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Associated Bearing Co. Ltd., Bombay v. Union Of India And Others

Bombay High Court
Dec 3, 1987
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition arises from a dispute about whether excise duty collected by the Excise authorities on certain textile machinery components was levied without authority of law and therefore must be refunded, or whether the claim for refund can be refused on the ground of the doctrine of unjust enrichment.

The petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on March 2, 1979 by a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, which manufactures ball and roller bearings and two types of textile machinery components (Centering Sleeve Inserts and Top Rollers). Ball and roller bearings were classifiable under Central Excise Tariff Item No. 49 (introduced into Schedule I to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 on May 28, 1971). The petitioners contended that the two textile components are distinct from ball bearings and are properly classifiable under Tariff Item No. 68 (a residuary item) which was inserted in the Schedule with effect from March 1, 1975.

The Excise authorities had recovered duty from the petitioners under Tariff Item No. 49 for the period from August 1, 1972 to September 30, 1975 (the opinion also records a related reference to September 13, 1975 in a later paragraph). The petitioners paid that duty under protest. Because of trade notices and departmental orders, duty was not charged between October 1, 1975 and December 10, 1978. Duty was again levied and recovered from December 11, 1978 onwards and paid by the petitioners under protest until March 30, 1979 when interim orders from the Court deferred payment on furnishing bank guarantees.

Administrative proceedings before the Excise authorities culminated in an order of the Central Government dated October 12, 1978 holding the petitioners liable to pay duty. In the writ petition the petitioners sought (a) setting aside the October 12, 1978 order; (b) setting aside Tariff Advice No. 28/78 and Trade Notice No. 114/78; and (c) setting aside the Demand Notice dated March 26, 1979. The petition also sought refund of Rs. 35,45,749.21 for the period August 1, 1972 to September 30, 1975 and further refund of duty paid from December 11, 1978 onwards.

Before a Division Bench there was a difference of opinion between Mr. Justice Shah and Mr. Justice Kolse-Patil on the question whether the Revenue is liable to refund duty collected without authority of law or whether refund may be refused on the ground of unjust enrichment. Rule 15 of Chapter XVII of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 (invoking Section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908) was followed to resolve the difference of opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Excise authorities are liable to refund excise duty that was collected without authority of law (i.e., whether the statutory provisions such as Section 11B and Rule 11 of the Central Excise Rules require refund where duty was paid under protest and later found not to be lawfully leviable).
  2. Whether the claim for refund can be refused on the doctrine of unjust enrichment on the ground that the duty recovered was passed on by the petitioners to their customers.
  3. Whether the petitioners' purported withdrawal of a part of their prayer (specifically prayer (b)) before one member of the Division Bench prevents the Court from granting a writ directing refund.
  4. Whether, if refund is ordered, the petitioners should be directed to furnish a bank guarantee to secure repayment in the event the Department succeeds on appeal (including before the Supreme Court).

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue / Department (as orally represented by Mr. Sethna)

  • The Department accepted that Tariff Item No. 68 applied as from March 1, 1975 and that duty had been paid under protest for relevant periods, but resisted the writ claim for refund on the sole ground that granting refund would amount to unjust enrichment because the duty recovered had already been passed on by the petitioners to their customers.
  • Reliance was placed on a circular dated August 7, 1984 that, according to the Department, confirmed levy under Tariff Item No. 68 and not under Item No. 49 (this is an evidentiary/administrative matter rather than a substantive legal bar to refund, as recorded in the opinion).
  • Mr. Sethna relied on the judgment of Mr. Justice Kolse-Patil (which in turn invoked earlier Division Bench authority, notably M/s. Ogale Glass Works Ltd. v. Union of India) and contended that Mr. Justice Kolse-Patil's view was in accordance with a Supreme Court decision in State of M.P. v. Vyankatlal (citation as recorded in the opinion is incomplete).
  • As an alternative protective measure the Department asked that if refund were to be ordered the petitioners should be required to furnish a bank guarantee to secure repayment in the event the Department succeeds in higher forum.

