Dhabe, J.:— This is a Letters Patent Appeal by the landlord against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court setting aside the order of the learned Appellate Deputy Collector, Nagpur who has granted permission to her to give quit notice to the respondent-tenant under clause 13(3)(vii) of the C.P and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (for short, “Rent Control Order”).

2. Briefly, the facts are that the appellant/landlord purchased the suit house for a consideration of Rs. 35,000/- by sale-deed dated 15-6-1978. On 14-9-1978 she filed an application under clauses 13(3)(vi) and (vii) of the Rent Control Order seeking permission to give quit notice to the respondent/tenant who was occupying the whole of the suit house. The respondent/tenant resisted the said application by filing his written statement. The parties led evidence before the Rent Controller. The learned Rent Controller after considering the evidence on record dismissed the application filed by the appellant/landlord. The appellant/landlord preferred an appeal before the Appellate Deputy Collector, Nagpur who maintained the order of the Rent Controller under clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order. He, however, set aside the order of the Rent Controller as regards the permission sought under clause 13(3)(vii) of the Rent Control Order. He held that the appellant/landlord was entitled to permission under clause 13(3)(vii) of the Rent Control Order. Being aggrieved, the respondent/tenant preferred a writ petition in this Court which it appears was heard ex parte. The learned Single Judge of this Court set aside the order of the learned appellate Deputy Collector and, therefore, the application filed by the appellant/landlord stood dismissed wholly. Being aggrieved, the appellant/landlord has preferred the instant Letters Patent Appeal against the aforesaid judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent/tenant has raised a preliminary objection that the instant Letters Patent Appeal is not maintainable because the judgment of the learned Single Judge, according to him is in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In support of the above contention he has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Umaji v. Radhikabai, 1986 Supp SCC 401 : AIR 1986 SC 1272. In particular he has relied upon paragraph 106 of the said judgment. On reading para 106 it is clear that according to the Supreme Court where a petition is filed both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India then if the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, and if the party chooses to file an application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 of the Constitution and thus allow the party aggrieved a right of intra-Court appeal if provided by the Letters Patent of the said Court. It is clear from the said judgment that it is held that if a petition is exclusively under Article 227 no Letters Patent Appeal would lie under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this Court.

3. The question, therefore, to be considered in the instant case in the light of the above judgment would be whether the petition filed by the respondent/tenant is exclusively under Article 227 of the Constitution. The title clause of the writ petition filed by the respondent/tenant shows that the petition is under Article 226 read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India for a writ of certiorari, mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction. It is true that as required in a petition under Article 226 the authority whose judgment is challenged is not joined as a party. However, the prayer clause (a) in the writ petition shows that the respondent/tenant has principally claimed that by a writ of certiorari or any other appropraite writ, order or direction the impugned order of the learned appellate Deputy Collector should be quashed. As regards the lacuna of not joining the authority as a party it may be seen that such an objection could have been raised in the writ petition by the appellant/landlord who was a respondent in the writ petition because the writ petition is preferred by the respondent/tenant.

4. In our view, the contents of the writ petition show that a relief is claimed by the respondent/tenant under Article 226 of the Constitution also. It may be seen that the rent control authorities are quasi judicial authorities are amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and, therefore, the relief could have been granted to the respondent/tenant thereunder. At any rate, in our view, in construing the contents of the writ petition it should be liberally construed so as to allow the parties to have a right of appeal rather than construing the same in a manner which would deprive them of a right of appeal. It may be that the order of the learned Single Judge is against the appellant/landlord. Had it been against the respondent/tenant he would have also been able to avail of the right of appeal, under the Letters Patent relying upon the contents of his petition. We, therefore, cannot accept the preliminary objection on behalf of the respondent/tenant that the instant Letters Patent Appeal is not maintainable.

5. Turning to the merits of the case the learned counsel appearing for the appellant has urged before us that the construction placed by the learned Single Judge upon clause 13(3)(vii) of the Rent Control Order is erroneous. It appears from the judgment of the learned Single Judge that according to him the word “essential” used in clause 13(3)(vii) of the Rent Control Order qualifies both the expressions, “repairs” as well as “alterations” because he has held that the word “essential” used in clause 13(3)(vii) contemplates that the said clause has a nexus with the condition of the house and not with the mere desire of the landlord. It is in the above view of clause 13(3)(vii) that he held that in the absence of appropriate evidence in regard to the condition of house the permission cannot be granted to the appellant landlord under clause 13(3)(vii) of the Rent Control Order.

6. As regards the construction of clause 13(3)(vii) of the Rent Control Order we may usefully refer to a previous decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court (Masodkar J. as he then was) in the case of Sumitradevi v. Chunnilai, 1975 Mh. L.J 290. The learned Single Judge has held in the aforesaid judgment that the word “essential” used in clause 13(3)(vii) controls the word “repairs” and not the word “alterations” used therein. Further according to him the expression “or” used therein is used disjunctively to cover separate categories of cases thereunder. The learned Single Judge in the above case has considered the object of using both the expressions “repairs” and “alterations” in clause 13(3)(vii) of the Rent Control Order. He has held that if the word “essential” were to qualify and control the expression “alterations” it would defeat its “plain meaning”. He has further held that by using the word “alterations” the essential and inherent right of the landlord to rebuild or remodel his house is not intended to be fettered by considerations which attend Upon the case of essential repairs. He, therefore, held that the word “essential” does not control or qualify the word “alterations” used in clause 13(3)(vii). The reason pointed out by him is that a landlord may want to rebuild or make structural changes in the house for its proper enjoyment which may in a given case accelerate its value as well as its present and potential utility. It is this right of the landlord which, according to him, is recognised by the use of the word “alterations” in clause 13(3)(vii) of the Rent Control Order.

