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East India Hotels Ltd. v. State Of Maharashtra And Another
Judgment Summary: S.P. Bharucha, J. — Liability of Discotheque Proprietor under the Bombay Entertainment Duty Act, 1923
Factual and Procedural Background
Source material: judgment text provided.
The petitioners are proprietors of a Bombay hotel, "Oberoi Towers", and since 1975 have operated within the hotel a members-only club called "The Cellar", described as a discotheque where music is piped, a dance floor is provided, seating is available and drinks/snacks are sold. Admission is restricted to club members, their guests and hotel residents.
On November 3, 1977 the Deputy Collector (2nd respondent) issued a show‑cause letter alleging that the petitioners were conducting a "programme of discotheque" and that the Bombay Entertainment Duty Act, 1923 ("the Act") applied. Correspondence followed in which the petitioners disputed liability. By an order dated March 6, 1980 the petitioners' contentions were rejected and they were called upon to pay entertainment duty and surcharge amounting to Rs. 17,21,884.30 and Rs. 2,97,256.59 respectively, from 1975‑76 onwards. The petition before the court challenged that order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the proprietor of a discotheque (the petitioners) is liable to pay duty under the Bombay Entertainment Duty Act, 1923 for admission to the discotheque.
- Whether the authorities have power to recover entertainment duty for the period prior to issuance of the first notice (i.e., from the commencement of the discotheque in 1975‑76).
- Whether the whole amount of a club membership subscription can be treated as payment for admission, or whether, under Section 3(2) of the Act, the subscription must be apportioned to separate that part which represents payment for admission to entertainment from other privileges/rights.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments (as recorded)
- There was no "entertainment" in the discotheque because there was no exhibition, performance or amusement in the sense of something objective outside the person entertained; the discotheque merely provided facilities for entertainment rather than holding or organizing an entertainment.
- To constitute 'entertainment' under the Act there must be a show or something objective outside the person amused; the Act postulated holding or organising of entertainment.
- Reliance on State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla: that the entertainment contemplated is not the subjective entertainment a person derives by, for example, solving a crossword puzzle; it must be something objective outside the person entertained.
- Reliance on Attorney General v. Southport Corporation (1934) 1 K.B. 226 to argue by analogy that amenities attracting visitors are not necessarily an "exhibition" or "sport" attracting entertainment duty.
- Claimed entitlement to an exemption under an exemption order dated November 22, 1973 read with a circular dated January 4, 1974, which exempted certain performances of music and classical/folk dancing; counsel argued this covered the petitioners' activities.
- There was no power to recover duty for the period prior to the first notice dated November 3, 1977 (i.e., argued against retrospective recovery to commencement in 1975‑76).
- Submission that the whole club membership subscription should not be treated as payment for admission; under Section 3(2) an apportionment must be made to exclude parts of the subscription that represent privileges or facilities other than admission to entertainment.
Revenue / Collector's Position (as recorded)
- The Deputy Collector's show‑cause alleged that the petitioners were conducting a "programme of discotheque", which constituted entertainment to which persons were admitted on payment and therefore the Act applied.
