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Centron Industrial Alliance Ltd. v. Pravin Kantilal Vakil And Another
Legal-Analytical Summary of the Opinion (Sujata V. Manohar, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner-company, Centron Industrial Alliance Limited ("the petitioner-company"), a public limited company since 1974, experienced financial difficulties from 1975. In or about 1980 a scheme of amalgamation was proposed for amalgamation with Brooke Bond India Ltd. Statutory meetings of shareholders, secured creditors and unsecured creditors were convened on January 27, 1981 pursuant to a court order; those meetings approved the scheme overwhelmingly (97.30% of shareholders, 100% of secured creditors and 98.50% of unsecured creditors). Company Petition No. 84 of 1981 under s. 391 of the Companies Act, 1956 seeking court sanction of the scheme was filed on March 6, 1981. An application for Central Government approval under s. 23 of the MRTP Act was also made.
An alternative proposal (involving Harbans Lal Malhotra and Sons Ltd., competitors) had earlier been considered and rejected by the board and secured creditors. The Central Government approved the Brooke Bond proposal by order dated January 21, 1982; the Malhotras challenged that approval in the Supreme Court, which declined to stay further High Court proceedings but stipulated that any High Court sanction would not take effect for four weeks.
After the Supreme Court order, on May 28, 1982, requisitionists (Pravin Kantilal Vakil and another) lodged a requisition to call an extraordinary general meeting for July 9, 1982, to move a resolution that the company renegotiate with Brooke Bond and/or examine alternate schemes and, principally, that the company withdraw Company Petition No. 84 of 1981. An explanatory statement accompanied the requisition. The board convened the extraordinary general meeting as requisitioned. A shareholder (Bhagwandas) sued in the Bombay City Civil Court for injunction against holding that meeting; that court refused to grant an injunction. The present judge's summons was filed by another shareholder (the applicant) seeking an injunction restraining the opponents from holding and proceeding with the requisitioned extraordinary general meeting pending disposal of Company Petition No. 84 of 1981.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether shareholders may requisition a meeting for the purpose of compelling the company to withdraw a petition presented under s. 391 of the Companies Act, 1956 (i.e., can shareholders compel the company to resile from its statutory obligation to present the petition)?
- Whether a subsequent change of mind by members or creditors, after statutory meetings under s. 391 have validly approved a scheme, is a matter that the court ought to take into account so as to require reconvening of statutory meetings or otherwise permit rescission of that approval?
- Whether an injunction should be granted restraining the holding of an extraordinary general meeting requisitioned to consider withdrawal of the pending s. 391 petition (including consideration of the adequacy of the explanatory statement annexed to the requisition and the applicability of s. 169 and related authority requiring the board to call a requisitioned meeting)?
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant (seeking injunction)
- Contended that the requisitioned meeting is designed to compel the company to withdraw Company Petition No. 84 of 1981, thereby pre-empting the court's consideration of the s. 391 petition and interfering with the statutory process established by s. 391 and r.79.
- Argued that the requisitioned meeting, by seeking withdrawal of the pending petition, affects outsiders (creditors) and the court's jurisdiction and is not an ordinary internal management matter that requisition meetings normally address.
- Contended the explanatory statement annexed to the requisition was vague, insufficient and misleading, and did not set out any concrete alternative scheme for shareholders to consider.
Opponents / Requisitionists (and their counsel Mr. Bhabha)
- Asserted that the requisitioned meeting was called primarily to consider alternative schemes and to renegotiate with Brooke Bond, and that shareholders must be allowed to express their views; their voice should not be stifled.
- Relied on s. 169 of the Companies Act to submit that, on receipt of a valid requisition signed by requisite members, the board is bound to call an extraordinary general meeting.
- Relied on authorities such as Isle of Wight Railway Co. v. Tahourdin and on Cricket Club of India Ltd. v. Madhav L. Apte to support the proposition that courts should not lightly restrain requisitioned shareholder meetings (and that boards are ordinarily bound to call such meetings even if resolutions may be irregular on their face).
- Submitted that delay (about 20 months since the statutory meetings) and alleged change of circumstances justified reconsideration and that alternative schemes were purportedly available (arguing shareholders knew the alternatives from annual reports).
- Also argued that the relief sought should be by suit rather than by judge's summons and cited Prakasam v. Sri Narayana Dharma Paripalana Yogam in support of the proposition that company courts will not assume jurisdiction where individual relief is sought.
Secured Creditors (SICOM and UCO Bank)
- SICOM filed an affidavit stating that, subsequent to the statutory meetings, the Government of Maharashtra (which held SICOM shares) had received an alternative proposal and instructed SICOM to withdraw its support to the merger.
