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Fr. Anthony Mendonca And Another v. State Of Maharashtra And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The State of Maharashtra introduced an amendment to rule 57.4 of the Secondary Schools Code (by resolution dated 19 January 1976) requiring that aided secondary schools reserve 34% of teaching and non‑teaching posts for scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, nomadic tribes and other backward communities (broken down as 13% SC, 7% ST, 4% nomadic tribes and 10% OBC). The rule was brought into force in 1979. A State circular dated 24 October 1979 directed managements of aided secondary schools to maintain these percentages with effect from 2 May 1979 (teaching posts) and 15 May 1979 (non‑teaching posts). The circular permitted temporary appointment of non‑backward class persons where managements could not secure members of particular backward sections despite efforts.
The petitioners are the trustee of St. Joseph's High School (a public trust registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act) and the school's principal. The trust was formed principally to give education to Catholic children and others; the school's character as a minority educational institution was not seriously disputed.
On 11 August 1980 the school (through counsel) wrote to the State contending that the amended rule and the circular were not applicable to minority institutions and sought directions staying their operation as to the school. The State acknowledged on 9 September 1980 that the question of exemption was being examined. The present petition was filed on 9 October 1980. The opinion records that the State at one point decided to exempt minority institutions but later countermanded that decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the amended rule 57.4 of the Secondary Schools Code and the State's circular of 24 October 1979 — making a 34% reservation in teaching and non‑teaching posts of aided secondary schools for certain backward classes — can be validly applied to minority educational institutions that receive grant‑in‑aid.
- Whether the application of that reservation to minority aided secondary schools infringes the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30(1) of the Constitution (the right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments (Sri Manezes, learned advocate)
- The reservation of teaching and non‑teaching posts under the amended rule and the circular, insofar as applied to secondary aided minority educational institutions, contravenes the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30(1) of the Constitution.
Respondents' Arguments (Sri Shah, learned counsel for the State; affidavit‑in‑reply)
- The amended rule and the circular do not take away the administrative autonomy of minority educational institutions; therefore Article 30(1) is not infringed.
- The Constitution itself provides for reservation in favour of backward classes, and hence the amended rule and the circular do not violate Article 30.
- Minority educational institutions that receive grants must abide by the terms specified in the Secondary Schools Code.
- As a preliminary objection, it was submitted that the petition was filed in October 1980 though the amended rule was brought into force in 1979, and that delay and laches should deprive the petitioners of relief.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rev Sidhrajbhat Sabbai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 540 | Art. 30(1) gives minorities an absolute right to establish and administer educational institutions; any law or executive direction infringing the substance of that right is void. The State may impose regulations that are reasonable and regulative of the educational character of the institution (e.g., efficiency, discipline, health, sanitation), but such regulations must satisfy a dual test: reasonableness and being directed to the educational character of the institution. | The court relied on these principles to assess whether the amended rule and the circular were regulatory measures aimed at preserving educational character (permissible) or measures that destroyed administrative autonomy (impermissible). The court found the measures here were not of the permissible regulatory kind. |
| Rev. Father W. Proost v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 465 | Article 30(1) must be given its full and wide meaning; its width cannot be cut down by considerations applicable to Art. 29(1). Attempts to whittle down protections for minorities are impermissible. | The court invoked the broad protection endorsed in this decision in concluding that measures undermining minority administration could not be sustained merely by analogies to other constitutional provisions. |
| D.A.V. College, Jullundur v. State of Punjab, (1971) 2 SCC 269 : A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1737 | A statutory provision requiring college staff appointments and subsequent changes to be approved by the Vice‑Chancellor (as a condition of affiliation) unjustifiably interfered with the rights of management of a minority college and was struck down as violative of Art. 30(1). | The court used this authority to show that State‑imposed controls over appointments that interfere with management rights are impermissible; by analogy, the present reservation impinges selection authority. |
| Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society v. State of Gujarat, (1974) 1 SCC 717 : A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1389 | The appointment of teachers is an important part of administration; minority institutions have a right to administer which includes selection and appointment of teachers. Reasonable regulations are permissible if they advance the excellence of the institution as a vehicle for general secular education; but regulations that permit State veto over selection or which interfere with the essential choice of qualified teachers are void under Art. 30(1). | The court relied on the detailed exposition in this case to emphasize that while regulatory checks might be permissible to ensure excellence, an imposed reservation that restricts the field of choice for selection and appointment of staff undermines the core of administration protected by Art. 30(1). |
| All Saints High School v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (1980) 2 SCC 478 : A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1042 | For institutions receiving State aid, the Government has a duty to ensure public funds are properly used. Conditions governing the appointment of staff (minimum qualifications, pay scales, service conditions and safeguards) are permissible so long as they do not amount to discrimination on grounds of religion/language or to deprivation of Article 30(1) rights. | The court cited this decision to recognize that while aid recipients may be subject to conditions designed to secure educational standards and proper use of funds, such conditions must not amount to deprivation of minority administration rights. The present rule/circular were held not to be permissible regulatory conditions of that character. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began from the established premise — drawn from a series of Supreme Court decisions — that Article 30(1) guarantees the right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice, and that the selection and appointment of teaching and non‑teaching staff is an important ingredient of that administrative right.
