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Prahlad v. State Of Maharashtra

Bombay High Court
Mar 15, 1990
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The application concerns whether the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ("the Code") applies to grant of bail under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 ("the Act").

The applicant was arrested on 1-12-1989 after 4.90 kilograms of Ganja were found in his possession and was prosecuted under Section 20 of the Act. The prosecution filed a charge-sheet on 6-2-1990, that is, beyond the 60-day period specified in Section 167(2) of the Code. The applicant moved for release on bail, relying on proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Code and on precedent from the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code (which entitles an accused to be released on bail on completion of the stipulated period if investigation is not completed) is applicable in the matter of grant of bail under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.
  2. Whether, in view of the Supreme Court's decision relied upon by the applicant, a magistrate is obliged to release an accused on bail under Section 167(2) proviso without regard to the non obstante and non-bailable provisions of Section 37 of the Act.
  3. Whether the conditions for bail contained in Section 37 of the Act override or are overridden by the Code's provisions (specifically the proviso to Section 167(2)).

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The applicant's counsel (Mr. Sirpurkar) argued that the applicant was entitled to be released on bail under proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code because the charge-sheet was filed after the 60-day period.
  • The counsel relied on the Supreme Court decision in Rajnikant v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau ((1989) 3 SCC 532 : AIR 1990 SC 71 : 1990 Cri LJ 62), submitting that the right to bail under the proviso is absolute and that the magistrate must pass an order of bail and communicate it so the accused can furnish bail bond.
  • It was further submitted that, following that authority, the applicant need not even apply for bail on completion of the stipulated custody period; the magistrate has no choice but to release the accused on bail, and that the conditions in Section 37 of the Act do not prevail over the provisions of Section 167(2) proviso.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any specific legal arguments advanced by the prosecution or other respondents.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rajnikant v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau, (1989) 3 SCC 532 : AIR 1990 SC 71 : 1990 Cri LJ 62 The Supreme Court in that case observed that the right to bail under the provisions (referring to proviso to S.167(2)) is absolute; a magistrate has no power to remand a person beyond the stipulated period and must pass an order of bail and communicate it so the accused can furnish bail bond. The court in the present opinion considered that Rajnikant was relied upon by the applicant, but noted that the Supreme Court in Rajnikant did not consider applicability of S.167(2) proviso to bail under the now-substituted S.37 of the Act; the present court refused to extend Rajnikant's principle by implication to S.37.
Raghubir (1986) 4 SCC 481 : AIR 1987 SC 149 : 1987 Cri LJ 157 Held that release on bail under proviso (a) to S.167(2) is not on merits but is a release by default; such bail can be cancelled for special reasons after the defect is cured; an accused cannot claim any special right to remain on bail if investigation reveals commission of a serious offence and a charge-sheet is filed. The present court recited Raghubir to show that bail under S.167(2) proviso is a privilege in default and can be cancelled. The court used this background while distinguishing the present situation under S.37 of the Act and concluded that Raghubir does not support extending S.167(2) proviso privileges to S.37 bail where the Act contains its own non-bailable scheme.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in distinct steps, each grounded in the statutory text and legislative purpose as set out in the opinion.