Petitioners (as represented by Mr. Desai and counsel in the Division Bench)

  • The petitioners asserted that the textile machinery components (Centering Sleeve Inserts and Top Rollers) were not ball or roller bearings and were correctly classifiable under Tariff Item No. 68; accordingly duty collected under Tariff Item No. 49 was without authority of law.
  • The petitioners had paid the impugned duty under protest and had filed refund applications; they relied on Rule 11 of the Central Excise Rules (and Section 11B) as entitling them to refund of duty collected without authority of law.
  • Before the Division Bench the petitioners' counsel at one stage stated they would not press their demand for refund in the petition but would pursue departmental refund procedures; that statement led Mr. Justice Shah to allow withdrawal of a portion of the petition (as recorded), though the other member of the Bench did not permit withdrawal and dismissed the petition.
  • Petitioners opposed the Department's request for bank guarantees and requested a direction that the refund be made within a stipulated period; they sought immediate refund by writ if the Court granted relief.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M/s. Ogale Glass Works Ltd. v. The Union of India, 1979 (4) ELT (J) 478 = 79 Bom LR 37 Authority relied upon by Mr. Justice Kolse-Patil to support the proposition that an earlier Division Bench decision should bind subsequent Division Bench decisions taking a contrary view. The opinion records that Mr. Justice Kolse-Patil relied on this decision; the present Court regarded the weight of subsequent Division Bench and Single Judge decisions as outweighing the position taken in Ogale for purposes of the dispute before it, and treated Kolse-Patil's reliance on Ogale as insufficient to sustain refusal of refund on unjust enrichment grounds.
R. Parthasarathy, Asstt. Collector, Central Excise Kalyan Division and another v. Dipsi Chemicals Private Ltd. and another, 1987 Maharashtra Law Journal 900 = 1987 (32) ELT 556 Examined earlier authorities and held that the court cannot refuse to direct Government to refund amounts collected without authority of law on the basis of the doctrine of unjust enrichment. The Court relied on this Division Bench decision as a recent, exhaustive treatment of the issue and agreed with its conclusion that unjust enrichment is not a valid bar to refund of excise duty collected without authority of law.
Tribhovandas Purshottamdas Thakkar v. Ratilal Motilal Patel, 70 Bom LR 73 Addressed principles concerning the binding nature of earlier Division Bench decisions (as recorded in the opinion). The opinion notes this decision was considered in Dipsi Chemicals and asserts it is not necessary to re-examine it here; the present Court treated the precedential discussion in Dipsi as sufficient support for its conclusion.
Panjumal Massomal Advani v. Harpal Singh Abnashi Singh, 76 Bom LR 729 Also concerned with the principles applicable to the binding nature of Division Bench decisions (as recorded in the opinion). The opinion records that this decision was considered in Dipsi Chemicals; the Court did not find it necessary to re-address those binding-rules issues and accepted the treatment in Dipsi.
State of M.P. v. Vyankatlal (Supreme Court decision; citation as recorded in the opinion is incomplete) Invoked by Mr. Sethna to support the view taken by Mr. Justice Kolse-Patil regarding refusal of refund on unjust enrichment grounds (as contended by the Department). The opinion records that Mr. Sethna relied on this Supreme Court decision for the Kolse-Patil view; the Court, however, found the Kolse-Patil position inconsistent with the weight of later Division Bench decisions and ultimately rejected Kolse-Patil's approach for the purposes of this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in these principal steps, each stated as expressly recorded in the opinion:

  1. Statutory entitlement: The Court observed that it was not disputed the petitioners are entitled to refund under the statutory provisions (Section 11B and Rule 11 of the Central Excise Rules) where duty has been paid under protest and recovered without authority of law. This statutory entitlement is the primary legal foundation for the petitioners' claim for refund.
  2. Classification concession: The Department no longer contested that the components were not liable under Tariff Item No. 49; Tariff Item No. 68 applies. That concession removes any substantive factual ground for denying refund other than the doctrine of unjust enrichment.
  3. Precedential landscape: The Court compared the two conflicting views in the Division Bench (Mr. Justice Shah rejecting unjust enrichment as a bar; Mr. Justice Kolse-Patil accepting it). The Court noted that a large number of subsequent decisions of both Division Benches and Single Judges had consistently rejected the unjust-enrichment defence when duty was collected without authority of law.
  4. Reliance on recent Division Bench authority: The Court relied particularly on the Division Bench decision in R. Parthasarathy v. Dipsi Chemicals (1987 (32) ELT 556 / 1987 MLJ 900) which exhaustively considered earlier decisions and held that the Government cannot refuse refund of amounts collected without authority of law on the ground of unjust enrichment. The present Court expressly agreed with that decision and considered it sufficient to dispose of the contention urged on behalf of the Revenue.
  5. On bindingness and earlier authorities: Although Mr. Justice Kolse-Patil relied on an earlier Division Bench decision (Ogale Glass) and Mr. Sethna invoked a Supreme Court authority (State of M.P. v. Vyankatlal) in support, the present Court concluded that the Kolse-Patil view was clearly erroneous in light of the line of subsequent authorities and the Dipsi decision. The Court therefore rejected Kolse-Patil's approach for the purpose of the present petition.
  6. Effect of attempted withdrawal of relief: The Court examined the procedural effect of the petitioners' attempt to withdraw part of prayer (b) before the Division Bench. Because Mr. Justice Shah granted the withdrawal while Mr. Justice Kolse-Patil did not (he had dismissed the petition including the relief in prayer (b)), the petition before the full Bench remained one in which prayer (b) had not been allowed to be withdrawn by the Bench. The Court therefore found that the petitioners could not be deprived of a writ remedy on the basis of the claimed withdrawal.
  7. Bank guarantee request rejected: The Court rejected the Department's request to require a bank guarantee as a condition of refund. The Court reasoned that it would be inequitable to require a bank guarantee where it was not disputed that duty had been recovered without authority of law; potential departmental appeals did not justify withholding or qualifying the refund by requiring security.
  8. Remedial direction and timeline: The Court concluded that a writ directing refund should be issued (in terms specified in the final order) and that the respondents should make the refund within three months from the date of the order. The Court also directed that the papers be placed before the Division Bench for passing final orders and left the question of costs of the hearing before the present judge to the Divisional Bench to determine.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The rule is made absolute insofar as it grants the relief in terms of prayers (a)(i) and (a)(ii) and the part of prayer (b) commencing from the words "and compelling them to refund" till the end of that prayer; the respondents are directed to refund the amounts recovered without authority of law within three months from the date of the order.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on parties: The respondents (Excise authorities) are ordered to refund the amounts claimed by the petitioners (including the specified sum for the earlier period and sums recovered thereafter that were paid under protest) within three months. The Court refused to condition the refund on the petitioners furnishing a bank guarantee.
  • Procedural consequence: The papers are to be placed before the Division Bench to pass final orders and the Divisional Bench will determine the costs of the hearing before the present judge.
  • Precedential effect: The opinion treats the result as an application of existing statutory provisions (Section 11B and Rule 11) and existing line of authority (notably the Division Bench decision in Dipsi Chemicals). The Court did not state that it was creating a new legal principle; rather it applied and followed the established line of decisions holding that unjust enrichment is not a bar to refund where duty has been collected without authority of law.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion. No facts, arguments, precedents, or conclusions have been added beyond what is contained in the source text.

Show all summary ...

1. This petition is placed before me in accordance with the direction of the learned Chief Justice in view of the difference between Mr. Justice Shah and Mr. Justice Kolse-Patil on the question whether the Excise authorities are liable to refund excess excise duty collected without authority of law or whether the claim can be refused on the doctrine of unjust enrichment. Rule 15 of Chapter XVII of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 provides that in case of difference of opinion between the Judges composing the Division Court, the point of difference shall be decided in accordance with the procedure laid down in Section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

2. Only few facts are required to be set out to appreciate the claim made by the petitioners in the petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on March 2, 1979. The petitioners are a Company incorporated under the Provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and manufacture ball and roller bearings and textile machinery components. The ball and roller bearings, all sorts are classifiable under the Central Excise Tariff Item No. 49 which was introduced in Schedule I to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") on May 28, 1971. The petitioners also manufacture textile machinery components of two types : (a) Centering Sleeve Inserts, and (b) Top Rollers. According to the petitioners, Centering Sleeve Inserts and Top Rollers are different and distinct from the ball bearings. The petitioners claim that the components are liable to payment of excise duty under Tariff Item No. 68 which is a residuary item and this residuary item was inserted in the Schedule with effect from March 1, 1975. The Excise authorities had recovered duty on the components under Tariff Item No. 49 for the period commencing from August 1, 1972 and ending with September 30, 1975. The duty was paid by the petitioners under protest. Because of certain trade notices and orders passed by the authorities, the Department did not charge duty on the components between the period commencing from October 1, 1975 to December 10, 1978. The duty was again levied and recovered with effect from December 11, 1978 onwards and paid by the petitioners under protest upto March 30, 1979 when the petitioners secured interim orders from this Court in the present petition and payment of duty was deferred on furnishing of Bank guarantees.