The court accepted that the State may impose regulatory measures aimed at securing educational standards (for example, prescribing minimum qualifications, pay scales, service conditions and safeguards) where such measures are genuinely regulatory in character and directed to making the institution an effective vehicle for education. The governing tests from the precedents are (a) reasonableness and (b) that the regulation be truly regulative of the educational character of the institution and conducive to its excellence.
Applying these principles to the amended rule and the circular, the court found:
- The amended rule and the circular impose a blanket reservation of 34% of teaching and non‑teaching posts in aided secondary schools (including minority aided schools) for specified backward classes.
- These measures do not operate as regulations directed to ensuring educational efficiency or standards in the sense identified by the precedents; rather they restrict the field of choice open to minority institutions in selecting and appointing staff.
- Because the selection and appointment of staff is a core aspect of administrative autonomy guaranteed by Article 30(1), a measure that restricts that choice — not being shown to be a permissible regulatory condition — impinges upon the constitutional right.
- The restriction could not be justified merely on grounds of general welfare or because the institution receives aid; neither circumstance validates a measure that amounts to deprivation of the Article 30(1) right.
- The court likewise rejected the State's preliminary objection of delay/laches, noting that the petition was filed while the State was still considering representations by minority institutions (as evidenced by the State's 9 September 1980 letter), and therefore delay did not bar relief.
In short, the court characterized the amended rule and circular as not being regulatory measures in the permissible sense and as unduly intruding into the managerial discretion of minority institutions in appointment matters protected by Article 30(1).
Holding and Implications
Holding: It is declared that the provisions of the amended rule 57(4) of the Secondary Schools Code and of the State's circular dated 24 October 1979, in so far as they are made applicable to secondary aided schools run by minorities (including the schools in petition), infringe Article 30(1) of the Constitution.
Implications and immediate consequences:
- The specific application of the amended rule 57(4) and the State's 24 October 1979 circular to minority‑run aided secondary schools (including the petitioning schools) is declared invalid as being violative of Article 30(1).
- The respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the petition to the petitioners.
- Rule was made accordingly (i.e., the petition succeeded to the extent declared above).
The opinion grounds its decision on established Supreme Court authorities; the decision addresses the direct effect of the rule and circular on the petitioning minority aided schools as described above.
1. A provision has been introduced in the Secondary Schools Code of the Government of Maharashtra which requires the reservation of teaching and non-teaching posts in aided secondary schools for members of the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, nomadic tribes and other backward communities. The provision is sought to be applied to minority educational institutions that received grant in-aid. This is a petition by a minority educational institution challenging the validity of the such application upon the ground that it infringes the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution.
2. The first petitioner is the trustee of the St. Joseph's High School, which is a public trust registered under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. The second petitioner is the principal of the said school. The trust has been formed with the principal object of giving education to Catholic children and other children, irrespective of religion, race or language. That the said school is a minority educational institution is not seriously in dispute.
3. By the State Government's resolution, dated 19 January 1976, rule 57.4 of the Secondary Schools Code was substituted by the following:
“57.4 The managements of aided secondary schools shall reserve 34 per cent of the total number of posts of teaching as well as non-teaching staff for the members of the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, nomadic tribes and other backward communities as follows:
(1) Scheduled castes 13 per cent (2) Scheduled tribes 7 per cent (3) Nomadic tribes 4 per cent (4) Other backward communities 10 per cent Total 34 per cent
It was brought into force in 1979. A circular, dated 24 October 1979, issued by the State required the managements of aided secondary schools to maintain the percentage prescribed by the amended rule with effect from 2 and 15 May 1979, for teaching and non-teaching posts, respectively. Managements of aided secondary schools, which despite efforts, failed to secure the services of persons belonging to particular sections of the backward classes for which the vacancies in teaching posts were earmarked were permitted to appoint non-backward class persons in these vacancies.
