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Sharad Bhiku Marchande v. The State Of Maharashtra And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Sessions Court, Bombay, filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner’s Criminal Appeal is pending in the Supreme Court. The petitioner applied for furlough on 25-1-1988, having completed nine years of actual imprisonment, but the application was rejected by the third respondent on 5-3-1988 citing an adverse police report. The petitioner seeks to quash the refusal order and to direct release on furlough.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioner, despite having a criminal appeal pending in the Supreme Court, is entitled to be released on furlough under the Prisons (Bombay Furlough and Parole) Rules, 1959.
- Whether the rejection of the petitioner’s furlough application based on an adverse police report and the pendency of the appeal was legally justified.
- The distinction between the legal right to furlough and the discretionary nature of parole under the applicable rules.
- The validity and interpretation of the Inspector General’s letter restricting furlough during pendency of appeal.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner’s Arguments
- The petitioner has completed nine years of actual imprisonment and is therefore entitled to furlough under the Rules.
- Furlough is a legal right, not a discretionary privilege, and should be granted if conditions are met.
- The pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court does not bar the grant of furlough.
Respondents’ Arguments
- The petitioner’s furlough application was rightly rejected due to an adverse police report.
- Since the petitioner’s appeal is pending in the Supreme Court, release on furlough is barred as per the Inspector General’s letter dated 28-7-1988 and the Division Bench judgment in Jayant Veerappa Shetty v. State of Maharashtra.
- The rules and precedents applicable to parole, which is discretionary, should also apply to furlough.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sharad Keshav Mehta v. State of Maharashtra, 1989 Cr. L.J 681 | Establishes that furlough is a substantial and legal right, not merely discretionary; Rule 17 of the Furlough Rules cannot deprive prisoners of this right. | The Court agreed with the principle that furlough is a legal right and must be considered on merit whenever applied for. |
| Jayant Veerappa Shetty v. State of Maharashtra, 1985 (1) Bom. C.R 311 | Held that Government has no power to grant parole during pendency of appeal; parole is discretionary and different from furlough. | The Court distinguished parole from furlough, holding that the judgment applies only to parole and not furlough, rejecting the respondents’ reliance on this precedent to deny furlough. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first analyzed the distinction between furlough and parole under the Prisons (Bombay Furlough and Parole) Rules, 1959. It noted that furlough is governed by Rules 1 to 17, which confer a substantial and legal right to prisoners fulfilling specified conditions, whereas parole (Rules 18 onwards) is discretionary and granted only in emergent cases.
The Court referred to Rule 3 of the Furlough Rules, which prescribes eligibility for furlough based on the length of imprisonment served, and Rule 4, which lists categories of prisoners who are ineligible. It emphasized that the petitioner had completed the requisite period and thus had a legal right to apply for furlough.
The Court relied heavily on the Division Bench’s judgment in Sharad Keshav Mehta, which clarified that Rule 17 cannot negate the substantial right to furlough. It rejected the respondents’ contention that the pendency of an appeal bars furlough, distinguishing the parole-related judgment in Jayant Veerappa Shetty as inapplicable to furlough.
The Court further held that the Inspector General’s letter interpreting the Jayant Shetty judgment to prohibit furlough during appeal pendency was an incorrect and illegal interpretation contrary to the Furlough Rules.
Since the petitioner’s previous furlough application was rejected based on an adverse police report, Rule 3(2) Note 3 mandates that the period for which furlough was refused lapses and does not carry forward. The petitioner is therefore entitled to make a fresh application, which the respondents must dispose of within four weeks, considering relevant judgments and facts.
Holding and Implications
Rule made absolute.
The Court held that the petitioner is entitled to apply for furlough under the Prisons (Bombay Furlough and Parole) Rules, 1959, notwithstanding the pendency of his appeal in the Supreme Court. The rejection of the petitioner’s furlough application solely on the ground of the appeal’s pendency and the adverse police report was not legally sustainable. The petitioner may submit a fresh application which must be decided expeditiously and on merits.
