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Bhaurao Govindrao Mulak v. Savitribai
Summary of the Court's Opinion (Revision Application)
Factual and Procedural Background
The non-applicants (landlords) had earlier filed Special Civil Suit No. 346 of 1983 against the present applicant (tenant) for ejectment and possession. That suit was decreed ex parte on 23-12-1983 and the non-applicants obtained possession of the first floor of the building “Prayag Sadan.” The applicant challenged that ex parte decree by first appeal to this Court (dismissed 14-2-1985) and by Special Leave Petition to the Supreme Court (dismissed 26-5-1986), rendering the decree final.
Separately, on 2-8-1984 the applicant filed Regular Civil Suit No. 1134 of 1984 alleging the ex parte decree was obtained by fraud and sought a temporary injunction. The trial Court on 2-8-1984 ordered the landlords to open the lock on the first floor and the applicant obtained possession pursuant to that injunction. The landlords' appeal against the injunction was dismissed, and the landlords filed revision (Civil Revision Application No. 55 of 1986) to this Court.
On 14-3-1990 the applicant filed a pursis withdrawing Civil Suit No. 1134 of 1984 to pursue relief under section 47 CPC and sought status quo pending his section 47 objection. This Court allowed the withdrawal and observed that the injunction thereby stood vacated. Following withdrawal, the landlords applied for restitution of possession under section 144 CPC on 13-3-1990; the trial Court ordered restoration on 6-4-1990, the appellate court dismissed the tenant's appeal on 24-4-1990, and the tenant moved the present revision application to this Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an application under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure for restitution of possession of the disputed property is tenable in the facts of this case.
- Whether the decree in Special Civil Suit No. 346 of 1983 is a nullity because the landlords did not obtain permission from the Rent Controller (as later required by subsequent change in law).
- Whether a claim that the disputed property falls within a slum area (and so eviction proceedings required prior permission under the Maharashtra Slum Areas Act, 1971) can be raised for the first time in execution/restitution proceedings.
- Whether a change in law (requiring prior permission from rent controller) affects the validity of final decrees and possession already taken pursuant thereto.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant (tenant) — Mr. Mohta
- Argued that the landlords initiated Special Civil Suit No. 346 of 1983 without obtaining permission from the Rent Controller to determine tenancy; therefore the decree in that suit was a nullity.
- Relied on decisions (Prithinath Singh v. Suraj Ahir and Suraj Ahir & Others v. Prithinath Singh & Others) where restitution was refused because the property had vested in the State and the State was not joined.
- Relied on decisions (including B.B. Patankar v. C.G. Sastry and Sunder Dass v. Ram Parkash) to support objections to executability of decrees or to challenge scope of section 47 CPC.
- Contended the disputed site falls within a slum area and relied on a government Notification dated 24-1-1976 and a certificate dated 23-2-1984 to argue that the landlords could not initiate eviction proceedings without permission of the competent authority under section 22 of the Maharashtra Slum Areas Act, 1971.
Non-applicants (landlords) — Mr. Bobde
- Contended that the argument the 1983 decree was a nullity could not be entertained in the present proceedings which arose from the withdrawn Civil Suit No. 1134 of 1984; the decree of 1983 had been finally affirmed in appeal and on special leave petition.
- Argued that the applicant cannot retain the benefit of the temporary injunction obtained in the withdrawn suit, and that withdrawal vacated the injunction.
- Submitted that subsequent changes in law would not affect decrees which had become final and where possession had been taken pursuant to them; relied on a Division Bench decision to that effect.
- Contended that the Notification itself shows the disputed site (being in front of Sitabuldi Main Road) is excluded from the slum area, and that the certificate cannot override the plain terms of the Notification; argued that whether the property is within the slum area is a mixed question of fact and law that could not be raised for the first time in execution/restitution proceedings.
