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Syed Khuwaja Syed Ahmed v. The Maharashtra Housing And Area Development Authority .

Bombay High Court
Sep 20, 1982
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

A dilapidated building at Grant Road was acquired by the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority ("the Authority") under Section 41 of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976. Occupants of the old building were entitled to be allotted suitable flats in the new building; Section 94 of the Act requires alternative accommodation when a building is to be demolished and during reconstruction. The building, however, collapsed (described in the opinion as having "crumbled down"), and the Authority reconstructed the building.

The petitioner (the plaintiff in the trial court) was one of the former occupants and claimed entitlement to allotment of Flat No. 6 in the newly constructed building. The Housing Board/Authority refused his demand, and the plaintiff sued in the City Civil Court seeking a declaration of entitlement to Flat No. 6. While the suit was pending, the plaintiff obtained an ad interim injunction restraining the Authority from allotting Flat No. 6 to any other person; that injunction was made absolute by the trial court on 20-11-1981.

Although Flat No. 6 remained vacant from some time before 20-11-1981 and continued to remain vacant thereafter, the plaintiff alleged he had not been given alternative accommodation. He filed a subsequent notice of motion seeking appointment of a Receiver for Flat No. 6 and asking to be appointed the Receiver's agent so that he could take occupation of the flat pending the suit. The trial court dismissed that notice of motion under Order 40, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.), holding that the plaintiff had not made out grounds for appointment of a Receiver and that there was no allegation of waste; the motion was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The plaintiff appealed the trial court's order. The appellate court allowed the appeal, set aside the lower court's order and appointed a Court Receiver for Flat No. 6 with directions for immediate possession to be taken and conditions imposed on the plaintiff's occupation as Receiver's agent.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Receiver should be appointed in respect of Flat No. 6 and whether the plaintiff could be appointed as the Receiver's agent to take temporary possession of the flat pending determination of the suit (application under Order 40, Rule 1, Civil P.C.).
  2. Whether the circumstances (vacant flat, prima facie entitlement by the plaintiff, and acute housing scarcity) constitute "waste" or justify appointment of a Receiver and temporary occupation as being "just and convenient".
  3. Whether any jurisdictional objection under Section 177 of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976, raised by the Assistant Government Pleader, should bar the appointment of a Receiver or prevent the interim possession arrangement at this stage.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff was one of the occupants of the erstwhile dilapidated building and was entitled, at least prima facie, to allotment of Flat No. 6 in the newly reconstructed building.
  • Flat No. 6 lay vacant from some time prior to 20-11-1981 and continued vacant thereafter; this created unnecessary waste and caused damage to the plaintiff, who lacked shelter.
  • The plaintiff sought appointment of a Receiver and to act as the Receiver's agent so he could occupy the flat temporarily; he offered to give undertakings that if he lost the suit he would hand back possession to the Receiver and would not create any third-party interest.

Defendant-Authority's Position

  • Earlier, when allocation was sought by the plaintiff, the Housing Board/Authority "had other views" and would not comply with the plaintiff's demand for allotment (i.e., they refused the plaintiff's demand for the flat).
  • For the notice of motion seeking a Receiver, no affidavit in reply was filed by the Authority; at a later stage the Authority did not resist the plaintiff's claim in the lower court (the Assistant Government Pleader adopted a fair / helpful attitude).

Assistant Government Pleader's Argument

  • Mrs. Shenoy, the Assistant Government Pleader, invited the court's attention to a possible defect in the suit, namely that the suit might suffer from want of jurisdiction of the Civil Court due to Section 177 of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court's analysis proceeds from factual premises and public-policy considerations expressly contained in the opinion:

  1. Prima facie entitlement and vacancy: The court accepted that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case for entitlement to Flat No. 6 and that the flat had been lying vacant since some time before 20-11-1981 and remained unoccupied thereafter. Those factual findings supported relief in the appellant's favour at an interim stage.
  2. Justness and convenience in context: The court emphasised that whether appointment of a Receiver is "just and convenient" must be assessed not only by an abstract or rigid test but with regard to the social context — in particular, severe housing scarcity in Bombay. Given acute need and the idle resource of an unoccupied flat, the court found it eminently just and convenient to appoint a Receiver and to permit temporary occupation by the plaintiff as the Receiver's agent.
  3. Waste as a relevant ground: The lower court had held that there was no allegation of waste and that grounds under Order 40, Rule 1 were not made out. The appellate court rejected this narrow view, observing that in present circumstances allowing a fit accommodation to lie vacant constituted not merely waste but "criminal waste" in social terms. The court stated that judicial interpretation of such terms must adapt to contemporary social realities.
  4. Procedural power and inherent jurisdiction: The court noted that Order 40 provides powers to appoint a Receiver but also emphasised the court's inherent power under Section 151 C.P.C. to craft reliefs necessary to do justice and to prevent social waste if Order 40 were, for any reason, inadequate.
  5. Jurisdictional objection (S. 177): The court declined to decide the jurisdictional point raised by the Assistant Government Pleader at this stage. It relied on the fact that the trial court had already made the injunction absolute on 20-11-1981, which indicated the trial court had considered the position and found a prima facie case. The appellate court reasoned that possible later findings on jurisdiction or on the merits would simply require the plaintiff to hand back possession to the Receiver; that potential outcome did not bar interim relief now.
  6. Conditions to protect rights: The court structured its remedy so as to protect the Authority's ultimate rights: it ordered appointment of an Official Receiver to take possession and to hand it to the plaintiff only on completion of specified formalities (affidavit undertaking, agreement, payment of lawful charges to the Receiver who would pay the Authority). These conditions ensured that if the plaintiff ultimately failed on the merits or jurisdiction, the Receiver (and thereby the Authority) could recover possession without execution.
  7. Critique of lower court: The appellate court expressly disagreed with the lower court's view that the case was not one in which appointment of a Receiver would be "just and convenient," calling that conclusion an instance of the lower court failing to appreciate the social context.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: APPEAL ALLOWED; ORDER OF THE LOWER COURT SET ASIDE; A COURT RECEIVER IS APPOINTED FOR FLAT NO. 6.

Direct consequences and operative directions contained in the holding:

  • The appellate court set aside the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's notice of motion and appointed an Official Receiver in respect of Flat No. 6 (as described in the plaint).
  • The Official Receiver was ordered to give immediate notice to the Authority and to take possession of the flat at 11:00 a.m. on 21 September 1982; if no one handed over possession, the Receiver was authorised to break any lock and take possession.
  • After taking possession, the Receiver shall hand the flat over to the plaintiff subject to specified conditions: the plaintiff must (a) file an affidavit undertaking to hand back possession immediately if he is ultimately found not entitled to it; (b) undertake not to part with possession or create any interest in the flat until further order; (c) pay lawful expenses (including any rent) to the Receiver who will pay the Authority; and (d) execute an agreement to act as the Receiver's agent. The plaintiff shall remain only as the Receiver's agent.
  • No order as to costs was made in relation to the appeal or the notice of motion, in view of the fair and helpful attitude of the Assistant Government Pleader and the Authority.

Broader implications: The opinion emphasises a flexible, context-sensitive approach to interim reliefs (Order 40 and inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 C.P.C.) in circumstances of acute social need. The judgment explicitly adapts concepts such as "just and convenient" and "waste" to contemporary social realities. The opinion does not, however, purport to announce or cite new precedential case-law beyond the reasoning it provides; the immediate legal effect is the appointment of a Receiver and the particular interim arrangement ordered between the parties.

Order accordingly.
Show all summary ...

1. This Appeal from Order has got to be allowed just for the asking. The simple facts are that there was a building at Grant Road which was in a dilapidated condition. It was acquired by the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (hereafter referred to as the “Authority”) under S. 41 of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 (hereafter the “Act”). The occupants of the old building were entitled, as a matter of right, to have the allotment of a suitable flat in the building to be newly constructed in the place of the old dilapidated building. As a matter of fact, under S. 94 of the Act, an alternative accommodation is required to be given to the occupants even when the building is to be demolished and while the new building is under construction. But it is really speaking, not necessary to go into all those facts and provisions at this stage. It is enough here to state that admittedly, without the Authority's active effort, the building itself decided to co-operate with the Authority and it crumbled down. The occupants had to fend for themselves for some roof over their head. The present petitioner who was the plaintiff in the trial Court was one of the occupants of the budlding. His grievance is that he has not been given alternative accommodation. But, really speaking, even that grievance is somewhat irrelevant at this stage. Point is that admittedly the building has been re-constructed by the Authority and according to the plaintiff, he being one of the occupants of the erstwhile building, he is entitled to allotment of one of the flats in the newly constructed building. For reasons to which I need make no reference, the Housing Board had other views and would not comply with the demand made by the petitioner in that behalf, with the result that ultimately the petitioner had to file a suit in the City Civil Court for declaration that he was entitled to allotment of Flat No. 6 in the said newly constructed building, particularly mentioned in the plaint in the suit. Pending the hearing of the suit, he took out a notice of motion for injunction restraining the Authority from allotting said Flat No. 6 to any other person. Ad interim injunction was granted by the court. It is the case of the plaintiff that no reply was filed by the Authority to the said notice of motion. Whatever that may be, the fact remains that the said notice of motion was made absolute by the trial Court on 20-11-1981.