The decision does not establish any new precedent beyond affirming the substantial legal right to furlough and clarifying the inapplicability of the parole-related restriction during appeal pendency to furlough cases. The direct effect is that prisoners with pending appeals retain the right to seek furlough under the Rules.
Kurdukar, J.:— The petitioner has filed this writ petition principally for two reliefs viz., (1) the order passed by respondent No. 3 refusing furlough to the petitioner be quashed and set aside and (2) an appropriate writ, order or direction be issued directing the second respondent to release the petitioner on furlough.
2. The present petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The first respondent is the State of Maharashtra. The second respondent is the Superintendent, Bombay Central Prison, Arthur Road, Bombay where the petitioner is presently detained. The third respondent is the sanctioning authority vested with the power to grant furlough to the convicted prisoners under the Prisons (Bombay Furlough and Parole) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules.)
3. In order to appreciate rival contention, we may summarise the facts of the present case as under:—
4. The petitioner was tried in Sessions Case No. 27 of 1980 in the Sessions Court at Bombay for an offence punishable under section 302 of the I.P.C The learned Sessions Judge vide his judgment and order dated 10th March, 1981 convicted the petitioner for the charged offence and sentenced him to suffer R.I for the life. The petitioner's Criminal Appeal No. 574 of 1981 was dismissed by this Court on 25-4-1984 Against the judgment and order of this Court, Mr. Gawankar informs us that the petitioner has filed the appeal. In the Supreme Court which is pending for hearing and final disposal. Better particulars however, could not be burnished by Mr. Gawankar. There does not seem to be any dispute that the petitioner's appeal is pending in the Supreme Court.
5. It is averred by the petitioner that by now he has completed nine year's actual imprisonment and therefore, he is entitled to be released on furlough in accordance with the Rules. On 25-1-1988 the petitioner applied to the third respondent for his release on furlough. However, the third respondent vide his order dated 5th March, 1988 rejected the said application on the ground of adverse police report. By this writ petition, the petitioner has sought the above two reliefs.
6. Shri G.N Tiwari, Jailor Group-II, Bombay Central Prison, Bombay has filed the affidavit on behalf of the respondents. In paragraph 2 of the said affidavit, two fold contentions were raised, viz. (1) in view of the adverse police report, the petitioner's application for furlough was rejected by the third respondent on 25-1-1988 and (2) that the petitioner's appeal challenging the order of conviction and sentence is pending in the Supreme Court and in view of the pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court, the petitioner cannot be released on furlough in view of the Inspector General's (Prisons) letter bearing No. JPF/1985/39342-D-5 dated 28-7-1988. These are the pleadings in the present case before us.
7. Before we advert to the contention raised before us, we may indicate in short the scheme and rights of the convicted persons for furlough and parole. In exercise of the powers conferred by clauses (5) and (28) of section 59 of the Prisons Act, 1894 (IX of 1894), in its application to the State of then Bombay, the Government of then Bombay framed the following Rules:
“5 Furlough not to be granted after return from parole — Ordinarily furlough shall not be granted to a prisoner within a period of six months from the date of his return from parole.”
“28 Application of certain rules to Parole cases — The provisions of rules 8(5), 10, 11 and 12 Shall mutatis mutandis apply in the case of release of prisoners on parole.”
8. There is no dispute that the same rules are in force to-day in the State of Maharashtra. These Rules are called the Prisons (Bombay Furlough and Parole) Rules, 1959. The Rules clearly distinguish furlough and parole. Even the applications for furlough and parole lie in different set of circumstances. However, few circumstances are common. Consequently, the Rules governing furlough application and parole applications are distinct and they operate in distinct fields.
9. So far Rules regulating the grant of furlough they are set out in the Rules 1 to 17, whereas Rules regarding parole are 18 to 28. In the present case we are now concerned with the Rules regulating the grant of furlough. Rule 2 prescribes the sanctioning authority over which there is no dispute before us Rule 3 prescribes as to when prisoner may be granted a furlough and we may quote Rule 3 which reads as under:—
“3. When prisoner may be granted furlough—
(1) A prisoner who is sentenced to imprisonment for a period exceeding one year but not exceeding five years, may be released on furlough for a period of two weeks at a time for every year for actual imprisonment undergone.
