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Mrs. Sejal Rikeen Dalai And Others v. The Stock Exchange, Bombay And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
Pradip Harkishondas Dalal, a member of the Bombay Stock Exchange, died in an air crash on 19th October 1988. His heirs, including his son, daughter, and widow, nominated Sejal Dalal, his daughter-in-law, for membership of the Stock Exchange. Sejal applied for membership on 15th December 1988, supported by this nomination and seconded by two members. The Stock Exchange raised inquiries about outstanding liabilities related to the firm Harkisondas Laxmidas and its connection with another firm, Harakshah & Co., both associated with Pradip’s family. The Stock Exchange’s Governing Board considered Sejal’s application on 19th May 1989 and, after a ballot, rejected her membership by a majority vote of 15 to 2. The present petition challenges this decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Stock Exchange, Bombay, is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
- Whether the rejection of the 1st petitioner’s membership application by the Stock Exchange Governing Board violates her fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(g) and 31(1) of the Constitution.
- The nature of membership in the Stock Exchange and whether it constitutes a property right.
- Whether the Governing Board’s discretion in admitting or rejecting members is subject to judicial review for mala fide or arbitrary exercise.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The 1st petitioner claims that denial of membership violates her right to property under Article 31(1) of the Constitution.
- They contend that the rejection infringes the fundamental right to carry on trade or occupation under Article 19(1)(g).
- The petitioners argue that the membership nomination by heirs should entitle the 1st petitioner to membership.
Respondent's Arguments
- The Stock Exchange contends it is not an “authority” under Article 226, hence not amenable to writ jurisdiction.
- It asserts the right to regulate membership, including rejecting unsuitable candidates to maintain professional standards and public interest.
- The Stock Exchange points to the outstanding liabilities and arbitration claims against the deceased member’s firm and associates as relevant to the suitability of the 1st petitioner.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandasjiswami Suverna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R Rudani, AIR 1989 SC 1607 | Broad interpretation of "authority" under Article 226 to include bodies performing public duty beyond statutory authorities and State instrumentalities. | The Court applied this precedent to hold that the Stock Exchange, being a recognized statutory body performing public functions, is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by considering whether the Stock Exchange is an authority under Article 226. Relying on the wide interpretation from the cited Supreme Court precedent, the Court held that the Stock Exchange is a statutory body recognized under the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, performing public duties such as regulating securities dealings and protecting investors. Hence, it is subject to writ jurisdiction.
The Court then examined the nature of membership in the Stock Exchange. It found that membership is a personal permission granted under the Stock Exchange Rules and is not a transferable property right. The right of nomination by heirs exists but does not guarantee automatic membership, which must be confirmed by a ballot requiring a two-thirds majority of the Governing Board.
The 1st petitioner, though exempt from certain qualification criteria under Rule 18 due to her succession to the deceased member’s business, failed to secure the required majority in the ballot (2 votes in favor, 15 against). The Court noted that the Governing Board’s discretion to admit or reject members is a reasonable restriction on the right to carry on trade under Article 19(1)(g) and is necessary to maintain professional standards and public interest.
The Court found no evidence of mala fide or arbitrary exercise of discretion by the Governing Board. The presence of substantial liabilities and unsettled claims against the deceased member’s firm and related parties was relevant to the Board’s decision. The Court emphasized that rejection in a ballot does not require reasons to be given and that the Board’s decision was bona fide and aligned with the Stock Exchange’s objects.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the denial of membership did not violate constitutional rights and did not warrant judicial interference under Article 226.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED WITH COSTS
The Court dismissed the petition challenging the rejection of the 1st petitioner’s membership application by the Stock Exchange Governing Board. The decision confirms that membership in the Stock Exchange is a regulated privilege subject to the Board’s discretion and is not a property right. The ruling upholds the authority of professional bodies to enforce standards and reject unsuitable candidates without judicial interference absent mala fide or arbitrariness. No new precedent was set beyond affirming established principles regarding the scope of Article 226 and the nature of membership rights in such bodies.