- UCO Bank had not filed an affidavit explaining any change of stance (the court notes UCO Bank filed no affidavit).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Raghubar Dayal v. Bank of Upper India Ltd., AIR 1919 PC 9 | Arrangement takes effect from the date of approval at the statutory meeting held under the court's order, not from the date of the court's sanction. | Used to explain that under s. 391 a scheme approved at statutory meetings becomes binding (subject to sanction) from the date of approval at those meetings, emphasizing the statutory route for member/creditor approval. |
| Dorman Long and Co. Ltd., In re, [1934] 1 Ch D 635 | Authority dealing with disputes about whether statutory meetings were properly held and whether votes were properly recorded; relates to validity of statutory meetings. | Court noted that Dorman Long concerned the propriety of statutory meetings and did not address reconvening meetings because of a later change of mind; distinguished that context from the present case. |
| Waxed Papers Ltd., In re, [1937] 156 LT 452 | Deals with validity of proxy votes and whether procedural irregularities at statutory meetings affect outcomes; Lord Justice Slesser made observations about whether courts should consider subsequent change of mind. | Cited for the observation (Slesser LJ) that a mere subsequent change of mind without new circumstances may not be a matter for the court; used to support reluctance to permit post-approval change of mind to undo statutory approvals. |
| Sidhpur Mills Co. Ltd., In re, AIR 1962 Guj 305 | Approach articulated: (i) ascertain compliance with statutory requirements; (ii) determine whether the majority acted bona fide in interests of whole body of shareholders; (iii) consider whether a fair and reasonable shareholder would regard the scheme as for the company's benefit; post-facto events are generally not to be considered except in rare cases. | Cited and followed for the proposition that, generally, the court should consider the resolution on the footing of circumstances existing when the scheme was formulated and approved; court expresses agreement with these observations. |
| Isle of Wight Railway Co. v. Tahourdin, [1884] 25 Ch D 320 (CA) | Held that courts will not normally interfere with internal company meetings; when shareholders requisition a meeting the board is bound to call it; only in strong cases (e.g., where nothing legal could be done under the notice) would the court restrain the meeting. | Considered by court but held inapplicable to the present case because the present requisition seeks to affect persons other than members and to interfere with the court's jurisdiction under s. 391; court accepted Lindley's guarded view that wholly illegal resolutions need not be facilitated but distinguished the present facts. |
| Foss v. Harbottle, [1843] 2 Hare 461 (and related line) | Principle restraining judicial interference in internal company management until members have used internal remedies (e.g., calling general meetings). | Referenced as part of the line of authority protecting internal management; court held that the Foss v. Harbottle line does not govern a requisition designed to affect outsiders (creditors) or to interfere with a pending s. 391 petition. |
| Cricket Club of India Ltd. v. Madhav L. Apte, [1975] 45 Comp Cas 574 (Bom) | Held that a board is bound to call a requisitioned meeting even if the resolution proposed would be contrary to statutory provisions relating to internal matters (s. 274 cited in that case). | Distinguished: court observed such authorities concern internal management matters and do not apply where the requisitioned meeting seeks to interfere with third parties' interests or the court's exercise of jurisdiction under s. 391. |
| Laljibhai C. Kapadia v. Lalji B. Desai, [1973] 43 Comp Cas 17 (Bom) | Principle that the explanatory statement required under s. 173 must ensure all facts bearing on shareholders' judgment are disclosed; failure renders resolutions bad in law. | Applied to hold the explanatory statement annexed to the requisition was vague, insufficient and potentially misleading; failure to set out relevant facts or alternative schemes supported invalidity of the requisition. |
| Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. Ltd. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., [1971] 41 Comp Cas 377 (Bom) | Also concerns adequacy of explanatory statements under s. 173 and protecting shareholders by full disclosure. | Used with Laljibhai to justify the court's view that the explanatory statement's inadequacy made the requisition legally defective. |
| Prakasam v. Sri Narayana Dharma Paripalana Yogam, [1980] 50 Comp Cas 611 (Ker) | Considered whether company court will assume jurisdiction where a member seeks to redress an individual injustice (Kerala High Court decision cited by opponents). | Not followed as a bar: court held that because the requisitioned meeting had a direct nexus with a pending s. 391 petition, the company court could deal with the judge's summons seeking to restrain the meeting. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeds from statutory text and the character of s. 391 proceedings. Key elements of the reasoning are:
- Statutory framework: Under s. 391, where statutory meetings convened under the section approve a compromise or arrangement by prescribed majorities, the arrangement, if thereafter sanctioned by the court, is binding on all members and creditors. The court cited the Privy Council in Raghubar Dayal to stress that the arrangement takes effect from approval at the statutory meetings.
- Mandatory procedural duty: Rule 79 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 requires that where a proposed arrangement is agreed at the statutory meetings, the company must present a petition to the court within seven days of the filing of the chairman's report (or a creditor/contributory may present it with leave). This imposes a statutory obligation on the company once statutory approval is secured.
- No challenge to statutory meetings' validity: There was no allegation that the statutory meetings held in January 1981 were improperly convened or that relevant information was withheld at those meetings. The approvals at those meetings were therefore valid and effective.
- Whether post-approval change of mind can undo approvals: The court examined authorities and concluded that, generally, a mere subsequent change of mind by members or creditors after valid statutory approvals is not a ground to reconvene statutory meetings or to treat the earlier approval as vitiated. The court relied on Waxed Papers (Slesser LJ) and Sidhpur Mills to support the proposition that the court should ordinarily consider the scheme in light of circumstances existing when the scheme was formulated and approved; post-facto events are exceptional grounds only in rare cases.
- Absence of meaningful new circumstances: The requisitionists relied on delay (about 20 months) and asserted availability of alternative schemes. The court found no concrete particulars of changed circumstances or any detailed alternative scheme in affidavits; SICOM's affidavit stated only that on government instruction it had withdrawn its support and mentioned an alternative proposal without particulars. The court held this was insufficient to show any alternative was better or sufficiently worked out.
