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Usman Gulam Hyder Kedri v. Abdul Hamid Abdul Karim Sheikh And Others

Bombay High Court
Mar 14, 1986
Smart Summary (Beta)

Summary of Opinion by Mehta, J. — Civil Revision on Refusal to Appoint Commissioner (Order XXVI Rule 9, CPC)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Uaman Gulam Hyder Kedri, filed a Civil Revision Application impugning an order dated 1-10-1985 of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Shirpur, which rejected an application by the defendants for appointment of a Commissioner under Order XXVI Rule 9, Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).

The underlying suit (Suit No. 101 of 1381) was filed by five respondents seeking possession of premises on the ground of bona fide requirement under section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. During trial the defendants applied (on 30-9-1885 as recorded in the opinion) for the appointment of a Commissioner to inspect the internal and external condition of the properties. The trial Court rejected that application on the ground that the burden of proving bona fide requirement was on the plaintiffs and that appointment of a Commissioner would not serve any useful purpose. The defendants (petitioner here) approached the High Court in revision against the order rejecting the Commissioner application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an order refusing to appoint a Commissioner under Order XXVI Rule 9 CPC is a revisable order under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e., whether such an order constitutes "any case which has been decided").
  2. Whether the impugned order is interlocutory in character and therefore not amenable to revision under Section 115.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments (as represented by Shri Kazi)

  • The impugned order rejecting the prayer for appointment of a Commissioner is interlocutory and does not decide "any case" within the meaning of Section 115 CPC; therefore the revision application is not maintainable.
  • Reliance was placed on a Division Bench decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court holding that an order refusing appointment of a Commissioner is interlocutory and not revisable under Section 115.

Petitioner / Defendant's Arguments (as represented by Shri Karlekar)

  • The order rejecting the application for appointment of a Commissioner is not merely interlocutory; it decides certain rights of the parties and therefore falls within the ambit of Section 115 CPC.
  • Reliance was placed upon (a) a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court (Pratap, J., Writ Petition No. 155 of 1986) where the matter was decided on merits in favour of granting a Commissioner, and (b) a judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court (Ponnusamy Pandaram v. The Selam Vaiyappamalal Jengamar Sangam, AIR 1986 Mad. 33) which held that refusal to appoint a Commissioner under Order XXVI Rule 9 could be a revisable order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dillon, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 497 Defines the expression "any case which has been decided" in Section 115(1) CPC — the word "case" is of comprehensive import and may include parts of proceedings; exercise of revision is discretionary even when conditions are met. The Court relied on this definition to interpret Section 115 and to frame the threshold inquiry: whether the interlocutory order in question decided any right or obligation of the parties.
Baldevdas Shivlal v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd., (1969) 2 SCC 201; A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 406 Holds that not every interlocutory order is a "case decided" for Section 115; an order may not be revisable if it does not adjudicate some right or obligation of the parties. The Court cited this authority for the proposition that only orders adjudicating rights/obligations qualify as "cases decided" under Section 115 and therefore not all interim orders are revisable.
Ponnusamy Pandaram v. The Selam Vaiyappamalal Jengamar Sangam, A.I.R. 1986 Mad. 33 Held (Madras High Court Single Judge) that an order declining appointment of a Commissioner under Order XXVI Rule 9 can be revisable under Section 115 because it may dispose of the right of a party to adduce material evidence. The petitioner relied on this case. The Court in the present opinion expressly noted this authority but expressed disagreement with its observations, finding that in the instant case the refusal did not decide any right or obligation.
Unreported — Writ Petition No. 155 of 1986 (Pratap, J., decided 3-3-1386) Held (on the merits) that appointment of a Commissioner ought to have been granted to assist the Court in appreciating rival claims under section 13(1)(g) and section 13(2) of the Bombay Rent Act. The Court observed that this Single Judge decided solely on merits and did not address maintainability under Section 115. The present Court did not follow this decision on the maintainability point and noted it had been decided on merits alone.
Smt. Harvindor Kaur v. Godha Ram, A.I.R. 1979 P. & H. 76 Division Bench held that refusal to appoint a Commissioner under Order XXVI Rule 9 did not determine or adjudicate any right or obligation of the parties and therefore was not revisable under Section 115 CPC. The Court expressly adopted the observations of this Division Bench and found itself in agreement, using it as a controlling authority to conclude that the impugned order was not revisable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by setting out Section 115 CPC (including its proviso and explanation) and considered authoritative interpretations, particularly Major S.S. Khanna and Baldevdas Shivlal, to fix the correct approach: Section 115 empowers supervisory revision when a subordinate Court appears to have exceeded or failed to exercise jurisdiction or acted illegally or with material irregularity, but the power is discretionary and subject to the proviso that the High Court should not vary or reverse interlocutory orders except in limited circumstances.