1. Pradip Harkishondas Dalal was a member of the Stock Exchange, Bombay. He died in an Air crash at Ahmedabad on 19th October 1988. The 1st petitioner Sejal Dalal is the daughter-in-law of Pradip. The 3rd petitioner is the widow of Pradip. Petitioner No. 2 is the son of Pradip and petitioner No. 4 is the daughter of Pradip 1st petitioner Sejal is the wife of the 2nd petitioner. On 6th December 1988 petitioners Nos. 2 to 4 as the heirs and close relatives of Pradip nominated the 1st petitioner Sejal for being made a member of the Stock Exchange, Bombay. Accordingly on 15th December 1988 the 1st petitioner applied for membership of the Stock Exchange, Bombay supported by this nomination. Her application was seconded by two members of the Stock Exchange as per requisite rules. On 2nd March 1989 the Stock Exchange addressed a letter to petitioner No. 1 enquiring whether late Pradeep Harkisondas Dalal had made any payment in respect of the outstanding liabilities of Harkisondas Laxmidas. The letter also sought details regarding the constitution of the firm of Harakshah which was a client of Harkisondas Laxmidas and whether dues were required to be paid by Harakshah to Harkisondas Laxmidas.
2. It seems that Harkisondas Laxmidas was a firm of long standing. The operation of this firm, however, from the beginning of 1970 had become highly speculative. Speculative dealings were being conducted in the name of another firm Harakshah & Co. which is said to have been promoted by the firm of Harkisondas Laxmidas. Originally in the firm of Harkisondas Laxmidas there were two partners Harkisondas Laxmidas (father of Pradip) and his brother Manharkant Laxmidas. After the death of Harkisondas Laxmidas in 1957 or thereabout the son of Harkisondas, Mukul Harkisondas who is the brother of Pradip, became a partner along with Manharkant Laxmidas. In the firm of Harakshah & Co. the wives of Mukul Harkisondas, Late Pradip, Manharkant Harkisondas Laxmidas were the partners, each having an 18% share; the remaining 10% share belonged to Shantilal Kothar. The firm of Harakshah & Co. was established in the year 1972 or thereabout.
3. It is the case of the Respondents that although Pradip Harkisondas was not a partner in the firm of Harkisondas Laxmidas, he held himself out as a partner of that firm. Manharkant Laxmidas died and on his death the firm of Harkisondas Laxmidas was dissolved in the month of October 1982. At the date of closure it was found that the firm was required to pay the claims of about 90 members of the Stock Exchange amounting to Rs. 32,34,900/-. It seems that there are a number of arbitration references against the firm of Harkisondas Laxmidas by various customers and constituents of the firm. The total claim in these arbitration references aggregated to over Rs. 1 crore. In one of the references the heirs of late Pradip are also made parties on the footing that Pradip held himself out as a partner of Harkisondas Laxmidas. It is the case of the 1st Respondent that the speculative business which was the bulk of the business of Harkisondas Laxmidas was conducted in the name of Harashah & Co. and Harakshah & Co. owes a substantial amount to the firm of Harkisondas Laxmidas.
4. The Stock Exchange also received a letter dated 2nd March 1989 from Mukul Harkisondas stating that he had filed a suit against Pradip Harkisondas being Suit No. 3384 of 1985 claiming a sum of Rs. 14 lacs from him in respect of certain business dealings between the firm of Harkisondas Laxmidas and Pradip Harkisondas. He objected, in this letter, to the application of the 1st petitioner for grant of transfer of membership of Pradip Harkisondas to her at the instance of the heirs and legal representatives of Pradip Harkisondas.