(2) A prisoner, who is sentenced to imprisonsent for a period exceeding five years may be released on furlough for a period of two weeks at a time for every two years of actual imprisonment undergone.
Provided that a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment for more than five years but not to imprisonment for life may be released on furlough every year instead of every two years during the last five years of his unexpired period of sentence:
Provided further that a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment may be released on furlough every year instead of every two years after he completes seven year's actual Imprisonment.
Note 1 — The period of imprisonment in this rule includes the sentence of sentences awarded in lieu of fine in case the amount of fine is not paid:
Provided that if fine is paid during the period of imprisonment and the total sentence thereby reduced to a term not exceeding 5 years; he shall thereafter be eligible for release every year in accordance with sub-rule (1) instead of every two years under sub-rule (2).
Note 2 — For the purposes of this rule, the period of imprisonment shall be computed as the total period for which a prisoner is sentenced even though one or more sentences be concurrent.
Note 3. — If at any time, a prisoner who could have been granted furlough is either not granted or is refused the same, the period for which he could have been granted the furlough shall not be carried forward but shall lapse.
Note 4. — The period of two weeks may be initially extended up to three weeks in the case of prisoners desiring to spend the furlough outside the State of Bombay.
Note 5 — An order sanctioning the release of a prisoner on furlough shall cease to be valid if not given effect to within a period of two months of the date thereof”
10. Rule 4 sets out a category of prisoners who shall not be considered for release on furlough.
“4. When prisoners shall not be granted furlough — The following categories of prisoners shall not be considered for release on furlough:—
(1) Habitual prisoners.
(2) Prisoners convicted of offences under Election 392 to 402 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code.
(3) Prisoners convicted of offences under the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949.
(4) Prisoners whose release is not recommended in Greater Bombay by the Commissioner of Police and elsewhere, by the District Magistrate, on the ground of public peace and tranquillity.
(5) Prisoners who, in the opinion of the Superintendent of the Prison, show a tendency towards crime.
(6) Prisoners whose conduct is, in the opinion of the Superintendent of the Prison, not satisfactory enough.
(7) Prisoners confined in the Ratnagiri Special Prison (other than prisoner transferred to that prison for jail services).
(8) Prisoners convicted of offences of violence against person or property committed for political motives, unless the prior consent of the State Government to such release is obtained.
(9) A prisoner or class of prisoners, in whose case the State Government has directed that the prisoner shall not be released or that the case should be refferred to it for orders.
(10) Prisoners who have at any time escaped or attempted to attempted escape from lawful custody or have defaulted in any way in surendering themselves at the appropriate time after release on parole or furlough.”
11. Rule 5 states that ordinarily a prisoner shall not be granted furlough with a period of six months from the date of his return from the parole.
12. Rule 6 puts condition that furlough not to be granted without surety.
13. Rule 7 prescribes that a prisoner who is granted furlough has to give a personal bond before release on furlough of the required amount in Form B appended to these rules.
14. Rule 8 is a procedural part and it prescribes a procedure as to how application for grant of furlough should be dealt with.
15. Rule 9 relates to fresh application far furlough.
16. Rule 10 deals with condition of release under rule 11 i.e, it is necessary for a prisoner before he is released on furlough to make a declaration in the prescribed form in accordance with the said rule.
17. Rule 12 deals with the cost of the journey both ways to be borne by the prisoner who is released on parole.
18. Rule 13 deals with the non-obsentee clause where power is conferred upon the Sactioning Authority to grant extension of a period of furlough.
19. Rule 14 requires that the Superintendent of Prisons to give intimation of release of the prisoner on furlough and also of non-surrender.
20. Rule 15 is not relevant in the present case and therefore, we do not think it necessary to refer to it Rule 16 has got some bearing and, therefore, we may reproduce the same.
