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Sheth & Bharmal (Firm) v. Municipal Administra...
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitions involve the same parties and subject-matter and were heard together. The petitioner is a partnership firm (Builders and Contractors) claiming ownership of land described as Survey No. 232, C.T.S. No. 622 (1 to 8) at James Beach Road, Kanjur Marg, Bhandup (West), Bombay. The petitioner says it acquired the land by conveyance dated 24 September 1979 from Mrs. Prabhavati Sanghani.
Under the 1964 Development Plan for the Greater Bombay Region a portion of the petitioner’s land (3619.95 sq. meters) had been reserved for public purposes. Between 1981 and 1985 the petitioner (through architects and solicitors) sought dereservation or raised objections and suggestions; the Planning Authority and the State took steps toward acquisition including intended joint surveys (notices dated 16 November 1984 and 2 January 1985). The petitioner obtained ad interim relief preventing the DILR (District Inspector of Land Records) from acting on those survey notices; that stay was vacated on 4 August 1986.
The petitions challenge the legality of the proposed acquisition, asserting lapses under sections 126 and 127 of the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966 (MRTP Act). The petitioner sought restraint on the State from making a declaration under section 126 and a declaration that the reservations for a primary school and playground had lapsed under section 127 and the land had reverted to the petitioner.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the reservation/designation in the 1964 Development Plan had lapsed under Section 127 of the MRTP Act because no acquisition by agreement or acquisition proceedings under the Act were commenced within ten years.
- Whether an application made by the Planning Authority under Section 126(1) (application to the State Government to acquire land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894) constitutes "proceedings for the acquisition of such land under this Act" for the purposes of Section 127, thereby preventing the deemed lapse envisaged by Section 127.
- Whether the proviso to Section 126(2) (the three-year limit for making a declaration) operates as a substantive fetter on the State's power to act on an earlier application for acquisition or whether it relates only to the date for assessing market value/compensation.
- What effect the pendency of a revision of the Development Plan under Section 38 has on acquisition proceedings initiated under the existing Development Plan—specifically whether revision suspends or limits acquisition steps and the making of an award, eviction, or payment of compensation.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The reservation in the 1964 Development Plan had lapsed because no action was taken within ten years from the date the final Development Plan came into force.
- They served the notice required by Section 127 on 13 June 1985 and waited the statutory six months; no action followed, so the reservation should be deemed to have lapsed and the land released for normal development.
- The Planning Authority and State had disregarded their objections and suggestions of 18 June 1984, and took steps (joint survey notices) without first ruling on those objections; acquisition could not proceed until objections were decided.
- Pending revision of the Development Plan should interdict acquisition proceedings that are intended to implement a reservation under the Plan.
Respondents' (BMC / State Government) Arguments
- The 1964 Development Plan was properly sanctioned and later modified; by 1981 the petition-land was reserved for a primary school and playground and BMC applied to the State Government (21 April 1981) to initiate acquisition under Section 126.
- Petitioners were obstructive—failing to attend joint survey and obtaining an interim order delaying survey—so the acquisition process was frustrated by petitioner conduct.
- An application under Section 126(1) initiated "proceedings for the acquisition of such land under this Act" within the meaning of Section 127, so the petitioners were not entitled to a deemed release under Section 127.
- The petitions lack substance and should be dismissed because acquisition proceedings had been commenced by the BMC as early as 1981.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court concentrated on issues arising under Sections 126 and 127 of the MRTP Act and on the effect of a pending revision under Section 38. Its analysis proceeded in discrete steps:
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Interpretation of "proceedings for the acquisition" in Section 127:
The court examined the plain words of Section 127 and the structure and context of Section 126 (which appears in Chapter VII titled "Land Acquisition"). It rejected the petitioners' submission that "proceedings for acquisition" must be limited to steps under the Land Acquisition Act (such as the Section 6 declaration) and not include the application required of a Planning Authority by Section 126(1).