- Maintained that section 144 CPC requires restitution where an order is vacated and that a fresh suit for restitution is barred by sub-section (2) of section 144 CPC.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| 1986 Mh.L.J 506 — Nanakram v. Kundalrai | Recognized change in law requiring landlord to obtain permission from Rent Controller to determine tenancy. | Referred to as the decision that changed the law in 1986; Court noted that the change could not be used to nullify a decree that had already become final before that decision. |
| (1970) 3 SCC 794 — Prithinath Singh v. Suraj Ahir | Instances where restitution was refused because the property had vested in the State and State was not joined. | Court held this precedent did not support the applicant because those decisions involved vesting in the State and absence of joinder of the State; they were distinguishable. |
| AIR 1963 SC 454 — Suraj Ahir & Others v. Prithinath Singh & Others | Same principle regarding vesting of property in the State and its effect on restitution rights. | Court observed the case did not support the applicant for the reasons stated above. |
| AIR 1961 SC 272 — B.B. Patankar v. C.G. Sastry | Scope of section 47 CPC (point relied upon by applicant). | Court noted the decision deals with section 47 but did not find it supportive of the applicant's position in the present facts. |
| (1977) 2 SCC 662 / AIR 1977 SC 1201 — Sunder Dass v. Ram Parkash | Executing Court cannot go behind a decree except where the decree is a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction. | Cited to explain that only a decree which is a nullity can be impeached in execution; court found the principle inapplicable to the applicant because the earlier decree was final and not shown to be a nullity for want of inherent jurisdiction. |
| (1990) 1 SCC 353 / AIR 1990 SC 623 — Bhanwar Lal v. Smt. Prem Lata | Authorities dealing with rent-control related issues; court found the point involved distinguishable. | Cited but treated as distinguishable on its facts; not relied on to overturn the final decree here. |
| 1986 Mh.L.J 882 — Division Bench decision (unspecified parties) | Principle that a subsequent decision changing the law does not affect the validity of any proceedings in which a decree or order of eviction has become final and landlord has taken possession. | Relied upon by the landlords and accepted by the Court as supporting the proposition that the change in law does not invalidate final decrees and possession already taken pursuant thereto. |
| (1987) 1 SCC 5 / AIR 1987 SC 88 — Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal | Requirement of obtaining permission to file a fresh suit under Order XXIII, Rule 1(3); public policy preventing repetitive suits. | Cited to justify that fresh suits are restricted and that the remedy of restitution under section 144 CPC is the appropriate avenue where applicable. |
| Civil Revision Application No. 638 of 1984 (decided 22-9-1988) — Chandrakant Purshottam Tapas v. Vinayak Keshaorao Buty | Held that whether premises are governed by the Slum Act is a mixed question of fact and law which cannot be raised for the first time in execution proceedings; objection that suit was filed without permission under Slum Act was rejected in execution. | Relied upon by the Court to hold that the slum-area objection could not be raised for the first time in restitution/execution proceedings in the absence of evidence. |
| 1984 Mh.L.J 796 — Fattechand Murlidhar Shop by Proprietor v. Shrikrishna Tejmalji | Executing Court has no warrant to investigate disputed facts not apparent on record; section 22 of Act 28 of 1971 does not create a jurisdictional bar but places restrictions on instituting suit. | Applied to reinforce the conclusion that the executing Court should not investigate the slum-area objection de novo when the issue requires evidence and was not raised earlier. |
| AIR 1984 Orissa 49 — Krushna Chandra Sahoo v. Indramani Sahu | Example of a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction where objection could be raised in execution. | Referred to illustrate that only in cases of inherent lack of jurisdiction can objections be entertained in execution; Court distinguished the present case from such situations. |
| 1984 Mh.L.J 261 — Kalwatibai wd/o Lokumal Sindhi v. Gopala Ganpati Bhanarkar | Permission under the Slum Act must be obtained before instituting the suit; no post facto permission can validate a suit instituted without permission. | Cited for the proposition that permission must be obtained before suit; Court nevertheless held that the slum-area contention here required earlier raising and evidentiary enquiry which was absent. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner, applying the facts and relevant legal principles as they arose from the record:
- The Court first noted the procedural chronology: Special Civil Suit No. 346/1983 resulted in an ex parte decree in favour of the landlords; that decree was unsuccessfully challenged by the tenant in first appeal and before the Supreme Court, making it final.
