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Purshottam Vishindas Raheja v. Life Insurance Corporation Of India
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff is the Karta and Manager of the Raheja Sons (H.U.F.) trading as Shri Tirupati Builders. The plaintiff submitted the highest tender and entered into an agreement of sale dated 21 January 1981 with defendant No. 1, the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), for purchase of the suit property at Dadasaheb Phalke Road, Parel, Bombay. The suit property was owned by LIC and included structures used as a cinema studio.
T. Tarachand had been the tenant of LIC in respect of the entire property and died on or about 18 September 1972. Defendants 2–8 are his heirs and legal representatives; defendant No. 9 (Roop Tara Studios) is a partnership firm in which Tarachand was originally a partner. Defendant No. 10 is N.L. Mehta Cinema Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.
Prior to the agreement of sale there were eviction proceedings instituted by LIC under the Public Premises Eviction Act against defendants 2–8; those defendants filed a writ petition challenging application of that Act to the LIC premises which was allowed (and an appeal from that decision was pending at the time of the opinion).
Defendants 2–9 purportedly entered into agreements assigning the studio business, goodwill, stock-in-trade and tenancy rights to defendant No. 10 (claiming payment and possession from 23 September 1980). The plaintiff filed the present suit on or about 1 September 1981 against defendants 1–10 seeking specific performance of the 21 January 1981 agreement against LIC, declarations that the assignments by defendants 2–9 were null and void, declarations that defendants 2–9 are not in possession, a declaration that defendant No. 10 has no right or title and is a trespasser, and possession against defendant No. 10.
The present proceeding was a notice of motion by the plaintiff seeking appointment of a receiver of the immovable property (especially the studio premises) and other interlocutory reliefs. There were prior related suits in the City Civil Court (including Suit No. 6053 of 1980 and Suit No. 7303 of 1980) in which receivers had been appointed and reports produced. Reports indicated that studio premises had been sealed and later opened with keys in defendant No. 10’s possession.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether this Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit against defendants 2–10 in view of S. 28 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (the "Bombay Rent Act").
- Whether the plaint disclosed any cause of action against defendants 2–10 so as to justify rejection under Order VII, Rule 11, Civil P.C.
- Whether defendants 2–10 were proper parties to a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale between the plaintiff and LIC.
- Whether a receiver should be appointed (and, more broadly, whether interlocutory relief including dispossession or protective steps for the plaintiff was appropriate at the interlocutory stage).
Arguments of the Parties
Defendants (Nos. 2–10) — Preliminary and substantive arguments
- Basic jurisdictional contention: under S. 28 of the Bombay Rent Act the Court of Small Causes alone has jurisdiction over claims arising under that Act; the claim against defendants 2–10 arises under the Bombay Rent Act and therefore this Court lacks jurisdiction.
- Under Section 9A Civil P.C., the issue as to jurisdiction must be tried at the stage of the notice of motion and the suit against defendants 2–10 should be dismissed.
- Substantive: the agreements between defendants 2–9 and defendant No. 10 were purported transfers of the tenants’ rights under a notification issued under Section 15 of the Bombay Rent Act; accordingly defendants 2–10 rely on the Act and assert that defendant No. 10 is not a trespasser but validly in possession.
- Objection under Order VII, Rule 11: the plaint discloses no cause of action against defendants 2–10 and should be rejected at interlocutory stage.
- Challenged plaintiff’s right to specific performance: alleged breaches by the plaintiff, alleged duty of LIC to accept the highest bid, and contention that LIC holds as trustee for policy-holders; asserted that defendant No. 9 had raised its bid to Rs. 38,50,000 at the time of tender opening (alleged higher than plaintiff’s), relying on Supreme Court authorities about tender processes.
Plaintiff
- Seeks specific performance of agreement with LIC (defendant No. 1) and ancillary declarations that assignments to defendant No. 10 are null and void, that defendants 2–9 are not in possession, and that defendant No. 10 is a trespasser; and possession against defendant No. 10.
- Primary interlocutory contention: defendants 2–9 have abandoned their rights and possession and defendant No. 10 is a trespasser in occupation; therefore a receiver should be appointed to protect the property and the plaintiff’s rights.
