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Ignatius D'Cunha (Dr.) And Another v. Father Denis .
Executive Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Rev. Father Denis s/o Chittarajan Kamath, who had been working as Secretary of the Saint Franics De-Sales Education Society, Aurangabad, was removed from his post by the Bishop who alleged to be the President of the Society. Father Denis challenged that removal by instituting Regular Civil Suit No. 814 of 1990 in the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Aurangabad.
The defendants (the alleged President and the person appointed in place of the plaintiff) contested the suit and raised a plea that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction due to a bar under section 80 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. The plaintiff applied for a temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking to restrain the defendants from obstructing him from acting as Secretary. The defendants, on 9-7-1990, filed an application (titled as under section 9-A of the Code of Civil Procedure) seeking that the point of jurisdiction be decided, apparently as a preliminary issue.
The trial judge did not frame any preliminary issue on jurisdiction (indeed no issues were framed in the suit) but nevertheless heard the applications and, by an order dated 23-7-1990, held that the Civil Court had jurisdiction and rejected the plaintiff's application for interim relief. The plaintiff appealed from this order in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 163 of 1990. The Additional District Judge, Aurangabad, by order dated 29-8-1990, granted the injunction as prayed by the plaintiff; that appeal however remained pending. A Civil Revision was then entertained by the Court authoring this opinion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under section 9-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a Civil Court can decide an application for interim relief (Order 39 Rule 1) without first framing and determining the question of its jurisdiction as a preliminary issue.
- Whether a trial court's simultaneous or composite determination of jurisdiction and interim relief (without framing the issue required by section 9-A and without following the procedure appropriate to an issue) vitiates its order.
- Whether a composite hearing (deciding jurisdiction and interim relief together) is permissible in practice and, if so, what procedural safeguards must be observed.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments — Shri S.C. Bora
- The trial court acted with material irregularity and without jurisdiction by deciding the interim relief without framing and deciding the jurisdictional issue as required by section 9-A CPC.
- When an objection to jurisdiction is raised, the court has no power to pass final interim relief unless it first determines that it has jurisdiction; an exception permits only ad interim relief during the pendency of the jurisdiction question, but the relief considered in the trial court was not merely ad interim — it had a temporary finality subject only to appeal.
- Because the trial court effectively disposed of the interim relief, the plaintiff had the right to seek interim relief in appeal; however, that interim relief in appeal would be without jurisdiction if the question of interim relief had not been finally disposed of by the trial court in a manner consistent with section 9-A.
Respondent's (Defendant's) Arguments — Shri Jethalia
- Section 9-A requires that the question of jurisdiction be considered before deciding an application for interim relief, and the purpose is that interim relief should not be considered unless the court finds it has jurisdiction.
- There is no material irregularity in deciding jurisdiction and interim relief simultaneously; it causes no prejudice if the court addresses both matters together.
- The authority recognizing a composite hearing (Kranti Mohan Guruprasad Mehra v. Fatehchand Vasuram Behal) indicates that simultaneous determination is permissible.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kranti Mohan Guruprasad Mehra v. Fatehchand Vasuram Behal, 1983 Mah LJ 141 : AIR 1982 Bom 263 (Kotval, J.) | Recognised that a composite hearing of the preliminary issue on jurisdiction and an interim relief application may be permissible, but held that the adjudication of the preliminary issue should precede the decision on the interim application; highlighted the deeper, fuller inquiry required for the jurisdiction issue as compared to the summary nature of interim relief proceedings. | The Court relied on Kotval, J.'s observations to accept that, although composite hearing might be conceivable, the preliminary issue must be framed and determined (and that ordinarily it is undesirable to hear both together because of differing natures of inquiry). |
| Sadguna Chimanlal Shah v. New Sagar Darshan Co-op. Housing Society, Bombay, 1980 Mah LJ 203 (Division Bench) | Held that the provisions of section 9-A require determination of the question of jurisdiction before an order of interim relief is passed; treated section 9-A as imperative and mandatory. | The Court treated this Division Bench decision as authoritative for the proposition that section 9-A's mandate is mandatory, and used it to support the conclusion that the trial court's failure to frame and determine the jurisdiction issue vitiated its interim order. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by contrasting the procedures and purposes of: (a) determining a jurisdictional preliminary issue (as envisaged under section 9-A and to be reflected in an issue framed under Order 14) and (b) deciding an application for interim relief under Order 39 Rule 1.