7. According to us, the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the case of Sumitradevi v. Chunnilai, cited supra, represents the correct law on clause 13(3)(vii) of the Rent Control Order. The view taken by the learned Single Judge in the above judgment is supported by the decisions of the Supreme Court under analogous provisions of other Rent Control Legislations. In the case of S.M Gopala Krishna Chetti v. Ganeshan, (1975) 2 SCC 408 : AIR 1975 SC 1750, it is observed by the Supreme Court that the landlord has every right to demolish and reconstruct his premises with a view to improve his business or to get better returns on his investment and per se if such a step is taken by the landlord it cannot be characterised as mala fide. The same view is taken by the Supreme Court in P.N Shenoy v. S.V Shenoy, (1970) 1 SCC 499 : AIR 1971 SC 942. The view thus taken by the learned Single Judge in the previous case, cited supra, is thus supported by the view taken by the Supreme Court also.

8. It is thus clear that the word “essential” used in clause 13(3)(vii) governs the word “repairs” and not the word “alterations”. However, it would not necessarily mean that at the mere ipse dixit of the landlord the permission can be sought under clause 13(3)(vii) on the ground of alterations. The landlord must still make out a bona fide case of reconstruction or remodelling of the house. It is, however, clear that the test about the condition of the house for establishing the necessity for its reconstruction such as the consideration that unless it is constructed it would be dangerous to live in the said house would not be applicable in regard to the case of “alterations”.

9. Considering the facts in the instant case in the light of the above law under clause 13(3)(vii) it may be seen that the landlord has pleaded in her application that the construction of the house is very old and that it has completed its life. She has, therefore, averred that she wants to dismantle the entire structure and wants to reconstruct a new three-storeyed house consisting of one shop block and strong room on the ground floor and residential accommodation on the 1st and 2nd floors. In the light of the pleadings the evidence is led on behalf of the landlord who has examined her husband and the Architect Mr. V.A Joshi who has deposed that the new construction as per plan cannot be made unless the old building is demolished. The husband of the appellant has also deposed that the new construction as per plan cannot be made unless the old building is demolished. The husband of the appellant has further deposed that the construction is about 100 years' old. He has produced the sanctioned map of the Corporation to prove the case of the appellant that she wants to reconstruct the suit house.

10. On the other hand, the respondent stated in his evidence that the condition of the house is good. In support of the above case he has also examined his Architect Mr. P.N Rajurkar who has stated in his evidence that the house is technically sound and can stand for next 25 years. He also deposed that it would not be advisable to dismantle the existing house and reconstruct it. It is clear from his report that the suit house had undergone some additions and alterations in the year 1938 which would support the contention of the landlord that it is a very old house. It is true that he has stated that there are no cracks in the wall, that the foundation of the house is sound and that it can stand for the next 25 years. But as already pointed out the consideration whether the house is dilapidated or not is not relevant when the permission is sought on the ground of “alterations” under clause 13(3)(vii) of the Rent Control Order.

11. The learned counsel for the respondent/tenant has next urged that the claim of the landlord is not bona fide because the husband of the appellant/landlord indulges in the business of purchasing and selling the houses and he does not intend to construct the house. In support of his submission he has drawn our attention to the admission of the husband of the appellant/landlord in his evidence that in 1971 he had purchased one house for Rs. 15,500/- near the suit house and had sold it in 1973 for Rs. 25,000/-. In our view, a single instance as cited by the respondent/tenant would not mean that it is the business of the husband of the appellant to indulge in the business of purchasing and selling the houses.

12. In the instant case the claim of the appellant/landlord for remodelling and reconstructing the house after demolishing it is supported by the sanctioned map of the Corporation. Moreover, in this Court an undertaking is given by the appellant/landlord by which he has bound himself by a time schedule for reconstruction of the house. He has stated that he would construct the house within one year from the date the respondent/tenant vacates the suit house. He has also stated that he would offer the respondent/tenant an equal area in the new house. It, therefore, cannot be said that the claim made by the appellant/landlord in the instant case is not bona fide. Moreover since there is a right of reinduction to the respondent/tenant under Clause 13(7)9 of the Rent Control Order if there is any such apprehension that the suit house is likely to be sold he can claim reinduction in the suit premises. The claim of the appellant/landlord cannot thus be negatived on this ground. A perusal of the evidence of the husband of the appellant/landlord shows that the appellant/landlord has capacity to invest funds for reconstructing the house.

13. In view of all the above facts and circumstances it has to be held that the appellant/landlord has made out a case for permission under clause 13(3)(vii) of the Rent Control Order. The finding of the learned Single Judge who has taken an erroneous view of law on the question of permission sought under clause 13(3)(vii) on the ground of “alterations” cannot be sustained. The view taken by the learned appellate Deputy Collector that the appellant/landlord has made out a case under clause 13(3)(vii) is correct and has to be upheld. In the result, the instant Letters Patent Appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside and that of the learned appellate Deputy Collector granting permission to the appellant/landlord under clause 13(3)(vii) of the Rent Control Order is restored subject to the condition that the undertaking given by the appellant/landlord today i.e 21-4-1987 would be a part of this judgment and subject to that undertaking the permission granted by the learned appellate Deputy Collector is affirmed. There would, however, be no order as to costs in this appeal.

Appeal allowed.