The court reasoned that Section 126 itself contemplates that where acquisition by agreement is not possible the Planning Authority must make an application to the State Government for acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Given the placement of Section 126 within the Chapter on Land Acquisition and its marginal note, all steps in that Chapter—including the application under Section 126(1)—are to be regarded as comprising the "proceedings for acquisition of land under this Act" used in Section 127. To read "proceedings" more narrowly would unjustifiably add words to the statute.
Because an application for acquisition had been moved by the BMC, the court held that the petitioners could not invoke the latter part of Section 127 (notice + six months) to claim deemed lapse/release.
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Effect of the three-year proviso in Section 126(2):
The court considered the amendment (Maharashtra Act 14 of 1971) introducing the proviso that no declaration shall be made after the expiry of three years from publication of the draft plan. It relied on the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the amendment and concluded that the proviso's purpose was to establish a date-nexus for determining the market value payable (i.e., assessment of compensation), not to create a substantive fetter on the State's power to acquire land.
Consequently, the claim by petitioners that the right to act upon the application had expired because a declaration was not made within three years was rejected: the proviso governs valuation timing, not the State's power to effect acquisition on an earlier application.
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Effect of an ongoing revision of the Development Plan under Section 38:
The court noted that revision of the Development Plan had been initiated but not completed (the revised draft plan had not received State Government sanction under Section 31). It acknowledged that nothing in the Act expressly stays the operation of an existing Development Plan pending revision.
However, the court considered it necessary to read into the Act a limited protection: although the Planning Authority and Government may continue to take steps under Section 126 and related formalities, the court would stay the final consequences of acquisition that would extinguish title, evict the owner, or permit payment and taking effect of an award, until the revised plan is finally sanctioned. The court explained this reading as necessary to avoid rendering the revision process a mere formality and to ensure that objections and suggestions, which are to be considered in the revision process, are not rendered nugatory by immediate irreversible acquisition consequences.
Thus the court distinguished procedural steps in acquisition (which may proceed) from the final, irreversible consequences (award, extinguishment of title, eviction, and entitlement to compensation), which it stayed pending sanction of the revised plan under Sections 38 and 31.
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Relief fashioned:
Having resolved the statutory construction issues against the petitioners on Sections 126 and 127 and on the three-year proviso, but recognizing the ongoing revision and the need to protect the petitioner's position from irreversible consequences before the revision is sanctioned, the court issued a limited order: it restrained the taking effect of any award extinguishing title, any eviction, and any entitlement to compensation until the revised Development Plan is sanctioned.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The court's final decision was to PARTLY ALLOW the rule in a limited way. Concretely, the court ordered that:
- The declaration of the award extinguishing the petitioner's title, any eviction of the petitioner from the land, and the entitlement to compensation shall not take effect until the revised Development Plan is sanctioned under Section 38 read with Section 31 of the MRTP Act.
- The rule was made absolute to this limited extent. The parties were directed to bear their own costs in both petitions.
Implications:
The direct effect on the parties is a temporary stay on the final, irreversible consequences of any acquisition award (title extinction, eviction, payment/entitlement to compensation) until completion of the statutory revision process for the Development Plan. The opinion explains the statutory basis for this limited relief (interpretation of Sections 126 and 127 and the role of Section 38) but does not set out broader declaratory outcomes beyond this case; accordingly, the practical consequence is limited to preserving the petitioner's position pending sanction of the revised plan.
This summary is drawn only from the material contained in the provided opinion and does not add factual or legal matter beyond that text.
Order accordingly.
1. These two petitions involving the same parties and relating to the same subject matter can be disposed of by a common judgment.