- Submitted that defendant No. 10 has taken the property with notice of the plaintiff’s agreement and that defendant No. 10 (or persons who took with notice) could be joined in suit for specific performance.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sushila Kashinath Dhonde v. Harilal Govindji Bhogani, AIR 1971 SC 1495 | Sec. 28 of the Bombay Rent Act covers matters arising under the Rent Act even if parties are not in landlord-tenant relationship. | Used to explain the breadth of S. 28 and to show that a matter must be examined in substance to determine if it arises under the Rent Act. |
| Importers and Manufacturers Ltd. v. Pheroze Framroze Taraporewala, AIR 1953 SC 73 | Similar observation on scope of S. 28 (earlier authority on interpretation). | Cited to reinforce the principle that S. 28 covers questions arising under the Rent Act notwithstanding formal labels. |
| Thakkar Keshavalal Mohanlal v. Parekh Amrutlal Harilal, AIR 1973 SC 1099 | Joinder of sub-tenant in landlord-tenant suit does not necessarily take the suit out of the ambit of S. 28; but a suit in trespass is not covered by the Rent Act. | Relied upon to show that a claim in trespass against defendant No. 10 is not covered by S. 28 and hence does not oust this Court's jurisdiction. |
| Hiralal Vallabhram v. Kasturbhai Lalbhai, AIR 1957 SC 1853 | Authority on the distinctions between suits in trespass and those covered by the Rent Act. | Supported the court's position that a trespass claim is not covered by the Rent Act and thus not within S. 28’s exclusive jurisdiction. |
| Luckumsey Ookerda v. Fazulla Cassumbhoy, (1880) ILR 5 Bom 177 | A stranger to a contract for which specific performance is sought cannot generally be a party to that suit. | Cited in discussing whether defendants 2–10, being strangers to the vendor’s agreement, were proper parties to a specific performance suit. |
| Mt. Nagi v. Damodar Jagobaji, AIR 1948 Nag 181 | Strangers claiming independent title are not proper parties to a specific performance suit. | Used to support the proposition that joinder of strangers in a specific performance suit is generally improper. |
| Prem Sukh Gulgulia v. Habib Ullah, AIR 1945 Cal 355 | Support for joinder in certain situations where purchaser takes subject to plaintiff's rights. | Cited as authority for the exception permitting joinder of purchasers who take with notice. |
| Mole v. Smith, (1820) Jac 490 (Lord Eldon) | Observation that a bill for specific performance should not be mixed with relief against other persons claiming interest in the estate. | Quoted to explain the traditional reluctance to mix specific performance relief with wider title disputes against strangers. |
| Sashi Bhusan v. Rai Chand, AIR 1950 Cal 333 | Illustration of the plaintiff's limited rights under an agreement to purchase (ability to call on vendor to protect property). | Used to explain that the plaintiff in an agreement of sale does not have present possessory rights against third parties. |
| Balwant Singh v. State Bank of India (FB), AIR 1976 Punj & Har 316 | Order VII, Rule 11 applies where plaint discloses no cause of action as a whole; not where only part of claim is defective. | Relied upon to hold that O.7 R.11 could not be invoked where some causes of action remain and partial relief may be possible. |
| T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, AIR 1977 SC 2421 | Where a plaint is manifestly vexatious and does not disclose a clear right to sue, a court may reject under O.7 R.11 on meaningful reading. | Cited by defendants but the court held its ratio did not apply as only part of the plaint might be defective, not the whole. |
| Vasant Tatoba Hargude v. Dikkaya Muttaya Pujari, AIR 1980 Bom 341 | Decision on whether tenancy rights may be transferred as a going concern under Section 15 notification. | Referenced by defendants to support their contention that tenancy rights could be transferred; court noted this conflict but did not decide it at interlocutory stage. |
| Kasturi Lal v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, AIR 1980 SC 1992; Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority, AIR 1979 SC 1628 | Authorities on tender process and duty to accept highest bid in certain contexts. | Invoked by defendants to challenge LIC's acceptance of plaintiff’s tender; court noted the contention but did not decide it at interlocutory stage. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in stages, addressing jurisdictional objections, the contention that the plaint disclosed no cause of action, and finally the interlocutory relief sought (receiver and protective orders):
-
Jurisdiction under S. 28 (Bombay Rent Act): The court acknowledged that S. 28 confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Court of Small Causes with respect to matters arising under the Rent Act and that this provision is broadly worded; it referred to Supreme Court authority (Sushila Dhonde and Importers & Manufacturers) to underscore that the substance of the plaint must be examined, not mere form. The court analyzed the substance of the plaintiff’s claims and concluded:
- The claim against defendant No. 10 is essentially a trespass claim (denying right, title or interest and asking for possession). A trespass claim is not covered by S. 28.
- Against defendants 2–9 the plaintiff seeks declarations that they have parted with their rights and possession and cancellation of documents; such reliefs (including cancellation) are not within the exclusive domain of the Court of Small Causes under S. 28.
- Order VII, Rule 11 (no cause of action): The court reviewed authorities that emphasize the limited circumstances for rejection of a plaint. It observed that while there is force in defendants' contention that some defendants may be improper parties to a suit for specific performance, the present plaint disclosed at least some causes of action (joinder of causes and parties such that a decree could be passed in respect of some claims/defendants). The court held that O.7 R.11 applies where the plaint discloses no cause of action as a whole; where only a part may be defective, the provision cannot be invoked at this interlocutory stage. It also noted that T. Arivandandam (cited by defendants) does not require rejection where only part of the plaint may be defective.
