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M/S. Consolidated Pneumatic Tool Co. (India) Ltd. v. R.A Gadekar And Others

Bombay High Court
Feb 28, 1986
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Dharmadhikari and Puranik, JJ.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner company challenged an order of the Industrial Tribunal dated 7 October 1985 which held that references made under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the "Central Act" / "Industrial Disputes Act") were not barred by section 59 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (the "MRTU and PULP Act").

The record shows that initially a complaint under the MRTU and PULP Act was filed in respect of certain employees who were also covered by references made by the State Government under the Industrial Disputes Act on 5 March 1985. At the time the MRTU complaint was filed, conciliation proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act were pending; the employer contended the MRTU complaint was not maintainable in view of section 59 of the MRTU and PULP Act.

The State Government later made references covering 57 employees. The opinion states the MRTU complaint was "qua 53 employees only" in one paragraph and "restricted to 50 employees only" in another paragraph of the judgment. After the references were made, the complainant union applied to withdraw the MRTU complaint; the Industrial Tribunal, Nasik, on 17 July 1985 disposed of the complaint for want of prosecution with no costs, noting the complainant did not wish to proceed and the company had no objection.

Following withdrawal, the union filed a statement of claim in the reference proceedings and the company filed a written statement raising a preliminary objection that the references were not maintainable by reason of section 59 of the MRTU and PULP Act. The Industrial Tribunal overruled that preliminary objection, and the company challenged that order by way of the present writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether references under the Industrial Disputes Act are barred by section 59 of the MRTU and PULP Act where a complaint under the MRTU and PULP Act had been filed but later withdrawn.
  2. What is the scope and meaning of the term "institute" as used in section 59 of the MRTU and PULP Act—specifically, whether mere filing of a complaint amounts to "instituting" proceedings under that Act for the purposes of section 59.
  3. Whether the company's prior conduct (having previously raised the same objection and later consenting to withdrawal of the MRTU complaint) estops it from raising the section 59 objection in the reference proceedings.
  4. Whether, on the facts (including that the references covered a larger set of employees than the MRTU complaint), the Industrial Tribunal correctly overruled the preliminary objection.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner-Company's Arguments

  • The references made under the Industrial Disputes Act are not maintainable because proceedings in respect of the same matter had been instituted under the MRTU and PULP Act and are therefore barred by section 59 of that Act.
  • It was contended (by Shri Kaka, for the petitioner) that the word "institute" in section 59 should be read broadly—so that mere filing of a complaint under the MRTU and PULP Act amounts to instituting proceedings and thereby ousts the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under the Central Act.

Respondent-Union's Position / Relevant Conduct

  • The union initially filed the complaint under the MRTU and PULP Act but applied to withdraw that complaint after the State Government made references under the Industrial Disputes Act; the withdrawal was made with the company's consent and the Industrial Tribunal disposed of the complaint for want of prosecution.
  • After withdrawal, the union proceeded in the reference by filing a statement of claim and challenged the company's later attempt to raise the section 59 bar.
  • There is an implicit position in the union's actions that where no effective steps were taken under the MRTU and PULP Act before withdrawal (or where withdrawal occurred with consent because of reference), section 59 would not operate to bar references under the Central Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Suppiah Chettiar v. V. Chinnathurai, AIR 1957 Madras 216 Authority for the meaning of the word "institute" (as used in a statutory provision), holding that "institute" means something more than mere filing of a claim. The court respectfully agreed with the Madras High Court's view and applied the same reasoning to section 59 of the MRTU and PULP Act: mere filing, if withdrawn before any effective steps are taken, does not constitute "instituting" proceedings for the purposes of section 59.
Mahendra Gajanan Kharsor v. Zonal Manager, Maharashtra State Cooperative Marketing Federation Ltd., (1984) (49) FLR 232 Held that conciliation proceedings cannot be equated with proceedings under the Central Act within the contemplation of section 59 of the MRTU and PULP Act. The court regarded this decision as distinguishable on its facts and noted that it does not control the present case.
Maharashtra Girni Kamgar Union v. S. Carona Sahu Co. Pvt. Ltd., (1985) CLR 100 Held that where a complaint under the MRTU and PULP Act had been filed and effective steps had been taken under that Act, the State Government had no power to make a reference under the Central Act to determine an identical question. The court found this decision distinguishable on its facts because, in the present case, the complaint had been withdrawn (and with the employer's consent), and therefore the earlier decision did not require the same outcome here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began with a textual reading of section 59 of the MRTU and PULP Act, observing that it embodies the principles of double jeopardy and election of remedies: if proceedings in respect of a matter have been instituted under the MRTU and PULP Act, then no proceedings shall be entertained under the Central Act in respect of that matter, and vice versa.

The court rejected any attempt to lay down a single, universal rule for the scope of section 59, stating that its applicability "must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case."

Applying this approach to the facts before it, the court emphasized the sequence of events: a demand/conciliation under the Industrial Disputes Act was pending when the union filed the MRTU complaint; the employer had then objected on the ground of section 59. After the State Government made references (covering a larger set of employees), the union sought to withdraw the MRTU complaint and did so with the company's consent; the Tribunal disposed of the complaint for want of prosecution. Thereafter the union proceeded in the reference and the company raised the section 59 objection again.

