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Arun Industries v. The State Of Maharashtra And Others

Bombay High Court
Jun 28, 1990
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Legal Opinion Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff appealed from an order dismissing its motion for an interim injunction to restrain the respondents from entering upon and taking possession of plot No. 123-CD, Kandivli Industrial Estate, Bombay. The plot had been granted to the plaintiff under an agreement (Ex. A) by the Government represented by respondent No. 3. Ex. A was described as a thirty years lease permitting the plaintiff to erect industrial sheds on the plot and restricting use of those sheds to industrial purposes.

Clauses IX and X of Ex. A restrained the plaintiff from subdividing or disposing of "any part of the said plot" without permission and prohibited assigning or under-letting "the said plot or any part thereof" without prior written consent of the Collector. The plaintiff erected structures and installed machinery; the machinery and sheds were operated for some time by entities doing business as Bharat Engineering Cos, Ganesh Plastic and Moon Light Electroplates under agreements on lines similar to Exs. B and C.

Respondents alleged these transactions violated the terms of Ex. A and served a notice of forfeiture. The plaintiff's appeals against forfeiture to the Divisional Commissioner and the State Government failed. The plaintiff then instituted Suit No. 4663 of 1985 in the City Civil Court, Bombay, seeking a declaration that Ex. A had not been violated and consequential injunction restraining respondents from taking possession. Alongside the suit, the plaintiff moved for an interim injunction; that motion was opposed and was dismissed by the trial Judge for want of a prima facie case. The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of that motion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a one-word dismissal or rejection of a writ petition in limine operates as res judicata or otherwise bars the plaintiff's separate civil suit or an application for interim relief.
  2. Whether the prohibitions in Clauses IX and X of Ex. A (referring to "the said plot" or "land") extend to the structures erected on the land and to letting or granting of interests in those structures.
  3. Whether the agreements evidenced by Exs. B and C created an effective assignment or subletting of the structures or land, or merely granted the right to operate machinery within the structures.
  4. Whether the plaintiff had established a prima facie case and a serious question to be tried warranting grant of interim relief restraining respondents from taking possession pending suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Patel)

  • The trial Judge's reasons for refusing interim relief were fallacious and unsustainable.
  • The one-word dismissal ("rejected") of the writ petition did not decide the matters agitated in that petition and therefore did not operate as a bar on the civil suit or the interim application; reliance was placed on the authority in Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. The Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust.
  • Ex. A did not prohibit the grant of a lease or letting in relation to the structures; Clauses IX and X refer expressly to the "plot" or "land" and the agreement elsewhere differentiates between land and buildings (for example, Clauses VII and VIII), so the restraint should not be read to include structures.
  • The maxim expressio unius exclusio alterius supports construing the agreement to exclude structures when land is the term used and buildings are separately referred to.
  • The trial Judge's reliance on section 2(16) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 to construe "land" as including structures was misplaced; if any statutory definition were relevant it would be section 2(4) which defines "building" and the document itself distinguishes between land and buildings.
  • Exs. B and C did not create any interest in the structures or land; they merely conferred the right to work the machinery installed in the structures. The plaintiff relied on the ratio in A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 716 (para 12) to show that where the dominant intention is to let the fixtures/machinery and the building is incidental, the transaction does not amount to an assignment of the building or creation of an interest in the land.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents alleged the transactions between the plaintiff and the concerns operating in the sheds violated terms of Ex. A and therefore issued a notice of forfeiture.
  • They opposed the interim injunction; the trial Judge accepted their position and held that the plaintiff had not made out a prima facie case for interim relief.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. The Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust One-word dismissal or dismissal in limine of a petition does not necessarily decide the substantive issues; such an order cannot be taken to constitute a bar by res judicata to trial of the same issues in a separate proceeding. The court relied on this authority to hold that the writ petition's one-word order "rejected" did not constitute a bar to the maintainability of the plaintiff's suit or to its application for interim relief.
R. v. Midland Railway Co. (1865) 4 E & B 958 Illustrates the interpretive rule that when an Act or document enumerates particular things (e.g., houses, buildings, works) and then uses a more general term like "land", the general term may be restricted so as not to render the enumeration redundant (application of expressio unius exclusio alterius). The court invoked this reasoning (as quoted in Maxwell on Interpretation) to support the conclusion that Ex. A's separate references to land and buildings indicate an intention to distinguish them; hence restraints on "land" should not be read to include structures.
A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 716 Where the dominant intention of the parties is to let fixtures or machinery (the mill) and the building is incidental, the transaction should be construed as relating primarily to the mill/fixtures and not as creating a lease of the building or accommodation under relevant tenancy provisions. The court applied the ratio (para 12) to hold that the arrangements in Exs. B and C conferred the right to operate machinery and did not create an interest in the structures or land, supporting the plaintiff's contention that there was no assignment or subletting of the structures.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court addressed the trial Judge's reasons for refusing interim relief and examined them sequentially.

