1. All these Appeals arise out of an accident which took place on 24-5-1968. The nature of the accident was of an extremely peculiar character and spells out a patent case of res ipsa loquitur. Really speaking, there is no dispute that the accident, which caused injuries to the appellants in First Appeals Nos. 579/75, 669/75, 602/76 and caused death of the husband of the appellant in First Appeal No. 601/76, was the result of the negligence of the person who was driving the vehicle at the relevant time. But the difficulty in this case is that nobody knows who was the driver and the respondents have studiedly refrained from bringing that fact before the Court. The appellants are ignorant and illiterate persons. Evidently, advantage is being taken of their ignorance and poverty.

2. The vehicle in question, MRC 5375, admittedly belonged at the relevant time to respondent 1. He had given the same for repairs to the Garage viz. Navyug Motor Garage. Respondents 2 to 4 are the partners of the firm owning the said garage. Respondent 5 is the Insurance Company with whom the vehicle has been insured by the owner, respondent 1. It appears that the work of the repairs of the car was more or less complete on 23-5-1968. It is the case of respondent No. 2, who has been examined as a witness for respondents 2 to 4, that he has an open garage, that work of the repairs of the car was more or less completed on 23-5-1968 and that in the evening he kept the Car's keys in the cupboard, locked the cupboard and had handed over the keys to one Kishanlal, who worked as an independent Auto Electrician in the Garage and also resided in the garage. The factual position, which is not in dispute, is that sometime or the other the vehicle was taken out of the garage by some one. The garage is situate at Agripada, near Mahalaxmi. The vehicle came all the way to the Crawford Market, driven by a person unknown. Time was 1.00 a.m and at that time these 4 appellants were sitting within a traffic island engaged in the most cherished hobby of this country, viz. chatting and gossiping. The vehicle, driven by unknown identity as it were, rushed into the traffic island and knocked these four appellants. Various injuries were received by three of them viz, the appellants in First Appeal No. 579/75, First Appeal No. 669/75 and First Appeal No. 602/76. One Bashir Ahmad who was then 28 years of age at that time died immediately.

The case of injured appellants is that they were removed to the Hospital, got some treatment and were later on discharged. Their further case is that they were kept out of work for a considerable time, the particulars about which will be given presently.

(a) The injured appellant in Appeal No. 579/75, Ramu Tolaram filed a claim before the Accidents Claims Tribunal for a total compensation of Rs. 15,000/-.

(b) The injured appellant in Appeal No. 669/75, Gulam Hussain Shaikh made a claim of Rs. 10,000/- before the Tribunal.

(c) The injured appellant in Appeal No. 602/76, Shaikh Mastan Shaikh Madar Saheb, made a claim of Rs. 15,000/- before the Tribunal.

(d) The widowed mother Rehematbi of deceased Bashir Ahmed in First Appeal No. 601/76 made a claim of Rs. 15,000/- before the Tribunal.

All these applications were heard together by the Tribunal. Even evidence was led more or less in common for all of them, excepting the evidence relating to the damage caused to the individual applicant. After examining the evidence, the learned Member of the Tribunal held that though the negligence of the driver was a matter of obviousness, neither respondent 1, the owner of the vehicle, nor respondents 2 to 4, the partners of the garage, could be held liable vicariously for the injuries caused by the driver of the vehicle.

As will be presently pointed out, they have not led any evidence to show as to who drove the vehicle, as to how the vehicle came out of the garage after it was very much parked therein at 7.30 p.m on 23-5-1968. Those facts must have been within the knowledge of respondents 2 to 4. The evidence shows that not only they have not led evidence about that aspect but have deliberately refrained from even making any enquiries in that behalf. According to the Tribunal, it is not proved as to whether the vehicle was driven by anybody with the knowledge or consent of respondents 2 to 4 and hence respondents 2 to 4 have been exonerated by the Tribunal of every liability. So far as respondent 1, the owner of the vehicle, is concerned, the Tribunal has held that he could not be held liable because the vehicle was not within his control at that time because he had given the same for repairs to the Garage. In this manner, though the vehicle was driven by somebody negligently when it was in the custody of respondents 2 to 4, those respondents have been given a clean chit by the Tribunal and thus all the appellants have been left high and dry. The learned Member has also held that this was a case of negligence of the driver, whosoever he might be.

