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Ceat Tyres Of India Limited v. Union Of India And Others

Bombay High Court
Jun 23, 1987
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Suresh, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a company operating a factory where tyres, tubes and other rubber products are manufactured. A stage in tyre manufacture requires a "dip solution" — described as a Resorcinol Formaldehyde Latex mix (a mixture of resorcinol, formaldehyde, caustic soda, styrene-butadiene latex, vinyl pyridine latex and water) — used to treat rayon and nylon cords before coating them with rubber. The dip solution is prepared inside the petitioner's factory and consumed there; it must be used within a few hours because it becomes unusable later.

In June 1977 samples were drawn by the Inspector of Central Excise and sent to the Deputy Chief Chemist. On the basis of the chemist's report, the department informed the petitioner that the dip solution fell under Item No. 15A(1)(i) of the Tariff and therefore attracted excise under the Central Excise and Salt Act. The petitioner challenged an order (passed without hearing) by filing Writ Petition No. 525 of 1978, which was withdrawn after respondents assured that the petitioner would receive a copy of the test report and an opportunity to be heard. The petitioner was furnished the report and was heard and allowed to cross-examine the chemist.

Following the hearing, on April 24, 1980 the Assistant Collector of Central Excise held the dip solution assessable under Item No. 15A. The petitioner appealed to the Collector of Central Excise and, during the pendency of that appeal, filed the present writ petition. On April 21, 1981 the Collector reversed the Assistant Collector's decision and held the dip solution not excisable under Tariff Item No. 15A. The Government sought review of that decision and the review was pending at the time of this opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the dip solution (Resorcinol Formaldehyde Latex mix) manufactured and consumed within the petitioner's factory is liable to Central Excise duty.
  2. Whether the dip solution falls within Item No. 15A(1) of the Tariff (i.e., whether it is an "artificial or synthetic resin" or otherwise covered by that item).
  3. Whether a material that is manufactured and consumed within the factory, and which is short-lived or not marketable, can be treated as "goods" for the purpose of charging excise under the Central Excise and Salt Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. Talyarkhan)

  • The dip solution cannot be considered an artificial or synthetic resin within Item No. 15A(1) of the Tariff; at best it is a solution of resin and not the resin as fully manufactured.
  • The dip solution is prepared and consumed entirely within the factory, is not sold, and is not capable of being sold; therefore it is not marketable and not "goods" for excise purposes.
  • The solution has no shelf life unless stabilisers are added; the Deputy Chief Chemist's cross-examination established that no stabilisers were added and the solution spoils quickly, supporting non-marketability.
  • Relied on Delhi High Court decision in Indian Plastics & Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (1981 E.L.T 108 (Del)) and on Supreme Court authority in Union Carbide India Ltd. v. Union of India (1986 (24) E.L.T 169 S.C.) to show that solutions of resin or intermediate unmarketable products are not excisable under the relevant tariff items.

Respondent's / Department's Arguments (Mr. Pochkhanwalla)

  • Technical literature and encyclopaedias describe resorcinol-formaldehyde products and their use in tyre-cord dips, and on that basis the dip solution can be termed a "resin" and thus fall within Item 15A.
  • Relied on precedents (Bombay High Court in M.R.F. Ltd. v. Union of India; CEGAT Collector v. Jay Enterprises) to argue that manufacturing an item is sufficient for excise chargeability if the item falls within a Tariff entry, and that short shelf-life alone does not necessarily prevent marketability or chargeability.
  • Pointed to authorities suggesting that resins and their solutions can attract duty depending on formulation, shelf life and marketability evidence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
Indian Plastics & Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 1981 E.L.T 108 (Del) Holds that a product that is a solution of resin (not the resin in its fully manufactured form) is not covered by Item No. 15A; administrative instructions distinguish solutions from resins for charging duty. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that "resin" in Item 15A refers to fully manufactured resin and not a solution of resin; used to distinguish dip solution from excisable resin.
Union Carbide India Ltd. v. Union of India, 1986 (24) E.L.T 169 (S.C.) Supreme Court held that an intermediate product which has no market and is not capable of being sold is not liable to excise; marketability is relevant to chargeability. The Court applied this case directly: since the dip solution is not saleable and has no market (per evidence), Union Carbide supports the conclusion that it is not excisable.
Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills, (1963) Supp. 1 S.C.R 586 One of the earlier authorities referred to in Union Carbide; relevant to the Supreme Court's analysis of manufacture and marketability. The Court noted that this case was referred to by the Supreme Court in Union Carbide; it formed part of the judicial context underpinning the marketability/manufacture analysis used in Union Carbide.
South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, 1978 E.L.T J 336 (S.C.) Another authority referred to by the Supreme Court in Union Carbide; related to issues of chargeability and nature of goods. Referenced as part of the legal background relied upon by the Supreme Court; the present Court treated Union Carbide (which considered this case) as authoritative on marketability.
M.R.F. Ltd. v. Union of India, 1985 (22) E.L.T 5 (Bom) Emphasizes that manufacture by a company is significant and that if the item falls under a Tariff entry it may be chargeable; observed that marketability was not the test in that case where the material was saleable. The Court considered this authority but distinguished it because in M.R.F. the material was found to be saleable; therefore M.R.F. did not apply to the present facts where the dip solution lacked marketability.
Collector v. Jay Enterprises, 1987 (29) E.L.T 288 (Tribunal) Dealt with stages in resin manufacture and held that a product with a short but demonstrable shelf life could be sold and therefore be excisable. The Court distinguished this Tribunal decision because there was a concession in that case that the product could be kept for 15 days and sold; the present dip solution was shown to have no such shelf life or market.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining both factual materials and legal principles as follows:

  1. Nature of the product: The dip solution is a mixture prepared in the factory and consumed there; its composition and manufacturing method were considered, including the Deputy Chief Chemist's evidence that the factory first prepares a resorcinol-formaldehyde aqueous resin which is then mixed with latex to produce the dip solution.
  2. Evidence on shelf life and stabilisers: The chemist's cross-examination established (on the factory's declaration) that no stabilisers were added and that the reaction in the solution continues, rendering the material unusable after a short time. The chemist described the dip solution as a liquid phenoplast and indicated that without arresting the reaction (via stabilisers or preservation) it will spoil.
  3. Marketability analysis: The Court examined whether the dip solution is "goods" within the meaning of the Central Excise and Salt Act and whether it is marketable. The Assistant Collector had held it assessable; the Collector had reversed that finding. The Court reviewed precedents and administrative instructions which distinguish a fully manufactured resin from a solution of resin, and which treat marketability as critical where a product is an intermediate, unmarketable item.
  4. Application of precedent and instructions: The Court relied particularly on the Delhi High Court decision in Indian Plastics (that solutions of resin are excluded from Item 15A) and on the Supreme Court's decision in Union Carbide (which emphasizes marketability as a criterion for chargeability in certain intermediate products). The Court also considered administrative instructions that exclude solutions of resin in volatile solvents (where solvent exceeds 50% by weight) from Item 15A and instruct how duty should be assessed where the resin content can be separately determined.
  5. Weighing departmental arguments: The department's technical literature was acknowledged (showing resorcinol-formaldehyde systems are used as pre-dips), but the Court found that mere technical description of constituent chemicals does not convert a short-lived, unmarketable dip solution into an excisable "resin" under Item 15A. The Court differentiated authorities relied on by the department (e.g., M.R.F., Collector v. Jay Enterprises) on factual grounds — in those cases there was either demonstrable marketability or concession as to shelf life enabling sale.
  6. Conclusion from facts to law: Given the uncontradicted evidence that the dip solution, as manufactured and used by the petitioner, lacks preservative stabilisers and spoils quickly — and in the absence of evidence of any market for such a solution — the Court concluded that the dip solution is not "goods" attractable to excise under Item 15A and related provisions. The Court held that Union Carbide's principle (that lack of marketability precludes excise) applied directly and compelled relief for the petitioner.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Rule made absolute. The petitioner's challenge succeeded; the Court granted the relief sought in terms of prayer (b) and ordered that there would be no order as to costs.

Implications

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petition succeeds — the dip solution, as manufactured and used by the petitioner and as described in the record, was held not to be excisable under Tariff Item No. 15A. The immediate orders assessing excise (as reflected in the Assistant Collector's decision) cannot be sustained on these facts; the Collector's earlier reversal is consonant with the Court's conclusion.
  • Costs: The Court ordered no costs in the circumstances.
  • On precedent and broader legal effect: The Court applied established authorities (notably Indian Plastics and Union Carbide) to these particular facts. The opinion reasons from existing precedents and administrative instructions to the present factual matrix rather than announcing a new rule of general application beyond these facts.

Rule made absolute.

Rule made absolute.
Show all summary ...