- The Court observed that the present proceedings originate from Regular Civil Suit No. 1134/1984 which the tenant filed and subsequently withdrew by pursis in which he stated his intention to pursue remedy under section 47 CPC. On withdrawal, the trial Court's injunction stood vacated; the Court emphasized that the tenant could not retain the benefit obtained by that injunction after withdrawal.
- Turning to the core question (tenability of restitution under section 144 CPC), the Court reproduced section 144 and interpreted it to create an obligation on the Court to cause restitution so as far as may be to place parties in the position they would have occupied but for the order that has been varied or set aside. The Court held that restitution under section 144 was the appropriate remedy for the landlords and that a fresh suit was barred by sub-section (2) of section 144 CPC.
- On the specific contention that the 1983 decree was a nullity because permission of the Rent Controller was not obtained, the Court declined to entertain that argument in the present proceedings. The Court reasoned that the decree in Special Civil Suit No. 346/1983 had been challenged and dismissed on appeal and by special leave to the Supreme Court; hence it could not be treated as a nullity in the restitution proceeding that arose from the withdrawn suit.
- The Court considered authorities cited by the tenant (including Prithinath Singh and related decisions) and found those authorities involved vesting of property in the State or other factual situations that made them inapplicable. The Court reviewed Sunder Dass to note the narrow exception allowing an executing Court to refuse execution if a decree is a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction, and concluded that the present decree was not shown to be such a nullity.
- The Court addressed the change in law (post-1986 decisions requiring Rent Controller permission) and accepted the submission that a subsequent change in law does not affect decrees that have become final and where possession has already been taken pursuant to those decrees; it relied on a Division Bench decision to support that view.
- The Court examined the slum-area objection. It compared the government Notification (which on its face excluded houses in front of Sitabuldi Main Road) with the certificate relied on by the tenant. The Court held that a certificate in conflict with the Notification could not prevail and that whether the property fell within the slum area was a mixed question of fact and law requiring evidence; therefore it could not be first raised in execution/restitution proceedings. The Court relied on prior decisions of this Court and other authorities that executing courts should not engage in fact-finding on matters not apparent on the record.
- Summarizing, the Court found that the trial and appellate courts were justified in ordering restoration of possession to the landlords under section 144 CPC and that the tenant's revision application had no merit.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The revision application is dismissed. The Courts below were correct in directing restitution of possession of the first floor to the non-applicants (landlords) under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Direct Consequences for the Parties:
- The applicant (tenant) must restore possession of the first floor to the non-applicants (landlords) in accordance with the orders of the trial and appellate courts.
- There shall be no order as to costs.
- Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is refused by this Court; however the applicant was permitted a two-month stay of possession to enable him to move the Supreme Court for a stay (the Court granted a two-month stay of possession).
Broader implications: The Court's reasoning emphasises that (a) restitution under section 144 CPC is the appropriate remedy where an order that gave rise to possession has been vacated by withdrawal; (b) a subsequent change in law does not ordinarily render final decrees and consequent possession vulnerable; and (c) mixed questions of fact and law (here, whether premises fall within a slum area) cannot be raised for the first time in execution/restitution proceedings without appropriate evidence. The opinion does not purport to set any novel, general precedent beyond applying these principles to the facts of this case.
Revision application dismissed.