- By the impugned order dated March 6, 1980 the Collector rejected the petitioners' contentions, called upon them to pay the assessed duty and surcharge, and refused to apportion the membership subscription for the purposes of Section 3(2), treating the membership subscription as not requiring apportionment.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Geeta Enterprises v. State of M.P. (Supreme Court) | Interpreted an identical definition of "entertainment" in the M.P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1937; described tests for a show to fall within the Act (public character, any kind of amusement, benefit derived, irrelevance of operator/operator's identity/duration). | The court relied on Geeta Enterprises to conclude that "entertainment" includes activities that divert or amuse (including modern/disco dancing) and to reject the requirement that there must be an objective "show" outside the person entertained. Geeta's tests supported holding that a discotheque falls within the Act. |
| 1982 A.I.R. M.P. 171 (M.P. High Court) | Held (in effect) that payments to provide tools for self-entertainment (e.g., video games) were not payments for admission to entertainment; the Supreme Court in Geeta disapproved this view. | The court noted that the Supreme Court in Geeta disapproved that M.P. High Court view and, through Geeta, rejected the related reasoning; used the disapproval to support treating discotheque dancing as entertainment liable to duty. |
| State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla | Held that the "entertainment" contemplated in constitutional entries was not the subjective entertainment dependent solely on the individual's mental pleasure (example: solving crossword puzzles); emphasized an objective external show or exhibition. | The petitioners relied on this decision; the court considered it but expressed doubt that crossword‑puzzle style subjective entertainments equate to provision of music and discotheque equipment. The court treated Geeta as overruling or limiting the requirement of an external "show". |
| Attorney General v. Southport Corporation (1934) 1 K.B. 226 | Applied definitions similar to the Act and held that amenities (sea‑bathing lake, terraces, cafes) which attracted visitors were not an "exhibition or sport" for entertainment duty purposes where attractions were ancillary and visitors were attracted by general amenities. | The court considered Southport but found factual distinction: a discotheque provides dancing (entertainment) and in the present case the petitioners were proprietors of an establishment "in which entertainment and diversion is provided", so the Southport reasoning did not preclude finding liability here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by textual and purposive interpretation of the Act's definitions and by applying the precedents cited in the judgment.
- Definitions and statutory structure
The Act levies "a duty in respect of admission to entertainment". Section 2(a) includes "any exhibition, performance, amusement, game or sport to which persons are admitted for payment". Clauses define "payment for admission", "admission" to a place where entertainment is held, and "proprietor" as the person responsible for or in charge of its management. The court analysed these definitions to determine what constitutes "that which entertains" and who is liable.
- Character of a discotheque
The court described a discotheque as a dance hall where music is piped (often amplified), equipped with a dance floor and typified by modern lighting. It equated a discotheque with a dance hall for ballroom dancing and held that dancing (including modern/disco dancing) entertains and diverts both participants and spectators, and therefore qualifies as "entertainment" as per the Act.
- Application of Geeta Enterprises
The Supreme Court's tests in Geeta Enterprises (public character, the provision of amusement, benefit derived, and irrelevance of operator identity/duration) were applied. The court used Geeta to reject the petitioners' contention that an objective external "show" was required; Geeta disapproved similar restrictive reasoning earlier taken by the M.P. High Court in relation to video games.
- Consideration of other authorities relied upon by petitioners
The court considered State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla and Attorney General v. Southport Corporation. It expressed doubt that the crossword‑puzzle style subjective entertainment rationale equated to the provision of music and dance equipment in a discotheque. Southport was treated as factually distinguishable: there, amenities were incidental and visitors were attracted by a range of attractions, whereas here the discotheque provided dancing entertainment.
- Amendment to the Act and proviso
The court noted an amendment (Maharashtra Act No. XI/8.4) inserting a proviso in Section 3 specifying that, in the case of cabaret or discotheque entertainment, 15% of the total payment charged by the proprietor per person per show shall be deemed payment for admission and duty shall be levied accordingly. The judge stated he did not rely upon this proviso to decide the primary question of liability, but later observed that the proviso indicates that total payments charged by discotheque proprietors include substantial payments for privileges other than admission.
- Exemption orders and circular
The petitioners invoked a November 22, 1973 exemption order and a clarifying circular of January 4, 1974 exempting performances of certain kinds of music and classical/folk dancing. The court held that at best the music played might be exempt, but not where there is dancing to accompany it, as in the present case.
- Recovery period
The court accepted the revenue's position on recovery period: petitioners were obliged to pay duty from the time the discotheque commenced (1975‑76), and the notice issued in November 1977 gave power to recover from commencement.
- Apportionment of membership subscriptions (Section 3(2))
The court accepted the petitioners' contention that members enjoyed privileges and facilities other than admission to entertainment (for example, the right to introduce guests) and that these other privileges could have a financial value. Accordingly, the Collector had been incorrect to refuse to consider apportionment of the lump‑sum membership subscription. The court held that the authorities must consider afresh what part of the subscription represents payment for privileges other than admission and charge duty only on the balance, taking due regard to the proviso introduced by the Amending Act (which, in the case of discotheques, deems 15% per person per show to be payment for admission).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court held that the proprietor of a discotheque is liable to pay entertainment duty under the Bombay Entertainment Duty Act, 1923; however, the impugned assessment order dated March 6, 1980 was quashed and set aside insofar as it failed to apportion membership subscriptions under Section 3(2).