The Tribunal has, however, examined each appellant's case as regards the damage. It is held that the appellant in First Appeal No. 579/75 has proved damages to the extent of Rs. 15000/- that the appellant in First Appeal No. 669/75 has proved damages to the extent of Rs. 275/-, the appellant in First Appeal No. 602/76 has proved damages to the extent of Rs. 2250/- and that the appellant in First Appeal No. 601/76 has proved damages to the extent of Rs. 20,000/- including the appellant's personal claim of loss of consortium However, in view of the fact that according to the Tribunal none of the respondents was liable for the negligence of the driver on the basis of the theory of vicarious liability, the claim of each of the appellant has been dismissed by the Tribunal. I have to examine the correctness of the these findings of the Tribunal.

3. I may mention that when the Appeals reached hearing before me Mr. P. Shankaranarayan, who has filed Vakalatnama on behalf of the appellants, chose to remain absent. I have to hear the appellants with the assistance of Mr. Mhamane, who has appeared for the Insurance Company, respondent 5.

After the Appeals were heard for some time and after I arrived at the tentative conclusion that the view taken by the Tribunal as regards the liability of both respondents 2 to 4 as well as respondent 1 could not be sustained, Mr. P. Shankarnarayan appeared in the Court but only to state that he had no instructions from his clients, the appellants, and that he wanted to withdraw his appearance. By a separate order, the Court had already recorded that this was an extremely unprofessional conduct of making an application for withdrawal of the appearance at the eleventh hour. All the same, I have no desire to delay the hearing of the appeals. Since I was likely to allow the appeals even without any argument from Mr. P. Shankarnarayan, I found it unnecessary to adjourn the hearing of the appeals any further. I would have certainly adjourned it if I needed some assistance of any Advocate on behalf of the appellants. But since I am allowing all the appeals except one to substantial extent, I am not inclined to adjourn the hearing of the appeals at all.

4. In my view, the finding recorded by the Tribunal to the effect that none of the respondents, 1 to 4, could be held vicariously liabel for the negilgence of the driver of the vehicle cannot be sustained at all.

(a) I will first deal with the liability of respondents 2 to 4. I may mention here that Mr. Mhamane, the learned Advocate appearing for the Insurance Company, respondent 5, was fair enough to state at the very outset that so far as respondents 2 to 4 were concerned, the Tribunal had no justification for exonerating them from the liability. However, Mr. Mhamane is not appearing for them and hence the concession given by him cannot bind respondents 2 to 4 although they are not appearing in this Court, either through any Advocate or personally. I will have, therefore, to examine the evidence led by respondent 2 and will have to see as to whether respondents 2 to 4 have been rightly exonerated by the Tribunal.

(i) As regards the liability of respondents 2 to 4 what strikes as the most signficant aspect of the matter is that the only witness examined by these witnesses, viz. respondent 2, has not stated one word as to who took the vehicle out of the garage and drove it at the time when the accident occurred. All that he has stated in his evidence is that at 7.30 p.m on 23-5-1968 the repairs of the vehicle was more or less complete and that he had locked the vehicle and had kept the keys of the vehicle in the cupboard in the garage. He admitted that the key of the cupboard was handed over by him to Kishanlal. He further admitted that Kishanlal looked after the garage in his absence and that though he was an independent Auto Electrician he resided in the garage itself. He wanted the Court to believe that he (respondent 2 Kapoor) gave no authority to Kishanlal to drive the vehicle. The Court has believed this evidence of said Kapoor, to my mind, without any justification. In these matters, we have to go by common experience of people owning the cars. It is a matter of common experience that when a car is given to any garage or repairs and when the owner wants to take it away after the working hours, some person is always kept as attendant, who always takes out the car for the owner. Quite often, he also drives the car out for the sake of the owner. Kishanlal was not an ordinary attendant. He was the Auto Electrician. It could not be expected that he did not know driving of the Car. Obviously, as the evidence goes, he was in the custody of the Car keys. It is, therefore, inconceivable that he would not be having authority to drive the car out of the garage, because such authority will always be necessary for one purpose relating to the car, or the other. Such an authority in such a case must be held implicit and if it is to be held that the said attendant did not have the authority satisfactory evidence in that behalf will have to be led by the owner of the garage to prove otherwise. The onus of proving such a fact cannot be upon the injured person, because from the very nature of things he could have had no knowledge about it. Those facts are within the knowledge of the garage owner and the person who drives the car with or without the authority of the garage owner. What is remarkable in this case is that though the keys were in the custody of Kishanlal, respondents 2 to 4, the owners of the Garage, have not examined Kishanlal in this case at all. Kishanlal would have thrown considerable light upon the question as to how the car came to be driven out of the Garage when the keys of the car were very much in his custody at the relevant time. It was incumbent upon respondents 2 to 4 to lead satisfactory evidence as to how the Car keys went to some driver of unknown identity. To my mind, a very strong adverse inference must be raised against respondents 2 to 4 in this behalf.