- Adequacy of shareholders' avenues to be heard: The court observed that shareholders have statutory means to express objections — the statutory meetings and the right to appear and oppose the scheme when the s. 391 petition is heard — and that a requisitioned meeting is not the only way to voice objections. Accordingly, the requisition was unnecessary to permit objections to be heard by the court.
- Interaction with s.169 and internal-management authorities: While s. 169 requires boards to call requisitioned meetings, the court reasoned that Isle of Wight and Cricket Club decisions addressing internal management cannot be applied where the requisitioned meeting seeks to affect interests of outsiders (creditors) or to interfere with the exercise of the court's jurisdiction under s. 391. The court accepted that in ordinary internal-management matters directors cannot be restrained from calling a requisitioned meeting, but distinguished the present requisition on that basis.
- Explanatory statement insufficiency: The explanatory statement annexed to the requisition did not set out any alternative scheme or adequate facts bearing on the shareholders' judgment; the court regarded the statement as vague, tricky, insufficient and misleading. Relying on authorities concerning s. 173 disclosure obligations, the court held that such inadequacy rendered the requisition bad in law.
- Interference with statutory obligation: Because the requisitioned meeting sought to compel withdrawal of the pending s. 391 petition, it interfered with the company's statutory obligation under r.79 and with the statutory process itself. The court held that this interference and the distinguishing features of the requisition justified judicial restraint of the requisitioned meeting.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The judge's summons is made absolute in terms of prayer (a) except for the bracketed portion. The opponents are ordered to pay the costs of the judge's summons fixed at Rs. 300.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The order restrains the holding and proceeding with the requisitioned extraordinary general meeting insofar as it sought to compel the company to withdraw the pending Company Petition No. 84 of 1981 under s. 391; it thereby protects the statutory process established by s. 391 and the company's obligation (under r.79) to present the petition following statutory meetings' approvals.
- On broader precedent: The court distinguished authorities that protect shareholders' rights to requisition meetings in internal-management contexts, holding those authorities inapplicable where a requisition seeks to interfere with third-party interests (creditors) or with the court's jurisdiction under s. 391. The opinion does not purport to lay down a general new rule beyond this factual context; it rests its decision on statutory interpretation, the inadequacy of the explanatory statement, the absence of concrete changed circumstances, and the need to protect the statutory s. 391 process.
Note: This summary is confined to information expressly contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond the text.
Sujata V. Manohar, J.:— The petitioner-company, Centron Industrial Alliance Limited, has filed a Company Petition bearing No. 84 of 1981 (See [1984] 55 Comp Cas 731 (Bom)), under the provisions of s. 391 of the Companies Act, 1956, for sanctioning a scheme of amalgamation of the petitioner-company with M/s. Brooke Bond India Ltd. The petitioner-company was incorporated in the year 1949. It became a public limited company in the year 1974. It is admittedly in financial difficulties since 1975. In September, 1976, the board of directors of the petitioner-company was reconstituted and directors sponsored or nominated by the State Industrial and Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. (SICOM) and United Commercial Bank (UCO Bank) were inducted on the board of directors of the petitioner-company. Ever since the petitioner-company became a public limited company in the year 1974, the petitioner-company has not paid any dividend whatsoever to the shareholders. The company has been declared a relief undertaking under the provisions of the Bombay Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, 1958, with effect from January 1, 1977. In these circumstances, in or about 1980, a scheme of amalgamation was proposed on behalf of the petitioner-company for its amalgamation with the Brooke Bond India Ltd. Thereafter, in pursuance of an order passed by this court in November 26, 1980, statutory meetings of the shareholders, secured creditors and unsecured creditors of the petitioner-company were held on January 27, 1981, to consider the proposed scheme of amalgamation. At the meetings so held, 97.30 per cent. of the shareholders, 100 per cent. of the secured creditors and 98.50 per cent. of the unsecured creditors approved of this scheme. Thereafter, on March 6, 1981, Company Petition No. 84 of 1981 (See [1984] 55 Comp Cas 731 (Bom)) was filed for sanctioning the said scheme of amalgamation. An application was also made to the Central Govt. under the provisions of s. 23 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as “the MRTP Act”), for its approval to the said scheme of amalgamation.
2. It seems that at about the time that the scheme of amalgamation in question was propounded, there was an alternative scheme under which Harbans Lal Malhotra and Sons Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “the Malhotras”), who were competitors in trade of the company, had proposed to take on lease the factory premises of the petitioner-company. This alternative proposal was rejected at that time by the board of directors and the two secured creditors (SICOM and UCO Bank) of the petitioner-company as not advantageous to the company. When the petitioner-company applied for approval of the Central Govt. under s. 23 of the MRTP Act, the scheme was strongly opposed by the Malhotras. The secured creditors, on the other hand, supported the scheme of amalgamation. By an order dated January 21, 1982, the Central Govt. approved of the proposal of M/s. Brooke Bond India Ltd. for amalgamation of the petitioner-company with it as contained in the application dated February 20, 1980. The Malhotras moved the Supreme Court against the order of the Central Govt. dated January 21, 1982. The Supreme Court, however, by its order dated March 12, 1982, declined to stay further proceedings in any High Court or any authority but ordered that any order passed would be subject to the result of the appeals. It also directed that in the event of either of the High Courts sanctioning the scheme of amalgamation, the judgment will not take effect for a period of four weeks. After the above order was passed by the Supreme Court, the opponents in this company application, Pravin Kantilal Vakil and another, lodged a requisition dated May 28, 1982, signed by the requisite number of shareholders at the registered office of the petitioner-company requisitioning an extraordinary general meeting of the company to be held on July 9, 1982, to consider the following resolution:
“Resolved that the company renegotiate with the Brooke Bond India Ltd. and/or examine alternate scheme(s) in the interest of the company and for the purpose, resolved further that the company should withdraw Company Petition No. 84 of 1981 (See [1984] 55 Comp Cas 731 (Bom)) filed in the High Court in Bombay from the date of this resolution.”