Suresh, J.:— The petitioner, a company, has a factory in which it manufactures tyres, tubes and other rubber products. The process of manufacturing tyres, involves the making of what is known as tyre carcass consisting of rubberised rayon and nylon cords. Such rayon and nylon cords are coated with a rubber compound, but before they are so coated, it is necessary to treat them with another solution in order to achieve a good adhesion of rubber to such cords. The solution that is used in the tyre industry is generally described as a Resorcinol Formaldehyde Latex mix or dip solution which is a mixure of six substances known as resorcinol, formaldehyde, caustic soda, styrene butadine latex, vinyl pyeidine latex and water. The, question in this petition is as to whether this dip solution becomes liable for any excise duty and whether this item comes within item No. 15A of the Tariff.

2. The petitioner says that this mixture has to be consumed within a few hours of its manufacture as after some time the same becomes unuseable. The said solution is prepared within the factory of the petitioner and it is consumed within the factory itself and it is at no time or stage removed from the said factory anywhere else.

3. Some time in June 1977 certain samples of the said dip solution were drawn by the Inspector of Central Excise and were sent to the Deputy Chief Chemist for test. For the purpose of the test the petitioner supplied the requisite information including the composition of the said dip solution. The Chemist gave his report on the basis of which the department informed the petitioner that the said dip solution fell under Item No. 15A(1)(i) of the Tariff and Central Excise and Salt Act. It appears that when the department passed the aforesaid order the petitioner had not been heard and, therefore, the petitioner had to file a writ petition in this Court being Writ Petition No. 525 of 1978. However, on April, 25, 1978 the said petition was withdrawn on an assurance given by the respondents that no orders would be passed in the said matter without furnishing to the petitioner, a copy of the said test report and without hearing the petitioner. Accordingly, a copy of the said report was furnished to the petitioner and the petitioner was also heard. The petitioner was also given an opportunity to cross-examine the Deputy Chief Chemist who gave the report to the department.

4. After such hearing, by an order dated April, 24, 1980 the Assistant Collector of Central Excise came to the conclusion that the said dip solution was assessable to duty under Item No. 15A of the said Tariff. As against the said order the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Collector of Central Excise, and during the pendency of the appeal, the petitioner filed the present writ petition. Thereafter, by an order dated April, 21, 1981, the Collector of Central Excise reversed the decision given by the Assistant Collector and held that the said dip solution was not exciseable under Tariff item No. 15A. It appears that the Government has gone in review and the same is still pending.

5. Before I deal with the relative merits of the case. I must set out the relevant portion of Tariff Item No. 15A(1) and it is as follows:—

“Artificial or synthetic resins and plastic materials, and other materials and articles specified below—

(1)…… artificial resins obtained by esterification of natural resins or of resinic acids (ester gums), chemical derivatives of natural rubber (for example, chlorinated rubber, rubber hydrocloride, oxidised rubber, cyclised rubber), other high polymers, artificial resins and artificial plastic materials, including alginic acid, its salts and esters; linoxyn;”

6. It is the contention of Mr. Talyarkhan, who appears for the petitioner, that this dip solution cannot be considered as artificial or synthetic resin at ad and, therefore, it could never have been considered under Item No. 15A(1) of the Tariff. He also contends that this dip solution is not being sold from the factory and in any event it is not capable of sale to any consumer. He further submits that the department has not been able to show as to how this item can be considered as a marketable item and that, therefore, this could be charged for excise.

7. In this connection Mr. Talyarkhan firstly drew my attention to certain paragraphs wherein we find certain answers given by the Deputy Chief Chemist when he was cross-examined. The relevant portions are as follows:

A. 5: The factory is first preparing a resorcinol formaldehyde Resin in aqeous solution. This is then mixed with rubber latex which they called as dip solution. This dip solution is taken for the tyre cord dipping.

Q. 6: Whether at any stage any stabilisers were added to the solution or did it contain any?

A. 6: As per the factory's declaration and the process shown to me they do not add any stabilisers.

Q. 34: As far as processing of dip solution is concerned by the Ceat, there is no separation of the resin by precipitation or other means. Also the reaction is not arrested and it continues and therefore the material is to be used in the prescribed time. If the solution prepared by Ceat is kept for a long time, the reaction, continues and what product comes out of it is not useful for any purpose. Keeping this factor in mind it can never be said that what Ceat processes in resin, but it is dip solution only?