4. On 11 August 1980, the said school through its advocate wrote to the State stating that the provisions of the amended rule and the circular were not applicable to minority educational institutions and called upon the State to issue necessary directions staying the operation of the amended rule and the circular in so far as it concerned the said school. On 9 September 1980, the Deputy Secretary in the Education Department of the State wrote to the said school's advocate stating that the question of exempting minority institutions from the application of the amended rule and the circular was being examined by the State and its decision would be communicated in due course. On 9 October 1980, this petition was filed. I am informed that, thereafter, the State took a decision to exempt minority educational institutions from the purview of the amended rule and the circular but, later, countermanded it.
5. It was contended by Sri Manezes, learned advocate for the petitioners, that the reservation of teaching and non-teaching posts by the amended rule and the circular in secondary aided minority educational institutions contravenes the fundamental right given by Art. 30(1). Sri Shah, learned counsel for the State, submitted that the administrative autonomy of minority educational institutions was not taken away by the amended rule and the circular, and that, therefore, Art. 30(1) was not infringed. In the affidavit-in-reply filed by the State it is contended that, since the Constitution itself provided for reservation in favour of the backward classes, the amended rule and the circular did not violate Art. 30. It is also contended that minority educational institutions that receive grants must abide by the terms Specified in the Secondary Schools Code.
6. By the amended rule and the circular a reservation is made of teaching and non-teaching posts to the extent of 34 per cent in aided secondary schools, including minority educational institutions of this character. The managements of aided secondary schools are thereby compelled to select 34 per cent of their teaching and non-teaching staff from among members of the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, nomadic tribes and other backward communities.
7. The impact of Art. 30(1) has been the subject of numerous decisions of the Supreme Court.
8. In the case of Rev Sidhrajbhat Sabbai v. State of Gujarat [A.I.R 1963 S.C 540], six Judges of the Supreme Court considered the impact of an order which required all private training colleges in the State of Bombay to reserve 60 per cent of “seats for Training Boards' School teachers nominated by the Government.” A minority educational institution protested against the order in a petition before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed that all minorities, linguistic or religious, had by Art. 30(1) an absolute right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice, and any law or executive direction which sought to infringe the substance of that right under Art. 30(1) would to that extent be void. This, however, was not to say that it was not open to the State to impose regulations upon the exercise of the right. The fundamental freedom was to establish and to administer educational institutions; it was a right to establish and administer what were in truth educational institutions — institutions which catered to the educational needs of the citizens, or sections thereof. Regulations made in the true interests of efficiency of the instruction, discipline, health, sanitation, morality, public order and the like could be imposed. Such regulations were not restrictions on the substance of the right which was guaranteed; they secured the proper functioning of the institutions in matters educational. The right established by Art. 30(1) was a fundamental right declared in terms absolute. It was not subject to reasonable restriction? It was intended to be a real right for the protection of the minorities in the matter of setting up, of educational institutions of their own choice. The right was intended to be effective and was not to be whittled down by so-called regulative measures conceived in the interest not of the minority educational institution, but of the public or the nation as a whole. If every order which, while maintaining the formal character of a minority institution, destroyed the power of administration was held justifiable because it was in the public or national interest, though not in its interest as an educational intitutions, the right guaranteed by Art. 30(1) would be but a “teasing illusion,” a promise of unreality. Regulations which might lawfully be imposed either by legislative or executive action as a condition of receiving grant or of recognition had to be directed to making the institution, while retaining its character as a minority institution, effective as an educational institution. Such regulation must satisfy a dual test — the test of reasonableness and the test that it was regulative of the educational character of the institution and was conducive to making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who resorted to it.
9. In the case of Rev. Father W. Proost v. State of Bihar [A.I.R 1969 S.C 465], Hidayatullah, C.J, spoke for the 5 members of the Bench hearing the matter and observed that the width of Art. 30(1) could not be cut down by introducing into it considerations on which Art. 29(1) was based. Article 30(1) was couched in wide language and had to receive its full meaning. Attempts to whittle down the protection given to minorities could not be allowed.