The decisive inquiry framed by the Court was whether the impugned order refusing the appointment of a Commissioner "decides any right or obligation of the parties in controversy" — i.e., whether it constitutes a "case which has been decided" within the meaning of Section 115. If it does not so decide any right or obligation, then it falls outside the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115.

Applying that test to the facts, the Court concluded that the trial Court's refusal did not decide any issue in the suit nor did it affect any right or obligation of either party. The learned Civil Judge had exercised his discretionary judgment that the plaintiffs should discharge the burden of proving bona fide requirement by independent evidence, and that appointment of a Commissioner would not serve any useful purpose. The High Court found no error in the exercise of that discretion.

The Court contrasted authorities: it agreed with the Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Harvindor Kaur v. Godha Ram (that refusal of a Commissioner may not be revisable) and expressly disagreed with the Madras Single Judge in Ponnusamy Pandaram (which treated such a refusal as revisable). The unreported Pratap, J. decision was noted as having been decided on merits without considering maintainability under Section 115, and therefore of limited relevance to the maintainability question.

On the merits, the Court endorsed the trial Judge's position that the issue of bona fide requirement was to be proved by independent evidence and that there was nothing wrong in refusing a court-appointed Commissioner where the trial Judge considered the Commissioner unnecessary.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The rule is discharged; the Court held that the order of the learned Civil Judge refusing appointment of a Commissioner under Order XXVI Rule 9, C.P.C. is not revisable under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that this is not a proper case for interference by the High Court's revisional powers.

Direct consequences for the parties: The impugned order of the trial Court stands (i.e., the refusal to appoint a Commissioner is upheld). The Court discharged the rule and made no order as to costs.

Broader implications: The opinion applies established Section 115 principles (as interpreted in the cited Supreme Court authorities) and aligns with the view taken by the Punjab & Haryana High Court that refusal to appoint a Commissioner under Order XXVI Rule 9 will not automatically be revisable unless it actually adjudicates rights or obligations. The Court expressly disagreed with the contrary observations in the Madras Single Judge decision referenced. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel principle beyond applying the statutory test and relevant precedents; its practical effect is to confirm that such interlocutory refusals will generally lie outside Section 115 unless they determine some substantive right or obligation.

Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Rule discharged. There will be no order as to costs." (Final paragraph of the opinion.)

Show all summary ...

Mehta, J.:— This Civil Revision Application has been filed by the petitioner Uaman Gulam Hyder Kedri impugning the orders of the learned Civil Judge, (Junior Division), Shirpur, dated 1-10-1985, whereunder the learned Civil Judge was pleased to reject an application made by the defendants for the appointment of a Commissioner under Order XXVI Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

2. The five respondents herein filed a suit in the Court of the learned Civil Judge, (Junior Division), at Shirpur, being Suit No. 101 of 1381, praying for possession of certain premises on the ground of bone fide requirement under section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents. Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947.

3. In the course of the proceedings, an application was made on 30-9-1885 by the defendants for the appointment of a Commissioner for the purpose of “Inspecting the internal end external condition of all the properties of the ownership of the ???. The learned Civil Judge felt that the burden of proving bone fide retirement was on the plaintiffs and, therefore the appointment of a Commissioner would not serve any ???. On this ground the learned Civil Judge rejected the application. The defendant has now approached this Court in revision against the said order.

4. At the outset, Shri Kazi, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 to 5 who were the ??? in the trial Court raised a ??? objection with regard to the maintainability of the revision ???. Shri Kazi submitted that the order of the learned Civil Judge rejecting the prayer for appointment of a Commissioner was an interlocutory order and in any event it could not be stated that the Impugned order had decided “any case” and hence it was not order which would fall within the purview of taction 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Shri Kazi has relied upon a decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court which ??? held that an order rejecting an application for the appointment of a Commissioner was an interlocutory order and hence not ??? I shell consider the authorities at a later stage.