- Proper parties to specific performance suit: The court accepted the general principle that strangers to a contract for specific performance are not ordinarily proper parties, except purchasers who take with notice or voluntary purchasers; it observed that defendants 2–10 are in substance strangers to the agreement for sale (which concerns the landlord's/lessor’s interest) because defendants 2–9 purportedly transferred tenants' interests to defendant No. 10. On a prima facie reading the plaintiff could not, at least on that basis alone, properly join defendants 2–10 in the main suit. However, this objection goes to merits and partieship and could not be finally decided on the notice of motion for interlocutory relief.
- Appointment of a receiver / interlocutory relief: The court emphasized the legal reality that the plaintiff has no present vested right to possession merely by virtue of an agreement to purchase (citing Sashi Bhusan). Specific performance is a discretionary remedy and possession ordinarily follows only upon a decree. Consequently, the court found it inappropriate at the interlocutory stage to dispossess a person in possession prior to suit. The factual record (receiver reports, sealed premises opened with keys in defendant No. 10’s possession) indicated that the premises were not abandoned and that defendant No. 10 likely had possession under some semblance of title or agreement. Thus, the court declined to grant the plaintiff’s prayer for appointment of a receiver in the sense of dispossessing existing occupiers.
- Interim protective relief the court granted: Although declining the main relief of immediate appointment of a receiver to take over possession, the court recognized the plaintiff's entitlement to protective measures pending final determination. Accordingly the court issued restraint orders preventing defendants 2–10 from disposing of, alienating, encumbering, inducing third parties, creating or recognising third-party rights, altering condition of the property, or parting with possession in certain ways; it also restrained execution of a deed of assignment pursuant to the contested agreement. The court ordered the Court Receiver to make an inventory (including goods in the studio) by removing and re-fixing the seal and to prepare a list of persons in occupation. The court fixed interim orders to continue until 15 June 1982 after which the ad interim orders would stand vacated and the Receiver remove her seal.
- Other interlocutory rulings: The court vacated the undertaking given by defendants 2–10 on 22 September 1981. The court rejected the defendants’ application that the plaintiff deposit a specified sum (because plaintiff’s counsel stated a sum had been deposited with plaintiff’s attorneys). Costs were ordered to be costs in the cause.
Holding and Implications
Holding (core rulings emphasized):
The Court held that it has jurisdiction to entertain the suit against defendants Nos. 1 to 10 and refused to reject the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 at the interlocutory stage. It declined to grant the plaintiff's primary interlocutory prayer to appoint a receiver to dispossess existing occupants, but granted limited protective interlocutory reliefs (restraints and an inventory by the Court Receiver) pending final hearing.
Direct consequences for the parties
- Defendants 2–10 (and their servants and agents) were restrained from disposing of, alienating, encumbering, inducting third parties into, creating or recognizing any third-party right in respect of the property described in Exhibit "A" to the plaint, or parting with possession or altering the condition of the property.
- Defendant No. 10 (and his servants and agents) were restrained from parting with possession of the premises in favour of defendants 2–9.
- Defendants 2–10 were further restrained from executing a deed of assignment pursuant to the contested agreement among them.
- The undertaking given by defendants 2–10 on 22 September 1981 was vacated.
- Ad interim orders were directed to continue until 15 June 1982, during which the Court Receiver was to make an inventory of Exhibit "A" (including goods in the studio) by temporarily removing and then re-fixing the seal; the ad interim orders were to stand vacated on 15 June 1982 and the Receiver to remove her seal thereafter.
- The defendants’ application seeking an order for deposit of the claimed balance purchase price was rejected in view of the plaintiff's counsel's statement that funds had been deposited with the plaintiff's attorneys.
- Costs were to be costs in the cause.
Broader legal implications noted by the court
The court emphasized established principles: jurisdiction under S. 28 depends on the substance of the plaint; a trespass claim is not covered by S. 28; strangers are generally not proper parties to a specific performance suit except purchasers who take with notice; a purchaser under an agreement of sale does not obtain present possessory rights until specific performance is decreed; and Order VII, Rule 11 is to be applied cautiously where at least part of a plaint discloses a cause of action. The court declined to decide disputed substantive questions (e.g., validity of the tenancy transfer under Section 15 notification, alleged tender irregularities) at the interlocutory stage and reserved those issues for trial.
Order reported: The opinion concludes with the court's interlocutory orders as summarized above and the endorsement "Ordered accordingly."
1. The plaintiff is the Karta and Manager of a Joint Hindu Family called Raheja Sons (H.U.F) which carries on business in the name and style of Shri Tirupati Builders. The plaintiff entered into an agreement with the Life Insurance Corporation of India (defendant No. 1) for the purchase of the suit property at Dadasaheb Phalke Road, Parel, Bombay under an agreement of sale dated 21st Jan. 1981. Life Insurance Corporation which is defendant No. 1 is the owner of the suit property which consists of several structures, some of which are used as a cinema studio. One T. Tarachand was a tenant of Life Insurance Corporation in respect of the said entire property including the said studio. T. Tarachand died on or about 18th September 1972. Defendants 2 to 8 are his surviving heirs and legal representatives. They claim tenancy rights in respect of the said property as the heirs of the deceased tenant. Defendant No. 9, Roop Tara Studios, is a partnership firm in which originally T. Tarachand was a partner. The said partnership firm claims that the tenancy rights of the said immovable property were held for the benefit of the partnership. One N.L Mehta Cinema Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. is defendant No. 10.