The court identified two principal strands in its reasoning:

  • Meaning of "institute": The term "institute" in section 59 should be understood as "setting on foot an enquiry" — something more than the mere filing of a complaint. Where an applicant merely files but withdraws a complaint before any effective steps are taken, the court held that the complaint cannot be said to have been "instituted" within the meaning of section 59. The court relied on the Madras High Court decision in Suppiah Chettiar and similar statutory usage (section 3(5) of the Workmen's Compensation Act) to support this interpretation.
  • Estoppel by conduct: The company was estopped by its own conduct from asserting the section 59 bar. The company had earlier raised the same objection when the MRTU complaint was filed, but later gave its consent to withdraw that complaint in view of the references made by the State Government. Having consented to the withdrawal, the company could not be permitted to assert the very bar which it had earlier argued against the maintenance of the MRTU complaint. The court characterised this as the company "trying to blow hot and cold in the same breath."

The court also reasoned that accepting the petitioner's broad construction (that mere filing would oust the Industrial Tribunal's jurisdiction) would lead to "palpable injustice and absurd inconvenience," and that statutory interpretation should avoid constructions leading to manifest absurdity or futility.

Finally, the court noted a pragmatic point of fact: the references covered more employees (57) than the MRTU complaint (variously described in the opinion as 53 and elsewhere as 50). As a result, even on a narrow reading, the references would survive in respect of those additional employees not covered by the MRTU complaint.

On these bases — the limited meaning of "institute," estoppel by conduct, avoidance of absurdity, and the differing coverage of employees — the court concluded that the Industrial Tribunal was right to overrule the preliminary objection.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition challenging the Industrial Tribunal's order overruling the preliminary objection was REJECTED.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The Industrial Tribunal's order that the references under the Industrial Disputes Act were not barred by section 59 of the MRTU and PULP Act stands; the reference proceedings may continue in respect of the employees covered by the State Government's references.
  • Interpretative guidance: The court accepted a narrow, contextual meaning of "institute" in section 59 — requiring more than mere filing and dependent on whether effective steps had been taken — and relied on estoppel principles where a party's conduct is inconsistent. These propositions were applied to the facts of the present case.
  • Scope of precedent: The court distinguished earlier decisions cited to it on the basis of factual differences; the opinion did not purport to lay down an inflexible rule applicable to all cases and did not state that it was creating a broader binding precedent beyond the contextual principles applied here.

End of summary based exclusively on the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

Dharmadhikari and Puranik, JJ.:— In this petition the petitioner company has challenged the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal dated 7th October 1985 holding that the reference made under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are not barred by section 59 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, hereinafter referred to as the ‘MRTU and PULP Act’.

2. It appears from record that initially a complaint under the MRTU and PULP Act was filed before the competent court, qua some of the employees who are also covered by the references made by the Government under the Indusrial Disputes Act dated 5th March 1985. In the said proceedings a contention was raised by the present petitioners that the employees have taken recourse to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the complaint is not maintainable in view of the provisions of section 59 of the MRTU and PULP Act.

3. It appears that when the complaint under the MRTU and PULP Act was filed conciliation proceedings were pending. Subsequently references came to be made by the State Government covering the cases of 57 employees. The complaint under the MRTU and PULP Act was qua 53 employees only. After the references were made on 5th March 1985, the Association of the Engineering workers which was complainant in the complaint filed under the MRTU and PULP Act, filed an application seeking permission to withdraw the complaint in view of the pendency of the references. The Industrial Tribunal, Nasik, on 17th of July 1985 passed the following order:

“Complainant's Advocate Shri Ashokan filed pursis Exh. U-8 that the complainant Union do not wish to proceed with the complaint in view of the reference received in this Court regarding the dismissal of the workers involved. The Respondent Company has no objection. Hence the complaint stands disposed of for want of prosecution. No order as to costs.”

4. After the withdrawal of the said proceedings the Union filed a statement of claim in the reference proceedings and the Company filed its written statement. In that written statement a preliminary objection was raised that the references are not maintainable in view of the provisions of section 59 of the MRTU and PULP Act. The. Industrial Tribunal overruled the said preliminary objection and as already observed it is this order which is challenged in the present petition.

5. For deciding the controversy raised in the present petition, it is worth while to make a detailed reference to section 59 of the mrtu and pulp act which reads as under:

“59. If any proceeding in respect of any matter falling within the purview of this Act is instituted under this Act, then no proceeding shall at any time be entertained by any authority in respect of that matter under the Central Act, or, as the case may be; the Bombay Act, and if any proceeding in respect of any matter within the purview of this Act is instituted under the Central Act, or as the case may be, the Bombay Act, then no proceeding shall at any time be entertained by the Industrial or Labour Court under this Act”.