“16. Furlough to be counted as remission of sentence.—The furlough period shall be counted as a remission of sentence.
Provided that where any furlough period has been extended under Note 4 below rule 3 or under rule 13, the period of extension shall not be counted as a remission of sentence.”
21. Rule 17 although states that the prisoner has no legal right to furlough, it does not detain us any longer in view of the reported Judgment of this Court in 1(Sharad Keshav Mehta v. State of Maharashtra), 1989 Cr. L.J 681.
22. Rule 18 onwards deal with the grant of parole to which we are not very much concerned in the present case, but however, to appreciate the distinction between the parole and furlough, we deem it necessary to indicate few provisions relating to parole.
23. Rule 19 deals with the circumstances when a prisoner may be released on parole which reads as under:—
“19. When a prisoner may be released on parole:— A prisoner may be released on parole for such period as the Competent Authority referred to in rule 18 in its discretion may order, in cases of serious illness, or death of any member of the prisoners family or of his nearest relatives or for any other sufficient cause”
24. Rue 20 is again relevant to appreciate the distinction between the concept of parole and furlough and the said rule reads as under:—
“20. Parole not to be counted as remission of sentence — The period spent on parole shall not count as remission of sentence.”
25. Rule 22 onwards deal with the procedural aspects in the matters of granting parole. Since the issue regarding parole is not before us, we do not think it necessary to reproduce these rules. As stated earlier in the present case we are called upon to be consider whether the rejection of the furlough application of the petitioner was legally justified and in accordance with furlough rules.
26. Mr. Gawankar, learned advocate appearing in support of this petition urged that the furlough and the parole operate in distinct fields although the ultimate end is the release of the prisoner on certain grounds and conditions. There is a clear distinction between the parole and the furlough rules. Mr. Gawankar urged that furlough is a legal right given to the prisoners under the rules, whereas parole is a discretionary one Having regard to the provisions contained in the Furlough Rules and in particular Rules 3 and 4 quoted above, it can be safely concluded that every prisoner has got a legal right to ask for a furlough under the furlough rules, if he satisfies the conditions laid down. In the furlough rules. The question whether release on furlough is a substantial and legal right of the prisoner notwithstanding rule 17 fell for consideration before the Division dench of this Court in Sharad Keshav Mehta v. State of Maharashtra (supra). The Division Bench considering the scheme of the furlough Jules held as follows:—
“It is not open to the Home Department of the State Government to prescribe rules giving facility of release of the prisoner on furlough by one hand and then providing that the prisoner has no legal right to be released on furlough. In our judgment, R. 17 cannot deprive the prisoner of the substantial right to be released on furlough provided the requirements of the rule are complied with. The submission advaced on behalf of the State Government overlooks the distinction between the right to be released on parole and the right to be released on furlough. Parole is granted for certain emergency and release on parole is a discretionary right while release on furlough is a substantial right and accrues to a prisoner on compliance with certain requirements. The idea of granting furlough to a prisoner is that the prisoner should have an opportunity to come out and mix with the society and the prisoner should not be continuously kept in jail for a considerable long period, the interaction with the society helps the prisoner in realising the folly which he has committed and the liberty which hers deprived of. In modern times the effort is to improve the prisoner and the punishment is to be considered as an action for reformation of an individual. It is futile to suggest that a prisoner should be kept behind the oars continuously and should not be permitted to come out on furlough unless the authorities think wise. In our judgment, the State Government has framed rules in exercise of the powers conferred by cls. (5) and (28) of section 69 of the Prisons Act, 1884 and on framing of such rules. R. 17 cannot deprive the prisoner of the right to be released on furlough. In spite of the enactment of R. 17, we held that the right to be released on furlough is a substantial and legal right conferred on the prisoner.”
27. With respect we agree with the view taken by the Division Bench in the case of Sharad Keshav Mehta (supra). It must, therefore, follow that under the furlough rules the prisoner has got a substantial and legal right subject to rule 17 and whenever the prisoner makes an application for furlough under the furlough rules, the authority must consider the said application on merits and pass appropriate orders.