5. The Stock Exchange forwarded a copy of this letter dated 2nd March 1989 to the 1st petitioner for comments. In her replies the 1st petitioner pointed out that Pradip was not a partner of the firm of Harkisondas Laxmidas. She proclaimed ignorance about the dealings of the firm of Harakshah & Co. Thereafter a meeting of the Governing Body of the Stock Exchange was held on 19th May 1989. In the notice convening the meeting which is dated 12-5-1989 one of the items on the agenda was to consider the membership application of the 1st petitioner. Annexure 5 of the agenda note for this meeting sets out that the Stock Exchange has on their record claims of members in the capacity of creditors admitted against Harkisondas Laxmidas involving an amount of Rupees 32,34,900 as per the enclosed list as on 30th October 1982.
6. At the meeting of the governing board of the Stock Exchange, Bombay held on 19th May 1989 the application of the 1st Petitioner for transfer of membership of late Pradip Harkisondas in favour of the 1st petitioner in pursuance of the nomination made by petitioners Nos. 2, 3 and 4 in her favour, was considered. As required by Rule 28 of the Rules of the Stock Exchange, a ballot was taken in which 2 members of the Governing Board voted in favour of admitting the 1st petitioner as a member while 15 members voted against admitting the 1st petitioner as a member. As a result it was decided by a majority of 15:2 not to admit the 1st petitioner as a member of the Stock Exchange. By a letter dated 24th May 1989 the 1st respondent informed the 1st petitioner about the rejection of her application by the governing board of the Stock Exchange. The present petition is filed challenging this decision of the governing board of the Stock Exchange not to grant membership to the 1st petitioner.
7. It is contended by the Stock Exchange, Bombay, who is the 1st respondent, that it is not an “authority” within the meaning of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Hence a writ does not lie against it. The Supreme Court, however, has construed Art. 226 very widely to include within the ambit of Art. 226 not merely statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State, but to cover any other person or body performing a public duty.
8. In the case of Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandasjiswami Suverna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R Rudani reported in AIR 1989 SC 1607, the Supreme Court said that the term ‘authority’ used in Art. 226 in the context must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Art. 12. It said: “The words ‘any person or authority’ used in article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities or the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied.” The 1st respondent Stock Exchange is a recognised Stock Exchange under the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956. The preamble to the Act states that it is an Act to prevent undesirable transactions in securities by regulating the business of dealing therein, by prohibiting options and by providing for certain other matters connected therewith. Under Sec. 3 of the Act, any Stock Exchange, which is desirous of being recognised for the purposes of this Act may make an application in the prescribed manner to the Central Government. Under Sec. 4 the Central Government is empowered to grant recognition to a stock exchange. Among the factors to be considered in granting recognition, the Government has to consider whether the rules and bye-laws of a stock exchange applying for registration are in conformity with such conditions as may be prescribed with a view to ensure fair dealing and to protect investors. It has also to consider whether it would be in the interest of the trade as also in the public interest to grant recognition to the stock exchange. The 1st respondent has been recognised by the Central Government under this Act and a notification to that effect being Notification No. SRO 27828 dated 31-8-1957 has been published in the Extra-Ordinary Gazette of India Part II Sec. 3 dated 31-8-1957. The 1st respondent is, therefore, a statutory body and the Central Government is vested with supervisory powers under the said Act over the functioning of the 1st Respondent. The Stock Exchange is, inter alia, established to assist, regulate and control dealings in securities and to ensure fair dealings. These are objects of public interest. Therefore, looking to the wide interpretation given to Art. 226 of the Constitution, the 1st respondent can be considered, for the purpose of this petition, as amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
9. It is submitted by the petitioners that by denying membership to the 1st petitioner, the Stock Exchange has violated the right of the 1st petitioner under Art. 31(1) of the Constitution of India and that she has been deprived of property without the authority of law. The petitioners also contend that denial of membership to the 1st petitioner is in violation of the fundamental right of the petitioners to carry on their trade or occupation. On both these counts the action of the Stock Exchange is bad in law and must be set aside. In this connection it is necessary to examine the rules, bye-laws and regulations framed by the Stock Exchange in 1957 which are statutory bye-laws approved by the Government of India under the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956. Under Rule 4 of these Rules the main objects of the Stock Exchange are, “To support and protect in the public interest the character and status of brokers and dealers and to further the interests both of brokers and dealers and of the public interested in securities, to assist, regulate and control in the public interest dealings in securities, to ensure fair dealing, to maintain high standards of commercial honour and integrity, to promote and inculcate honourable practices and just and equitable principles of trade and business, to discourage and to suppress malpractices, to settle disputes and to decide all questions of usage, custom or courtesy in the conduct of trade and business.” These aims and objects are important because the decision taken by the 1st respondent will have to be examined in the light of these aims and objects.