A. 34: Dip solution is phenoplast in liquid form. If they do not arrest by putting stabilisers keeping it for a long time without proper care and preservation, just like any material gets spoiled, this will also get spoiled.”

8. Mr. Talyarkhan submitted, therefore, that without the addition of stabilisers the solution cannot the preserved and it has no life as such. He, therefore, submitted that this dip solution is not marketable at all. He then drew my attention to what is said by the Appellate Collector in this behalf and the relevant portion is as follows:

“Let us now examine the product in question. It is stated that dip solution is prepared in two stages. In the first stage, all chemicals in requisite quantities except laticas are mixed together under controlled conditions of temperature, inter alia so as to ensure that the temperature thereof do not rise above 24 to 27 degrees sentigrade. This solution after reacting for specific period (4 to 6 hours) is then added to a requisite quantity of latex or latices kept at ambient temperature. This final mixure of the dip solution then become ready for processing and is to be consumed within a few hours, as thereafter it becomes unusable. The Dy. Chief Chemist at the time of his cross examination deposed that dip solution can be kept for long by addition of stabilisers etc. and since they (appellants) do not want to keep dip solution they immediately take it to the process and he also admits that the appellants do not add any stabilisers, while replying to questions 17 and 18. Thus it is seen that the product as manufactured by the appellants cannot be brought to the market. Therefore I agree with the appellant's contention that the dip solution is not goods within the meaning of section 3 of the Central Excise and - Salt Act, 1944, as judicially interpreted by the Courts. It is merely as in process material for use in the manufacture of tyres. Since dip solution is not goods it is not liable to excise duty under any of the T.I mentioned in the first schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act 1944 much less under T.I 15A Dip solution is not known in the market as resin. In fact it is a solution of resins and other substances. Dy. Chief Chemist had described the products the same is in the form of pale brown coloured liquid. It is an aqueous dispersion viz. of reaction of products of vinyl pyridine latex, resorcinol and formaldehyde. It given tack free coating. At the time of his cross examination, he further elaborated that the appellants were first preparing resorcinol and formaldehyde resin in aqueous solution, which is then mixed with rubber latex and the resultant product is known as dip solution. Thus it is not that the resin is in liquid form, but solution of resin which according to the Delhi High Court's judgment in the case of Indian Plastic & Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. 1981 E.L.T 108 (DEL) cannot be excisable under T.I 15A. Court also held that the resin in item 15A regers to the resin as fully manufactured and not to any solution of resin. Thus, in any case dip solution is not liable to excise duty under T.I 15A.”

9. Mr. Talyarkhan also relied upon the case of 1(Indian Plastics & Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India), reported in 1981 E.L.T 108 (Del.), which is the case decided by the Delhi High Court. In this case the Delhi High Court considered the question as to whether the product, in that case, can be regarded as artificial or synthetic resin in liquid form after taking note of the fact that Item No. 15A refers to all types of artificial and synthetic resins. The Court said as follows:—

“To my mind this product cannot be regarded as artificial or synthetic resin in liquid form. It is, at best a solution of resin which is not covered by the aforesaid entry. Reference in this behalf may also usefully be made to the instructions which have been issued by the Central Board of Customs and Excise. In the said instructions it has been inter alia stated as follows:—

“Solution of artificial or synthetic resin in volatilej organic solvent, are excluded from the scope of this item, if and when the weight of such Solvent Exceeds 50 per cent of the weight of the solution.

In other cases the duty should be levied on the actual weight of the resin contained in the solution and not on the total weight of the solution.”

10. The aforesaid instructions, refer to solutions, in organic solvent. The important point, however, is that it is recognised that where the solvent exceeds 50 per cent of the weight of the solution then such a product cannot be regarded as being covered by Item No. 15A. In the same instructions it is also stated as follows:—

“When the solvent is other than volatile organic one, if the weight and volume of the resin or basic plastic material can be determined, that quantity used attracts duty; if not, duty would be payable on the total weight and volume of the solution irrespective of the weight of solvent added.”

The aforesaid shows two things. Firstly, resin in item 15A refer to the resin as fully manufactured and not any ‘solution of resin.’ Secondly, if more than 50 per cent weight is that of solvent then the product cannot be regarded as ‘resin’ at all. There maybe force in the contention on behalf of the respondent that these Instructions are not binding. But these instructions the Government has, to my mind, sought to explain the meaning of the aforesaid item No. 15-A.”

