- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Yogesh Kantilal Patel v. Home Secratary, Home Department, Govt. Of Mah. And Another .
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Per Agarwal, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
A concise narrative, based solely on the opinion:
- On 15 February 1981 five unaccompanied packages were unloaded at the Air Cargo Complex, Sahar Airport, Bombay. Two of the packages were from London consigned by the petitioner; three were consigned by Johal Manjit Singh; the consignee for all five was one Mrs. Fulla Prabhakar.
- On 26 February 1981 the petitioner, Johal Manjit Singh and one Dhillon arrived at Bombay from London and stayed at the Holiday Inn. The petitioner and Johal Manjit Singh attempted (unsuccessfully) to change the consignee to their own names. Customs officers seized the packages on or about 26 February 1981; the packages contained video cassettes and VCRs.
- Investigation revealed the petitioner and Johal Manjit Singh had booked the consignment from London at the instance of Shri Dhillon. Both were arrested on 28 February 1981 and later released on bail.
- The petitioner left India on or about 13 May 1981 for London because his three-month visa was about to expire.
- The opinion records an impugned detention order passed against the petitioner; the text contains two differing date references for that order (the opinion first states 4 December 1984 and later refers to 4 December 1981). The opinion itself contains both references; this summary reproduces that factual record without reconciling the internal inconsistency.
- On identical facts a detention order was passed against Johal Manjit Singh; that order was served on him and, in Criminal Writ Petition No. 650 of 1982 (Kurdukar & Parekh, JJ.), this Court quashed that detention order by judgment dated 18 January 1983 on grounds that the single instance did not warrant detention and the detention order was passed after inordinate delay.
- The present petition by the petitioner was filed on 2 December 1986 seeking to challenge the impugned detention order (the petitioner remaining at large and not having been served with the order).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a writ can be issued quashing an order of detention when that detention order has not been served on the proposed detenu and the proposed detenu is not under detention.
- Whether, on the facts (including an allegedly solitary instance, unexplained delay in passing the detention order, and the petitioner's absence from India after May 1981), the impugned detention order deserved to be quashed.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (as advanced by Shri Madhu Patel for the petitioner)
- The impugned detention order relies on grounds identical to those on which the detention order against Johal Manjit Singh was passed and subsequently quashed by this Court; thus the impugned detention order against the petitioner should be quashed for the same reasons.
- This Court, having already held that the solitary instance did not justify detention and that there was inordinate and unexplained delay in issuing the detention order against Johal Manjit Singh, should similarly quash the petitioner's detention order.
Respondent's Arguments (as advanced by Smt. Desai, learned Public Prosecutor)
- The Court should not quash the detention order where the petitioner has not been served with the order and the petitioner is not in detention; specifically, she contended that until the person is under detention a habeas corpus petition cannot lie, and relatedly the court should not entertain a premature prayer to quash an unserved detention order.
- Reliance was placed on an unreported decision (S.J. Purohit v. State, decided by Rege & Mehta, JJ.), where a petition was held premature because it was filed on apprehension without any detention order or grounds being served; the procedure of avoiding service and filing a petition on imagined grounds was disapproved.