  1. Statutory change and non obstante clause: The court noted that Section 37 of the Act was substituted by Act 2 of 1989 and now begins with a non obstante clause. The substituted Section 37 establishes an independent scheme for bail in the Act and, to that extent, overrides the Code in matters it expressly enumerates.
  2. Content of substituted S.37: The substituted Section 37 makes many offences under the Act cognizable and non-bailable for offences punishable with imprisonment of five years or more unless specific conditions (opportunity to Public Prosecutor to oppose, court satisfaction of reasonable grounds that accused is not guilty and not likely to commit offence while on bail) are fulfilled. Sub-section (2) of Section 37 states that these limitations are in addition to limitations under the Code or any other law.
  3. Limited adoption of the Code: The court examined other provisions of the Act (notably Sections 36-A, 36-B, 36-C and Section 51 and new Section 51-A(4)) and concluded the Act adopts provisions of the Code only to the extent they are explicitly made applicable and for specific procedural purposes. Section 36-C was read to incorporate Code provisions "to the extent consistent" for proceedings before Special Courts, but not to import rights and obligations of parties wholesale. Similarly, Section 51 related to issuance of warrants and was for limited purposes. Section 51-A(4) was noted to materially change admissibility of certain items as primary evidence.
  4. Legislative intent and purpose: The opinion emphasized the declared object of the amending Act — to make narcotics law more stringent and to prevent release of drug offenders on technical grounds. The court took this legislative purpose into account in interpreting whether S.167(2) proviso could apply.
  5. Nature of S.167(2) proviso: The court recited the established understanding that proviso (a) to S.167(2) of the Code operates as a statutory command to release an accused on bail where the investigation is not completed within the stipulated period, and that such release is a privilege or remedy to reduce harassment from prolonged custody rather than a limitation on the State's ability to frame charges. It does not create procedural conditions or limitations akin to those in Chapter XXXIII of the Code governing bail.
  6. Incompatibility with Section 37: The court reasoned that the proviso to S.167(2) is not a "limitation" on granting bail in the sense used in sub-section (2) of Section 37 (which imports limitations like conditions and procedural requirements). Because the proviso confers a release-by-default privilege rather than a limitation to be assimilated into the Act's bail framework, adopting it would defeat the non obstante clause and the stricter scheme that Parliament deliberately enacted for narcotics offences.
  7. Application to the facts: On the merits, the court reviewed the investigative papers. Although the panchanama did not record a house number, the charge-sheet and panchanama described how the panchas went to the house of Prahlad Rakhe, called out a name, a person came out and identified himself as "Prahlad Rekhe," whereupon the panchas entered and seized the narcotic substance. The court found from that description and the statements that the applicant was in possession of the premises from which the Ganja was seized and therefore that the counsel's contention of lack of connection was without substance.
  8. Conclusion of analysis: Given the statutory scheme of the Act, its legislative purpose to prevent technical release of drug offenders, the limited incorporation of Code provisions into the Act, and the factual material indicating possession and a prima facie case, the court concluded that the proviso to S.167(2) of the Code could not be ipso facto extended to govern bail under S.37 of the Act. The applicant therefore did not deserve bail.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application for bail was rejected, and the application was dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The applicant, arrested on 1-12-1989 for possession of 4.90 Kgs of Ganja and charged under Section 20 of the Act, was not released on bail despite the delay in filing a charge-sheet beyond 60 days; the court found the statutory scheme of Section 37 of the Act precluded application of the privilege in proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Code in this context.
  • Broader implications: The opinion explains that the substituted Section 37 creates an independent, stricter bail regime for offences under the Act, and that the proviso to Section 167(2) of the Code cannot be read into Section 37 by implication. The opinion does not purport to create a new, general precedent beyond applying these interpretative conclusions to the facts before the court; it does not state that any novel legal principle beyond this statutory interpretation is being established.

Final Disposition: Application dismissed.

Show all summary ...

1. Question as posed in this application pertains to applicability of proviso to sub-s. (2) of S. 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code) in the matter of grant of bail u/S. 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (“the Act”). The applicant was arrested on 1-12-1989 on having found in possession 4.90 Kgs of Ganja. He is, therefore, being prosecuted for the offence punishable u/S. 20 of the Act. The prosecution on 6-2-1990 filed a charge-sheet i.e beyond 60 days.

2. Mr. Sirpurkar, the learned Counsel appearing for the applicant, therefore, asserted that the applicant is entitled to be released on bail in view of the provisions laid down in proviso (a) to sub-s. (2) of S. 167 of the Code. He placed reliance on the decision delivered by the Supreme Court in case of Rajnikant v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau, (1989) 3 SCC 532 : AIR 1990 SC 71 : (1990 Cri LJ 62). The applicant-Rajanikant in that case was prosecuted for the offence punishable under the Act. The Supreme Court was observed that a right to bail under these provisions is absolute. The magistrate has no power to remand a person beyond the stipulated period. He must pass an order of bail and communicate the same to the accused to furnish the requisite bail bond. Mr. Sirpurkar advanced a submission that the Supreme Court has explicity considered the applicability of S. 162(2) proviso (a) to release the accused on bail for the offence punishable under the Act.

3. Mr. Sirpurkar also tried to submit that in view of the observation of the Supreme Court, the applicant on completion of the stipulated period under the custody, is not required even to apply for grant of bail. The Magistrate being under Legislative command is left with no choice but to release the applicant on bail. As such, conditions laid down in S. 37 of the Act need no adherence, as they do not prevail over the provisions of S. 167(2) Proviso.