10. In the case of D.A.V College, Jullundur v. State of Punjab [(1971) 2 SCC 269 : A.I.R 1971 S.C 1737], the Supreme Court was concerned with a provision in a statute made in exercise of powers under an University Act. One of these provisions required that the staff initially appointed by a college should be approved by the Vice-Chancellor and that all subsequent changes should be reported for the Vice-Chancellor's approval. This was a condition of affiliation. The Supreme Court held that there was no justification for this provision which decidedly interfered with the rights of management of the minority's college. They could not, therefore, be made conditions of affiliation, the non compliance of which would involve disaffiliation, and, consequently, were struck down as being violative of Art. 30(1).
11. Nine Judges of the Supreme Court decided the case of Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society v. State of Gujarat [(1974) 1 SCC 717 : A.I.R 1974 S.C 1389), Beg and Dwivedi, JJ., dissented from what was the majority conclusion but several judgments were delivered. Ray, C.J, speaking for himself and Palekar, J., observed that it was manifest that the appointment of teachers was an imp arrant part in educational institutions. The qualifications and the character of the teachers were really important. The minority institutions had the right to administer institutions. This right implied the obligation and duty of the minority institutions to render the very best to the students. In the right of administration, checks and balances in the shape of regulatory measures were required to ensure the appointment of good teachers and their conditions of service. The right to administer was to be tempered with regulatory measures to facilitate smooth administration. Regulations which served the interests of the teachers and students were of paramount importance in good administration. In the field of administration it was not reasonable to claim that minority institutions would have complete autonomy. Checks on the administration might be necessary in order to ensure that the administration was efficient and sound and would serve the academic needs of the institution. The right of a minority to administer its educational institution involved, as part of if, a correlative duty of good administration. Jaganmohan Reddy, J., speaking on behalf of himself and Alagiriswami, J., observed that the right of a linguistic or religious minority to administer educational institutions of their choice, though couched in absolute terms, had been held by the Supreme Court to be subject to regulatory measures which the State might impose for furthering the excellence of the standards of education. Khanna, J., noted that the right of the minorities to administer educational institutions did not prevent the making of reasonable regulations in respect of those institutions. Those regulations had necessarily to be made in the interest of the institution as a minority educational institution. They had to be so designed as to make it an effective vehicle for imparting education. The State could prescribe regulations to ensure the excellence of the institution and regulations made in the true interest of efficiency, of instruction, discipline, health, sanitation, morality, public order and the like were not restrictions on the substance of the right but secured the proper functioning of the institution in matters educational. A regulation which was designed to prevent mal-administration of an educational institution could not be said to offend Art. 30(1) but it had to be ensured that under the power of making regulations nothing was done as would detract from the character of the institution as a minority educational institution or which would impinge upon the rights of the minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. A law which interfered with a minority's choice of qualified teachers was void as being violative of Art. 30(1). It was, of course, permissible to prescribe the qualifications of teachers, but once the teachers possessing the requisite qualifications, were selected by the minorities for their educational institutions, the State would have no right to veto the selection of those teachers. The selection and appointment of teachers for an educational institution was one of the essential ingredients of the right to manage an educational institution and the minorities could not be denied such right of selection and appointment without infringing Art. 30(1), Mathew, J., speaking for himself and Chandrachud, J, said that if a Legislature could impose any regulation which it thought necessary to protect what in its view was in the interest of the State or society, the right under Art. 30(1) would cease to be a fundamental right. It sounded paradoxical that a right which the Constitution-makers wanted to be absolute could be subjected to regulations which need only satisfy the nebulous and elastic test of State necessity. No educational institution established by a religious or linguistic minority could claim total immunity from the regulations of the university; but the character of the permissible regulations must depend upon their purpose. Such regulations would be permissible if they were relevant to the purpose of securing or promoting the object of recognition or affiliation. In every case, when the reasonableness of a regulation came up for consideration before the Court, the question to be asked and answered was whether the regulation was calculated to subserve, or would in effect subserve the purpose of recognition or affiliation, namely, the excellence of the institution as a vehicle for general secular education to the minority community. The question whether a regulation was in the general interest of the public had no relevance if it did not advance the excellence of the institution as a vehicle for general secular education, as the only permissible regulations were those which secured the effectiveness of the purpose of the facility, namely, the excellence of the educational institutions in respect of their educational standards. That was the reason why the Supreme Court had time and again said that the question whether a particular regulation was calculated to advance the general public interest was of no consequence if it was not conducive to the interests of the minority community and those persons who resorted to it. The right to choose the principal and to have the teaching conducted by teachers appointed by the management after an overall assessment of their outlook and philosophy was perhaps the most important facet of the right to administer an educational institution.