28. Shri Page, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent—State drew our attention to another judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in 2(Jayant Veerappa Shetty v. State of Maharashtra), 88 Bombay Law Reporter page 44 : 1985 (1) Bom. C.R 311. It is true that the Division Bench in this case held that during the pendency of the appeal proceedings in the High Court, the Government has no power to grant parole. The learned Public Prosecutor drew our attention to the last paragraph of the said judgment which reads as under:—
“In the result the petition succeeds and it is declared that the Prisons (Bombay Furlough and Parole) Rules, 1959 would not apply to the grant of parole to a convicted person whose appeal is pending before the appellate Court and when the appellate Court is in seisin of the matter and is empowered under section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to pass appropriate orders. Rule is made partiy absolute. Rule partiy made absolute”
29. Relying upon these observations, it was urged by the learned Public Prosecutor that the judgment of the Division Bench in Jayant Veerappa Shetty's case (supra) applies even to furlough. We are unable to agree with this submissions. As indicated earlier, parole cannot be claimed by a prisoner as of right. Application for parole can be entertained only in certain emergent cases as mentioned in Rule 19 Further more, period spent on parole shall not be counted as remission of the sentence. As against this, if we read rules 3 and 4 of the Furlough Rules, it is clear that by reason of completion of certain period as a prisoner in the prison, the prisoner gets a right to apply for furlough leave. Moreover, whenever furlough is granted, the period spent on such leave shall be counted as remission in the sentence and the prisoner is not required to undergo further sentence of the furlough period. Mr. Page, the learned Public Prosecutor then drew our attention to the affidavit filed by Shri Tiwari Jailor, Bombay Central Prison and urged that the jail authorities proceeded on the footing that the laid down in the case of Jayant Veerappa Shetty (supra) applies to furlough also and on that footing, the petitioner's application for furlough was refused. In our opinion, the assumption on the part of the jail authorities is clearly untenable and unsustainable. As indicated earlier, the issue raised before the Division Bench in the case of Jayant Veerappa Shetty was restricted to parole and the rules of parole and the Division Bench had no occasion to consider the distin guishing features of furlough rules in contradistinction with parole rules.
30. The judgment in Jayant Shetty's case (supra) therefore, in our opinion, does not lay down a law that a prisoner whose appeal is pending in the Court is not entitled for furlough. Once it is held that the furlough is a substantial and legal right granted to a prisoner under the rules, then the prisoner is entitled to exercise the said right in accordance with the rules and the appropriate authority has to consider furlough application in accordance with the rules for furlough notwithstanding the fact that criminal appeal is pending in a Court of law. In view of this legal position in our opinion the letter of Inspector General bearing No. JPF/1985/39342-D-5 dated 28-7-1888 interpreting the Judgment in Jayant Shetty case (supra) that during the pendency of the appeal of the prisoner in the Court, such prisoner is not entitled to be released on furlough is not correct Interpretation of the said Judgment and is contrary to the furlough rules. The tetter to that extent must, therefore, be held illegal and bad.
31. In the present case, the petitioner made an application for furlough on 5-1-1988 and it was rejected on 5-3-1988 since the police report was against the petitioner. Under rule 3(2) Note 3 if the application of the prisoner for furlough was refused, then the period for which he had applied for furlough shall not be carried forward, but it shall lapse. In view of this provision it would now be necessary for the petitioner to make a fresh application for furlough. The petitioner is at liberty to make a fresh application for furlough under the furlough rules and if any such application is made by the petitioner, the respondents shall dispose of the same within four weeks from the date of receipt of such application. It is needless to state that the police authority who would be making report shall bear in mind the various judgments of this Court as regards submission of such report.
32. In the result, the writ petition succeeds. Rule made absolute in the above terms and it is held that the petitioner is entitled to apply for furlough under the furlough rules despite the pendency of his appeal in the Supreme Court. No order as to costs.
Rule made absolute.
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