3. There was an explanatory statement annexed to this notice to which I will refer later. Pursuant to this requisition, the board of directors by their notice dated June 11, 1982, convened an extraordinary general meeting of the company as requisitioned. The notice convening the extraordinary general meeting is exhibit “C” to the petition. Thereafter, one Bhagwandas, a shareholder of the petitioner-company, filed a suit in the Bombay City Civil Court for an injunction restraining the company from holding the extraordinary general meeting. He also took out a notice of motion for an injunction to restrain the holding of the meeting. The City Civil Court, however, did not grant such an injunction. Thereafter, the applicant herein, who is also a shareholder of the petitioner-company, has taken out the present judge's summons for an order, that pending the hearing and final disposal of Company Petition No. 84 of 1981 (See [1984] 55 Comp Cas 731 (Bom)), the opponents, their servants and agents should be restrained from holding and proceeding with the extraordinary general meeting.
4. In order to consider whether an injunction as prayed for can be granted or not, it is necessary to consider the nature of the requisition which has been received by the petitioner-company and the purpose for which the requisition is made. The resolution which is proposed to be considered at the requisitioned meeting is in two parts. The first part of the resolution calls upon the company to renegotiate with M/s. Brooke Bond India Ltd. and/or to examine alternate schemes in the interest of the company. The main part of the resolution, however, calls upon the company to withdraw Company Petition No. 84 of 1981 (See [1984] 55 Comp Cas 731 (Bom)). The main purpose of requisitioning the meeting of shareholders is to compel the company to withdraw Company Petition No. 84 of 1981 (See [1984] 55 Comp Cas 731 (Bom)) which is a petition for sanctioning the scheme of amalgamation. The resolution itself makes it quite clear that unless Company Petition No. 84 of 1981 is withdrawn, the company cannot either renegotiate with M/s. Brooke Bond India Ltd. or examine any alternative schemes. It was strongly argued by Mr. Bhabha, the learned counsel for the opponents, that the requisitioned meeting has been called mainly for the purpose of considering alternative schemes which may be beneficial to the company. On a perusal of the said resolution and the explanatory statement attached to it, it becomes quite clear that the requisitionists have not put forth before the shareholders any alternative scheme whatsoever. The explanatory statement sets out the following:
(i) That one of the shareholders of the company, Mr. Joseph Sabastian D'Mello has filed an affidavit setting out the facts and figures for the proposed scheme of amalgamation with M/s. Brooke Bond India Ltd. as not fair and equitable to the shareholders of the company. Under sub-paras. (a) to (e), the explanatory statement sets out why, according to the requisitionists, the scheme of amalgamation is not beneficial to the shareholders of the petitioner-company.
(ii) In the next paragraph, it is stated that the final sanctioning of the scheme will not be granted before September, 1982, and this delay is very long. It then sets out that the company should either renegotiate the terms of merger with M/s. Brooke Bond India Ltd. or it should examine any alternative course of action. There is nothing in this explanatory statement which would show either that there are any alternative proposals more beneficial to the company, or that there is any possibility of renegotiation, with M/s. Brooke Bond India Ltd. Quite clearly, the purpose of requisitioning the meeting of the shareholders is to get rid of the company petition which is pending before this court for considering the scheme of amalgamation with M/s. Brooke Bond India Ltd.
5. Under s. 391 of the Companies Act, 1956, whenever a scheme of amalgamation is put before the members or classes of members or creditors or classes of creditors of a company at the statutory meetings convened for the purpose under s. 391(1) of the Companies Act, 1956, if a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the class of members or creditors, as the case may be, present and voting at the meeting agree to any compromise or arrangement, it shall, if sanctioned by the court, be binding on all the members or creditors of the class, as the case may be, and also on the company. As pointed out by the Privy Council in the case of Raghubar Dayal v. Bank of Upper India Ltd., AIR 1919 PC 9, the arrangement will take effect from the date of approval of the arrangement at the statutory meeting held for the purpose, and not from the date of sanction by the court. Thus, under s. 391 of the Companies Act, 1956, a specific method is provided for obtaining the approval of the members and creditors of a company to a proposed scheme. Once such an approval is obtained in the manner provided by s. 391, the scheme, subject to it being sanctioned, becomes binding on all the members and/or creditors of the company as also on the company from the date of granting of such approval by the members and/or creditors. Under r. 79 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, where the proposed compromise or arrangement is agreed to, with or without modification, as provided by sub-s. (2) of s. 391, the company shall, within 7 days of the filing of the report by the chairman of the statutory meeting(s), present a petition to the court for confirmation of the arrangement. If the company fails to present any petition for confirmation within the time prescribed, it shall be open to any creditor or contributory, with the leave of the court, to present the petition and the company shall be liable for the costs thereof. Thus, after a scheme is approved at the statutory meeting(s) held for the purpose, the company is under an obligation to present a petition for confirmation of the scheme within 7 days of the filing of the report by the chairman of such meeting or meetings.