3. The petitioners had adopted proceedings before the Excise authorities claiming that the duty levied and recovered by the authorities under Tariff Item No. 49 was not legal and valid and those proceedings ultimately ended by an order passed by the Central Government on October 12, 1978 holding that the petitioners are liable to pay the duty. The petitioners sought the following prayers in the petition :

(a) The order dated October 12, 1978 be set aside;

(b) The Tariff advices No. 28/78 and the Trade Notice No. 114/78 be set aside, and

(c) Demand Notice dated March 26, 1979 be set aside.

The petitioners then as a part of prayer sought the relief of refund in the following terms :

"The respondents be compelled to refund to the petitioners the sum of Rs. 35,45,749.21 for the period 1-8-1972 to 30-9-1975 as per the Refund Applications filed by the petitioners and further compelling them to forbear from claiming any amount or amounts from the petitioners on the basis that the textile machinery components are excisable under Tariff Item No. 49 and also to refund the duty paid by the petitioners under Tariff Item No. 49 for the period 11-12-1978 onwards."

4. Before the Division Bench, it was contended on behalf of the Department that in view of the Circular dated August 7, 1984 issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs, the levy of duty on the components would be only under Tariff Item No. 68 and not under Tariff Item No. 49. It was not disputed that Tariff Item No. 68 was inserted in the Schedule with effect from March 1, 1975. It was also not disputed that the duty was paid by the petitioners under Tariff Item No. 49 between August 1, 1972 and September 13, 1975 under protest. The recovery of duty from the petitioners between December 11, 1978 till March 30, 1979 was also under protest. In view of this, Rule 11 entitles the petitioners to secure refund of duty recovered without any authority of law. The relief sought by the petitioners was resisted on behalf of the Revenue only on the ground that grant of refund would amount to unjust enrichment by the petitioners as the duty levied and recovered from the petitioners had already been passed over to the customers by the petitioners and the refund granted would not ensure for the benefit of the customers. Mr. Justice Shah delivered judgment between December 15 and December 19, 1986 and concluded that the doctrine of unjust enrichment has no application and it is well-settled by the decisions of the various Division Benches of this Court that the Revenue is liable to refund the duty recovered without any authority of law and cannot retain the same by taking shield behind the doctrine of unjust enrichment.

At the conclusion of the judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Shah, Mr. Justice Kolse-Patil announced that he is differing and would deliver judgment on a later date after perusing the copy of the judgment of Mr. Justice Shah. At that stage, the counsel on behalf of the petitioners submitted that the petitioners would not press their demand for refund in the petition, but will pursue their refund application with the Department as the claims of the petitioners are squarely covered by Rule 11 of the Central Excises Rules. Mr. Justice Shah though earlier had granted relief in terms of prayer (a)(i), (a)(ii) and (b), in a latter portion of the judgment restricted relief only to prayers (a)(i), and (a)(ii) in view of the application made by the petitioners. The final order passed by Mr. Justice Shah was the grant of prayers (a)(i) and (a)(iii) only and the petitioners were allow to withdraw prayer (b) with liberty to pursue their claim for refund before the competent authorities.

5. Mr. Justice Kolse-Patil delivered his judgment six months after the decision delivered by Mr. Justice Shah by judgment dated June 16, 1987. The learned Judge dismissed the petition and discharged the rule. The learned Judge held that in view of Section 11(b) of the Act and Rule 11, normally the petitioners would have been entitled to seek refund of the duty paid under protest but in spite of the statutory provisions the claim was refused on the ground of doctrine of unjust enrichment. Mr. Justice Kolse-Patil felt that the decision of the Division Bench reported in = 1979 (4) ELT (J 478) = 79 Bombay Law Reporter 37 M/s. Ogale Glass Works Ltd. v. The Union of India, holds goods and the subsequent decisions of the Division Bench taking the contrary view are not binding. The learned Judge felt that the subsequent decisions unfortunately did not follow the salutory principle that the decision of the Division Bench of this Court given earlier is binding and, therefore, the subsequent decisions could be ignored.