4. S. 37 of the Act as then originally stood reads as thus “Offence to be cognizable — Notwithstanding, anything contained in the Code, every offence punishable under this Act, shall be cognizable. The Act then did not contain a specific provision for grant of bail for the offence punishable under the Act. Matter was governed by the Code.

5. Section 37 which is now in vogue came to be introduced on Statute book by act 2 of 1989. It has on 6-1-1989 received the assent of the President. It is notified on 9-1-1989 in the Gazette of India. S. 37 now substituted read as thus:—

“Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable—

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),—

(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable;

(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years or more under this Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless—

(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and

(ii) where the Public Prosecutor oppose the application for such release, and

(iii) where the Public Prosecutor oppose the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-s. (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.”

6. Section 37 has thus incorporated its independent scheme for grant of bail for the offences punishable under the Act.

7. The Supreme Court on 8-5-1989 delivered the judgment in the case cited supra. The Supreme Court has examined the order of the High Court passed in exercise of power u/S. 439(2) of the Code cancelling the bail which was granted u/S. 167(2) proviso. The Supreme Court referred to the dictum laid down in Raghubir case, (1986) 4 SCC 481 : AIR 1987 SC 149 : (1987 Cri LJ 157) that the order of release on bail u/S. 167(2) proviso was not on merit but one in default. Such order could be rectified for special reason after the defect was cured. The Supreme Court in para 13 of the report in case cited supra has held that:

“The accused cannot, therefore, claim any special right to remain on bail. If the investigation reveals that the accused has committed a serious offence and charge-sheet is filed, the bail granted under proviso (a) to S. 167(2) could be cancelled.”

8. The Supreme Court in the ultimate result upheld the order of cancellation of the High Court and dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court had no occasion to consider, the question of the applicability of S. 167(2) proviso, in the matter of grant of bail u/S. 37 of the Act which is now substituted. It would be an error to infer that by necessary implication the Supreme Court extended the benefit provided u/S. 167(2) proviso of the Code to the matter of grant of bail u/S. 37 of the Act.

9. The learned Counsel made a submission that S. 37 no doubt begins with non obstante clause, however, sub-s. (2) of S. 37 specifically borrows the provisions laid down under the Code in the matter of grant of bail. Beside this, various provisions under the Act, for the governance of various matters indicated therein adopt the provisions under the Code. He in support, particularly placed reliance on Ss. 36-C and 51 of the Act. The Counsel, therefore, reiterated that S. 167(2) proviso has admittedly an applicability even in the matter of grant of bail u/S. 37 of the Act. Submissions do not appear to be well founded.

10. The Act of 1985 has been introduced with a specific object to make the law relating to the Narcotic Drugs and other matter connected thereto more stringent so as to control the menance thereof and further to implement the provisions of international convention on narcotic drugs. The statement of objects and reasons of the act 2 of 1989 solemnly declares that “Even though major offences are non-bailable by virtue of the level of punishment, on technical ground the drugs offenders were being released on bail”.

(Emphasis supplied).

Amending Act has aimed to strengthen the existing law.

11. Chapter IV deals with various offences and penalties provided therefor under the Act. S. 36 as then orginally stood provided for summary trial of the offences by the Magistrate. S. 36 now substituted provides for the constitution of the Special Court. S. 36-A(1)(a) which is now introduced lays down that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code all offences under the Act are triable by a Special Court. S. 36-B provides for the applicability of Chapters XXIX and XXX of the Code which deal with appeal, revision and references. S. 36-C on which reliance is placed and which is now introduced provides that the provisions of the Code to the extent consistent shall apply to the proceedings (emphasis supplied) before the Special Court. It is quite clear that relevant provisions of the Code as relates to procedure have applicability in conduct of proceedings under the Act before the Special Court. However, S. 36-C does not borrow the provisions of Code pertaining to right and obligation of parties.

12. Chapter V deals with the procedure regarding issuance of warrant, entry, search, seizure, arrest etc. etc. S. 51 therein (on which reliance is placed) refers to the applicability of the relevant provisions of the Code for the proceedings relating to issuance of warrants etc. etc. It is again crystally clear that the applicability is for a restricted purpose. Sec. 51-A(4) reads as thus:—

“Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872) or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), every court trying an offence under this Act, shall treat the inventory, the photographs of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances and any list of samples drawn u/sub-s. (2) and certified by the Magistrate, as primary evidence in respect of such offence.”