- She urged that the present tendency of evading detention and yet challenging the order through a next friend should be discouraged and that the extraordinary jurisdiction should not be invoked in such circumstances.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jayantil Bhagwandas Shah v. State of Maharashtra, 1981 Cri. L.J. 767 | That the position of a person actually under illegal detention and of a person in imminent jeopardy of illegal detention are not far dissimilar; supports relief against prospective illegal detention under Article 226. | The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that High Courts may protect persons against imminent or prospective illegal detention and may issue writs in the nature of mandamus/certiorari/prohibition to prevent execution of illegal detention. |
| Dwarkanath v. I.T. Officer, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 81 | Article 226 confers a wider power on High Courts than the traditional English prerogative writs; the expression “nature” allows moulding reliefs suited to India’s constitutional scheme and federal structure. | The court cited this authority to emphasize the comprehensive scope of Article 226 and to reject a narrow, English-style limitation on the High Court's power to issue writs to prevent illegal detention or its prospect. |
| S.J. Purohit v. State (unreported, Rege & Mehta, JJ.) | Held that a petition was premature where filed on apprehension without any detention order or grounds being served on the petitioner; such anticipatory procedure was not provided by the Act. | The respondents relied upon this unreported decision. The Court in the present opinion distinguished and rejected the broad application of that reasoning, holding it limited to its facts and not determinative of the present matter. |
| Sukhramdas Prabhudas Thakur v. The State of Maharashtra, Criminal Writ Petition No. 622 of 1982 (unreported) | Unreported decision cited in support of the court's view on maintainability of petitions challenging detention orders even if not served. | The court cited this unreported decision as one of several that fortified its view that petitions challenging detention orders may be maintainable despite non-service in appropriate cases. |
| Sayed Iqbal… v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Writ Petition No. 1159 of 1986 (Mehta & Daud, JJ.), decided 21 Aug 1987 | Unreported/recent decision (as cited) supporting the court's approach to maintainability under Article 226. | The court relied on this decision as further support for its conclusion that it could entertain a petition challenging a detention order notwithstanding non-service where facts warranted relief. |
| Johal Singh Manjit Singh v. Home Secretary, Criminal Writ Petition No. 650 of 1982 (Kurdukar & Parekh, JJ.), decided 18 Jan 1983 | On identical facts the court had quashed the detention order: the solitary instance did not warrant detention and the detention order had been passed after an inordinate delay which was not explained. | The present Court applied and followed the reasoning in that decision, treating it as directly persuasive and as demonstrating that the identical explanation for delay was unsatisfactory; this formed a key basis for quashing the petitioner's detention order. |
| Criminal Writ Petition No. 605 of 1982 (decision relied upon by respondents) | Authority upon which the respondents relied to argue that a petition challenging an unserved detention order was not maintainable (the court in the present opinion describes it as applicable to the peculiar facts of that case). | The present Court held that the view in CWP No. 605 of 1982 applied to its specific facts and did not lay down a rule of universal application; the Court therefore did not treat it as controlling here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's step-by-step legal analysis, stated only as found in the opinion:
- The central jurisdictional point: the Court accepted that although a writ of habeas corpus may not lie where the person is not yet in detention, that limitation does not preclude the High Court from exercising its powers under Article 226 to issue other writs — mandamus, certiorari or prohibition — to protect a person against an illegal invasion of liberty even before actual detention occurs.
- The Court examined the language and scope of Article 226 and concluded it is couched in "wide" and "comprehensive phraseology" enabling High Courts to mould remedies to India's circumstances; the Article is not to be narrowly equated with English prerogative writs, and procedural limitations of English practice should not be imported so as to curtail the High Court's constitutional power.
- The court relied on Jayantil Bhagwandas Shah to support the proposition that the position of a person in imminent jeopardy of illegal detention is comparable to that of a person actually under illegal detention, and hence interim relief to prevent illegal detention is within the High Court's competence.
- The Court acknowledged the respondent's reliance on authorities (including the unreported S.J. Purohit decision and CWP No. 605 of 1982) holding such petitions premature; however, it distinguished those authorities on their facts, holding they did not establish a universal bar to judicial relief where the facts justify intervention.
- The Court emphasised that the extraordinary nature of prerogative writs requires them to be exercised sparingly and only in fit cases; the power is not to be exercised indiscriminately.
- Applying these principles to the facts, the Court observed that:
- The detention order against Johal Singh Manjit Singh (served on him) had already been quashed by this Court on the basis of a single instance and inordinate delay in passing the detention order.
- The petitioner’s explanation for delay was identical to that relied upon in Johal Singh’s case, and thus the Court found the delay in issuing the impugned order had not been satisfactorily explained.
- There was an additional ground favoring quashing in the petitioner's case: the impugned detention order was passed (the opinion gives a date as 4 December — see factual background for the internal inconsistency) after the petitioner had left India in May 1981 and there was no evidence that he had returned to India after May 1981 or that he had engaged in activities covered by section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act.
- Given the prior quashing in the near-identical Johal Singh matter, the unexplained delay, the solitary instance relied upon, and absence of evidence of relevant activity by the petitioner after leaving India, the Court concluded the impugned detention order was not justified on the merits.
- On that basis the Court found the petition maintainable under Article 226 and that it was a "fit case" for the extraordinary remedy to be granted.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The impugned order of detention is quashed and set aside; the rule is made absolute.
Implications (as expressed in the opinion):
- Direct effect on the parties: the petition succeeds and the impugned detention order against the petitioner is quashed and set aside (rule made absolute in terms of the petitioner's prayers Clauses (a) and (b)).
- Scope of doctrine: the Court explicitly held that Article 226 empowers High Courts to issue writs in the nature of mandamus, certiorari and prohibition to prevent prospective illegal detention and to quash illegal detention orders even when the proposed detenu has not been served and is not yet in custody, provided the case is a fit one.