(ii) But equally significant is the fact that respondent 2 Kapoor has not as much as murmered one word in his evidence as to what inquiry he made as regards the identity of the person driving the car at the relevant time. It appears that he was informed by Kishanlal and another person about the incident at about 2.00 a.m at night. Questions have been asked to respondent 2, Kapoor, as to what information was received by him from Kishanlal. The questions were disallowed by the Tribunal on the ground that it would be a hearsay evidence.

I have grave doubt as regards the correctness of this view. Questions asked by respondent 2 to Kishanlal at the particular time viz. 2.00 a.m on 24-5-1968 were very much relevant not as regards what was the answer but as to what was the question. If the car was driven without the authority of respondent 2, the first question that he would have asked Kisanlal would be as to how the car went out of the garage. The question that was asked was as to what was the information given by Kisanlal to him at that unearthly hour. What Kisanlal told him would be relevant. But it may be said that answer may be the hearsay evidence. But the question that must have been asked by respondent 2 to Kisanlal is very much relevant and the evidence about that question is not hearsay evidence. The Court should have set out defendant 2's question, though not the answer received by him to the question, or else, the answer received by him should have been set out. The nature of answer given by Kisanlal would have thrown light upon the nature of the question put by him. By not allowing the questions asked in this connection, the Tribunal has kept important piece of evidence in favour of the applicants out of record.

But even assuming that the said evidence was not admissible under S. 32 of the Evidence Act, the fact remains that no evidence is led by respondents, 2 to 4 to prove as to who drove the vehicle out of the garage when the keys of the car were lying in the custody of Kisanlal, who was admittedly the custodian of the keys. Non-examination of Kisanlal in this behalf and the studied abstinence on the part of the respondents 2 to 4 to lead any evidence in this behalf must give rise to the strongest adverse inference against them.

This is the reason why I very much appreciate Mr. Mhamane's contention that so far as respondents 2 to 4 are concerned, they could not be exonerated of the liability.

(iii) However, Mr. Mhamane argued further that so far as the Insurance Company is concerned, it had undertaken to indemnify the loss that would be caused to respondent 1, not to respondents 2 to 4 with whom the Company had no privity of contract.

Mr. Mhamane may be right on this point. But what the learned Advocate has lost sight of is that even assuming that the Company was not liable for the negligence of respondents 2 to 4, actual or vicarious, it would be answerable for the liability of respondent 1, the owner of the car and it is here that the court must pause to consider as to whether respondent 1 was not liable vicariously for the acts or omission of respondents 2 to 4. It may be that respondent 1 will not be liable vicariously for the loss caused by the unidentified driver, because respondent 1 was not having the control of the car at that time, the control having been transferred by respondent 1 lawfully to respondents 2 to 4. When the car is given by the owner of the vehicle to the garage for repairs, the control of the car certainly stands transferred to the owner of the garage. But the point is that in such a case the owner of the garage is constituted by the owner of the car as his agent. Everything done or omitted to be done by the agent will be something for which the principal will be vicariously liable. It is the principal's liability for the acts done or omitted to be done by the agent. I give an illustration to Mr. Mhamane. The owner of the garage makes various purchases for the purpose of the repairs of the car. The owner of the car has to pay for those purchases. This could be so only because the owner of the garage is the agent of the owner of the car and the purchases made by the former are as the agent of the latter. If the doctrine of agency extends to this situation, there is no reason why it should not extend to other situation where the car is allowed by the agent to go out of the garage berserk. The liability of the agent will have to be vicariously fastened even upon the principal in such a case.