2. The above facts are relevant for appreciating the following position, viz that:—

(a) said Flat No. 6 is lying vacant from the date quite some time before 20-11-1981 till this date;

(b) the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for succeeding in the suit and for getting allotment of the said flat;

The further position is crystal clear that notwithstanding the housing situation in the city of Bombay where millions of people are painfully smarting under the maddening impossibility of having some veritable roof over their heads and when amongst teeming millions there is a person such as the plaintiff clamouring for the flat with at least an established prima facie claim to the same, that flat is allowed by the Authority to remain vacant for years together. At least from 20-11-1981 till this date, the flat is remaining vacant; nobody occupies it and nobody wants to worry about it.

In these circumstances the petitioner-plaintiff took out another notice of motion for appointment of Receiver in respect of the flat and for appointing himself as the Receiver's Agent so that he could go into the occupation of the said flat. The petitioner's contention is so simple that it has got to be accepted by any court without the slightest hesitation and without a second thought. His contention is that he is without roof over his head. There is a flat lying vacant vis-a-vis which he has got at least a prima facie case. The flat is as vacant as anybody would want it to be. There is thus an unnecessary waste of this flat and unnecessary damage being caused to the plaintiff. He, therefore, contends that the court may appoint a Receiver and the plaintiff may be kept as the Receiver's agent. Implicit in it is the plaintiffs contention that if he ultimately loses in the suit, he will hand over the possession of the flat to the Receiver and implicit in that understanding is the further understanding that the Receiver in that case, when he takes back the possession from the plaintiff shall hand over the same to the Authority.

3. Probably because the simplicity of this demand, was not lost upon, defendant-authority, not affidavit-in-reply was filed by it even, to this, notice of motion taken out by the plaintiff and the notice of motion came up for hearing without any return before the learned Judge. But, as wilt be presently pointed out, all the same the learned Judge took a view by taking which he did not do justice to himself. He took the view that eve though there was no return filed to this notice of motion, still the plaintiff had not made good his case for appointment of Receiver. According to the learned Judge, this was not a case where it was just and convenient to appoint the Receiver. He observed further that there was nor allegation of waste against the Authority. He, therefore held that the grounds: an which the Receiver could be appointed as mentioned under Order 40, Rule 1 in the Civil P.C had not been made good by the plaintiff it was one this ground that the learned Judge dismissed the notice of motion with no order as to costs.

4. As mentioned at the outset, the appeal has got to be allowed just for the asking. I just fail to understand as to haw it is not just and not convenient to appoint a Receiver for the purpose of the eminently just utilisation of the flat in question. Whether the condition of justness and convenience is made out or not has got to be appreciated not only with reference to the facts of each case but also in the context of social situation. It is just impossible to conceive of a situation where there can be more of a case of justness and convenience than one where order of at least temporary utilisation of the flat where the flat is lying idle while thousands of people are suffering hardship (to) no end just because they lack even a small nook to rest their limbs in. On the other hand, it must be held, in the context of such situation, that it is eminently just and convenient in such cases that the Receiver should he appointed of such flat and if the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for his claim, which admittedly he has made out, then the Receiver can take possession of the flat and appoint the plaintiff as his agent and, further, it is perfectly just and convenient that the plaintiff should get into the occupation of the flat at least temporarily. If, ultimately, it turns out that he has not made good his case, then he will hand over the possession to the Receiver and the Receiver win, in his turn, hand over the same to the Authority without any necessity of execution as such. As a matter of fact, the plaintiff can be asked to give undertaking that he will hand over the possession to the Receiver if his claim is not made good. Nothing can be as just and as convenient as that.

5. Coming to the question of waste, I would like the courts to be abreast of the fact that contents and imports of expressions have got to be read in the context of the times. The flat lying vacant might not be a waste thirty years ago, but in these days of the acutest housing scarcity it is not a mere wastes it is a case of criminal waste. The courts cannot turn a blind eye to such criminal waste. No more and no longer the court could or should play the role of a silent and helpless spectator in respect of this criminal social waste. The court must realise that the Authority is after all constituted for the purpose of seeing to it that the persons who are likely to lose accommodation because the building which accommodate bowed down against the ravages of time should not take to pavements and railway platforms but should have some other reasonably decent accommodation secured for them. If the Authority does not perform that duty and allows the flat to remain vacant, the Authority itself commits waste. It is as far as that and nothing less than that. If flats are allowed by the Authority to lie vacant for no avoidable reason, the court should keep their eyes skinned to find some way to avoid this insane waste. A suitable order as regard undertaking is one such way, and when it comes to it as it were, on a platter, the court should grab such an opportunity. The law facilitates the court to pass such orders, in the first instance, under Order 40 itself; but if for any reason that Order 40 is inadequate for that purpose, there is that ever present section 151 of the code which the court must resort to in order to find ways and means to do justice between the parties or to administer real social justice to the Society as a whole.