12. It remains only to note the judgment of the Supreme Court in All Saints High School v. Government of Andhra Pradesh [(1980) 2 SCC 478 : A.I.R 1980 S.C 1042], Chandrachud, C.J, Fazl Ali and Kailasam, JJ., delivered separate judgments but upon the basic principle they were in agreement. Chandrachud, C.J, found that the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court showed that while the right of the religious and linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice could not be interfered with, restrictions by way of regulations for the purpose of ensuring educational standards and maintaining the excellence thereof could be validly prescribed. For maintaining educational standards of an institution, it was necessary to ensure that it was competently staffed. Conditions of service which prescribed minimum qualifications for the staff, their pay-scales, their entitlement to other benefits of service and the laying down of safeguards which must be observed before they were removed or dismissed from service or their services were terminated were all permissible measures of a regulatory character. Paragraph 4 of his judgment, upon which Sri Shah relied, may be quoted:
“In the case of institutions that receive State aid, it is the duty and obligation of the Government which grants aid to see that public funds are usefully and properly expended. If the expenditure incurred for paying the emoluments of the staff is subsidised or financed from out of State funds, it becomes the duty of the State to see that no one who does not possess the minimum qualifications is appointed on the staff, the pay and other emoluments of the staff are guaranteed and their service conditions secured. Minority institutions which receive Mate aid cannot complain of conditions subject to which the aid is granted, so long as such conditions do not amount to discrimination against them on the ground of language or religion and so long as the aid is not made to depend upon the performance or observance of conditions which amount to deprivation of the right guaranteed by Art. 30(1). There is also no doubt that minority institutions cannot be discriminated against in the matter of granting State aid.”
Fazl Ali, J., set out the propositions that emerged from an exhaustive analysis of the earlier cases decided by the Supreme Court and the views taken by it during the last two decades on Art. 30(1). From its language it was clear that it enshrined a fundamental right of the minority institutions to manage and administer their educational institutions. The State could make regulatory measures to promote the efficiency and excellence of educational standards and issue guidelines for ensuring the security of the services of the teachers or other employees of the institution. The State or the university could not under the garb of adopting regulatory measures tend to destroy the administrative autonomy of the institution or start interfering with the management of the institution so as to render the right of the administration of the management of the institution nugatory or illusory.
13. Having due regard to the Supreme Court's judgments, there is little doubt that the amended rule and circular infringe Art. 30(1).
14. Article 30(1) guarantees the right of minorities to administer their educational institutions. The selection and appointment of teaching and non-teaching staff thereof is an important ingredient of their administration. The State can regulate the educational qualifications of teaching staff to ensure the high standard of the education imparted. The amended rule and the circular are not regulatory in character, and are — fairly — not urged to be. The amended rule and the circular restrict the field of choice of miniority institutions for selecting and appointing teaching and non-teaching staff. In so doing the amended rule and circular impinge upon the administrative autonomy guaranteed by Art. 30(1). The restriction is not valid even though it be for the general welfare of the State. The restriction is also not valid even though the minority educational institution is aided.
15. Sri Shah submitted, as a preliminary objection, that though the amended rule had been brought into force in 1979, the petition has been filed only in October 1980, and that, therefore, there was delay and laches which ought to deprive the petitioners of relief. Considering that the petition was filed even while the State was considering the representation made by miniority institutions, as shown by the State's letter, dated 9 September 1980, there is no merit in the objection.
16. In the result, it is declared that the provisions of the amended rule 57(4) of the Secondary Schools Code and of the State's circular, dated 24 October 1979, in so far as they are made applicable to secondary aided schools run by minorities, including the schools in petition, infringe Art. 30(1) of the Constitution.
17. The respondents shall pay to the petitioners the costs of the petition.
18. Rule accordingly.
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