2. The Life Insurance Corporation advertised for the sale of the said property in “as is where is” condition some time in June 1980. The plaintiff had submitted a tender for Rs. 37,50,000/-. Defendant No. 9 Roop Tara Studios had submitted a tender for Rs. 20,07,000/- and N.L Mehta Cinema Enterprises Private Limited (Defendant No. 10) had submitted a tender for Rs. 21,06,000/-. There were other tenders also. The plaintiff's tender being the highest, was accepted by the Life Insurance Corporation by a letter dated 4th July 1980. Thereafter a formal agreement between the plaintiff and Life Insurance Corporation was entered into on 21st Jan. 1981.
3. Prior to the agreement of sale there were proceedings between the Life Insurance Corporation and the heirs of T. Tarachand in respect of the suit property. Life Insurance Corporation had terminated the tenancy in respect of the suit property and had instituted proceedings under the Public Premises Eviction Act for eviction of defendants 2 to 8. Defendants 2 to 8 thereupon filed a writ petition in this court challenging the application of the Public Premises Eviction Act to the premises owned by the Life Insurance Corporation. The Writ Petition was allowed. An appeal is pending from the decision in the writ petition.
4. It is the case of defendants 2 to 10 that defendant No. 9 entered into an agreement with defendant No. 10 in June 1980 whereunder defendant No. 10 agreed to buy the business of defendant No. 9 in respect of their studio division together with its goodwill and tenancy rights in respect of the said immovable property. Thereafter by an agreement dated 23rd Sept. 1980 entered into between defendants 2 to 9 on the one hand and defendant No. 10 on the other hand, the defendants 2 to 9 agreed to assign to defendant No. 10 the studio business of defendant No. 9 together with its stock-in-trade, goodwill and tenancy rights in the said immovable property. Defendant No. 10 claims to have paid to defendants 2 to 9 a sum of Rs. 3 lakhs on 23rd Sept. 1980 and to have obtained possession inter alia of the said studio on that day from defendants 2 to 9. Defendant No. 10 thus claims to be in possession of the studio premises since 23rd Sept. 1980.
5. The plaintiffs have filed the present suit on or about 1st Sept. 1981 against defendants 1 to 10. In the plaint the plaintiff has asked for specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 21st Jan. 1981 as against defendant No. 1. They have sought in addition, a declaration that the agreements entered into between defendants 2 to 9 on the one hand and defendant No. 10 on the other hand are null and void and have asked for a cancellation of these agreements. They have asked for a declaration that defendants 2 to 9 are not in actual or symbolic occupation or possession of the suit property. They have also asked for a declaration that defendant No. 10 has no right, title or interest in respect of the suit property and is a trespasser and have asked for possession of the premises from the defendant No. 10. The present notice of motion is taken out by the plaintiff for the appointment of a receiver of the said immovable property, especially of the studio premises and for other reliefs set out in the motion.
6. Defendants Nos. 2 to 10 have raised certain preliminary objections to the notice of motion. The first preliminary objection is to the effect that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as against defendants 2 to 10 in view of the provisions of S. 28 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Bombay Rent Act). Defendants Nos. 2 to 10 have submitted that under S. 9A of the Civil P.C the issue as to jurisdiction must be tried at the stage of the Notice of Motion as a preliminary issue and suit against defendants 2 to 10 should be dismissed on the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction.