The Court identified several material differences that make simultaneous treatment without appropriate safeguards unacceptable:
- Procedure and evidence: Order 39 prescribes a summary procedure for interim relief which permits reliance on affidavits and a prima facie assessment (Order 39 Rule 1), differing from the fuller evidence-recording process in a trial (see rule 4 of Order 18) and the procedure attendant to deciding a framed issue.
- Nature of evidence and depth of inquiry: The evidence required to decide an interim relief application is typically of a different and thinner character (prima facie) than the fuller, substantive evidence required when an issue as to jurisdiction is tried and decided.
- Purpose of issues: Framing issues (Order 14) informs parties what is to be contested and what evidence they must lead. A determination of an issue on jurisdiction, after evidence adduced on that issue, has the character of a concluded finding on that aspect and may finally dispose of the suit if the court finds it lacks jurisdiction.
- Consequences of a finding of no jurisdiction: A finding that the court has no jurisdiction results in the suit being disposed of, which is a materially different outcome than a summary order on interim relief.
The Court rejected the respondent's submission that a simultaneous decision causes no prejudice, observing that when the statute (section 9-A) prescribes a particular course — framing and deciding the jurisdictional issue first — that prescription is mandatory. The Court relied on the Division Bench authority in Sadguna Chimanlal Shah to treat section 9-A as imperative.
The Court also considered Kotval, J.'s observations in Kranti Mohan (which allowed the conceptual possibility of a composite hearing) and emphasised that, even under that view, the preliminary issue must be treated as such and determined in a manner consistent with the procedure for issues; practically, it is undesirable to hear both matters together because of the differing depths of inquiry.
Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that the trial Judge had not framed the jurisdictional issue (indeed no issues at all were framed), did not afford the parties an opportunity to lead evidence on the point, and proceeded to decide the matters after merely hearing counsel. There was no record of any concession by the parties that would justify such summary treatment. Consequently, the trial Judge's decision on the interim relief and on jurisdiction was vitiated for non-compliance with section 9-A and the established procedure.
Holding and Implications
Civil Revision Application allowed.
Holding (core rulings):
- The order dated 23-7-1990 passed by the 4th Civil Judge, Junior Division, Aurangabad, rejecting the defendants' application (exhibit 14) and rejecting the plaintiff's application for interim relief (exhibit 5) is quashed for failure to comply with the mandatory procedure under section 9-A CPC.
- The learned trial Judge is directed to frame the issue regarding the jurisdiction as it arises from the pleadings and then to decide the plaintiff's interim application (exhibit 5) afresh in accordance with law.
- The interim relief granted by the appellate court on 29-8-1990 is ordered to continue, and is to be treated as interim relief granted under sub-section (2) of section 9-A for the pendency of the decision on the question of jurisdiction.
- The preliminary issue under section 9-A is to be framed by the trial Judge within two months from the date of the opinion; it is indicated that it would be desirable for the matter to be assigned to a different Judge by the Principal Judge of the Civil Court, Aurangabad.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The trial court's order of 23-7-1990 is quashed and the matter is remitted for proper framing and adjudication of the jurisdictional issue; the interim injunction granted by the appellate court remains in force as interim relief under section 9-A(2) during the pendency of the jurisdictional determination.
- Procedural guidance: The opinion reiterates that section 9-A imposes a mandatory procedural requirement — the jurisdictional question must be treated as a preliminary issue and determined in accordance with the procedure for issues before interim relief is finally granted by the trial court.
- Broader precedent: The opinion applies and follows existing decisions (including the Division Bench in Sadguna Chimanlal Shah and Kotval, J. in Kranti Mohan) rather than announcing a new principle. The opinion does not purport to set a novel legal rule beyond enforcing the statutory scheme in section 9-A and emphasizing the procedural distinctions between issue-trial and summary interim applications.
Order: Application allowed. Parties to appear before the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Aurangabad on 26-12-1990. Preliminary issue to be framed within two months. The writ to go forthwith.