6. It is not disputed before me that the petitioners are entitled to refund in view of the statutory provisions of Section 11B and Rule 11 of the Central Excise Rules and it is no longer the claim of the Revenue that the components manufactured by the petitioners are liable to levy of duty under Tariff Item No. 49. On behalf of the Department, Mr. Sethna contended that the view taken by Mr. Justice Kolse-Patil is in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Vyankatlal report in . Mr. Sethna did not dispute that several other decisions of the Division Bench of this Court had consistently taken the view that the theory of unjust enrichment has no place when duty has been recovered by the Department without any authority of lay. In my judgment, the view taken by Mr. Justice Kolse-Patil is clearly erroneous and cannot be sustained in view of large number of decisions consistently taken by both the Division Benches and the Single Judges of this Court rejecting the plea of unjust enrichment propounded by the Department. It is not necessary to refer to this long line of decisions and it would be suffice if reference is made to the latest decision of Division Bench of this Court reported in 1987 Maharashtra Law Journal, 900 = 1987 (32) ELT 556 (Bom.) R. Parthasarathy, Asstt. Collector, Central Excise Kalyan Division and another v. Dipsi Chemicals Private Ltd. and another. In this decision, the Division Bench exhaustively considered all the earlier decisions and observed that the court cannot refuse to direct the Government to refund the amounts, which the Government had collected without the authority of law on the basis of doctrine of unjust enrichment. The Division Bench also examined the different view taken by Mr. Justice Kolse-Patil and pointed out the infirmity in the judgment. Mr. Sethna submitted that the Department has no further arguments to advance than those submitted before the Division Bench in the decision reported in 1987 (32) ELT 556 = 1987 Maharashtra Law Journal 900. I have closely perused the decision and with respect I am in entire agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench. It is not necessary to consider the question of the binding nature of the decision of the Division Bench in view of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 70 Bombay Law Reporter 73 Tribhovandas Purshottamdas Thakkar v. Ratilal Motilal Patel and the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Panjumal Massomal Advani v. Harpal Singh Abnashi Singh reported in 76 Bombay Law Reporter 729. Both these decisions were considered in the case of Dipsi Chemicals (Supra) and the principles applicable in respect of binding nature of the decisions were set out. It is not necessary to refer to them in this judgment. In my judgment, the view taken by Mr. Justice Kolse-Patil is entirely incorrect and is clearly contrary to large number of decisions of the Division Benches and of Single Judges of this Court. Indeed, the difference was not called for in face of this line of decisions. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by Mr. Justice Shah.

7. Mr. Sethna then submitted that latter part of prayer (b) made in the petition for refund was given up or withdrawn by the petitioners before Mr. Justice Shah and Mr. Justice Kolse-Patil and, therefore, the petitioners would not be entitled to get order of refund in pursuance of the writ of this Court. It is not possible to accept this submission because though the application to withdraw prayer (b) was granted by Mr. Justice Shah, the other learned Judge did not grant that prayer but dismissed the petition including the relief sought in prayer (b). As the prayer (b) was not allowed to be withdrawn by the Bench, it is futile to claim that refund should not be granted by writ or direction of this Court. It is undoubtedly true that under Rule 11, the petitioners are entitled to recover back the duty which was paid under protest and the Excise authorities are bound to refund the same. I enquired from Mr. Sethna as to what is difference in granting refund in pursuance of the writ of this Court and in granting refund in accordance with Rule 11 of the Central Excise Rules and the learned counsel had no answer. In my judgment, as the Division Bench of Mr. Justice Shah and Mr. Justice Kolse-Patil did not grant the application to withdraw prayer (b), it is desirable that the relief in terms of prayer (b) is also granted in addition to relief in terms of prayers (a)(i) and (a)(ii) and accordingly I would pass the final order.

8. Mr. Sethna then submitted that even if the order of refund is granted, the petitioners should be directed to furnish Bank Guarantee to ensure that in case the Department approaches the Supreme Court and succeeds, then the petitioners would refund the amount. In my judgment, it is impossible to accede to the submission. It is no longer in dispute that the duty was recovered without any authority of law and it would be most inequitable to direct the petitioners to furnish Bank guarantee merely because the Revenue may consider to approach the Supreme Court. Mr. Desai, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submits that the Department should be directed to make the refund within a stipulated period and, in my judgment, the request is proper and the Department should refund the amount within a period of three months from the date of the decision.

9. Accordingly, I will make the rule absolute in terms of prayer (a)(i) and (a)(ii) and part of prayer (b) commencing from the words "and compelling them to refund" till the end of the prayer. I will direct the respondents to make the refund within a period of three months from the date of the order.

10. The papers now be placed before the Division Bench for passing the final orders. Cost of hearing before me to be determined by the Divisional Bench