1. The non-applicants/landlords were the plaintiffs in the earlier proceedings Special Civil Suit No. 346 of 1983. They had filed the said suit against the present applicant/tenant for ejectment and possession without permission from the Rent Controller since no permission was then necessary. That suit was decreed ex parte vide order dated 23-12-1983. The present non-applicants are the owners of the three storied building “Prayag Sadan” situated in Ward No. 1, Variety Square, bearing house No. 1, Nagpur. In the present proceedings, we are concerned only with the first floor of the said building. In pursuance of the decree in Special Civil Suit No. 346 of 1983, the non-applicants/landlords got possession of the first floor. The applicant/tenant challenged the ex parte decree by way of first appeal before this Court. The appeal was dismissed by this Court on 14-2-1985. Thereafter, the tenant filed Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court of India, but that was also dismissed on 26-5-1986. Thus, the decree for ejectment and possession obtained by the present non-applicants/landlords in Special Civil Suit No. 346 of 1983 against the present applicant/tenant became final.
2. The applicant/tenant filed Regular Civil Suit No. 1134 of 1984 on 2-8-1984 against the non-applicants/landlords for a declaration that the ex parte judgment and decree dated 23-12-1983 in Special Civil Suit No. 346 of 1983 was obtained by fraud. The applicant/tenant also applied for temporary injunction. The 4th Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nagpur, vide order dated 2-8-1984, directed the non-applicants/landlords to open the lock which they had put on the first floor. In pursuance of this order, the applicant/tenant got possession of the first floor. The non-applicants/landlords challenged the order of injunction passed by the trial Court by way of an appeal before the District Court. Nagpur (Misc. Civil Appeal No. 188 of 1984). However, the appeal was dismissed and hence the non-applicants/landlords had to approach this Court by way of revision (Civil Revision Application No. 55 of 1986). When the matter came up for hearing before this Court on 14-3-1990, the applicant/tenant filed a pursis which reads as under:
“The non-applicant hereby withdraws the Civil Suit No. 1134 of 1984 to pursue his remedy under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code in view of the changed position of law after the pronouncement of the judgment reported in 1986 Mh.L.J 506, provided this honourable High Court grants status quo till the decision of his objection under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code.”
In view of the pursis, this Court allowed the present applicant/tenant to withdraw Regular Civil Suit No. 1134 of 1984. While allowing the applicant/tenant to withdraw the suit, this Court observed:
“In view of the withdrawal of the suit, the injunction granted by the trial Court automatically stands vacated. No further orders are necessary on that point.”
3. In view of the withdrawal of Civil Suit No. 1134 of 1984, the non-applicants/landlords filed an application for restitution of possession of the first floor on 13th March, 1990. The trial Court, vide order dated 6th April, 1990, directed the applicant/tenant to restore possession of the first floor to the non-applicants/landlords. This order was challenged by the applicant/tenant in appeal before the 6th Additional District Judge, Nagpur, but the appeal also came to be dismissed by an order dated 24th April, 1990 and hence this revision.
4. The question that falls for my consideration is whether the application under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure for restitution of possession of the disputed property is tenable.
5. One of the main contentions of Mr. Mohta appearing on behalf of the applicant/tenant is that the non-applicants/landlords had initiated the proceedings for ejectment and possession in Special Civil Suit No. 346 of 1983 without obtaining permission from the Rent Controller to determine the tenancy of the applicant/tenant. Therefore, he contended that the decree in that suit was a nullity. In my view, it is not possible to entertain this argument in the present proceedings which have their origin to Regular Civil Suit No. 1134 of 1984 which was withdrawn. I have already pointed out that the decree in Special Civil Suit No. 346 of 1983 was challenged by the applicant/tenant by way of first appeal before this Court which was dismissed on 14-2-1985. Thereafter, the matter was agitated before the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition which was also dismissed. In view of this background, it is not possible to entertain the argument that the decree in Special Civil Suit No. 346 of 1983 is a nullity, apart from the fact that present proceedings have not arisen out of that suit. The suit out of which the present proceedings have arisen has been withdrawn by the applicant/tenant and, therefore, he cannot retain the benefit which he got on account of the order of temporary injunction passed in the present proceedings in pursuance of which he dispossessed the non-applicants/landlords of the first floor. This Court had already observed that in view of the withdrawal of Civil Suit No. 1134 of 1984. the order of injunction also stands vacated. The non-applicants/landlords were already in possession of the first floor before filing of Civil Suit No. 1134 of 1984 in their capacity as owners thereof. Because of the order passed by the trial Court on an application for an injunction filed by the applicant/tenant that the non-applicants/landlords lost possession of the first floor. That injunction order having been vacated as a consequence of the withdrawal of the Civil Suit Np. 1134 of 1984, the benefit which the applicant/tenant had obtained cannot be retained by him. That would be contrary to the very object of section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code. The portion of section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is material for our purpose, is reproduced below:
“144. (1) Where and in so far as a decree or an order is varied or reversed in any appeal, revision or other proceeding or is set aside or modified in any suit instituted for the purpose, the Court which passed the decree or order shall, on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made as will, so far as may be. place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or order or such part thereof as has been varied, reversed, set aside or modified: and, for this purpose, the Court may make any orders, including orders for the refund of costs and for the payment of interest, damages, compensation and mesne profits, which are properly consequential on such variation, reversal, setting aside or modification of the decree or order.