10. In order to decide whether there is any property in the membership of the Stock Exchange, it is necessary to refer to Rules relating to membership of the stock exchange. Under Rule 5, the membership shall constitute a personal permission from the Exchange to exercise the rights and privileges attached thereto subject to the Rules, Bye-laws and Regulations of the Exchange. The membership, therefore, is not a transferable right. It is only a personal permission granted by the Stock Exchange to an individual member. This is brought out further by Rule 6 which states that the right of membership is inalienable. The membership rules give to a member a right of nomination which shall be personal and non-transferable. This right under Rule 11 can be exercised by a member of not less than 7 years standing who desires to resign. He may in turn nominate a member as set out in Rule 11. In the case of a deceased member, under Rule 9, on his death, his right of nomination ceases and vests in the Exchange. There is, therefore, no property in membership.
11. Under Rule 11(b), however, “The legal representatives of a deceased member or his heirs or the person mentioned in Appendix C to these Rules may with the sanction of the Governing Board nominate any person eligible under these Rules for admission to membership of the Exchange as a candidate for admission in the place of the deceased member”. The nomination does not, however, secure automatically membership of the Stock Exchange. Rule 28 provides “The election of all new members (whether they shall have been nominated or not) shall be by ballot and a candidate shall be deemed duly elected if approved by a majority of not less than two-third of the votes cast at a meeting of the Governing Board at which not less than one half of the total number of the members of the Governing Board are present in addition to the Government Nominee (if any) attending the meeting.” Rule 28, therefore, makes it clear that even persons who have been nominated as per the prescribed rules will have to be elected by the Governing Board by the requisite majority before they can become members.
12. Rule 18 lays down qualifications for membership which all nominees must also necessarily possess. However, when a person seeking membership is succeeding to the established business of (inter alia) a deceased member who is his father, uncle, brother or a close relative, he need not possess other qualifications pertaining to past experience etc. That is to say, under Rule 18 he need not possess the qualifications prescribed under sub-clauses (1) and (2) of Rule 18. The 1st petitioner, therefore, does not need to fulfil the requirements of sub-clause (1) and (2) of Rule 18.
13. Under Rule 15 of the Rules of the Stock Exchange, the Governing Board shall not approve a nomination unless the nominating member, or in the case of a deceased member, his legal representatives or heirs or persons mentioned in Appendix C or any other person on his behalf, shall have paid and satisfied in full, inter alia, all debts, liabilities obligations and claims arising out of any contracts made by such member subject to the Rules, Bye-laws and Regulations of the Exchange as shall have been admitted by the Governing Board. In the present case, the 1st petitioner is being nominated by heirs and legal representatives of a deceased member. She has, apparently, not been considered as not fulfilling the requirements of Rule 15, because her name was put up for ballot under Rule 28 before the Governing Board. Her contention, therefore, that to a deceased member himself did not have any liabilities arising out of any contract made by the deceased member appears to have been accepted. The 1st petitioner is 23 years of age and does not have any experience of the business of stock exchange. But sub-clauses (1) and (2) of Rule 18 do not apply to her. Her name, however, when it was put up for membership before the Governing Board, failed to secure the required majority in the ballot. Hence her application for membership has been rejected.