7. Under S. 28 of the Bombay Rent Act the Court of Small Causes alone has jurisdiction to entertain and try any suit or proceedings between a landlord and a tenant relating to the recovery of rent or possession of any premises and to decide any application made under that Act and to deal with any claim or question arising out of the Act or any of its provisions. Admittedly the present suit is not a suit between a landlord and a tenant for recovery of rent or possession of any premises. According to the defendants Nos. 2 to 10 however, the claim in the suit against them is a claim arising out of the Bombay Rent Act and its provisions and hence it is covered by S. 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. Now it is true that in order that a claim should arise under the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act, it is not necessary that the claim should be between a landlord and a tenant. Section 28 is wide enough to cover all questions which arise out of the bombay rent act even though the parties may not have the legal relationship of a landlord and a tenant. The Supreme Court, in the case of Sushila Kashinath Dhonde v. Harilal Govindji Bhogani reported in AIR 1971 SC 1495 has held that it is not necessary that there should be a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties for a matter to be covered by Sec. 28. No doubt, one type of action contemplated under that section viz., a suit or proceeding for recovery of rent or possession of any premises may be between a landlord and a tenant; but in respect of other matters dealt with in that section it is not necessary that the relationship of a landlord and a tenant should exist between the parties before the Court. In the case before the Supreme Court the suit was to enforce a charge under the provisions of S. 18 of the Rent Act. It was held as covered by S. 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. There is a similar observation in an early case of Importers and Manufacturers Ltd. v. Pheroze Framroze Taraporewala reported in AIR 1953 SC 73. In the present case we have to examine whether the claim of the plaintiff against defendants 2 to 10 is a claim which arises under the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. It is now well established that in order to decide this question one has to examine the substance of the case in the plaint and not merely the manner in which the claim framed. Ingenuity in drafting cannot confer jurisdiction on a court. According to the defendants Nos. 2 to 10 the suit is in substance for eviction against defendants Nos. 2 to 8 who are the heirs of the tenant and against defendant No. 9 who claim to be the tenants and for obtaining possession from their proposed transferee defendant No. 10. According to these defendants there was admittedly a tenancy in respect of the suit property created by the first defendant in favour of T. Tarachand and defendants 2 to 8 are the heirs of that tenant. There is some dispute as to whether tenancy is now a statutory tenancy or a contractual tenancy. Defendants Nos. 2 to 9 have purported to enter into an agreement to transfer the business of defendant No. 9 together with its tenancy rights, stock-in-trade and good-will in favour of defendant No. 10 in purported exercise of their rights under the notification issued under Sec. 15 of the Bombay Rent Act. According to these defendants the disputes between them and the plaintiff in the suit are thus under the bombay rent act and they ought to be tried before the Court of Small Causes. This contention is not tenable. The plaintiff has claimed reliefs against defendant No. 10 on the ground that they are trespassers and have no right, title or interest in the suit premises. It is true that in order to decide whether defendant No. 10 is trespasser on the premises or not, it will be necessary to examine the provisions of S. 15 of the Bombay Rent Act and the notification issued under it. But the court does not cease to have jurisdiction simply because, in order to decide the title of a person to any property, it may incidentally have to examine the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. In substance the suit against defendant No. 10 is a suit on the basis of trespass and as such the suit cannot be considered as covered by S. 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. As against defendants Nos. 2 to 9, it is the plaintiff's case that they have parted with all their rights in the suit premises. They have also parted with possession of the suit premises. They therefore have ceased to be tenants of the suit premises. The plaintiff has therefore merely sought a declaration against defendants 2 to 9 that they are no longer in possession of the suit premises. The plaintiff has also asked for a cancellation of certain agreements executed between defendants 2 to 9 and defendant No. 10 on the ground that these documents are illegal and/or null and void. Such a suit also cannot be considered as a suit which is covered by S. 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. In fact the court of Small Causes would not have jurisdiction to grant the relief of cancellation of documents. In substance, therefore, the claim of the plaintiff in the suit does not fall under S. 28 of the Bombay Rent Act.
8. My attention was drawn to the case of Thakkar Keshavalal Mohanlal v. Parekh Amrutlal Harilal reported in AIR 1973 SC 1099. In that case a suit had been filed before the Competent Court under S. 28 of the Bombay Rent Act for eviction both against the tenant as well as his sub-tenant. The subtenant contended that since the claim against him was a claim in trespass. S. 28 would not apply to the suit against him and the court had no jurisdiction to entertain a claim against him. In negativing this contention the Supreme Court observed that the suit was essentially a suit between a landlord and tenant; and the joinder of the sub-tenant in such a suit would not make the suit any the less a suit between a landlord and a tenant. The court referred to its earlier decision in Hiralal Vallabhram v. Kasturbhai Lalbhai reported in AIR 1957 SC 1853 and observed that a suit on the basis of trespass was clearly a suit which was not covered by the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. In substance the claim of the plaintiff is in trespass against defendant No. 10. Such a claim does not fall under S. 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. It is true that in the present case the tenants are also made parties to the suit. But no relief of eviction or possession is asked for against the tenants. This is not merely a technical camouflage as the defendants 2 to 10 would like to submit, because in substance, it is the plaintiff's case that the tenants have parted with their possession of the premises and have also parted with their right title and interest as tenants. The plaintiff therefore seeks a declaration that the tenants have ceased to be tenants. Whether the plaintiff's case is correct or not is a matter which will be decided at the final hearing of the case after evidence is led. But whatever be the merits of the plaintiff's case, the fact remains that the basis of the suit against defendants Nos. 2 to 9 is that they have abandoned all their rights as tenants. Accordingly plaintiffs have not claimed any relief of possession against defendants Nos. 2 to 9 but are content with a declaration against them that they are no longer in possession or occupation of the suit premises. Under these circumstances it is not possible to hold that the claim in the suit against defendants 2 to 9 is a claim against tenants for possession. Thus the suit against defendants Nos. 2 to 10 is not covered by the provisions of S. 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. This court therefore has jurisdiction to entertain the present suit not merely against defendant No. 1 but also against defendants Nos. 2 to 10.