11. In any event, for the purpose of showing that there can be no excise duty as the product is not marketable at all, Mr. Talyarkhan relied upon a recent case of the Supreme Court in the case of 2(Union Carbide India Ltd. v. Union of India), reported in 1986 (24) E.L.T 169 S.C That was a case where the Union Carbide India Ltd., which is carrying on a business of manufacture and sale of flashlights (torches), dry cell batteries, chemicals and plastics, were also purchasing aluminium slugs from the manufacturers of aluminium in India and were producing aluminium cans or torch bodies by a process of extrusion. The department contended that aluminium cans were liable for excise duty under Item No. 27(e) of the Tariff. The company contended that aluminium cans were neither sold not were capable of being sold in the market and, therefore could not be described as the goods for the purpose of Central Excise and Salt Act. It was also asserted that the preparation of aluminium cans out of aluminium slugs did not amount to manufacture, and that aluminium cans were merely an intermediate product in the manufacture of flashlights. These contentions did not find favour with the excise authorities. But the Supreme Court upheld these contentions. I may mention that while deciding this particular case, the Supreme Court referred to two earlier cases viz. the case of 3(Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills), (1963) Supp. 1 S.C.R 586, and the other, the case of 4(South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. etc. v. Union of India), 1978 E.L.T J 336 S.C The relevant observations of the Supreme Court at page 172 are as follows:

“The question here is whether the aluminium cans manufactured by the appellant are capable of sale to a consumer. It appears on the facts before us that there are only two manufacturers of flashlights in India, and appellant being one of them. It appears also that the aluminium cans prepared by the appellant are employed entirely by it in the manufacture of flashlights and are not sold as aluminium cans in the market. The record discloses that the aluminium cans, at the point at which excise duty has been levied, exist in a crude and elementary form incapable of being employed at that stage as a component in a flashlight. The cans have sharp uneven edges and in order to use them as a component in making flashlight cases the cans have to undergo various processes such as trimming, threading and redrawing. After the cans are trimmed, threaded and redrawn they are readed, beaded and anodised or painted. It is at that point only that they become a distinct and complete component, capable of being used as a flashlight case for housing battery cells and having a bulb fitted to the case. We find it difficult to believe that the elementary and unfinished form in which they exist immediately after extrusion suffices to attract a market. The appellant has averred in affidavit that aluminium cans in that form are unknown in the market. No satisfactory material to the contrary has been placed by the respondents before us. Reference has been made by the respondents to the instance when aluminium cans were ordered by the appellant from Messrs Krupp Group of Industries. This took place, however, in 1966 as a solitary instance, and what happened was that aluminium slugs were provided by the appellant to Messrs Krupp Group of Industries for extrusion into aluminium cans. The facts show that the transaction was a works contract and nothing more. Apparently, the appellant made use of the requisite machinery owned by that firm for extruding aluminium cans. Not a single instance has been provided by the respondents demonstrating that such aluminium cans have a market. The record discloses that whatever aluminium cans are produced by the appellant are subsequently developed by it into a complete and perfected component for being employed as flashlight cases.”

12. In the present case, it is clear that the dip solution in the condition and as it is found, in the petitioner company, is not saleable at all. There is no market for such a solution. In any event, no satisfactory evidence has been placed, at any stage, to show that such an item attracts a market. The material on the other hand clearly show that the solution is manufactured and used by the petitioner alone and, therefore, in my view, this case must directly apply to the facts of the present case. If that is so, the petitioner must succeed.

13. However, the department think otherwise. Mr. Pochkhanwalla, appearing for the department, firstly relied on the definition and the technical meaning of this dip solution as given in various text books and encyclopaedia of chemical technology. The relevant portions from the various books are as under:

“Rubber Technology and Manufacture (By C.M Blow And C. Hepburn, at pages 333 and 334) (IInd Edition.) “One of the earliest systems for bonding rayon was based on resorcinol-formal-dehyde resin and natural rubber latex, but the material suffered from a limited pot life, Butadiene-styrene and vinyl pyridine copolymer latices, in admixture with resorcinol formaldehyde, followed. A later development was isocyanate adhesive. A modification of the latter was the formation of adducts, which were water soluble for easier application. With combinations of these systems, the range of fibres available can be pre-treated so that they will adhere to any rubber.”

14. Encyclopaedia of Chemical Technology By Kirk-Othmer, at page 464) IIIrd Edition.

“Tire cord (qv) is normally first treated with rubber latex to improve adhesion to the vulcanised rubber. The latex dip solution often contains additives to further improve adhesion. Resorcinol-formaldehyde resins are commonly used but amino resins are also effective. Both urea and melamine resins are described in the patent literature but melamine resins are preferred.”