2. Petitioner is a partnership firm registered under the Partnership Act carrying on business as Builders and Contractors. It claims to be the owner of the property bearing Survey No. 232, C.T.S No. 622 (1 to 8) at James Beach Road, Kanjur Marg, Bhandup (West), Bombay 400078. It claims to have purchased the said property form one Mrs. Prabhavati Sanghani under an Indenture of Conveyance dated 24 September, 1979. In the year 1964, the Government of Maharashtra sanctioned the Development Plan for Greater Bombay Region. Under that Plan, a portion measuring 3619.95 square meters from out of the above land was reserved for various public purposes as detailed in para 6 of the Writ Petition No. 316 of 1985. Till about 1981 no steps were taken either by the Planning Authority which in this case is the Bombay Municipal Corporation, hereinafter to be referred to as the ‘BMC’, or the petitioners' predecessor-in-title Mrs. Sanghani. In 1981 a number of communications were addressed to the State Government by S.S Joshi & Associates, Architects, purporting to act on behalf of the petitioners. The object of these representations was to get an order for dereservation of the entire reserved area or the maximum that could be so dereserved. In 1982, the petitioners' Architects made a similar request to the Planning Authority and the State Government. Some information was called for and furnished. In 1983, the Government informed the petitioners' solicitors that it was not possible to accede to the request for dereservation inasmuch as the acquisition proceedings had already been initiated for acquisition of the land by the BMC for the purposes specified in the Development Plan. By a communication dated 18 June 1984, the petitioners' Architects submitted objections and suggestions to the Planning Authority. On 16 November 1984 and 2 January 1985, the office of the District Inspector of Land Records intimated the petitioners and the BMC of an intended joint survey of the land as a preliminary to the acquisition thereof, for a Municipal Primary School and playground. To the first communication, petitioner gave a reply on 26 November 1984 pointing out that no decision had been taken by the Planning Authority to the objections and suggestions aforementioned and that until that was done, further steps preparatory to the acquisition could not be taken. The re-scheduling of the survey vide the letter of 2 January 1985, made it clear that the BMC and the State Government were not to be diverted. Petitioner moved this Court and obtained an ad interim relief which had the effect of preventing the DILR from taking steps pursuant to the notices dated 16 November 1984 and 2 January 1985. On 4 August 1986, on the application of the petitioners' Counsel, the aforementioned stay order was vacated. The two petitions complain of many lapses by the BMC and the State Government which it is said, rendered illegal the proposal to acquire the land. The reservations made in the Development Plan of 1964 had lapsed because action as required by sections 126 and 127 of the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966 (MRTP Act or the Act) had not been taken. Petitioners sought an order restraining the State Government from making a declaration under the provisions of section 126 of the mrtp act qua the petition-land. In Writ Petition No. 1757 of 1986, the cause of action is the alleged disregarding of the objections and suggestions made by the petitioners by their Architect's letter dated 18 June 1984 — the disregard being evident from the joint survey notices dated 16 November 1984 and 2 January 1985. Until a ruling had been given on the objections and suggestions, the respondents had no right to proceed with the proposal for acquisition. As a matter of fact, having regard to their letter dated 13 June 1985, on which no action had been taken within the stipulated period of 6 months, the petitioners had become entitled to a release from reservation as contemplated by section 127 of the mrtp act. They therefore sought a declaration that the reservations made for the location of a Primary School and a playground, stood lapsed and that the property stood reverted free of reservation to the petitioners.
3. Respondents have filed separate returns, but the common stand taken by them may be stated thus: The 1964 Development Plan designated diverse portions of the petition-land for various purposes. The Development Plan had gone through the requisite stages and was eventually sanctioned under Section 31 of the Act. Later on, the reservations were curtailed and in 1981, the petition-land was reserved for a Primary School and a play-ground. In 1981 by a communication dated 21 April 1981, the BMC had written to the State Government to initiate proceedings for acquisition of the area designated for Primary School and play-ground. Petitioners from the very beginning adopted an obstructive attitude. The acquisition proposal got stuck up because of the failure of the petitioners to turn up for the joint survey and later by their ning obtaining an order staying the said survey. With some difficulty the stay order was got vacated. It was not correct to say that the petitioners had become entitled to a release order under Section 127 of the Act. This was because the proceedings for the acquisition had been commenced by virute of the application for acquisition moved by the BMC as far back as 1981. The petitions were without substance and deserved to be dismissed.