  1. On the procedural point concerning the earlier writ petition: the court held that a one-word order ("rejected") disposing of a writ petition in limine could not be taken to have decided all matters raised in that petition. Relying on the principle in the Workmen of Cochin Port Trust case, the court concluded that such an order did not operate as res judicata or a bar at the stage of considering maintainability of the civil suit or an interim injunction application.
  2. On construction of Ex. A: the court examined Clauses IX and X and observed they speak of the demised property as the "Plot of land". The agreement elsewhere (for example Clauses VII and VIII) differentiates between land and buildings. Where the instrument intended to refer to structures it did so explicitly. Thus, the court reasoned that restraints expressed to apply to "land" could not be read to include the structures by implication.
  3. The court rejected the trial Judge's reliance on section 2(16) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 (a statutory definition of "land") to construe the term "land" in the private agreement. The appellate court held that if any statutory definition were to be looked at, section 2(4) (defining "building") would be more relevant, but in any event the agreement itself manifested a deliberate distinction between land and buildings and must be construed on its own terms. The court invoked the maxim expressio unius exclusio alterius, supported by the illustration from R. v. Midland Railway Co., to justify this interpretive approach.
  4. On the effect of Exs. B and C: the court accepted the plaintiff's contention that the arrangements with the operating concerns conferred only a right to work the machinery installed in the structures and did not confer any interest in the structures or the land itself. The court relied on the ratio from A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 716 (para 12) to illustrate that where the dominant intention is to let machinery/fixtures and the building is incidental, the transaction is not an assignment of the building or interest in land.
  5. Considering whether a serious question arose: having regard to the complexity and the number of factual and legal issues (construction of the lease, scope of Clauses IX and X, the nature of Exs. B and C, and the procedural history), the court concluded that serious and substantial questions of fact and law were involved. Thus, the plaintiff had demonstrated a prima facie case and a serious triable issue.

The court limited its analysis to the issues before it on the interim motion and did not resolve the ultimate merits of the suit; it assessed only whether an interim injunction was warranted.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL ALLOWED. The dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for interim relief is set aside and an interim injunction is granted restraining the defendants from taking possession of the suit building together with the structures standing thereon. The injunction shall remain in force until the disposal of the suit. Costs in the appeal are to be costs in the cause.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that respondents are temporarily restrained from taking possession of the plot and the structures pending final determination of Suit No. 4663 of 1985.
  • The court's reasoning clarifies that, for the purpose of construing the specific private agreement (Ex. A), the terms "land" and "building" were to be treated distinctly and that isolated statutory definitions should not be imported to override the document's express distinctions.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a broad new precedent beyond the application of established principles (res judicata/limitation of one-word dismissals, expressio unius exclusio alterius, and the principle regarding dominant intention in leases involving fixtures). The decision's practical consequence is limited to the parties: preservation of the status quo by interim injunction until the suit is disposed of.
Appeal allowed.
Show all summary ...

Duad, J.:— This is plaintiff's appeal taking exception to the dismissal of a motion taken out by it to restrain respondents from entering on and taking possession of plot bearing No. 123-CD, Kandivli Industrial Estate, Bombay 400067.