13. This section which is now introduced has brought a substantial change regarding admissibility of certain material as primary evidence for trial of the offences, under the Act. Section has immunised the admissibility of evidence from the test as laid down under the indian evidence act as well under the Code.

14. Taking into consideration the entire schemes, the Legislature has consciously adopted certain provisions under the Code for regulating specific matters under the Act. The adoption of the Code is not with a general applicability but for a restricted purpose and only for the aspects and subjects as specifically indicated under the corresponding provisions of the Act. It is explicit that the Parliament with a definite object as declared, refrained the general applicability of the Code to the offences, trial and other matters under the Act.

15. Bearing in mind the specific object of the Act i.e to make the law more stringent, also to prevent release of the drug offender on bail on technical ground and the Scheme as codified under the Act, I am definite in my conclusion that privilege u/S. 167(2) proviso (a) of the Code cannot ipso facto be extended in the matter of grant of bail u/S. 37 of the Act.

16. Section 37 opens with non obstante clause which does not permit the applicability of Code, to the matters enumerated therein. Cl. (b) of sub-s. (1) of S. 37 unequivocally denies the grant of bail for certain offences unless conditions laid down in sub-cls. (i) and (ii) are fulfilled. Sub-s. (2) proclaims that these limitations are in addition to those others provided under the Code and in any other law. Chapter XXXIII of the Code deals with the grant of bail. It imposes several conditions for such grant, such as executing bond, refusing to release on failure to comply with the condition laid down, refusing to grant bail if previous convict for offence punishable with death, recording of special reason by the Court, arrest of person who is released on bail etc. etc. Such conditions as laid down by the Code are within the contemplation of the term “limitation” as envisaged by sub-s. (2) of S. 37 of the Act.

17. These provisions u/S. 167 do not however carve out any condition, limitation or restriction in the matter of grant of bail. S. 167 which is a part of Chapter XII of the Code deals with the investigation. S. 167(2) proviso (a) has issued, as observed by the Supreme Court a Legislative command to the Court to release the accused on bail in the eventuality of default to complete the investigation within a specified period. The section intends to minimise the harassment to the accused in custody in the case of prolonged investigation. The Section instead of putting limitation in the matter of grant of bail, virtually confers a privilege on accused to claim release on bail in case of default as envisaged. Sub-s. (2) of S. 37 of the Act while adopting limitation in the matter of grant of bail under the Code, even by any implication, does not endeavour to embarrass, proviso to S. 167(2). These provisions since not being a limitation in the matter of release on bail cannot be adopted through the media of subsec. (2) of S. 37 of the Act. Any attempt to extend the applicability of S. 167(2) proviso, to the matter of grant of bail u/S. 37 would nullify the overriding effect provided by the non obstante clause over the Code. The applicant, therefore, cannot claim a benefit of being released on bail for the offence punishable u/S. 20 of the Act of 1985 by taking resort to these provisions as contained in S. 167 of the Code since the prosecution failed to complete the investigation and file charge-sheet within a period of 60 days. The accused is charged for having found in possession of 4.90 Kgs of Ganja. According to Mr. Sirpurkar from the papers of the investigation, there is no identification or house number as disclosed indicating that he is either an owner, lessee, licensee of the house. As such, in view of Mr. Sirpurkar he (the applicant) was not liable to be connected with the offence and as such no prima facie case is made out. The copy of the charge-sheet is shown to me which refers recovery of 4.90 Kgs. of Ganja from the house of applicant Prahlad Rakhe. In seizure panchanama which is recorded on the same day i.e 1-12-1989, it is stated that the Panchas as per the information received in the Police Station reached the house of Prahlad Rakhe. They have further stated that by standing before house in question they gave a call by referring the name of applicant as Prahland Rekhe. On receiving the call, one person came out of the said house. They asked him his name and he said that “my name is, Prahlad Rekhe”. On identifying the accused applicant the Panchas entered into the said house and seized the narcotic substance i.e Ganja. It is true that in panchanama house number is not given but from the description and the statements, made by the panchas, it is apparent that the applicant was in possession of the premises from where the Ganja was seized. In these circumstances, I do not find any substance in the contention of the learned Counsel. No other ground has been urged. The applicant does not deserve to be released on bail, in view of the seriousness of the offence. The application is, therefore, rejected.

18. Application dismissed.