14. This right to deny membership and the exercise of this right cannot be considered as in violation of Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. A professional or trade body is entitled to regulate its membership. It is entitled to ensure that an unsuitable person is not admitted to membership. The test of suitability is not always explicit. Often it may be difficult to articulate. The question of judging suitability may be left by members to the mature and experienced judgment of respected members of the profession such as those constituting its Governing Board or Managing Committee. The members may consider these persons as the best and most qualified to decide on the suitability of a new candidate for membership. If a Governing Board in exercise of its discretion, decides that the person is unsuitable, its decision cannot be labelled as arbitrary or unreasonable simply because it is in the exercise of its discretion. It would also be incorrect to call such discretion as unguided. Such discretion is required to be exercised bearing in mind the aims and objects of the organisation. Of course, if the decision is not bona fide, or is based on ill-informed prejudice, it can be challenged as a mala fide exercise of discretion. In the absence of any material which points to a mala fide exercise of discretion, the exercise of discretion is not per se bad in law. A decision of the Governing Board arrived at bona fide not to grant membership to a candidate is not violative of Art. 19(1)(g). The right to regulate admission to a professional body including a right to reject unsuitable persons, is a reasonable restriction on the right to carry on a profession or trade. Such restriction may be necessary in the interest of professional standards, for ensuring probity of conduct and in public interest.
15. In the present case, the aims and objects of the Stock Exchange are, inter alia, to support and to protect in public interest the character and status of brokers and dealers; in furtherance of its objects it has ensured a high standard of commercial honour and integrity. One of its aims is to promote and inculcate honourable practices and just and equitable principles of trade and business. The Stock Exchange is also required to discourage and suppress malpractices. In the present case, the Governing Board had, before it, the past conduct of a firm which had as its partners, close relatives of the deceased member as also of the 1st petitioner who was seeking nomination in his place. The firm of Harkisondas Laxmidas has large undischarged liabilities which are admitted by the Stock Exchange. The brother and uncle of the deceased were partners of this firm. The 1st respondents have stated in their affidavit that the deceased also held himself out as a partner of this firm and that there are claims which are referred to arbitration in which the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased member have also been joined as respondents because of this facts. The Stock Exchange also had before it a letter from Mukul Harkishondas stating that he had filed a suit to recover from the deceased member some dues which, according to him, were payable to the firm of Harkishonda Laxmidas. The Stock Exchange has also pointed out that Harakshah was a firm which was floated by close relatives of Pradip Harkisondas. These included the wife of Pradip Harkisondas. It was through this firm that substantial speculative business of the firm of Harkisondas Laxmidas was conducted. In these circumstances, if the Governing Board, by a substantial majority, decides against granting membership to the daughter-in-law of the deceased member, they cannot be said to have exercised their discretion mala fide. The Governing Board is required to enjoin fair dealings and high standards of commercial honour. The fact that the son of the deceased or his wife did not apply for membership but nominated a 23 years old daughter-in-law itself is somewhat significant. In these circumstances, the denial of membership to the 1st petitioner is a valid exercise of a right which the Governing Board has, granting membership or not granting membership to a candidate. Rule 28 does not violate article 19. Under Rule 28 all new members, whether they are nominated or not, have to be elected by ballot. Each candidate has to secure a majority of not less than 2/3rds of the votes cast. The 1st petitioner failed to secure even a simple majority. Only 2 votes were cast in her favour and 15 were against her. When the election is by ballot there is no question of giving any reason for rejection.
16. Looking to the circumstances of the present case, the rejection does not appear to be mala fide or based on grounds which are not germane to the objects of the Stock Exchange.
17. In these circumstances, therefore, no intervention is called for under Article 226 of the Constitution.
18. Petition is, therefore, dismissed with costs.
Petition dismissed.
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