4. The debate in these petitions has ranged far and wide. It will not be necessary to deal with all the contentions raised, for which reason I propose to restrict myself to the petitioners' contentions based upon Sections 126 and 127 of the Act. It was argued that the reservation or designation made in the 1964 Development Plan had lapsed. This was because no action had been taken within 10 years from the date on which the final Development Plan came into force in 1964. Petitioners had given the requisite notice on 13 June 1985. After having given such a notice, it waited for the prescribed six months' period but to no avail. Therefore, as required by Section 127 of the Act, the reservation or designation must be deemed to have lapsed. In reply, it is argued that in 1981 itself the BMC had given an application as required by Section 126(1) of the Act to move the State Government for acquiring the land under the land acquisition. For one reason or the other effective steps on the application could be taken only in 1984-1985. This also was frustrated by the petitioners obtaining an interim injunction against the carrying out of the survey by the DILR. The deemed lapse/release could not take effect when an application under Section 126(1) had been given and steps pursuant thereto, were in progress. For a proper understanding of the position, it will be necessary to set out the material portions from Sections 126 and 127 of the Act:—
“126. (1) When after the publication of a draft Regional plan, a Development or any other plan or town planning scheme, any land is required or reserved for any of the public purposes specified in any plan or scheme under this Act at any time the Planning Authority, Development Authority, or as the case may be, (any Appropriate Authority may, except as otherwise provided in Section 113(A), acquire the land) either by agreement or make an application to the State Government for acquiring such land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
(2) On receipt of such application, if the State Government is satisfied that the land specified in the application is needed for the public purpose therein specified, or if the State Government (except in cases falling under Section 49 and except as provided in Section 113(A) itself is of opinion) that any land included in any such plan is needed for any public purpose, it may make a declaration to that effect in the Official Gazette, in the manner provided in Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in respect of the said land. The declaration so published shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, be deemed to be a declaration duly made under the said section:
Provided that, no such declaration shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of publication of the draft Regional plan, Development plan or any other plan.
(3) On publication of a declaration under the said Section 6, the Collector shall proceed to take order for the acquisition of the land under the said act; and the provisions of that act shall apply to the acquisition of the said land, with the modification that the market value of the land shall be—
(i) where the land is to be acquired for the purposes of a new town, the market value prevailing on the date of publication of the notification constituting or declaring the Development Authority for such town;
(ii) where the land is acquired for the purposes of a Special Planning Authority, the market value prevailing on the date of publication of the notification of the area as an undeveloped area; and
(iii) in any other case the market value on the date of publication of the interim development plan, the draft development plan or the plan for the area or areas for comprehensive development, whichever is earlier, or as the case may be, the date of publication of the draft town planning scheme:
Provided that, nothing in this sub-section shall affect the date for the purpose of determining the market value of land in respect of which proceedings for acquisition commenced before the commencement of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning (Second Amendment) Act, 1972:
Provided further that, for the purpose of clause (ii) of this sub-section, the market value in respect of land included in any undeveloped area notified under sub-section (1) of section 40 prior to the commencement of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning (Second Amendment) Act, 1972, shall be the market value prevailing on the date of such commencement.
(4) If a declaration is not made within the period referred to in sub-section (2) or having been made, the aforesaid period expired on the commencement of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning (Amendment) Act, 1970, the State Government may make a fresh declaration for acquiring the land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in the manner provided by sub-sections (2) and (3) of this section, subject to the modification that the market value of the land shall be the market value at the date of declaration in the Official Gazette made for acquiring of the land afresh.