Implications and direct effects:
- The primary legal conclusion is that a discotheque (including modern/disco dancing) falls within the Act's definition of "entertainment", and the proprietor is a person liable to pay duty on admissions.
- The order of March 6, 1980 is quashed. The authorities are directed to reconsider afresh the portion of club membership subscriptions that represents payment for privileges, rights or purposes other than admission to entertainment in the discotheque, and to charge duty only on the balance amount.
- The court recognized that the legislative proviso (deeming 15% per person per show in the case of discotheques to be payment for admission) is relevant to apportionment and should be given due regard in the re‑assessment.
- No order as to costs was made by the court.
- The decision resolves the liability question in the factual circumstances before the court and directs reassessment on apportionment grounds; the judgment applies established interpretive principles and relied upon Supreme Court authority (Geeta Enterprises) rather than creating a novel legal test in the text of this opinion.
Disposition: Rule made absolute in part; impugned order quashed and matter remitted for fresh consideration consistent with the judgment.
JUDGMENT S.P. Bharucha, J.
1. The interesting question that arises in this writ petition is this: Is the proprietor of a discotheque liable to pay duty under the provisions of the Bombay Entertainment Duty Act, 1923?
2. The petitioners own a hotel in Bombay known as "Oberoi Towers". Since 1975 they conduct in the hotel a club called "The Cellar". The club is a discotheque where music is piped and a dance floor is provided for those who wish to dance. There is seating accommodation and drinks and snacks can be purchased. The music is suitable for what is described as modern dancing. Entrance to the club is restricted to its members and their guests and to the residents of the hotel.
3. By a letter dated November 3, 1977 the 2nd respondent, the Deputy Collector of Bombay, called upon the petitioners to show cause why action should not be taken against them for contravening the Bombay Entertainment Duty Act,. 1923 now called 'the Act'). The letter stated that the petitioners were conducting a "programme of discotheque" in the hotel, that the programme was entertainment to which persons were admitted on payment and that the provisions of the Act were attracted. In the correspondence that ensued, the petitioners were called upon to pay entertainment duty and furnish returns in respect thereof and the petitioners contended, inter alia, that there was no entertainment provided in the club and that, therefore, they were not liable. Ultimately, by an order dated March 6, 1980, the petitioners' contentions were rejected and they were called upon to pay entertainment duty and surcharge, amounting to Rs. 17,21,884.30 and Rs. 2,97,256.59 respectively, from the year 1975-76 onwards. The petition impugnes that order.
4. It was submitted by Mr. Vahanvati, learned Counsel for the petitioners, that there was no entertainment in a discotheque because there was no exhibition or performance or amusement. As he put it, in order to constitute 'entertainment', there had to be a show or something objective outside the person amused or entertained. There was a distinction between providing entertainment and the facilities for entertainment. The definition of 'entertainment' in the Act and its scheme postulated the holding or organising of the entertainment.
5. The Act imposes 'a duty in respect of admission to entertainment'. Under Section 3 thereof the duty is leviable 'on all payments for admission to any entertainment'. Section 2(a) gives an inclusive definition of 'entertainment'; it includes any exhibition, performance, amusement, game or sport to which persons are admitted for payment'. Under Clause (b) of Section 2, payment for admission includes 'any payment for seats or other accommodation in a place of entertainment'. Under Clause (d), admission to an entertainment includes 'admission to any place in which the entertainment is held'. Clause (c) defines 'proprietor' in relation to any entertainment to 'include any person responsible, or for the time being in charge of the management thereof.
6. The word 'entertainment' is used in the Act as a noun to mean that which entertains or is intended to entertain. Duty under the Act is payable on payments for admission to that which entertains or to any place in which that which entertains is held. That which entertains is that which diverts and includes an exhibition, performance or amusement. The proprietor of that which entertains is the person responsible for or in charge of its management.
7. A discotheque is a dance hall wherein a certain type of music is piped in, usually through an amplifying system. It is equipped with a floor for dancing. It is typified by flashing ligtts. Basically, a discotheque is on a par with a dance hall for ballroom dancing. A dance in the sense of a couple executing a ballroom dance, entertains and diverts both those who are dancing and those who are looking on. It is an. entertainment.