6. Can the shareholders thereafter requisition a meeting for the purpose of compelling the company to withdraw the petition for sanctioning the scheme? In other words, is it open to the shareholders to compel the company to resile from its legal obligation to present a petition for confirmation of the scheme?
7. It is nobody's case in this application that the statutory meetings which were convened and held for the purpose of considering the scheme for the amalgamation in question were either not properly convened or that there was any withholding of the relevant information from the persons attending and voting at these meetings. The statutory meetings were properly convened and properly held. At these meetings, there was no dispute that an overwhelming majority of members and secured creditors and unsecured creditors approved of the scheme. What is stated is that, now, the secured creditors and a substantial body of the shareholders have changed their mind; and they wish to demonstrate this change of mind at the requisitioned meeting. The two secured creditors of the company, “SICOM and UCO Bank”, have appeared through a common counsel and have stated that they do not now support the scheme of amalgamation. While “SICOM” has filed an affidavit purporting to explain this change of stand, no affidavit has been filed on behalf of “UCO Bank”. I have to consider whether such a subsequent change of mind by some of the members and creditors of the company can be taken note of and whether it is necessary to permit the shareholders to hold a requisitioned meeting of the company in order to demonstrate that they have changed their stance.
8. There have been instances where at the time of consideration of a scheme of amalgamation, a dispute has been raised as to whether the statutory meetings held for the purpose of considering the scheme of amalgamation were properly held or not. In Dorman Long and Co. Ltd., In re, [1934] 1 Ch D 635, there was a dispute as to whether the statutory meetings for considering the scheme had been properly held and whether voting was properly recorded at the statutory meetings. It was, in this context, that the court was required to consider whether the petition should be dismissed or whether fresh meetings should be summoned. The question of holding a fresh meeting for considering the scheme on account of a subsequent change in the stand of the members did not arise in that case at all. In Waxed Papers Ltd., In re, [1937] 156 LT 452, the court was required to consider whether proxy votes which were cast at the statutory meeting convened for considering the scheme were valid. The difficulty in that case arose because the proxy votes were utilised for voting on a resolution to adjourn consideration of the scheme and a point was raised that the power to vote by proxy on the scheme did not entail a power to vote on a resolution to adjourn the consideration of the scheme. Once again, the dispute related to the manner in which the statutory meeting had been held. The court was not called upon to consider any subsequent change of mind by any members. In that case, however, Lord Justice Slesser observed:
“Speaking for myself, I should like to reserve the question, whether, in any event, a subsequent change of mind on the part of the shareholders is a matter which the court ought to consider at all if when considered by the court, the scheme cannot be legally impeached for reasons other than those which would be appropriate at the meeting. I do not think that in the present case, it is necessary to express a final conclusion upon the matter, because the learned judge has said that such change of mind as did arise in this case was induced by statements which were not fair, and, therefore, I think that he was perfectly justified in disregarding that matter; but it would appear, when the section is looked at, that that which the court is sanctioning is the arrangement or compromise made at the meeting which has been called under the order of the court. I think it is difficult to see how, if no new matters, had they been known at the time the meeting was held, would have influenced the position (so that at that time, the scheme was a proper one for all reasons to sanction) a mere change of mind later, on the part of persons, either transferees of the shares or the shareholders themselves, where there were really no new circumstances producing any different legal situation, could be a matter to be considered by the court. Certainly, the number of such persons do not seem to me material in this sense, that, while it is true that under sub-s. (2) the majority to approve the scheme must represent three-fourths in value of the members or class of members, it cannot I think make any difference that the members who change their minds and oppose later on are or are not more or less than three-fourths in number, if they have a good ground for opposition, that ground would be good, even if they were less than three-fourths in value, if they have no ground, it does not seem to me to avail them to show that they represent more than three-fourths in value.”
9. Nearer home, in the case of Sidhpur Mills Co. Ltd., In re, AIR 1962 Guj 305, a learned judge of the Gujarat High Court, while considering a scheme of amalgamation, observed as follows (at p. 311):
“Therefore, in my judgment, the correct approach to the present case is (i) to ascertain whether the statutory requirements have been complied with, and (ii) to determine whether the scheme as a whole has been arrived at by the majority bona fide and in the interests of the whole body of shareholders in whose interests the majority purported to act, and (iii) to see whether the scheme is such that a fair and reasonable shareholder will consider it to be for the benefit of the company and for himself……. I do not wish to be understood to say that, in no case post facto circumstances or events cannot be taken into account, but, on the whole, I have come to the conclusion that, whilst, in some rare and exceptional cases, the court may take into consideration subsequent events to protect the interests of the company or the shareholders, as a general rule, the court should consider the resolution on the footing of the circumstances which were in existence at the time when the scheme was formulated, deliberated upon and approved. If any other approach were to be made, then, in that case,. there would be no sanctity about business contracts. In fact, such an approach may induce interested persons to shape future events and circumstances in such a way as to convert a reasonable scheme into an unreasonable one.”