- Limitation: the Court emphasised that the power is extraordinary and must be sparingly exercised; prior decisions disallowing premature petitions were held to be confined to their facts and not of universal application.
- The Court applied and followed prior decisions (including Johal Singh Manjit Singh and Jayantil Bhagwandas Shah) to reach its conclusion; it treated contrary or restrictive decisions as fact-specific rather than laying down a general bar.
Rule made absolute.
This summary is strictly confined to information contained in the provided opinion. No facts or legal propositions beyond those expressly stated in the opinion have been added or inferred.
Per Agarwal, J.:— A short question that has been put for our consideration is whether a writ can be issued quashing an order detention when that order has not been served on the detenu and the detenu is not under detention. A few facts giving rise to the above question may be stated.
2. On the 15th of February 1981 five unaccompanied packages had been unloaded at the Air Cargo Complex at Saher Airport. Bombay. Two out of the said packages had been from London by the petitioner and three by one Johal Singh Manjit Singh and the consignee of the aforesaid five packages was one Mrs. Fulla Prabhakar. On the 26th February 1981 the petitioner, the aforesaid Johal Manjit Singh and one Dhillon arrived at Bombay from London and atayed in the hotel Holiday Inn. The petitioner as also the said Johal Manjit Singh had made an attempt to change the name of the consignee from Mrs. Fulla Prabhakar to their own name but the same was not fruitful. On certain information being received, the Customs Officers on or about 26th February 1981 seized the said packages. They were found to contain video cassetees and V.C Rs. Investigation revealed that the petitioner and the aforesaid Johan Manjit Singh, at the instance of the aforesaid Shri Dhillon had booked the said Consignment from London Both, the petitioner as also Johan Manjit Singh came to be arrested on the 28th February 1981 and were therefore released on bail. The petitioner on or about 13th May 1981 left India.back for London and this was on account of the fact that his Visa which had been issued for a period of three months was about to expire. It was on the 4th of December 1984 that the present impugned detention order was passad against the petitioner. On identical facts and grounds, a detention order was also passed against Shri Johal Manjit Singh. That order was duly served upon Johal Singh and he filed in this Court, a Criminal Writ Petition No. 650 of 1982 wherain by a judgment and order dated 18th January 1983 this Court (Kurdukar & Parekh, JJ.) quashed and set aside that detention order on the ground that the single instance in question did not warrant the passing of the said detention order and there was an inordinate delay in passing the said order of detention. The petitioner having left India almost six months prior to the date of the passing of the impugued detention order could not be served with that order and the petitioner is thus still at large. The present petition has been filed on the 2nd of December 1986 seeking to challenge the impugned order of detention.
3. Shri Madhu Patel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has contended that the impugned order of detention that has been passed against the petitioner is on grounds identical to the grounds on which the detention order against Johal Manjit Sinyh was passed. This Court after holding that this solitary instance did not justify the passing of the detention order and the detention order and the detention order had been passed after undue and unexplained delay, has quashed that detention order. Thus, this was a fit case where the impugned detention order should be quashed:
4. Smt. Desai, the learned P.P appearing on behalf the respondents, however, strenuously urged that it is not open for this Court to issue a writ quashing the detention order when the petitioner has not been sevred with the order of detention and the petitioner is still at large. In other words, her contention is that till such time that the detenu is under detention, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus cannot lie. In support of her contention she relied upon an unreported decision in Criminal Application No. ??? of 1987 (S.J Purohit v. State), decided by Rege & Mehta, JJ. where it was held that, that petition was premature as it was filed only on apprehension and without any detention order or the grounds and the material being served upon the petitioner therein. The procedure adopted by the petitioner appeared to be to keep away from the service of the order and file the petition on the imagination of the grounds for anticipatory order on the same basis as anticipatory bail and such a procedure was dot provided for by the Act. It was observed that the petitioner can move the Court as and when the detention order is served upon him.