15. Encyclopaedia Britannica (Volume VIII. At page 526) XVth Edition.

“Resorcinol, orm-Dihyanrvybenzene, molecular formula C6 H4 (OH)2, a phenolic compound used in the manufacture of resins, plastics, dyes, medicine and numerous other organic chemical compounds. It is produced in large quantities by sulfonating benzene with fuming sulferic acid and fusing the resulting benzene disulfonic acid with caustic soda. The activating action of the two hydroxyl (OH) groups makes the compound highly susceptible to substitution reactions. Reaction with formaldehyde produces resins used extensively as predips before impresenating rayon and nylon with rubber.”

16. On the basis of these definitions, Mr. Pochkhanwalla pointed out that this item can be termed as resin and, therefore, if it is so, the same comes under Item 15A of the Tariff.

17. Mr. Pochkhanwalla has also drawn my attention to two judgments, one of the Bombay High Court and the other of the Supreme Court. The first is the case of 5(M.R.F Ltd. v. Union of India), reported in 1985 (22) E.L.T 5 (Bom). He referred to this judgment to point out what is important is that a particular item is manufactured by the company and that is sufficient, provided the said item comes under any of the Tariff items. In this case the question involved was as to whether rubberised tyre cord warp sheets can be considered as an item which would be liable for Excise duty. By referring to certain observations in this particular cast Mr. Pochkhanwalla pointed out that marketability is not the test but the test is whether the manufacturer has manufactured a particular item, and ever if the same is not put in the market that would not make any difference to the chargeability of the substance to excisa duty if it is covered by an item in Schedule 1 of the Act. I am afraid that these observations may not apply to the present case inasmuch as in para 13 of the said judgment the Court had come to the conclusion that the material was saleable. If that is so, this case can easily be distinguished from the case before me.

18. The other case which is of the Supreme Court is the case of 6(S.B Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India), reported in 1978 E.L.T (J336). The relevant observations are in para 14 of the judgment. The question involved in this case was one relating to what is known as Kiln gas. However, in my view, I need not deal with this authority at all, inasmuch as the Supreme Court while deciding the case of Union Carbide India Ltd., referred to above, had taken into account this very case and, thereafter, laid down the proposition that for the purpose of chargeability the goods must be such as to have a market or must be saleable.

19. Mr. Pochkhanwalla has also relied upon a case decided by the CEGAT viz. the case of 7(Collector v. Jay Enterprises), reported in 1987 (29) E.L.T 288 (Tribunal). This is a case where the question was one relating to manufacture of resin. The judgment deals with the details of the product and points out that there are various stages in the manufacture. The are set out in para 8 of the judgment. After setting cut these various stages the Tribunal goes to observe that in the case of resins there are so many varieties and these have wide-ranging shelf lives ranging from a few days to couple of months or even more. The Tribunal further observes that the product has a short shelf life and that it has been conceded by the learned advocate that it can be kept for as long as 15 days. On the basis of this the Tribunal observes that at that stage the material could be sold to a consumer or a buyer. The Tribunal of course, has negatived the contention of the manufacturer that the product manufactured by the company should be marketable. This case again can be distinguished on two counts. Firstly, there is a concession by the Advocate of the manufacturers that the particular product could be kept for about 15 days and that it could be sold to the consumer or a buyer if they required the same. Secondly, to the proposition that whether the product is marketed or sold would not make any difference, appears to be in contradiction to what the Supreme Court has stated. If that is so, this approach of the Tribunal cannot be a guiding factor for the purpose of deciding the matter which is before me.

20. Mr. Talyarkhan has laid great emphasis on the fact that the evidence of the Deputy Chief Chemist itself shows that without the addition of the stabilisers, this particular solution has no life at all and it sets spoiled. There is no other material before me to hold otherwise. It that is so, in my view, this item without any stability whatsoever has no shell life at all, and therefore, the material would be spoiled within a short time and, therefore, it cannot be considered as an item which would come under Item No. 15(A)(1). In any event, it is clear that this item is not marketable at all and if that is so having regard to the judgement of the Supreme Court, the same can not attract any charge of excise under the Act.

21. In the result, the petitioner must succeed. I, therefore, pass the following order:

22. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (b). However, in the circumstances of the case, there would be no order as to costs.

Rule made absolute.