10. With all respect to the learned judge, I am inclined to agree with his observations.
11. I have not been shown a single case where in considering a scheme of amalgamation, the court ordered a fresh meeting of the members and/or creditors on the ground that after the statutory meetings were held, the members or creditors have had second thoughts about the scheme. All cases where the question of reconvening the statutory meeting was discussed, were cases where there were disputes relating to the validity of the statutory meetings. There is no such dispute in the present case. Secondly, though the requisition talks about a change of circumstances, I have not been told what these changed circumstances are which make it necessary for the members to reconsider the scheme. Mr. Bhabha has pointed out lapse of time as one such circumstance. He has submitted that more than 20 months have elapsed since the scheme was put before the statutory meetings of the members and the creditors. This delay, however, has been occasioned because sanction of the Central Govt. was required under the MRTP Act, and the application for sanction was strenuously opposed by persons who were interested in the alternate scheme. How this delay of 20 months has affected the merits of the scheme has not been explained by anybody. Nor is there any guarantee that any alternate scheme will be sanctioned within a shorter period. It was also submitted before me that alternative and better schemes are forthcoming. No particulars, however, have been given in any affidavit of anybody as to what these alternative schemes are, who has submitted them and in what manner such alternative schemes are more beneficial. SICOM, who is one of the secured creditors of the petitioner company, has filed an affidavit in which it has stated as follows:
“After the scheme of merger was presented to this Hon'ble court and the meetings of the shareholders and the creditors were held in January, 1981, the Government of Maharashtra which is holding 100 per cent. shares of SICOM received an alternative proposal for rehabilitation of the petitioners which, according to the Government, had the main advantage of continuing the petitioners as an independent entity.
The Government of Maharashtra, therefore, instructed SICOM to withdraw its support to the merger.”
12. It is apparent from this affidavit that SICOM has withdrawn its support to the merger on instructions from the Government of Maharashtra. Apart from a bare reference to the alternative proposal, there is nothing in this affidavit which would show that SICOM is aware of the nature of the alternative proposal or whether it is better than the existing proposal or whether it is sufficiently worked out so as to be capable of being put before the statutory meetings of members and creditors of the company. If there is such a scheme which is more beneficial to the company, there is nothing which prevents any member or creditor from coming before the court and asking for the scheme being considered at the statutory meeting, though whether the propounding of a subsequent but more beneficial scheme can be a good reason for not sanctioning a scheme beneficial to the company and binding on the company and its members and creditors, is a moot point.
13. It has also been submitted that the shareholders are entitled to express their views and the voice of the shareholders should not be stifled. If the shareholders or any of them have good grounds for opposing the scheme of amalgamation, there is nothing which prevents such shareholders from appearing at the company petition for sanctioning the scheme of amalgamation and pointing out their objections. If the objections are weighty, they can be certainly considered at the time of the hearing of the company petition. It makes no difference whether such an objection is by one shareholder or a large number of shareholders. What matters is the basis of the opposition. Thus, the requisition is wholly misconceived.
14. It has next been submitted that under s. 391, statutory meetings are required to be called to ascertain the views of the shareholders. If the voice of the shareholders is required to be heard, then they must be allowed to hold a requisitioned meeting. A requisitioned meeting, however, is not the only way in which the voice of the shareholder can be heard, nor is such a requisitioned meeting contemplated in the scheme of s. 391. Views of the shareholders under s. 391 are required to be ascertained by calling a statutory meeting of the shareholders for that purpose. In addition, the shareholders also have a right to appear at the hearing of the scheme of amalgamation and to put forth their objections to the scheme, if they have any. Both these methods clearly ensure that the voice of the shareholders will be heard, and there is no need, nor is there any legal sanction, for departing from the prescribed method.
15. It has been submitted before me that it will be easier for the shareholders to attend the requisitioned meeting, and it will be more difficult for the shareholders to appear in court in order to voice their objections. I do not see how it will be more difficult for the shareholders to appear in court. Undoubtedly, their objections, if voiced before the court, will have to be supported by reasons, while presumably, in a requisitioned meeting, the resolution can be carried by a majority vote without having to assign any reason for it. If giving reasons for objections make for hardship, then there is a hardship in appearing before the court. In the interests of justice, the shareholders must put up with this hardship.
16. It has next been submitted that by calling the requisitioned meeting, the shareholders will be able to draw attention to the change of circumstances that has taken place. In spite of my repeated enquiries, I have not been told what these changed circumstances are except that a period of about 20 months has elapsed since the scheme was first proposed. This lapse of 20 months does not, in my view, justify the calling of the requisitioned meeting.
17. As I have pointed out earlier, under r. 79 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, the company is required to present the petition for sanctioning the scheme within 7 days of the filing of the report by the chairman; and if the company does not do so, then any member or creditor has been given the right to present a petition for sanctioning the scheme. The company is thus under a statutory obligation to present a petition for sanctioning the scheme. The requisitioned meeting clearly interferes with the company's obligation in this connection.
18. It is also extremely doubtful if any subsequent change of circumstances can be taken into account while considering the scheme of amalgamation (See Sidhpur Mills Co. Ltd., In re, AIR 1962 Guj 305).