1. Rev. Father Denis s/o Chittarajan Kamath, who was working as a Secretary of Saint Franics De-Sales Education Society. Aurangabad was removed from his post by Bishop who alleges to be the President of the Society and this removal was challenged by him in Regular Civil Suit No. 814 of 1990 filed in the Court of Civil Judge. Junior Division at Aurangabad Defendants namely; the alleged President and the person who is appointed in place of the plaintiff, contested the suit and also raised plea that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to hear this suit because of a bar created by section 80 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. Plaintiff had submitted an application for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 praying that the defendants be restrained from obstructing him from working as a Secretary of the said Trust. Despite raising an objection in the written statement, a separate application was also moved by the defendants on 9-7-1990 that the point for the jurisdiction be decided though the prayer did not say so elaborately but the intention of the defendant in filing this application appears to be that this issue be tried as preliminary issue. This is clear by the fact that in the title of this application, there is a mention that this application, is under section 9-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. It appears that the learned trial Judge did not pass any order separately on this application and did not frame any preliminary issue. In fact, no issues have been framed in this suit at all. But he proceeded to dispose of both the applications namely; application for temporary injunction at exhibit 5 and application for deciding issue of jurisdiction namely; exhibit 14 together by an elaborate judgment. The learned Judge framing points at issue held that Civil Court had the jurisdiction to entertain and try the instant suit and also consider the question of grant of interim relief and reject the application by his order dated 23-7-1990.
2. Aggrieved by this order passed by the 4th Civil Judge, Junior Division, Aurangabad in Regular Civil Suit No. 814 of 1990, plaintiff preferred Misc. Civil Appeal bearing No. 163 of 1990 objecting to the refusal of the temporary injunction. In this appeal, an application for the interim relief was moved by the plaintiff appellant and the learned Additional District Judge, Aurangabad was pleased to grant an injunction as prayed by the plaintiff restraining defendants from obstructing plaintiff's function as Secretary of the said Trust-Society by Order dated 29-8-1990 but the Misc. Civil Appeal No. 163 of 1990 is still pending on the file of the District Court, Aurangabad.
3. The main contention raised by Shri S.C Bora, learned counsel for the appellant, before me is that not only the trial Court has acted with material irregularity in deciding the question of the interim relief before framing an issue regarding the jurisdiction and deciding it as a preliminary issue required by mandate of section 9-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 but has also acted without jurisdiction. Shri Bora submits that whenever an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court is raised the Court has no jurisdiction to pass any order of interim relief unless it decides the question of jurisdiction first and finds that it has jurisdiction and only an exception carved out from this is that during the pendency of the question of jurisdiction and when the decision of the said question is in process, ad interim relief can be granted by the Court. Shri Bora submits, that in the instant case, the relief considered and refused is not ad interim relief but it is temporary having finality, only subject to appeal till disposal of the suit. Shri Bora further submits that since the matter was disposed of in the trial Court, right to appeal arose in plaintiff and he could obtain interim relief in the appeal. Therefore, even interim relief granted in appeal would be without jurisdiction since question of interim relief cannot be said to have been finally disposed of by the trial Court.
4. Shri Jethalia, learned counsel for the respondent, submits that what is required by section 9-A is that before deciding application for interim relief, question of jurisdiction will have also to be decided by the Court and reason behind this provision appears to be that unless Court finds that it has jurisdiction, interim relief should not be considered. Therefore, there will not be any prejudice to the parties or material irregularity if the question of jurisdiction and question of interim relief are decided simultaneously.
5. Shri Jethalia's submission cannot be accepted for the reason that when the procedure as is laid down for deciding two things is one and the same, then decision on both the points simultaneously or one after another will have no difference. But, in the instant case, it cannot be said that a decision on issue to be framed under Order 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure and a decision on the question of application under Order 39 are to be decided by the same procedure. A summary procedure has been prescribed for decision application under Order 39 and it is evident from special provision made in respect of taking evidence while considering the interim relief. Order 39, Rule 1 authorises specifically to the Court hearing application for interim relief to pass orders when the facts are proved by affidavits. This is an exception to the general rule how the evidence is to be recorded in the trial of a suit as mentioned in rule 4 of Order 18. Secondly, the nature of the evidence which a party would be required to place before the Court when the Court is considering a question of granting or refusing interim relief under Order 39 would be totally different from the nature of the evidence which it would require to place before the Court when the Court is to consider question of jurisdiction and, thirdly, an issuers required to be framed for the reasons that the parties must be made aware as to what are questions to be decided by the Court. Parties are to submit evidence in the light of these issues and the burden of proving them is on either of the parties. Therefore, when the issue is to be decided, it is a conclusion of the trial so far as that aspect of the case is concerned and fourthly, in case the Court finds that it has no jurisdiction, the finding on this issue results into disposal of the suit itself. Therefore, there is material difference between the nature of the hearing in respect of an interim relief and in respect of issue regarding jurisdiction.