8. Modern or disco dancing also entertains and diverts both those who dance and those who look on and is an entertainment. Admission to a discotheque is admission to a place in which there is modern or disco dancing; therefore, to a place in which an entertainment is held. Payment for admission into a discotheque is hence, payment for admission to an entertainment. The proprietor of a discotheque is the person responsible for the management thereof. He is, therefore, upon an analysis of its provisions liable to pay duty under the Act.
9. Before I consider three decisions, relevant to this aspect, I must note that by Maharashtra Act No. XI/8.4 the Act was amended. Section 3 of the Act now contains a proviso which reads: -
Provided that, in the case of the cabaret or discotheque entertainment fifteen per cent of the total payment charged by the proprietor per person per show shall be deemed to be the payment for admission and duty shall be levied thereon accordingly under this clause.
I do not rely upon this proviso in determining the question before me.
10. The Supreme Court considered the provisions of the M.P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1937, in the case of Geeta Enterprises v. State of M.P. in the context of video games. The definition of 'entertainment' in the M.P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1937, is identical to that in the Act before me. The Supreme Court noted that 'entertainment' was defined in Words and Phrases (Permanent Edn. Vol. 14 p. 353) thus:-
An entertainment is a source or means of amusement, a diverting performance, especially a public performance, as a concert, drama, or the like;
and in Webster's Third New International Dictionary (p. 757) thus: -
'Entertainment':- the act of diverting, or causing some one's time to pass agreeably. Something that diverts, amuses, or occupies the attention agreeably.
On a consideration of the legal connotation of the word 'entertainment' as defined in various books as also on true interpretation of the word as defined in the M.P. Act, the Supreme Court held that the following tests had to be passed for the show to fall within the ambit of the statute (at p. 1101 para 12): -
(1) that the show, performance, game or sport, etc., must contain a public colour in that the show should be open to public in a hall, theatre or any other place where members of the public are invited to attend the show;
(2) that the show may provide any kind of amusement whether sport, game or even a performance which requires some amount of skill.
In some of the cases, it has been held that even holding of a tombola in a club hall amounts to entertainment although the playing of tombola does, to some extent, involve a little skill;
(3) that even if admission to the hall may be free, but if the exhibition derives some benefit in terns of money it would be deemed to be an entertainment;
(4) that the duration of the show or the identity of the person who operates the machine and derives pleasure or entertainment or that the operator who pays himself feels entertained is wholly irrelevant, in judging the actual meaning of the word 'entertainment' as used in section 2(3) of the Act, So also the fact that the income derived from the show is shared by one or more persons who run the show.
The Supreme Court disapproved the findings of M.P. High Court [19821 A.I.R. M.P. 171 at p. 173 to this effect (at p. 1102): -
Therefore, what entertains a person in the video games parlour is his own performance and not the exhibition, performance, amusement, game or any sport offered by the petitioners. The payment made by a person to another to provide him with tools for deriving pleasure from his performance with the help of the tools cannot be held to be payment to that another for 'admission to entertainment' as contemplated by the Act. In our opinion, therefore, it cannot be held that the petitioners receive 'payment for admission to entertainment', when they collect amounts inserted by the persons in the slot.
11. Mr. Vahaovati laid great stress on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla Chagla, C.J., dealt with the entertainment contemplated in List II, entries 33 and 62 of the Constitution, and held that this was not the subjective entertainment which a person might receive by solving a cross-word puzzle or by indulging in any other mental or intellectual pleasure. The entertainment contemplated was something objective outside the person entertained. Therefore, although it could be said that a person who solved the cross-word puzzle was entertaining himself, this was not the entertainment which the Constitution contemplated.
12. I doubt whether the provision of a cross-word puzzle in a magazine or newspaper can be equated with the provision of music and the other equipment of a discotheque. In any event, the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Geeta Enterprises, quoted above, has rejected the view of the M.P. High Court similar to that taken in the Bombay case. It cannot now be held that, in order to constitute entertainment, there must be a show or something objective outside the person entertained.