9. The next preliminary objection raised on behalf of defendants Nos. 2 to 10 is to the effect that the plaint discloses no cause of action against defendants Nos. 2 to 10. The plaint should therefore be rejected under the provisions of O. 7, R. 11 of the Civil P.C Now, the present suit is a suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale entered into between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1. Ordinarily in a suit for specific performance, persons who are not parties to the contract of which specific performance is sought, cannot be joined as party defendants. In this connection a reference may be made to a decision of this Court in the case of Luckumsey Ookerda v. Fazulla Cassumbhoy reported in (1880) ILR 5 Bom 177 where it was held that a stranger to a contract of which specific performance is sought, cannot be a party to the suit. In that case the plaintiff had joined another person who claimed a charge on the land which was agreed to be sold and had asked for a declaration that person was not entitled to any charge upon the said land. The court held that the latter defendant had been improperly made a party. Similarly in the case of Mt. Nagi v. Damodar Jagobaji reported in AIR 1948 Nag 181, Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) held that in a suit for specific performance of agreement for sale of land, strangers claiming independent title are not proper parties to the suit. He observed that the scope of a suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale of land, coupled with a prayer for possession cannot be enlarged and the suit turned also into a title suit. The plaintiff could take action against strangers only after he had perfected his title by obtaining specific performance. He cited the observation of Lord Eldon in the case of Mole v. Smith (1820) Jac 490 to the effect that when a bill is filed for specific performance it should not be mixed with a prayer for relief against other persons claiming an interest in the estate. Lord Eldon observed:
“It is to be regretted that this opinion will prevent the parties from having the question between them so effectively decided as it might otherwise have been; but I cannot, to avoid an inconvenience in a particular case, sanction a proceeding which I consider to be inconsistent with the rules of pleading, and which, if recognised, might lead to much difficulty and confusion in the proceedings of the Court.”
The only exception to this rule is in the case of a voluntary purchaser from the vendor and a purchaser who takes with notice of the agreement. Such persons can be joined as party defendants in a suit for specific performance. The reason is that any person who has taken the property subject to the plaintiff's rights can always be joined as a party defendant. In this connection a reference may also be made to the decision in Prem Sukh Gulgulia v. Habib Ullah, AIR 1945 Cal 355. There is therefore considerable substance in the contention of defendants Nos. 2 to 10 that they are not proper parties to a suit for specific performance. Mr. Ashok Sen, learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that just as a purchaser with notice and a voluntary purchaser can be joined in a suit for specific performance, in the present case, defendant No. 10 who has taken the property with notice of the plaintiff's agreement with defendant No. 1 can also be joined. But this submission cannot be accepted because defendant No. 10 is not a person who has purchased the right, title and interest of the vendor in the suit property with notice of the agreement of which specific performance is sought assuming for the time being that defendant No. 10 has taken possession with notice of the plaintiff's claim. The agreement for the sale between plaintiff and defendant No. 1 is an agreement for sale of a lessor's interest in the suit property. Admittedly at the date when the agreement of sale was entered into, there was a tenancy in respect of the property which was agreed to be sold subject to such existing tenancy. Defendant No. 10 purports to have agreed to acquire the tenant's interest in the suit property, from defendants 2 to 9. The agreements between defendants 2 to 10 inter se are in respect of the tenants' interest in the property. Defendants 2 to 10 therefore are not concerned with the landlord's interest in the premises at all. In that sense they are, therefore, strangers to the agreement of sale which is in terms only in respect of the landlord's interest in the property. Prima facie therefore the plaintiff cannot join defendants 2 to 10 in the present suit.
10. The matter may also be looked at from a slightly different angle. The plaintiff is merely a person who has entered into an agreement to purchase an immovable property. He has a right to obtain specific performance of the agreement of sale and perfect his title. But, by virtue of an agreement of sale the plaintiff does not get any interest in the property which is agreed to be sold to him. The plaintiff, therefore, does not have in praesenti any interest in the property which he has agreed to purchase. He cannot, therefore, take any action against the tenants of the property, the sub-tenants of the property or even trespassers on the property. He may be entitled to seek protection of the property which is agreed to be sold to him. By virtue of the agreement of sale he is entitled to the benefits of the obligations which arise out of the contract and which are annexed to the ownership of the immovable property which he has agreed to purchase. He may also be able to call upon the seller to protect the property in the same manner as an owner of ordinary prudence would, until the property is conveyed to him. In this connection a reference may be made to the case of Sashi Bhusan v. Rai Chand, AIR 1950 Cal 333. Since however, he does not himself have any interest in the property he cannot sue third parties who claim to have an interest in the property which is agreed to be sold. In that sense also it is possible that the plaintiff may not be able to sustain his cause of action against defendants Nos. 2 to 10.