6. From the para reading of this section it is quite clear that it involves a principle of double jeopardy and option or election of remedy and, therefore, if any proceeding in respect of any matter falling within the purview of the MRTU and PULP Act is instituted, then it is directed that no proceeding shall at any time be entertained by any authority in respect of that matter under the central act or, the bombay act, as the case may be. The question still remains as to what is the scope of section 59 of the mrtu and pulp act. In our view no general rule could be laid down which will be applicable to all the cases so far the amplitude of section 59 is concerned. To some extent it must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. As already observed initially the Union has raised a demand under the Industrial Disputes Act which was pending for conciliation. Thereafter a complaint under the MRTU and PULP Act came to be filed. In the said complaint it was contended by the employer that in view of the pendency of proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, the complaint was not maintainable. When the references covering larger controversy and involving more employees were made, the Union by its pursis withdraw the complaint to which the Company had also no objection. After the said complaint was withdrawn, now a contention is again raised that the proceedings under the Central Act are barred by section 59 of the mrtu and pulp act. To say the least, the Company is estopped by its own conduct from raising such a contention. When a complaint under the MRTU and PULP Act was filed an objection based on the very section was raised that it was not maintainable since the conciliation proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act was. pending. When the complaint is withdrawn to which the Company had no objection, again a contention is being raised that the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act is not maintainable. It is conceded before us that qua 7 employees who were not covered by the earlier complaint, a reference could proceed. In our view the Company is trying to blow hot and cold in the same breath, which cannot be permitted.

7. In this context it is also pertinent to note that the withdrawal of the complaint was not unconditional. The complaint was withdrawn since references were made by the State Government covering a larger area. How ever, it is contended by Shri Kaka, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that once it is shown that the proceedings in respect of the same matter were instituted under the MRTU and PULP Act, then, the Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the references under the Central Act in view of the specific wording of section 59 of the mrtu and pulp act. It is not possible for us to accept this broad proposition. The word “institute” as used under section 59 can be taken as meaning “setting on foot an enquiry” which means something more than mere filing of complaint. Where the applicant does nothing more than filing a complaint under the Act, and withdraws it before any effective steps are taken, then in our view the provisions of section 59 of the MRTU and PULP Act will not apply. Obviously as to what could be termed as effective steps will again depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Similar expression seems to have been used in section 3 sub-section (5) of the Workmens Compensation Act. The expression ‘institute’ as used in the said act i.e workmens compensation act fell for consideration of the Madras High Court in AIR 1957 Madras 216-5. Suppiah Chettiar v. V. Chinnathurai wherein after making a reference to the meaning’ assigned to the said term in Law Lexicon by Ramnath Iyer and other law dictionaries, the Madras High Court held that the word ‘institute’ means something more than mere filing of a claim. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Madras High Court, Thererfore if an applicant does nothing more than filing the complaint under the Act, and withdraws it before any effective steps are taken, then it cannot be said that the proceedings were instituted under the MRTU and PULP Act. In our view such a meaning will have to be given to the said term. If the interpretation and construction suggested by Shri Kaka is accepted then it will result in palpable injustice and absurd inconvenience. It is well settled principle of interpretation of statutes that a construction should not be put upon a statutory provision which would lead to manifest absurdity or futility, pelpable injustice or absurd inconvenience or anomaly. In any circumstances, if a complaint filed is withdrawn by consent of parties and that too in view of the reference made under the Central Act, then for all practical purposes it will have to be held that in law no proceedings were instituted under the MRTU and PULP Act. In any case, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case the present petitioner-Company is estopped by its own conduct from raising such a contention.

8. The decisions to which a reference was made before us i.e one reported in 1984 (49) FLR page 232—Mahendra Gajanan Kharsor v. Zonal Manager, Maharashtra State Cooperative Marketing Federation Ltd. and 1985 Current Labour Reports page. 100—Maharashtra Girni Kamgar Union v. S. Carona Sahu Co. Pvt. Ltd. are obviously distinguishable on facts. In the earlier decision it was held that the conciliation proceedings cannot be equated with the proceedings under the Central Act within the contemplation of section 59 of the ‘MRTU and PULP Act. In Maharashtra Girni Kamgar Union's case the complaint was already filed under. the MRTU and PULP Act and effective steps were also taken in that behalf. Therefore it was held that the State Government had no power to make a reference to deternine identical question. The said finding was based on the facts of that case and, therefore, the decision is distinguishable.

9. In the present case, as already observed, when the complaint under the MRTU and PULP Act was filed an objection was raised that it is barred by section 59 since conciliation proceedings were pending. When the said complaint was withdrawn in view of the references made under the Central Act and that too with the consent of the Petitioner-company now a contention is raised that the proceedings under the Central Act are barred by section 59 of the mrtu and pulp act. In our view the stand taken by the Petitioner-company being wholly inconsistent, the company cannot be permitted to go back and is now estopped from raising such a contention. Further in the references made, the dispute referred to is about 57 employees whereas the complaint was restricted to 50 employees only Therefore in any case references must survive qua other 7 employees. This being the position the Industrial Tribunal was wholly right in taking a view that the present proceedings under the Central Act are not barred by the provisions of section 59 of the MRTU and PULP Act.

10. Even otherwise having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, in our view this is not a fit case wherein any interference is called for, in the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court, with the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal overruling the preliminary objection raised by the Petitioner-Company.

11. Hence writ petition is rejected.