2. The suit plot of land was given under the agreement at Ex. A to the plaintiff by Government represented by respondent No. 3. The agreement is described as a thirty years lease of the plot of land. Plaintiff was permitted to put up industrial sheds on the plot which sheds were not to be used for any purpose other than as industrial sheds. Clauses IX and X of Ex. A are important, and the first restrained the plaintiff for subdividing or disposing of without the permission of the lessor “any part of the said plot”. The second clause afore-mentioned prohibited the plaintiff from assigning, under-letting “the said plot or any part thereof to anybody without the previous consent in writing of the Collector etc.” Plaintiff erected some structures on the plot and installed machinery therein. The machinery together with the sheds numbering about three were worked for sometime by concerns doing business in the name and style of ‘Bharat Engineering Cos’ ‘Ganesh Plastic’ and ‘Moon Light Electroplates’. Agreements governing this type of transaction between the plaintiff on the one hand and the concerns afore-mentioned on the other, were on the same lines as Exs. B and C. The respondent alleged that the said transactions violated certain terms of Ex. A. For that reason a notice of forfeiture was given to the plaintiff. Plaintiff appealed against the decision to the Divisional Commissioner and failing there, to the State Government. The appeals having failed, plaintiff instituted Suit No. 4663 of 1985 in the City Civil Court at Bombay. The suit was for a declaration that no condition of Ex. A had been violated, for which reason respondents were not entitled to take possession of the suit plot. A consequential injunction to restrain the taking over of the plot was sought. Alongside the institution of the suit, plaintiff moved a motion seeking an interim injunction to prevent the taking over of the plot until the disposal of the suit. The motion was opposed by the respondents. After hearing parties the learned Judge held that plaintiff had not made out a prima facie case and that it was not therefore entitled to the interim injunction. This order is assailed in appeal Mr. Patel representing the appellant contends that all the reasons given by the Judge hearing the motion for refusing interim relief are fallacious. The submission advanced by learned Counsel is sustained and the appeal is allowed for the reasons given below.

3. The first reason given by the learned Judge is that plaintiff had failed in a writ petition taken out by it to assail the forfeiture of the lease. Mr. Patel says that this view is untenable and relies upon 1(The Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. The Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust), in support of his submission. The writ petition was disposed of by a single word order viz. “rejected”. In the aforementioned authority the Supreme Court held as under:—

“However, from the order dismissing the special leave petition in limine it cannot be inferred that all the matters agitated in the said writ petition were either explicitly or implicitly decided.

The technical rule of res judicata, although a wholesome rule based upon public policy, cannot, be stretched too far to bar the trial of identical of issues in a separate proceeding merely on an uncertain assumption that the issues must have been decided. It is not safe to extend the principle of res judicata to such an extent so as to found it on mere guess-work.”

4. Though the observations are made in relation to a special leave petition under Article 136, the ratio would apply equally to a writ petition rejected in limine. Therefore, a one word order would not constitute a bar, certainly not, at the stage at which the case was as to the maintainability of the suit.

5. On merits Mr. Patel submits that Ex. A did not prohibit the grant of a lease vis-a vis the structures. This seems to be correct. Clauses IX and X of Ex. A refer to the demised property as Plot of land. Wherever the document intended to refer to the structures that would come up on the land, Ex. A took care to refer to the same as distinct and different from the open land. An instance of this is the recital to be found in clauses VII and VIII. No restraint is placed upon the lessee vis a-vis the letting out of the structures that were to be erected on the plot. Clause VII placed a restraint upon the purpose of user when it says that neither the land nor the building shall be used for any purpose other than as an industrial shed. If any restriction in regard to the letting out of the structures had been intended that would have been so explicitly specified in clauses IX or X. Reliance has been placed upon the definition of the word “land” occuring in section 2(16) of the Maharashtra Land revenue Code, 1966 by the learned traial Judge to hold that the expression “land” included structures thereon. Learned Counsel submits and rightly so that this construction is a variation of the rule embodied in the maxim expressio unius exclusio alterius. Simply stated, the maxim implies that mention of one or more things of a particular class may be regarded as silently excluding all other members of the class. Where a statute uses two words or expressions, one of which generally includes the other, the more general term is taken in a sense excluding the less general one; otherwise there would have been little point in using the latter as well as the former (see Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition page 293). In this commentary there is a reference to 2(R. v. Midland Railway Co.), (1865) 4 E & B 958 the authority of which has been abbreviated at page 294 as follows:—