6. But apart from the fact there exists power in the court to pass such order, in the context of times, the courts of justice are under a duty and obligation to follow this course. As a matter of fact, I would like to go to the extent of saying that if the plaintiff has not asked for such relief, the court has itself to suggest such relief to both the parlies. I want to make it clear that the days have gone past the distant times when courts could sit down non-challantly twiddling its fingers thinking that everybody was for himself and devil for the hindmost. The institution of the court is not meant only for the purpose of doing justice merely in accordance with the grammar of law; without delving into the spirit of it, not worrying, is the process of such administration of justice, whether justice smothered itself to death. Times are changing, the courts must keep abreast of the times; at least must make attempt to be abreast of the times; and these snail orders are the matters which give opportunity to the court to have a second thought at the old notions.

I do not wish to deliver a pious homily on this subject. But I do hope these words will serve at least in a small measure (to?) give some indication to the Courts who are required in administer this aspect of justice with everyday frequency, about the manner in which they can see new content in the expressions such as just and convenient an in the all pervading inherent power u/sec. 151 C.P.C

7. It is true that while playing positive role in the administration of justice, the courts can't do anything in respect of situation of injustice which has not been brought by parties themselves before the court. If an illegal order is passed by some officer and the judge reads it in the newspaper, he cannot move his small finger against it unless the aggrieved party has come before the court for redressing his grievance. But once the party comes before the court and the court sees the injustice of the matter, the court cannot turn a blind eye and deaf ear to the injustice merely because an application in that behalf has not been happily made or drafted.

8. I must state that Mrs. Shenoy, the learned Asstt. Government Pleader was as fair as the Authority who did not resist the plaintiff's claim in the lower court. But she tried to invite my attention to one alleged defect in the suit. According to her, the suit itself suffers from want of jurisdiction for Civil Court. In this connection, she invited say attention to S. 177 of the Act. I do not at all wish to enter into the controversy at this stage. That is not necessary for the simple reason that the earlier notice of motion for injunction was made absolute by the court by its order dated 20-11-1981 which clearly means that the trial Court has considered this particular position and has found that the plaintiff has got a prima facie case for the relief which he claimed. If that is so, it is impossible for any court to say that the second notice of motion will have to face the difficulty of S. 177 raised by Mrs. Shenoy. If ultimately it turns out that the court has no jurisdiction or if it turns out that for any other reason the plaintiff is not entitled to claim the possession which claim be has set up in the suit, he will not be entitled to continue with the possession as the Receiver's agent or in any capacity. He shall have to hand over the possession to the Receiver and the Receiver will hand over the same hack to the person concerned. The difficulty suggested by Mrs. Shenoy, therefore, need not be considered at this stage at all.

9. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The order passed by the Lower Court, as set aside and the Court Receiver is appointed in respect of Flat No. 6 in the building more particularly described in the plaint in the suit. The Official Receiver shall give immediate notice to the Authority stating that possession of the said flat shall be taken by the Receiver at 11.00 a.m tomorrow, that is, on 21st September, 1982 and if there is no one to hand over the possession to the Receiver, the lock, if any, shall be broken open by the Receiver and the possession shall be taken by him. After taking the possession, the Receiver shall hand over the same to the plaintiff subject to the following condition. The plaintiff shall make an affidavit giving an undertaking therein that in case it turns out in the suit or any other proceedings that he is not entitled to the relief that he has claimed in the suit, he shall hand over the possession to the Receiver forthwith without raising any objection. He shall also further give an undertaking in the affidavit that he shall not part with the possession of the flat or shall not create interest in respect of the flat in favour of any other person until further orders of the court. It is made clear that the plaintiff shall remain in possession of the flat only and purely as the Receiver's agent and he shall give an undertaking that he shall pay all the lawful expenses including rent claimable by the Authority to the Receiver in the first instance who in turn shall pay the charges to the Authority. The plaintiff shall also execute the requisite agreement with the Receiver mentioning that he would act as the Receiver's agent and shall also give an undertaking as mentioned above on affidavit. He shall not get the possession from the Receiver until he observes the above mentioned indispensable formalities.

10. In view of the very fair and helpful attitude taken by the Asstt. Government Pleader as also by the Authority, there shall be no order as to costs either of this appeal or of the notice of motion.

Order accordingly.