next the factory, workshop or workplace has to be one in which it is intended that steam, water, electrical or other mechanical power is to be used. Mr. Bharucha says use of electric lights in a watch repair establishment would attract section 390(1). Use of electricity for illumination of the workplace is incidental and what the sub-section aims at is use of water, steam, electrical or mechanical power for the manufacture or processing or servicing of an article. Sub-section (2) would show that the aim is to regulate factories or trades which are likely to be a health or comfort hazard to the residents of the neighbourhood, except such trades others would not be within the purview of section 390. Having scrutinised all the provisions pointed out, I find no section in the Act which can be said to empower the levy of trade refuse charge except to the limited extent of section 368(5). That does not apply to the tradesmen sought to be covered by Exh. D.
7. The absence of a legal sanction for the levy of a trade refuse charge incorporated in Exh. D leads to the allowing of the petition. Petitioners will be entitled to reliefs claimed in prayers (a) and (b) to the petition with an entitlement to the refund of the charge as from the fiscal year 1985–86. Rule in these terms made absolute with parties being left to bear their own costs.
Petition allowed.
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