(2) No suit shall be instituted for the purpose of obtaining any restitution or other relief which could be obtained by application under sub-section (1).”
From the close scrutiny of the above section, it is clear that it is an obligation on the Court that it shall on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution, cause such restitution to be made in so far as it may place the party in the position which, it could have occupied, but for such order as has been varied. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, application for restitution is the only remedy available to the non-applicants since a fresh suit is barred in view of sub-section (2) of section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Courts below were, therefore, perfectly justified in directing the applicant/tenant to restore possession of the first floor to the non-applicants/landlords.
6. Mr. Mohta has invited my attention to the decision reported in (1970) 3 SCC 794, Prithinath Singh v. Suraj Ahir. After going through this decision, I do not think, it in any way supports Mr. Mohta. In this case, restitution was refused on the ground that the property which was the subject-matter of the restitution had vested in the State free from all encumbrances and the State was not joined as a party to the restitution proceedings. He has also relied on AIR 1963 SC 454, Suraj Ahir & Others v. Prithinath Singh & Others but even this case does not support him. The last portion of para 21 of the said judgment reads as under:
“21………………
It is clear therefore that the land in suit cannot be deemed to be settled with the respondents by the State in accordance with the provisions of section 6 of the Act. In the absence of any such settlement, no rights over the land in suit remained in the respondents after the date of vesting, all their rights having vested in the State by virtue of sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Act.”
In para 22 of the judgment, it is observed:
“22. We are therefore of opinion that the respondents lost their right to recover possession from the appellants, even if they were trespassers, on their estate vesting in the State, by virtue of sections 3 and 4 of the Act and that therefore, thereafter, they had no subsisting right to recover possession from the appellants. The right to possession now vests in the State. The respondents being no more entitled to recover possession of the land in suit the decree of the High Court has to be set aside. We, accordingly, allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the Court below and restore the decree of the trial Court, though for reasons other than those given by that Court in its judgment. In the circumstances of the case, we order the parties to bear their own costs.”
Thus, it would be clear that the cases relied upon by Mr. Mohta are where the restitution was refused on the ground that the property had already vested in the State on account of the operation of law. He has also invited my attention to the decision reported in AIR 1961 SC 272, B.B Patankar v. C.G Sastry. This decision is on the point of the scope of section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Reliance was also placed on the decision reported in (1977) 2 SCC 662 : AIR 1977 SC 1201, Sunder Dass v. Ram Parkash, and particularly on para 3 of the judgment, the relevant portion of which is reproduced below:
“Now, the law is well-settled that an executing Court cannot go behind the decree nor can it question its legality or correctness. But there is one exception to this general rule and that is that where the decree sought to be executed is ??? nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction in the Court passing it, its validity can be set up in an execution proceeding. Where there is lack of inherent jurisdiction, it goes to the root of the competence of the Court to try the case and a decree which is a nullity is void and can be declared to be void by any Court in which it is presented. Its nullity can be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon and even at the stage of execution or even in collateral proceedings. The executing Court can, therefore, entertain an objection that the decree is a nullity and can refuse to execute the decree. By doing so, the executing Court would not incur the reproach that it is going behind the decree, because the decree being null and void, there would really be no decree at all.”