11. These, however, are matters to be decided at the final hearing of the suit. It is not possible at the stage of the notice of motion to hold that under the provisions of O. 7, R. 11 of the Civil P.C plaint should be rejected as not disclosing any cause of action. By and large the provisions of O. 7, R. 11 are contemplated to apply to the rejection of a plaint as a whole where it discloses no cause of action against the defendants. Where there is a joinder of causes of action and joinder of parties and a decree can be passed in respect of some of the causes of action against some of the defendants, provisions of O. 7, R. 11 cannot be invoked. My attention was drawn to the case of Balwant Singh v. State Bank of India (FB) reported in AIR 1976 Punj & Har 316 where a Full Bench of the Punjab High Court held that provisions of O. 7, R. 11 will be attracted only in a case where by reason of the plea that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action the plaintiff would be wholly non-suited. This rule would have no application to the cases where a plaint discloses a cause of action in respect of a part of the claim against some of the defendants. At the highest, in the present case a part of the cause of action would be found defective against some of the defendants. It is therefore not a fit case where the provisions of O. 7, R. 11 can be applied. In any case such provisions cannot be invoked in a notice of motion taken out by the plaintiff for appointment of a receiver and injunction.
12. Mr. S.D Parekh, learned counsel for defendants Nos. 2 to 10 drew my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in T. Arivandandam v. T.V Satyapal, AIR 1977 SC 2421 in which the Supreme Court observed that if on a meaningful — not formal — reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, the trial court should exercise its power under O. 7, R. 11, of the Civil P.C, taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. The case does not lay down that in a case where only a part of the claim may be defective against some of the defendants, it is the duty of the court to reject the plaint under O. 7, R. 11. The ratio of that case has no application to the facts of the present case.
13. Mr. Parekh, learned counsel for defendants Nos. 2 to 10 also submitted that the suit against defendants Nos. 2 to 10 should be dismissed at the stage of the notice of motion. It is not possible to accept this contention or to hold that in a notice of motion taken out by the plaintiff for receiver and injunction it is the duty of the court to dismiss the suit because it has prima facie come to a conclusion that the suit is not maintainable against some of the defendants. This is a matter which will be adjudicated upon at the hearing of the suit or in a proper proceeding and not at the stage of the present notice of motion.
14. The question whether a Receiver should be appointed of the said property is therefore required to be considered on the merits of the case. It is submitted by the plaintiff that the original tenants, whether statutory or contractual, have abandoned their rights; there is a trespasser viz. defendant No. 10 who is in occupation and therefore it is necessary to protect their rights and that a Receiver should be appointed of the property in dispute. The defendants Nos. 2 to 10 contend that defendant No. 10 is not a trespasser. According to these defendants, under the notification issued under S. 15 of the Bombay Rent Act it is possible for a party to transfer his business as a going concern together with stock-in-trade, goodwill and tenancy rights, even though the tenancy rights may be only as statutory tenants. The contention of these defendants is contrary to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in Vasant Tatoba Hargude v. Dikkaya Muttaya Pujari reported in AIR 1980 Bom 341. Defendants 2 to 10 also contend that the tenancy continues to be a contractual tenancy as there is an alleged waiver of the notice to quit. It is not necessary to examine these contentions at the interlocutory stage. But they are relevant at present only for the purpose of showing that rightly or wrongly, defendant No. 10 claims to be in possession under a semblance of title and he claims to be in possession as a person who has entered into an agreement with defendants 2 to 9 to purchase the business of defendant No. 9 as a going concern together with stock-in-trade, goodwill and tenancy rights of the suit premises.
15. There is a dispute as to whether defendant No. 10 entered into possession prior to the agreement of sale between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 or thereafter. There has been considerable argument on both sides on the question of possession of defendant No. 10 in respect of the suit premises. It seems that original tenant T. Tarachand was a partner in the defendant No. 9's firm. The 9th defendant had hired certain equipment and machinery for the studio from a third party, one Samulla Sunny. After the death of the said Sunny a suit was filed for the administration of his estate, being Suit No. 6053 of 1980 in the Bombay City Civil Court at Bombay. In that suit a Receiver was appointed inter alia of the equipment and machinery which were lying in the suit premises. Pursuant to the order in that suit the Court Receiver had gone to take an inventory of the said machinery lying in the suit premises and had sealed the said premises. Thereafter the plaintiff filed a suit in the Bombay City Civil Court being Suit No. 7303 of 1980 against some of the defendants as well as the L.I.C in which also a Receiver was appointed. There are various reports of the Receiver in that suit as well as at the ad interim stage in the present suit. Both the parties are relying upon various reports which have been made by the Receiver. From a perusal of these reports one thing at least is clear viz. that the Receiver had not put her lock on the premises. The premises were locked when the Receiver went there and she put her seal on the premises. Ultimately when the studio premises which had been locked throughout and on which there were seals of the Receiver appointed in these various litigations were opened by the Receiver, the premises were opened with the keys which were in the possession of defendant No. 10. It is not necessary to go into the question as to how defendant No. 10 obtained the keys of the premises, but the fact remains that the keys of the locks on the premises were with defendant No. 10.