127. If any land reserved, allotted or designated for any purpose specified in any plan under this Act is not acquired by agreement within ten years from the date on which a final Regional plan, or final Development plan comes into force or if proceedings for the acquisition of such land under this Act or under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, are not commenced within such period, the owner or any person interested in the land may serve notice on the Planning Authority, Development Authority or as the case may be, Appropriate Authority to that effect; and if within six months from the date of the service of such notice, the land is not acquired or no steps as aforesaid are commenced for its acquisition, the reservation, allotment or designation shall be deemed to have lapsed, and thereupon the land shall be deemed to be released from such reservation, allotment or designation and shall become available to the owner for the purpose of development as otherwise, permissible in the case of adjacent land under the relevant plan.
5. Counsel for the BMC contends that by making an application under Section 126(1) his clients had initiated “proceedings for the acquisition of such land under this Act” contemplated by the first part of Section 127. Therefore, the second part, viz. intimation and consequences of inaction provided by the second part of the section, did not come into operation. Mr. Paranjape submits that when the first part of Section 127 speaks of “proceedings for acquisition of such land under this Act.”, it contemplates not a mere application, but the issue of a declaration under Section 126(2) and further steps provided by the remaining sub-sections of Section 126. A different interpretation, according to learned Counsel, would be unreasonable as it would amount to conferring a licence upon the Planning Authority and the State Government to keep the land under reservation and designation without acquiring it, thus subjecting the owner of the land to uncertainty and irreparable loss. The object of Section 127 was to check the indolence and sloth inherent in any administration. The object of Section 127 was to put the administration on the alert so that it could take corrective measures within six months from the date of service of the notice of failure to have taken the requisite steps within 10 years, and, either repair the omission or enable the owner to secure the benefit of a deemed lapse or de-reservation. This argument cannot be accepted as it runs counter to the plain words of Section 127. When Section 127 in its first part speaks of “proceedings for the acquisition of such land under this Act” it cannot be said to exclude the application which the Planning Authority has to make to the State Government vide Section 126(1) of the Act. After all, as section 126(1) itself shows where the Planning Authority cannot acquire the land by agreement, it has to make an application to the State Government for acquiring such land under the Land Acquisition Act of 1894. Section 126 appears in Chapter VII under the heading “Land Acquisition” and the marginal note to the section indicates that it pertains to “acquisition of land required for public purposes specified in plans”. Therefore, all steps mentioned in this Chapter, in particular, Section 126 will be taken to comprise the “proceedings for acquisition of land under this Act” spoken of by Section 127. To read these words as restricted to effective steps under the Land Acquisition Act commencing with a declaration under Section 6 thereof, would be to interpose words not appearing in the section. Admittedly, an application for acquisition had been moved and the mere fact that the Section 6 notification had not been issued, did not have the effect of creating conditions for the petitioners to seek a release from reservation or lapse from designation, as is the object of these petitions. The deemed lapse or release from reservation occurs only when there has been total inaction for 10 years and despite intimation of this inaction, the Planning Authority etc. take no steps within 6 months from the service of the notice. Once a step in the proceedings for acquisition of the land under the Act is taken, it is not permissible to go to the latter part of the section.
6. It was next contended that no declaration under the first proviso to Section 126(2) had been made within 3 years. Therefore, the right to act upon the application moved by the petitioners did not survive. The real purpose of the amendment made to Section 126 vide Maharashtra Act 14 of 1971 whereunder the proviso was introduced, is best explained in the Statement of Objects and Reasons given to explain the Bill which brought about the amendments proposed thereunder. Explaining the changes in Section 126, that Statement recited:
“Under Section 126(3) of the Act, the market value payable in respect of acquisition of land is the market value prevailing on the date of the notification designating an area as the site for new town or the publication of the draft Development Plan or draft Town Planning Scheme. It has been noticed that in many cases there is an interval of several years before the date of publication of a draft Development Plan and the date of notification under Section 126. It is therefore, proposed that no declaration for acquiring the land shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of publication of the plan etc. and that the market value shall be as on the date of such publication. This is in line now with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Provision is also made for making a fresh declaration in cases where such declaration has not been made within such period; but in such cases the market value shall be the one on the date of such fresh declaration.”