(iv) Mr. Mhamane relied upon the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court reported in 1984 Mah LJ 456 : (AIR 1984 Bom 335), V.J Acharya v. Ratilal Fulchand Shah firstly in support of the proposition that the owner of the garage is certainly liable for the damage caused to any person by the car while the same is in the custody of the owner of the garage and secondly in support of his contention that the owner of the vehicle can in no case, be liable for the acts or omissions of the owner of the garage once the control of the car is transferred by the owner of the car to the owner of the garage. The facts of the case were as follows:—

A car got stalled up on the road and hence the car owner went to the garage and told the owner about the complainant. Hearing the nature of the complaint the garage owner asked his mechanic to accompany the car owner to the place where the car was parked. The mechanic had no driving license. But all the same, he drove the car to the garage and that too negligently, thus knocking down the claimant. The Tribunal awarded damages both against the owner of the garage as also the owner of the vehicle. A learned single Judge of this Court held that whether the mechanic was authorised by the owner to drive the car or not, the vicarious liability for the negligence on the part of his employees was complete. However, the Court further held that the mechanic was not the agent of the owner of the car. It was therefore held that the penalty for the negligence on the part of the mechanic could not be visited upon the car owner.

(v) So far as the first proposition is concerned, I am in full agreement with the same. But so far as the present case is concerned, the state of record is even more serious. In that case, the contention was that the mechanic had no authority to drive the car and in fact he had not even any driving license. In the instant case, the evidence of the 2nd respondent that Kisanlal had no authority to drive the car is just incredible and, further, in view of the fact that the 2nd respondent has kept a very eloquent mum about the identity of the person driving the car at the particular time reflects upon his evidence in this behalf.

But the above judgment is no authority for the question as to whether the owner of the garage was the agent of the owner of the car or not. The perusal of the judgment shows that what was argued before the Court was as to whether the mechanic having no licence to drive the car and who all the same drove the car negligently was the agent of the owner of the car or not. With respect, I am in full agreement with the view taken by the learned single Judge that the mechanic driver could not be considered to be the agent of the owner as such directly. But the point is that when the car is given by the car owner to the owner of the garage for repairs, the owner of the garage is constituted an agent of the owner of the car for various purposes and while doing that work the owner of the garage is required to drive the car in and out of the garage, either himself or through his own agent. No doubt such owner of the garage is an independent contractor. But even an independent contractor is an agent of the principal by whom the contract is entrusted. I may mention here that this aspect of the vicarious liability of the owner of the car was not urged before this Court when the appeal was decided by this Court. What was urged was that the mechanic was directly the agent of the car owner, not that the owner of the garage was the agent of the car owner. In the present case, I have held that the owner of the garage is liable for the negligence of the driver in question. Once we go a step further and hold that the owner of the garage was the agent of the owner of the car, the principal viz. the owner of the car, must be held exposed to the vicarious liability. Since this point was not even urged before this Court and since this Court had no occasion to consider this aspect of the question in the judgment reported in 1984 Mah LJ 456 : (AIR 1984 Bom 335), that judgment cannot be relied upon by Mr. Mhamane as an authority on the question as to whether the garage owner was the agent of the car owner or not. If any authority is necessary for this propostion, the same can be seen in the Full Bench judgment of this Court in 58 Bom LR 404 : (AIR 1956 Bom 332). Parappa Ningappa v. Mallappa Kallappa popularly known as “Parappa” case. In that case, it has been held by Chagla C.J, speaking for the Full Bench, as follows:—

“A decision of a Full Bench, or of any Court, is binding provided it is a considered decision. But when a decision has been given without the pros and cons of the question being considered it cannot be urged that such a decision acquires a finality which cannot be interfered with by any subsequent decision.”

I may mention here that if the above point of the relationship of agency between the car owner and the garage owner was examined and decided by the learned single Judge of this Court, I would have certainly referred this question to a Division Bench. But since the above question as such has not been decided it is unnecessary for me to drive the poor appellants to a Division Bench requiring them to go on knocking the door of justice further and further.

(vi) This brings me to the question of quantum of damages viz-a-vis the claim of each of the applicant.