In view of this fact, prima facie, it is not possible to hold, as contended by the plaintiffs, that the premises were abandoned premises and that nobody was in possession of these premises, either when a Receiver was appointed in the City Civil Court Suit No. 6053 of 1980 or at any time thereafter. Self-occupied premises in the city of Bombay are extremely valuable. They may fetch for its occupier a large sum of money. It is difficult to accept the contention of the plaintiff that such valuable premises which may fetch for its possessor an amount running into lacs of rupees would be simply abandoned by anybody, and would require a Receiver to take possession of the same in order to preserve them. Defendants 2 to 9 cannot be said to have abandoned the premises. They have entered into an agreement to transfer inter alia their rights in these premises to defendant No. 10. Defendant No. 10 appears to have been in possession of the suit premises under such an agreement before the filing of the suit. At present, therefore, the premises are not in an abandoned state.
16. We have next to examine whether the plaintiff has a present right to possession of these premises. Assuming for the sake of argument that the possession of defendant No. 10 is wrongful the plaintiff today has no interest in the property in dispute. He is merely a person who has entered into an agreement 4 to purchase the property. He has not paid the full purchase price to the vendor nor has he obtained a conveyance in his favour. As such, he cannot claim any right to immediate possession of the suit property.
17. Mr. Parekh, learned counsel for the defendants Nos. 2 to 10 has challenged the plaintiff's right to obtain specific performance of the agreement of sale. He has alleged that the terms of the agreement of sale are different from the terms on which tenders were invited. He has alleged certain breaches of the agreement on the part of the plaintiff and he has also submitted that L.I.C; the first defendants are in the position of trustees of the property because they hold this property for the benefit of their policy holders. He has further submitted that at the stage when the tenders were opened, and before the tender of the plaintiff was accepted, defendant No. 9 had raised his bid to Rs. 38,50,000 which was Rs. 1 lac more than the bid of the plaintiff. Relying upon the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kasturi Lal v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, AIR 1980 SC 1992 as well as Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1628, he has submitted that it was the duty of the Life Insurance Corporation to accept the highest bid and they acted wrongfully in accepting the bid of the plaintiff. According to him this could be a fit case where the court should not exercise its discretion in granting specific performance of the agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff.
18. At the interlocutory stage it is not necessary to examine the merits of the case. But these submissions merely highlight the fact that the plaintiff does not have an immediate right to possession of the property in respect of which they have entered into an agreement of sale. In fact specific performance of an agreement of sale is a discretionary remedy which may or may not be granted. It is quite possible that in a given case the party who asks for specific performance may, even when successful, get only damages in lieu of specific performance. Therefore, unless the plaintiff gets a decree of specific performance in his favour, he does not get a right to possession. He cannot, therefore, at the interlocutory stage, dispossess somebody who is in possession prior to the filing of the suit. In view of this position, it is not possible to uphold the contention of the plaintiff that a receiver should be appointed of the property described in Exhibit “A” to the plaint. It may be noted that in the present proceedings the landlord namely, the Life Insurance Corporation has not advanced any arguments and has submitted to the orders of the court. The plaintiff is, however, entitled to some protection in respect of the property which he has agreed to purchase so that his rights may be protected in the event of his succeeding in the suit. Accordingly, I pass the following order:
Defendants 2 to 10, their servants and agents are restrained from in any manner disposing of alienating, encumbering, inducting any third party or creating or recognising any right in favour of any third party in respect of the property described in Exhibit “A” to the plaint or parting with possession thereof or any part thereof. Defendants 2 to 10, their servants and agents are also restrained from altering the condition of the property described in Exhibit “A” to the plaint or any part thereof.
Defendant No. 10 his servants and agents are further restrained from parting with the possession of the said premises or any part thereof in favour of defendants Nos. 2 to 9 or any of them.
Defendants 2 to 10, their servants and agents are restrained further from executing a deed of assignment pursuant to the agreement in question entered into between them.
The undertaking given by defendants 2 to 10 on 22nd Sept. 1981 is vacated.
Ad interim orders to continue till 15th June 1982. The receiver to make an inventory in respect of the property Exhibit “A” to the plaint including the goods lying in the studio premises and to prepare a list of all persons in occupation of the property Exhibit “A”. Inventory to be made by the Court Receiver immediately by removing the seal of the studio premises and re-fixing the same after the inventory is completed.
Ad interim orders to stand vacated on 15th June 1982 and the Receiver ta remove her seal forthwith thereafter.
Mr. Parekh learned counsel for the defendants 2 to 10 applies that the plaintiff should deposit in court a sum of Rs. 28,12,500 which, according to him, is the balance purchase price payable in respect of the agreement for sale.
Mr. Amin, learned counsel for the plaintiff states that the balance purchase price of Rs. 23,12,500 has been deposited by the plaintiffs with their attorneys Bachubhai Munim & Co. In view of this statement application rejected.
Costs to be costs in the cause.
Ordered accordingly.
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