6. Shri Jethalia further submitted that since decision of temporary injunction and decision about an issue if answered in affirmative holding that Court has a jurisdiction can be challenged by way of Civil Revision Application before this Court, no material prejudice would be there to the parties. But even on this count, the argument of the learned counsel cannot be accepted. Though both the revision applications shall be under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure but this Court may take different approach while interfering in revision in respect of interim relief and in revision which raises question of jurisdiction of the Court.
7. In the instant case, since the issue has not been framed at all, a mere consideration of the question of jurisdiction by asking counsel to address the Court on the point will not be a decision on the issue as is required by the mandate of section 9-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, there is no compliance of the provisions of section 9-A.
8. The question of jurisdiction and of interim relief can be heard together was also considered by Kotval, J. in Kranti Mohan Guruprasad Mehra v. Fatehchand Vasuram Behal, 1983 Mah LJ 141 : AIR 1982 Bom 263. Kotval, J. observed thus—
“It is true that it may be permissible for the Court to adopt a composite hearing of the said preliminary issue and the interim relief and even to determine the preliminary issue at such hearing and it may even be conceivable in certain circumstances to make such determination on both counts by a composite order, however the governing clause remaining intact would enunciate that the adjudication of the Preliminary issue would precede the decision of the interim application.”
9. Relying on this observation, Shri Jethalia submitted that the composite decision of both the issues is held to be permissible. Even the hypothetical possibility which was considered by Kotval, J. points out that the issue will have to be framed and determined along with question of the temporary in junction. Kotval, J. has further pointed out the difference between the nature of the hearing on both the matters as follows—
“Thus, it cannot be overlooked that the scheme of the said provision unmistakably indicates that the Court is expected to determine the objection to jurisdiction as an issue in the suit which should be treated as a preliminary issue and having regard to the concept of the pleading, the issues arising therefrom and the determination of such issues on evidence and on the anvil of procedure as prescribed under the Code, it would be clear that the determination of such an issue even at that stage would be on the consideration of all aspects in which the said issue is enveloped; secondly, it would be after giving the parties a full opportunity to lead all the necessary material and the evidence as they would have done when the issue was framed at the trial and lastly the determination of such an issue even at that stage would get a label of finality in so far as that proceeding and the suit is concerned. … It is this depth that is in contrast with the thinner one of the interim application for an interim relief which is to be decided essentially on the prima facie view without probing deeper in the finer shades and aspects. One tends to touch the roof whereas the other remains on the surface. This difference would equally be alive even if both the matters are heard at one and the same time.”
10. Though Kotval, J. has pointed out the possibility of both the questions to be decided together, but looking to the difference of the nature of the inquiry as was pointed out by him, it would always be desirable that both the things are not heard together.
11. Provisions of section 9-A require determination of the question of jurisdiction first before an order of interim relief is to be passed and was considered to be an imperative and mandatory by the Division Bench of this Court in Sadguna Chimanlal Shah v. New Sagar Darshan Co-op. Housing Society, Bombay, 1980 Mah LJ 203.
12. In the case at hand, since the issue itself was not framed, the parties were not given to understand that they have to lead evidence on the point, learned Judge appears to have heard learned counsel on the question of jurisdiction on assumption that parties do not want to lead evidence on the point. No such concession was made by the parties in this case and, therefore, determination of the interim relief by the learned trial Judge itself stands vitiated. Civil Revision Application is, therefore, allowed. Order dated 23-7-1990 passed by the 4th Jt. Civil Judge, Junior Division, Aurangabad rejecting application at exhibit 14 filed by defendant and also in rejecting the application at exhibit 5 filed by the plaintiff is hereby quashed. The learned trial Judge is directed to frame the issue regarding the jurisdiction as it arises out of the pleadings in his opinion and then proceed to decide application exhibit 5 afresh. Shri Jethalia submits that since the order dated 23-7-1990 is being quashed and the matter is being sent to the trial Court, the appeal filed by his client in the Court of District Judge, Aurangabad becomes infructuous and he would withdraw the same for that reason. However, it appears that an interim relief has been granted in Misc. Appeal by the appellate Court on 29-8-1990 and that interim relief still continues. This interim relief is directed to be continued and to be taken as interim relief granted under sub-section 2 of section 9-A only during the pendency of the decision on the question of jurisdiction. Preliminary issue to be framed by learned trial Judge, if any, under section 9-A within a period of two months from today. The writ to go forthwith. Since the learned trial Judge has taken a view about the interim relief in his order, it would be desirable if the matter is assigned to some other Judge. This liberty is there with principal Judge of Civil Court. Aurangabad Parties are directed to appear before the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Aurangabad on 26-12-1990.
Application allowed.
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