13. Mr. Vahanvati also relied upon the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case of Attorney General v. Southport Corporation (1934) 1 K.B. 226. The corporation of the borough were the proprietors of an enclosure which adjoined the sea-shore and included a sea-bathing lake. Two areas were reserved for sun-bathing. Dressing accommodation was provided. There was a terrace with seating accommodation which provided non-bathers with a view of the bathing, the lake, the adjacent parks, the recreation ground and the sea-shore There was a cafe. Admission to the enclosure was by tickets. The Court of Appeal held that the provisions in regard to entertainment duty were not attracted. The relevant definitions in the Finance (New Duties) Act, 1916, were virtually identical to those in the Act before me. Lord Hanworth M. R. framed the test; 'Is there then any exhibition or sport in relation to which they (the corporation) are proprietors and managers?' He held that there was not. The amenities provided were of such a nature as could be used by a number of visitors. The visitors were attracted by those amenities and not necessarily by any exhibition or sport. Slesser L. J. and Romer L.J. agreed.
14. The reasoning of the Court of Appeal would seem to be that the exhibition of bathing was ancillary to various other amenities provided and it could not be said that those who were attracted to the grounds were attracted only by reason of the exhibition of bathing. Apart from this, the test which the Master of the Rolls framed may in the present case, be answered by saying that here is a discotheque, of which the petitioners are proprietors in which entertainment and diversion is provided.
15. In conclusion! upon this aspect, I hold, both upon a construction of the Act and the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Geeta Enterprises, that the petitioners are, as proprietors of the discotheque, liable to pay duty under the Act.
16. My attention was drawn by Mr. Vahavati to a exemption order dated November 22, 1973 read with a circular dated January 4, 1974. The former states that the State Government had exempted from liability to pay entertainment duty under the Act all performances of music (classical, light and instrumental) and classical and folk dancing from Western and Eastern countries. By the latter it is clarified that
"while beat music should be included within the scope of these three orders, Ball Dancing and cabaret Dancing are not clearly covered". It was submitted that the petitioners were entitled to exemption by reason of the aforesaid. I do not so find. At best, it can be said that the music played at the discotheque is exempt, but not if there is dancing, as there is, to accompany it.
17. It was submitted by Mr. Vahanvati that there was no power to recover duty for the period prior to November 3, 1977 when the first notice was issued. The petitioners were obliged to pay the duty from the time the discotheque commenced in 1975-76. The notice having been issued in November 1977, there is power to recover from the date of the commencement.
18. The last submission on behalf of the petitioners deserves acceptance. Counsel on their behalf submitted that duty could not be recovered by treating the whole amount of the club membership subscription as payment for admission. It was necessary under Section 3(2) to determine what part of the membership subscription represented payment for privileges, rights and purposes other than admission to the entertainment since the petitioners had claimed that members of the club enjoyed diverse other privileges and facilities. The Collector by his impugned order had, however, held: -
Your contention at (f) of the written submissions that a member of the club enjoys diverse facilities, including right to admit guests and that he has unlimited right to re-entry, etc., which aspect should have been considered as other privileges for the purpose of apportionment under Section 3(2) of the Act is irrelevant.
19. There is substance in the contention that members of the club enjoy privileges and facilities other than the right of admission to the entertainment. As an example, they have the right to introduce guests. It was, therefore, not correct for the Collector to say, The so-called rights or privileges do not involve any financial implications and as such the question of determining or apportioning any payment, therefore, from the lumpsum does not arise at all.
20. Due regard must also be had to the proviso under Section 3, introduced by the Amending Act. There-after in the case of discotheques, only 15% of the total payment per person per show can be deemed to he payment for admission and duty must be levied accordingly. The proviso indicates that the total payment charged by the proprietor of a discotheque include in a substantial measure payment for privileges, rights and purposes other than the admission to the entertainment.
21. In this view of the matter, the order dated March 6, 1980 is quashed and set aside. The authorities shall consider afresh what part of the subscription paid by members of the club called "The Cellar" represents payment for privileges, rights or purposes other than the admission to the entertainment in the discotheque and shall charge duty only on the balance amount.
22. No order as to costs.
23. Rule accordingly.
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