As mentioned above, so far as the claim of the appellant in Appeal No. 601 of 1976 is concerned, it has been allowed by the Tribunal in toto. From the averment made in para 21 of the original Application No. 701/68, it does appear that the claim extended to Rs. 15,000/- only. Even in the prayer clause, the claim is of Rs. 15,000/-. But it is further stated that such other sums should be awarded as may be deemed just, proper and reasonable by the Tribunal. Properly, it is on this account that the Tribunal has found that when the husband of the applicant widow had died, general damages, of Rs. 15,000/- would be the minimum that could be awarded to her and that he rightly held that, that apart, she should be awarded Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium. But when the applicant has made a claim for Rs. 15,000/- only as per the claim in Para 21, the amount adjudicated upon is Rs. 20,000/-. In the present appeal also, the claim made by the appellant is of Rs. 20,000/-

I am inclined to take the view that the amount awarded by the Tribunal is quite legal apart from being reasonable. So far as the reasonableness of the Award is concerned, it can hardly be disputed. A man of 28 years of age has died. The Tribunal has taken his age to be 35 years. I am assuming that his age was 35 years. Further, the Tribunal held his remaining life span to be 25 years. I see no reason why it should be so. At least till the age of 60, the man could have worked and provided wherewithals to his family. The general damages of Rs. 15,000/- are, therefore, themselves very much inadequate. Further, the widow is certainly entitled to damages for loss of consortium and the amount of Rs. 5,000/- granted on that account cannot be said to be much of a munificence. The only technical objection, therefore, would be as to whether the Court can award the amount larger than the one claimed. On this point, there may be some difficulty. When court fees are required to be paid on any claim ad valorem, the fact that the claim is restricted to a smaller amount and the fact that the Court fee commensurate with the claim is paid would have telling effect and the Court would be helpless in granting to the applicant more than what is claimed by him. But, in the instant case, the claim of the claimant was itself nebulous. From the prayer clause it is clear that though Rs. 15,000/- is specified, it is further stated that such other amount as the Court might find just, proper and reasonable, should be paid. This means that the claim is not restricted to Rs. 15,000/-, but the extent of the claim is left to the Court. Further, the point to be noted is that the Court fee payable on the claim is not ad valorem Court fee but fixed Court fee. If that is the position, then there is no reason why this discrepancy in the statement made in Para 21 and in the prayer clause should not be resolved in favour of the claimant. I, therefore, hold that the claimant is entitled to a sum of Rs. 20,000/- as awarded by the Tribunal with interest as provided by law from the date of the application till the date of realisation. The appellant should also be entitled to the costs of this appeal.

(B) So far as First Appeal No. 579/75 is concerned, the Tribunal has awarded only a sum of Rs. 1500/- out of a total claim of Rs. 15,000/-. The applicant sustained fracture of left tibia and was hospitalised for a full period of 30 days. His leg remained in plaster for 3 weeks. The Tribunal disbelieved the applicant when he stated that the till got pain and was still taking treatment. The Tribunal expected him to examine Hikumtulla, with whom he was working, after 6 to 7 months, and on account of his inability to do so, his contention that he was immobilised for about 6 to 7 months has been disbelieved by the evidence. According to the applicant, he was employed by said Hikmutulla after he started attending to his work, that is to say about 6 or 7 months after the accident. If Hikmutulla was not available for evidence, it would not be proper to draw adverse inference against the applicant. After all, it would be difficult for a very poor employee to expect his rich employer to come to the Court for giving evidence for him. Even if summons is served to him from the Court, the purpose would not be served because in such a case the employee would have a justified fear that the employer would become enraged against him, jeopardising his chances of continuance of employment.

But that apart, point is that if the applicant remained in the Hospital for nearly 3 weeks and did suffer injuries resulting in pain and sufferance, there is no reason why he should be cut off with a pittance of compensation. The pain and suffering of a rich man is not more acute than the pain and suffering of a poor riff-raff. It may be that special damages would be different. But the general damages for pain and suffering and for general immobilisation should not defer to a very larger extent. The fact remains that the applicant remained hospitalised for 3 weeks where he must have been subjected to untold agonies (which are the well-known concomitants of poor patients' lives in the general hospitals) for no fault on his part. To my mind, the applicant should get at least Rs. 5000/- on this account. Further, there is no reason to believe why it should not be held that the applicant was unable to walk for quite some time after he was discharged from the Hospital. He would have been deprived of at least 3 months' income on that account which comes to about Rs. 450/-. I should say that it is roughly Rs. 500/-. A sum of Rs. 10,500/- should be therefore, a reasonable sum for being awarded to the claimant.