19. The opponents, in the present case, have strongly relied on the provisions of s. 169 of the Companies Act and have submitted that no injunction should be granted restraining the holding of a requisitioned meeting of the company. Under the provisions of s. 169 of the Companies Act, the board of directors of a company shall, on the requisition of such number of members of the company as is specified in sub-s. (4) forthwith proceed duly to call an extraordinary general meeting of the company. Thus, if the board of directors receive a valid requisition signed by the requisite number of members, they are bound to call a requisitioned meeting of the company. In this connection, the opponents rely upon a decision in the case of Isle of Wight Railway Co. v. Tahourdin, [1884] 25 Ch D 320 (CA). The court, in that case, held that it would not interfere with the internal working of the company and that when the shareholders had requisitioned a meeting, the board of directors is bound to call such a meeting and it cannot refuse to call such a meeting on the ground that some of the resolutions, if passed at such a meeting, would be irregular. Lord Justice Lindley observed in that case as follows (at p. 333):
“We must bear in mind the decisions in Foss v. Harbottle, [1843] 2 Hare 461 and the line of cases following it, in which this court has constantly and consistently refused to interfere on behalf of shareholders, until they have done the best they can to set right the matters of which they complain, by calling general meetings. Bearing in mind that line of decisions, what would be the position of the shareholders if there were to be another line of decisions, prohibiting meetings of the shareholders to consider their own affairs? It appears to me that it must be a very strong case indeed which would justify this court in restraining a meeting of shareholders. I do not mean to say of course that there could not be a case in which it would be necessary and proper to exercise such a power. I can conceive a case in which a meeting might be called under such a notice that nothing legal could be done under it. Possibly in that case an injunction to restrain the meeting might be granted.”
20. In the case of Cricket Club of India Ltd. v. Madhav L. Apte, [1975] 45 Comp Cas 574 (Bom), a special case was taken before a learned single judge of this court to consider the question whether the board of directors of a public limited company was bound to call a meeting requisitioned by its members when the resolution which was purported to be passed in such a meeting was contrary to the provisions of s. 274 of the Companies Act. The learned single judge, who answered this question, held that the board of directors were bound to call a meeting which was so requisitioned, even though the resolution which would be passed at such a meeting would be contrary to the provisions of s. 274 of the Companies Act. Now, these cases pertain to the shareholders calling a requisitioned meeting of the company for considering matters relating to the internal management of the company. In neither of these cases, there was any question of a requisitioned meeting being called to consider matters which affected persons other than the members and the company or to compel the company to resile from its statutory obligations or to interfere with the exercise of the court's jurisdiction under s. 391 of the Companies Act.
21. One of the main reasons why injunctions are not normally granted to restrain the holding of a requisitioned meeting is that the shareholders ought to be allowed to regulate and set right the affairs of the company by calling general meetings. The court, has, therefore, been reluctant to interfere in the internal management of the company. Secondly, such injunctions were sought in the cases cited before me by the board of directors of the company. The courts have not normally permitted the board of directors of the company to sit in judgment over the requisition received by them to call a meeting of the shareholders. Normally, such a meeting would be required to be requisitioned by the shareholders in order to pass resolutions which are not supported by the board of directors or the management of the company. The board of directors would, therefore, be expected to thwart the calling of such requisitioned meeting. It is thus undesirable that the board of directors should be allowed to refuse to call a requisitioned meeting, because the board considers the resolutions which were proposed to be passed at such a meeting, undesirable or not in the interest of the company. Courts have, therefore, consistently held that if the requisition is called for the purpose of passing a resolution which can be implemented in a legal manner, although the form in which the resolution has been proposed is irregular on the face of it, nevertheless, such a meeting must be called because ultimately a decision taken at the meeting can be implemented in a legal manner. Lord Justice Lindley has, in the case of Isle of Wight Railway Co. v. Tahourdin, [1884] 25 Ch D 320 (CA), in his guarded language, expressed a view that if the resolution proposed to be passed at the requisitioned meeting were wholly illegal, then the board of directors would be under no obligation to call a meeting requisitioned for the purpose of passing such an illegal resolution. Left to myself, I would rather lend my humble support to the weighty pronouncement of Lord Justice Lindley rather than to the stand taken by learned brother, Desai J. when he stated that the requisitioned meeting must be called, even if the resolution proposed at the requisitioned meeting was illegal. To my mind, there can be no point in calling a meeting for passing a resolution which would be wholly illegal. In any event, in the present case, it is not necessary to decide one way or the other on this aspect, because there are various reasons why the meeting sought to be requisitioned in the present case is not covered by any of the considerations which have led the courts in the past to refuse to injunct such meetings.
22. In the first place, the present meeting has not been called to consider the internal management of the company. The resolution which has been proposed does not deal with matters which concern only the company and its shareholders. The purpose of the requisition is to compel the company to withdraw the petition for amalgamation which is pending before the court. Such a resolution does not pertain only to the company's management and the line of decisions starting with Foss v. Harbottle, [1843] 2 Hare 461, therefore, cannot have any bearing on such a meeting. Secondly, the board of directors are not asking for an injunction to prevent the shareholders from discussing the management of the company. They have called the requisitioned meeting. If the meeting has been called to pre-empt a consideration by the court of the scheme of amalgamation, the calling of such a meeting can be questioned by any affected person. It is irrelevant whether such a person has been put up by the board of directors or not.
23. A scheme of amalgamation affects not merely the company and its shareholders, but it also vitally concerns an important body of outsiders, viz., the creditors of the company, both secured and unsecured. It is, therefore, important that any opposition to this scheme should be expressed and taken note of in the manner provided in s. 391 of the Companies Act and not by the shareholders requisitioning a meeting in order to compel the company to withdraw the petition. In the present case, there appears to be a clear attempt on the part of the opponents to interfere with the petition under s. 391 which is pending in this court. It seems that the opponents, by calling a requisitioned meeting of the shareholders, are seeking to undo the effect of the statutory meetings which have been already held to consider the scheme and are seeking to postpone the sanctioning of the scheme by the court as far as possible. In fact, the timing of the requisition lends support to such a suspicion. The requisition has been made after the Supreme Court refused to stay consideration of the amalgamation petitions pending in the High Court. The requisitioned meeting in the present case, therefore, is convened for a purpose which is totally different from the purpose for which such meetings are ordinarily convened. The ratio, therefore, of Isle of Wight Railway Co. v. Tahonrdin, [1884] 25 Ch D 320 (CA) and Cricket Club of India Ltd. v. Madhav L. Apte, [1975] 45 Comp Cas 574 (Bom) does not apply to the present application.