“The word “land” is generally understood as includings buildings, but if, after imposing a rate on houses, buildings, orks, tenements and hereditaments, an Act exempted “land”, this word would be restricted to land unburdened with houses, buildings or works which would otherwise have been unnecessarily enumerated.”

6. In Ex. A a distinction is made between land and buildings. The restraint in regard to assigning land under-letting is restricted to land and therefore it cannot be deemed to embrace structures also. Mr. Pat el points out, and rightly, that the clause applicable for the construction of the word “land” would not be section 2(16) of the afore-mentioned Code but section 2(4) thereof. In that sub-section “building” has been defined as “any structure, not being a farm building”. The principal section viz. section 2 itself begins with words “In this Code, unless the context otherwise requires”. The word land occuring in Ex. A cannot take colour from the meaning given to it in section 2(16). This is because the draftsman of Ex. A has taken care differentiate between land and buildings.

7. Lastly, learned Counsel submits that Exs. B and C could not be construed as evidence of a contravention of the prohibition against subletting or assigning the concerns with which plaintiff had entered into agreements were not given any interest in the structures. All that was given to them was the right to work the machinery installed in structures. This did not create any interest in them in the structures or the land. Amongst the authorities relied in this connection by learned Counsel is the judgment reported in A.I.R 1965 S.C 716. Para 12 at page 719 is in the following words and the ratio thereof applies on all fours to the construction of Exs. B and C in the instant case. Para 12 is worded as follows:

“What then was the dominant intention of the parties when they entered into the present transaction? We have already set out the material terms of the lease and it seems to us plain that the dominant intention of the appellant in accepting the lease from the respondent was to use the building as a Dal Mill it is true that the document purports to be a lease in respect of the Dal Mill building; but the said description is not decisive of the matter because even if the intention of the parties was to let out the Mill to the appellant, the building would still have to be described as the Dal Mill building. It is not a case where the subject matter of the lease is the building and along with the leased building incidentally passes the fixture of the machinery in regard to the Mill; in truth, it is the Mill which is the subject matter of the lease, and it was because the Mill was intended to be let out that the building had inevitably to be let out along with the Mill. The fact that the appellant contends that the machinery which was transferred to him under the lease was found to be not very serviceable and that he had to bring in his own machinery, would not alter the character of the transaction. This is not a lease under which the appellant entered into possession for the purpose of residing in the building at all; this is a case where the appellant entered into the lease for the purpose of running the Dal Mill which was located in the building. It is obvious that a mill of this kind will have to be located in some building or another, and so, the mere fact that the lease purports to be in respect of the building will not make it a lease in respect of an accommodation as defined by section 3(a)(y)(3). The fixtures described in Schedule to the lease are in no sense intended for the more beneficial enjoyment of the building. The fixtures are the primary object which the lease was intended to cover and the building in which the fixtures are located come in incidentally. That is why we think the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the rent which the appellant had agreed to pay to the respondent under the document in question cannot be said to be rent payable for any accommodation to which the Act applies.”

8. Apart from what has been stated above, the learned Judge had only to address himself as to whether a serious question arose for determination. Having regard to the many complicated issued arising, it cannot be doubted that the suit gave rise to serious and substantial questions of fact as also law. The proper course to follow in such a case was to grant interim relief.

9. The result of the foregoing discussion is that the appeal has to be allowed. The dismissal of the motion is set aside and an interim injunction restraining defendants from taking possession of the suit building together with the structures standing thereon, is issued. This injunction shall be in force until disposal of the suit. Costs in appeal to be costs in the cause.

Appeal allowed.