7. From the above it is clear that the object of the proviso was to furnish a date-nexus with the mode for ascertainment of compensation payable to the owner, rather than creating a fetter on the power of the State Government to acquire the property. Therefore, the declaration claimed by the petitioners in consequence of the alleged inaction of the Planning Authority for 10 years succeeding the coming into force of the Development Plan, cannot be granted.
8. The next question is whether the petitioners are entitled to any relief. Admittedly the Development Plan of 1964 is under revision. The process of revision has begun and has not yet been completed, in the sense of the revised draft plan being accorded the sanction prescribed by Section 38 read with Section 31 of the Act. The Planning Authority considered the objections and suggestions preferred by the petitioners and has recommended their rejection. According to the BMC, the Planning Authority has approved the rejection. However, the revised draft plan has yet to receive the sanction of the State Government. It was contended that merely because the revision is not completed, does not mean that the existing Development Plan is obliterated or been placed in abeyance. It continues to be in force and actions began thereunder, will continue. That the revision has not been completed will not affect the actions taken. Petitioners contend the contrary, arguing that the process of revision until completed, interdicts a process of acquisition if one be pending to implement a reservation or designation made under the Development Plan. Unless such a view is taken, the very purpose of providing for a revision would be nullified. Counsel for the BMC argues that there is nothing in the Act to indicate that pending a revision, the operation of the preceding Development Plan is stayed. Section 38 of the Act which deals with revisions of a Development Plan has this to say:—
“38. At least once in ten years from the date on which a Development plan has come into operation, and where a Development plan is sanctioned in parts, then at least once in ten years from the date on which the last part has come into operation, a Planning Authority may and shall at any time when so directed by the State Government, revise the Development Plan either wholly, or the parts separately after carrying out, if necessary, a fresh survey and preparing an existing-land-use map of the area within its jurisdiction, and the provisions of sections 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31 shall, so far as they can be made applicable, apply in respect of such revision of the Development plan”.
9. The various sections mentioned above form part of Chapter III which is titled “Development Plan” and has the following sub-titles:
(a) Preparation, submission and sanction to Development Plan.
(b) Procedure to be followed in preparing and sanctioning Development Plans.
10. These, read along with Section 38, make it clear that the revised plan will cease to be a draft and become a revised Development Plan only after sanction is accorded as required by Section 31. The fact that the Planning Authority and the Planning Committee have rejected the objections and suggestions raised by the petitioners, does not preclude the State Government from bringing to bear upon subject of its independent powers. Section 31 requires the State Government to take into consideration various factors, one of them being the inadvisability of the Planning Authority's excessive ambitions in disregard of its resources position. Section 31(5) is an indication to this effect Counsel for the BMC argues about the non-existence of a power to stay acquisition proceedings because of the pendency of a revision of the Development Plan. In clear terms, there appears to be no provision in the Act staying the operation of the Development Plan, when it is under revision. But something of this nature will have to be read into the Act, unless the process of revision prescribed by Section 38 is to be reduced to a mere formality. One cannot conceive of the legislature providing for a revision, and, at the same time permitting the Planning and Development Authorities to go ahead with acquisitions regardless of the outcome of the objections which have to be taken into consideration before according sanction to the revised draft plan. This does not mean that the pending acquisition proceedings will lapse or that steps already taken, will all stand voided. The Planning Authority and the Government will go ahead with the completion of formalities prescribed by Section 126 of the Act, except for the making of an Award, extinction of the owner's title and evicting the said owner from the acquired land. It is precisely that, and only that, which I propose to stay in the present case. Hence the order: Rule partly allowed, in that the declaration of the award extinguishing the petitioner's title, evicting it from the land and entitling it to the compensation, shall not take effect until the revised plan is sanctioned under Section 38 read with Section 31 of the Act. Rule to this limited extent made absolute, with parties being left to bear their own costs in both the petitions.
Order accordingly.
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