The maintainability of the application for restitution has to be examined on the basis of the proceedings in Civil Suit No. 1134 of 1984. Civil Suit No. 346 of 1983 was filed by the non-applicants/landlords in 1983 without obtaining permission from the Rent Controller, since the law then in force did not require any permission from the Rent Controller. It is only in the year 1986 on account of the pronouncement of the judgment by the Supreme Court in 1986 Mh.L.J 506, Nanakram v. Kundalrai that it became necessary for the landlord to obtain permission from the Rent Controller to determine the tenancy even of such tenants to whom premises were let out without permission of the Rent Controller. The decision reported in (1990) 1 SCC 353 : AIR 1990 SC 623, Bhanwar Lal v. Smt. Prem Lata has also been relied upon, but the point involved therein is also distinguishable.
7. I think, there is much substance in the contention of Mr. Bobde that subsequent change in law would not affect the cases where decree is passed. For this purpose, he has relied on the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 1986 Mh.L.J 882, particularly the last portion which is reproduced below:
“We, however, make it clear that this decision would not affect the validity of any proceedings in which a decree or order of eviction has become final and the landlord has already taken possession of the building or any part thereof, pursuant thereto.”
He has also relied on the decision reported in (1987) 1 SCC 5 : AIR 1987 SC 88, Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Gwalior, the material portion of which reads as under:
“In order to prevent a litigant from abusing the process of the Court by instituting suits again and again on the same cause of action without any good reason the Civil Procedure Code insists that he should obtain the permission of the Court to file a fresh suit after establishing either of the two grounds mentioned in sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII. The principle underlying the above rule is founded on public policy…”.
8. Another limb of argument of Mr. Mohta was that the disputed site falls within the slum area. He has filed the Notification bearing No. BLN-1075-5280-9 dated 24-1-1976 published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette dated 5th February, 1976, and also the certificate issued by the competent authority dated 23-2-1984. Mr. Mohta has invited my attention to section 22 of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). In view of this section, he contended that the non-applicants/landlords could not initiate proceedings for eviction without the permission of the competent authority.
9. Mr. Bobde has, however, contended that from the Notification itself it is clear that the disputed site being in front of the Sitabuldi Main Road, does not fall within the slum area. Since this objection was not taken by Mr. Mohta before the trial Court, necessary enquiry was not made in this regard. However, after going through the Notification, I am satisfied that the disputed site being in front of the road cannot be included in the slum area. Mr. Mohta, relying on the certificate dated 23-2-1984 issued by the competent authority, vehemently contended that the disputed site falls within the slum area. If the certificate is in conflict with the Notification, the certificate will have to be ignored.
10. I find much force in the contention of Mr. Bobde that the question of fact and law cannot be raised for the first time in execution proceedings. He has relied on the decision of this Court in Civil Revision Application No. 638 of 1984 decided on 22-9-1988, Chandrakant Purshottam Tapas v. Vinayak Keshaorao Buty by V.A Mohta, J. In the said revision also, the objection was taken at the stage of execution on the basis of the Maharashtra Slum Areas Act of 1971. It was contended therein that the decree obtained by the landlord was a nullity since the suit was filed without the permission from the competent authority under the Slum Act. While rejecting the objection this Court observed as under:
“With the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties, I have examined the record. I do not see any case for interference in the revisional jurisdiction. Whether or not particular premises are governed by the Act is a mixed question of fact and law which cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in execution proceedings. If that be the correct position, it is difficult to see how the decree is nullity specially when the judgment debtor has not challenged it.”