5. In our judgment, there is no merit in the aforesaid contention of Smt. Desai. It may be that it may not be open to this Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus at the instance of the petitioner when he is not in detention. That however, cannot preclude the power of this Court to issue a writ of mandamus, certiorari or prohibition or a writ of the aforesaid nature. To say that a writ cannot be issued to quash an illegal order of detention would be to curtail the jurisdiction of the prerogative of the High Court to issue the aforesaid writs when no limitation can be found in that power. Article 226 is couched in a language wide enough to protect a person against an illegal invasion of his right to freedom by protecting him while still free and by regaining his freedom for him if he has already been wrongfully detained. It cannot be said that the High Courts are impotent to give relief against the prospect of illegal detention and must first require the intended detenu to surrender to the illegal detention. The High Court may under the provisions of Article 226 issue a direction order and writ in the nature of mandamus and/or certiorari questioning an illegal order of detention and may by direction, order and writ in the nature of prohibition enjoin the person threatening the illegal detention from executing the threat. The position of a person who is actually under illegal detention and of a person who is in imminent jeopardy of illegal detention are not far dissimilar. 2(Jayantil Bhagwandas Shah v. State of Maharashtra), 1981 Cri. L.J 767.
6. Article 226 is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wider power on the High Courts to reach injuctice wherever it is found. The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purpose for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised. It can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England, but the source of those writs also tn widened by the use of the expression “nature” for the said expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in India with those in England, but only drawns an analogy from them. This apart. High Courts can also issue directions, orders or writs other than the prerogative writs. It enables the High Courts to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. Any attempt to equate the scope of the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution with that of the English Courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of Government to a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the Article itself. To say that is not to say that the High Courts can function arbitrarily under this Article. Some limitations are implicit in the Article and others may be evolved to direct the article through defined channels. 3(Dwarkanath v. I.T Officer), A.I.R 1966 S.C page 81.
7. In this view of the matter we have no hesitation in holding that the present petition is maintainable despite the fact that the petitioner has not been served with the order of detention and is not in detention. We also fortified by the above view by the unreported decisions in the case of 4(Sukhramdas Prabhudas Thakur v. The State of Maharashtra Criminal Writ Petition No. 622 of 1982 decided by Kurdukar & Khatri, JJ.) 5(Sayed Iqbal… v. State Of Maharashtra….). Criminal Writ Petition No. 1159 of 1986 decided by Mehta & Daud, JJ. on 21st August, 1987 and 6(Johal Singh Manjit Singh v. Home Secretary), Criminal Writ Petition No. 650 of 1982 decided by Kurdukar & Parekh, JJ. on 18th January 1983 wherein the aforesaid decision of Jayantital Bhagwandas Shah, 1981 Criminal Law Journal page 767 has been followed. Thus the view expressed in Criminal Writ Petition No. 605 of 1982 relied upon by Smt. Desai would have to be held as applicable to the peculiar facts of that case and not as laying down the law of Universal application.
8. Though we have hold that there is no impediment in the power to entertain such positions and to issue appropriate write, it does not follow that such a power can be exercised indiscriminately. It must be stated that the issuance of writs is an extra ordinary remedy and the same has to be sparingly utilised. It is only in fit cases that this power would be exercised.
9. Coming to the facts of the present case the question is whether on the facts of the instant case, the impugned order of detention deserves to be quashed and set aside. Mrs. Desai strenuously contended that this is not a fit case where the extraordinary jurisdiction of issuing a writ can be invoked. According to her though the order of detention was passed on the 4th of December 1981, the petitioner has successfully avoided service thereof by remaining out of India. He, while being at large, has sought to have the said detention order set aside and avoid being detained. She submitted that instances of the present nature are on the increase and the present tendency to evade detention and yet challenge the order of detention through a next friend should be discouraged.
10. In our judgment, there is no merit in the aforesaid submission of Smt. Desai. It must be remembered that on identical facts, this Court had found the order of detention in respect of Johal Singh Manjit Singh in Criminal Writ Petition No. 650 of 1982 as unsustainable. It has been held that the delay of about nine months in passing the order of detention had not been properly explained. We find that the explanation given in the present petition for the delay is identical to the explanation given in that petition and on consideration of that explanation, this Court has held that the said delay has not been satisfactorily explained. The said order of detention has also been struck down on the ground that the same was not justified on the solitary instance that had taken place is February 1981. There is one additional glaring ground in the present petition which was not there in that petition and that is, that the impugned order of detention has been passed as far back as on the 4th of December 1981 and there is no evidence that the petitioner has either visited India after May 1981 or has indulged in any activities of the nature contemplated under section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act. Hence it will have to held that this is a fit case where the impugned order of detention daserves to be quashed and set aside on this ground also.
11. In the result, this petition succeeds. The impugned order of detention is quashed and set aside and rule is made absolute in terms of prayer Clauses (a) and (b).
Rule made absolute.
Alert