5. Shri Karlekar the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner-defendant, has submitted that the order of the learned Civil Judge rejecting his client's application for the appointment of a Commissioner was not an interlocutory order and that such an order fell within the ambit of section 115 of the of Civil Procedure. Shri Karlaker has relled upon a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court as also a Judgment of a teemed Single Judge of the Madras High. Court wherein it was held that an order rejecting the appointment of a Commissioner under Order. XXVI, Ruts 9 was a revisable order.

6. Now it will be relevant at this stage to set out the provision of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure:—

115. (1) The High Court may calf for the record of any case which his been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court end in which no appeal lies thereto and if such subordinate Court appears—

(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or

(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or

(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.

the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit.

7. Provided that High Court shall not, under this Section very or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceedings, except where—

(a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision/would have filially disposed of the suit or other proceeding, or

(b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made.

(2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto.

Explanation: In this section, the expression any case which has been decided includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding.”

8. The expression “any esse which has been decided” appearing in section 115 sub-section (1) has been defined by the Supreme Court in the case of 1(Major S.S Khanna v. Brig. F.J Dillon), reported in A.I.R 1964 S.C 497, Their Lordships observed:—

“The expression ‘case’ is a word of comprehensive import: it includes civil proceedings other than suits, and is not restricted by anything contained in the section to the entirely of the proceeding in a Civil Court. To interpret the expression ‘case’ as an entire proceeding only end not a part of a proceeding would be to impose a restriction upon the exercise of powers of superintendence which the jurisdiction to issue writs, and the supervisory jurisdiction are not subject, and may result in certain cases in denying relief to an aggrieved litigant where it is most needed, and may result in the perpetration of gross injustice………

That is not to say that the High Court is obliged to exercise jurisdiction when a case is decided by a subordinate Court and the conditions in clauses (a), (b) or (c) are satisfied. Exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary: the High Court is not bound to interfere morely because the conditions are satisfied. The interlocutory character of the order, the existence of another remedy to an aggrieved party by way of are appeal, from the ultimate order or decree in the proceeding or by a suit, and the general equities of the case being served by the order made are all matters to be taken into account in considering whether the High Court, even in cases where the conditions which attract the jurisdiction exist, should exercise its jurisdiction.”

9. It may next be pointed out that the Supreme Court in the case of 2(Baldevdas Shivlal v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd.) reported in (1969) 2 SCC 201 : A.I.R 1970 SC 406, held that an order overruling an objection to a question put in cross-examination was not revisable fat the purpose that it was “not a case decided”. Their Lordships observed:

“A case may be said to be decided, if the Court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy; every order in the suit cannot be regarded, es a case decided within the meaning of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”

10. I shall now deal with the submissions made by Shri Karlekar and consider the authorities relied upon by him. Shri Karlekar contended that an order ejecting an, application for vine appointment of a Commissioner was a case decided and, therefore would fall within the purview, of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Shri Karlekar contended that such an order was not an interlocutory order, inasmuch as it decided certain rights of the parties. Shri Kariekar relied upon a recent judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of 3(Ponnusamy Pandaram v. The Selam Vaiyappamalal Jenngamar Sangam), reported in A.I.R 1986 Madras 33. The teamed Single Judge was of the view that the order declining the appointment of Commissioner under Order XXVI, Rule 9 was a revisable order under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Single Judge was pleased to observe:

“The law of evidence enjoins upon the party to prove the fact which he relies on end in that sense, an obligation is cast upon the party and if he fails to discharge that obligation adverse consequence will follow and he will have to face the repercussions of the same. This right of the party to adduce evidence gets adjudicated in the interlocutory proceedings under Order XXVI, Rule 9. When there is a decline by the Court to issue the commission asked for to make local investigation, the purpose behind it being significant and in elated cases imperative top, that order certainly disposes of the right claimed by the party to place the requisite evidence on his behalf. The question as to whether a particular order adjudicates some rights or obligations of the parties in controversy will depend, upon the nature of the right or obligation and is not possible to Jay down an uniform rule and no decision, including any of the highest Court in the land, attempted to do so.”