11. Mr. Mohta has submitted that the landlords have admitted the Notification and the certificate. On the basis of this admission, he has argued that it is not open to them to challenge the same. Mr. Bobde has rightly contended that the admission of the certificate and the Notification would not amount to admission of the contents thereof. Certainly, there can be no dispute that the Notification is there and that the certificate has also been issued by the competent authority. But, as I have already observed above, when the plain reading of the Notification itself excludes the houses situated in front of the Main Road, it would not be possible to hold that the property in dispute falls within the slum area. Had this objection been raised before the trial Court, then the evidence could have been led by the parties and the matter could have been enquired into. But, in the absence of evidence, it is not possible to hold that the property in dispute falls within the slum area. This would certainly be a mixed question of fact and law and, therefore, it should have been raised before the trial Court itself. Mr. Bobde has also relied on the decision reported in 1984 Mh.L.J 796, Fattechand Murlidhar Shop by Proprietor v. Shrikrishna Tejmalji in support of his contention that there is no warrant of execution in Civil Court to entertain a suit even without the permission from the competent authority under the Slum Act and the executing Court has no right to refuse to execute the decree particularly when the objection requires investigation. Mr. Bobde relied on para. 17 of the said judgment which reads as under:
“17. Shri Deopujari laid stress on certain observations in Krushna Chandra Sahoo v. Indramani Sahu, AIR 1984 Orissa 49. But that again was a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction because the objection had been raised before the executing Court that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try suit for eviction when Rent Control Act was in force. Though the objection had not been raised earlier in the suit or in appeal, plea of absence of jurisdiction could still be raised during the execution proceedings. In the present case, as I have already pointed out, section 22 of Act 28 of 1971 does not create a jurisdictional bar to the civil Court's entertaining the suit but only places restrictions on the persons who propose to institute a suit. If the suit is instituted without the permission of the competent authority, on an objection being raised or the Court noticing the non-compliance thereof, the suit will not be entertained. It is true that the permission, as held in Kalwatibai wd/o Lokumal Sindhi v. Gopala Ganpati Bhanarkar, 1984 Mh.L.J 261, must be obtained before instituting the suit. No post facto permission can be granted. That would not, however, clothe the Court at the stage of execution, with the power to investigate into the facts, when they are not apparent from the face of the record, for deciding whether the suit could have been entertained at all. In view of the observations of the Supreme Court, such a course would be impermissible. I, therefore, find that the learned Judge of the Court of Small Causes was in error in entertaining and allowing the objection to the executability of the decree in the circumstances of the present case. The executing Court was found to execute the decree as it stood. The executing Court also erred in holding the decree not to be executable as a whole. It was conceded by Shri Deopujari the learned advocate for the opponent that there could be no objection to executing the decree so far as the monetary parts were concerned.”
I have already observed above that it was for the applicant/tenant to have proved that the disputed property or a portion thereof was within the slum area notwithstanding the entry in the Notification to the following effect:
“South — Sitabuldi Main Road leaving front of the road.”
12. I also find substance in the submission of Mr. Bobde that question of the bar under the Slum Act may not arise in so far as restitution proceedings are concerned. According to him, section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code casts an obligation on the Court to restore the party to its old position from which it was deprived of on account of the order of the Court which was subsequently varied. The applicant/tenant in the instant case got the possession of the first floor on account of the temporary injunction which he had obtained in Civil Suit No. 1134 of 1984. The suit was subsequently withdrawn by him and the temporary injunction stood vacated. Therefore, he has got to restore the possession of the first floor to the non-applicants/landlords under section 144, Civil Procedure Code, as rightly found by the Courts below.
13. In view of the reasons stated above, I find no substance in the revision application and the same is accordingly, dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
Leave to appeal to Supreme Court is refused. Mr. Mohta requests for two months' time to enable him to move the Supreme Court to get the stay. However, his request for stay of possession for two months is granted.
Revision application dismissed.
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