(C) In First Appeal No. 669/75 the claim is of Rs. 10,000/-, whereas what is awarded by the Tribunal is a pittance of Rs. 275/-. I was inclined to enhance the Award in that behalf. But unfortunately the names of respondents 1 and 2 have been deleted by the order of the Registrar of this court dt/- 14-10-1980. This means that the decision in favour of respondents 1 and 2 has now become final if the decision in favour of respondent 1 is final, the Insurance Company, respondents, also cannot be subjected to any liability. If respondent 2 is exonerated, then it would be impossible that respondents 3 and 4 can be held liable, because their liability is bound to be joint and several. Very reluctantly though, I have no other option but to dismiss First Appeal No. 669 of 1975.

(D) There remains First Appeal No. 602/76, arising from Application No. 693/68. In this case, the names of respondents 3 and 4 have been deleted. But I have held above that respondents 2 to 4 were only the agents of respondent 1. If respondent 1 is liable as a principal, the insured party would be entitled to be reimbursed from the Insurance Company, respondents, who has insured the claim against respondent 1. The deletion of names of respondents 3 and 4 would at the most exonerate respondent 2. I will consider the question separately. However, this does not affect the liability of respondent 1 and respondent 5.

In this case, even the Tribunal has held that the appellant sustained fracture of left tibia and was in the Hospital for 30 days. As per the Tribunal's finding, his leg remained in plaster for 3 months. In spite of this position, general damages assessed by the Tribunal is of Rs. 1800/- only. I see no reason why the Court should be so thrifty in such matters. To my mind, for the pains and sufferance and for all other inconveniences suffered by the applicant, for no fault on his part, he should be entitled at least to Rs. 15,000/-. The Tribunal has held that he is entitled to Rs. 450/- as special damages on account of loss of income for 3 months. I would have been inclined to enhance even this claim. But since the total claim made by the applicant is of Rs. 10,000/- only, it would be unnecessary for me to further consider the question any further. However, the claim is restricted by the appellant to Rs. 10,000/- only. Hence, the Appeal will have to be allowed to the extent of Rs. 10,000/-.

5. This brings me to the question relating to the effect of the fact that there is no effective appeal filed by the appellant in F.A No. 602/76 (Application No. 693/68) against original opponents 3 and 4 in that their names have been deleted from the array of parties. They are impleaded only because they are the partners of the firm respondent 2. Respondent 1 is the managing partner of the firm respondent 2. Both of them are agents of the firm. Respondents 3 and 4 are after all only the agents of respondent 2 firm. Decree, if any, passed against the firm must bind its agents whether they are impleaded or not. Deletion of their names from the array of parties need not, therefore, be fatal for this appeal.

6. For the reasons mentioned above, First Appeal No. 669 of 1975 fails and the same is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.

First Appeal No. 579 of 1975 is allowed. The Award of the lower Court is set aside and the appellant is held entitled to a sum of Rs. 10,500/- with interest at the rate of 6% from the date of the application till the date of realisation as also for costs of this Appeal.

First Appeal No. 601 of 1976 is allowed. The Award passed by the lower Court is set aside and the appellant is held entitled to a sum of Rs. 20,000/- with interest at 6% from the date of the application till the date of realisation and also for the costs of the appeal from respondents 1 to 4 jointly and severally. The appellant, however, will be entitled to recover the amount due and payable by respondent 1 from respondent 5 as the insurer of respondent 1.

First Appeal No. 602 of 1976 is allowed. The Award passed by the lower Court is set aside so far as respondents 1, 2 and 5 are concerned and the appellant shall be entitled to recover the amount of Rs. 10,000/- jointly and severally from the said respondents 1, 2 and 5. It is made clear that the appellant will be entitled to recover the amount payable by respondent 1 from respondent 5.

All the appellants shall also be entitled to interest on the amount awarded at the rate of 6% from the date of the application till the date of realisation and also to the costs of the appeal.

The Costs shall be taxed with reference to the Court fees only. No costs shall be payable to the appellant for the Advocates fees, because the Advocate has taken discharge.

Respondent 5 is directed to deposit the amount awarded in each of the appeals in this Court within 6 weeks from today. After the amount is deposited, the office is directed to issue notices to the appellants concerned for withdrawal of the said amount from this Court after appropriate identification.

Order accordingly.