11. Shri Karlakar also relied on an unreported judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in 4 Writ Petition No. 155 of 1986 decided by Pratap, J. on 3-3-1386. The learned Single Judge was pleased to observe:

“The Code of Civil Procedure specifically provides for appointment of Commissioner in certain contingencies. Plaintiff's application for appointment of Commissioner makes out adequate grounds for the relief claimed. In the facts and circumstances grant of the said application would have assisted the parties es also the Court in correctly appreciating the rival claims relating to the issues arising under section 13(1)(g) and section 13(2) of the Bombay Rent Act. I also see no prejudice ensuing to the defendant. On the contrary the defendant also should welcome the Commissioner end his report before the Court, which, for ought one knows, may as well support the defendant.”

12. It will be noticed that the learned Single Judge decided the matter solely on merits. The objection with regard to the maintainability of the revision application had not been Invoked before the teamed Single Judge.

13. Shri Kazi hes submitted that the impugned order was an ??? order and that under no circumstances could it be said that by the said order “the esse had been decided”. That being the case, the order was not revisable. In support of his submission. Shri Kazi has relied on a decision of a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of 5(Smt. Harvindor Kaur v. Godha Ram), reported in A.I.R 1979 Punjab & Haryana 76, which decided a similar question as to whether an order refusing to appoint a Commissioner under Order XXVI, Rule 9 was not revisable under section 115 of the Coda of Civil Procedure. Their Lordships observed:

“In the light of the aforesaid observations, without dilating any more on this subject, the meaning that can be given to the explanation is that an order made in the course of a suit or proceeding would be revisable only when it determines or adjudicates some right or obligation of me parties in controversy. Thus, a revision would lie against an interlocutory order only if it determines or adjudicates some right or obligation of the parties in controversy. However, even after the satisfaction of the aforesaid test the power of revision would be exercisable by this Court subject to the limitation put under sub-section (1) and the proviso to section 115 of the Civil P.C”

“Adverting to the facts of the present case, we find that the trial Court has only rejected the application forme issuance of a commission on the ground that Issue No. 3 could be proved by producing the relevant record and that demarcation was not necessary, from these observations, it is clear that the learned Subordinate Judge did not decide any issue nor did he adjudicate for the purposes of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in ???.”

14. Now in adjudicating the issue whether the impugned order is reusable or not, the decisive factor would be whether the order decides any right or obligation of the parties in controversy. The right or obligation need not necessarily have a nexus to the main issues in the suit or the lis; it may not even have any connection with the final adjudication of or ??? of the controversy between parties. ??? lights or obligations do emerge and if such rights and obligations are decided by such interlocutory orders, or if they decide any case, then they would ??? fall within the ambit of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the instant cage, the order refusing the appointment of a Commissioner does not, to my mind, decided any issue in the suit or the case nor does it affect any right or obligation of either party. That being the case, I do not think that this order would be revicable under section 115 of the ??? of Civil Procedure. With respect I find myself in agreement with the ??? of Their Lordships of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Harvinder Kuar v. Godha Ram, A.I.R 1979 P. & H. 76 and find myself in disagreement, with, respect, with the observotions of the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in the case of Ponnusamy Panduram v. The Saleem Vajyappamalal Jangamar Sangam, A.I.R 1986 Mad. 33. I am of the view that the order refusing the appointment of a Commissioner under Order XXVI Rule, 9, C.P.C is not a revisable order.

15. With regard to the merits, I may only state that the learned trial Judge has exercised his discretion rightly in that the learned Civil Judge felt that the issue of bona fide requirement ought to be proved by the plaintiffs by independent evidence without relying upon the evidence collected by the Commissioner appointed by the Court. If the learned Civil Judge felt that the issues in the suit ought to be prayed by Independent evidence procured by the parties ??? the intervention of the Commissioner appointed by the Court I tee nothing wrong with such a course of action. I am, therefore, of the view that this is not a proper case for interference by invoking the revisional powers of this Court.

16. In the result, the rule is discharged. There will be no order as to costs.

17. Rule discharged.