24. Lastly, learned counsel appearing for the opponents and for the secured creditors have urged that the requisitioned meeting has been called to consider alternative schemes. Even if I accept this submission, it is clear from the requisition that no alternative schemes are being put before the shareholders at the requisitioned meeting. The resolutions which are proposed to be moved themselves do not refer to any specific alternative scheme. In the explanatory statement annexed to the requisition by the requisitionists, there is no reference to any specific alternative proposal. The explanation is confined mainly to pointing out in very vague and general terms why, according to the requisitionists, the Brooke Bond Scheme should not be approved. The requisitionists have not put forth any alternative or better scheme for the consideration of the shareholders at the requisitioned meeting. If the purpose of calling the requisitioned meeting is for the shareholders to consider an alternative proposal which may be more beneficial to the company, that purpose is not going to be served by calling the requisitioned meeting. It has been argued before me that in the 30th annual report of the company for the year ending December 31, 1980, it has been mentioned that a modified proposal to lease the company's factory at Aurangabad to M/s. Harbans Lal Malhotra and Sons Ltd. had again been revived and that this has been forwarded to the solicitors and chartered accountants for advice. In the 31st annual report of the company for the year ended December 31, 1981, it has been stated that a proposal to lease the company's undertaking by Harbans Lal Malhotra & Sons Ltd., which has been dealt with in the last annual report, has not been further considered in the light of legal advice that such a scheme of leasing would also require the approval of the Government of India under the MRTP Act. Learned counsel for the opponents and for the secured creditors have submitted that in view of the statements made in the two annual reports, it must be presumed that the shareholders knew what was the alternative scheme; and, hence, in the requisition or in the explanatory statement, it was not necessary to set out any alternative scheme. This contention cannot be accepted. In the first place, I have not been shown in either of the two annual reports in question, the alternative scheme of Harbans Lal Malhotra and Sons Ltd. set out in detail anywhere. Secondly, in the explanatory statement, there is not even a reference to the proposal of Harbans Lal Malhotra and Sons Ltd. If the purpose of calling the requisitioned meeting was to consider the scheme proposed by Harbans Lal Malhotra and Sons Ltd., it should have been so stated. The explanatory statement, in my view, is extremely vague and somewhat tricky. In fact, the explanatory statement is insufficient and misleading. If this is so, then the requisition for calling the meeting must be considered as bad in law. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision in the cases of Laljibhai C. Kapadia v. Lalji B. Desai*, [1973] 43 Comp Cas 17 (Bom) and Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. Ltd. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., [1971] 41 Comp Cas 377 (Bom). The explanatory statement which is required to be annexed under s. 173 is for the purpose of ensuring that all facts which have a bearing on the question on which the shareholders have to form their judgment are brought to their notice. If this requirement is not complied with and all relevant facts in the present case, and the alternative schemes are not put before the shareholders fairly, then the resolutions will become bad in law. Calling such requisitioned meeting, assuming that the requisitioned meeting is to consider alternative schemes, will, in any case, be bad in law.
25. To sum up, the requisitioned meeting which is being called is not to consider matters which affect the company's management or which affect only the company and its members. In view of the several features of the meeting requisitioned in the present case, which distinguished it from ordinary requisitioned meetings, this is a fit case where shareholders can be prevented from holding the requisitioned meeting.
26. It was submitted by Mr. Bhabha, learned counsel for the opponents, that s. 391 is not the only section under which a scheme can be presented. He drew my attention to s. 395 of the Companies Act and to s. 494 of the Companies Act. The latter deals with the power of the liquidator to accept shares as a consideration for the sale of the property of the company in liquidation. He submitted that it is open to the shareholders to present a scheme under any of these provisions of the companies act also. The requisition, in the present case, however, is not for the purpose of presenting any scheme under any of the provisions of the companies act. The purpose is only to get the pending petition under s. 391 of the Companies Act withdrawn.
27. It was lastly submitted that this is a fit case where a suit should be filed against the company and that a judge's summons is not a proper method for obtaining reliefs. It was also pointed out that a suit had, in fact, been filed in the city civil court for this purpose. My attention was also drawn to a decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Prakasam v. Sri Narayana Dharma Paripalana Yogam, [1980] 50 Comp Cas 611 (Ker). In this case, the Kerala High Court held that the company court will not assume jurisdiction where a member seeks to redress an individual injustice done to him.
28. In the present case, however, the resolution is aimed at withdrawal of a petition pending under s. 391 of the Companies Act. The meeting which is requisitioned has a direct nexus with the pending petition under s. 391 of the Companies Act; and hence the company court exercising its jurisdiction under s. 391 of the Companies Act can certainly deal with the judge's summons taken out for the purpose of restraining the holding of such a meeting. In the premises, the judge's summons is made absolute in terms of prayer (a) except for the bracketed portion. The opponents to pay to the applicant the costs of the judge's summons fixed at Rs. 300.
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