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Devidas v. State Of Maharashtra

Bombay High Court
Mar 26, 1981
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Structured Summary of the Opinion by Sharad Manohar, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The case arises from an alleged nocturnal dacoity at the residence of Baburao Ganpatrao Gaikwad (P.W.1) in the village Walur. The opinion records that on the night of 17th December 1976, at about 1:00 A.M., about 15–16 unknown persons are said to have carried out the dacoity; articles (utensils, jewellery, cash of Rs. 3,500) were allegedly taken and family members were beaten. The complainant lodged a report at the Manwat Police Station on the next day (the opinion contains a textual date of 18-12-1973 in one place and 1976 elsewhere).

Police investigation allegedly located articles near the outskirts of the village; a dog squad purportedly led police to the hut of accused No. 3 on 20-12-1976. Searches and panchanamas (Exhibits 16, 17, 18) are recorded as having been made, and the prosecution alleges that all five accused were arrested on 28-12-1976 and each, in turn, purportedly led police and panchas to places where they dug up and produced incriminating articles (panchnamas Exhibits 20, 21, 22, 28, 30, 32 are referenced).

The accused were tried in the Sessions Court, Parbhani and convicted for an offence under section 396 of the Indian Penal Code (as stated at the outset). The present opinion is an appeal by the original accused Nos. 1–5. The appellate court (Sharad Manohar, J.) allowed the appeal and acquitted all the accused; sentences are not set out because the appeal was allowed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether convictions based solely on "discoveries" by the accused—when unsupported by an informative statement made by the accused in the presence of independent panchas—constitute admissible and reliable evidence under the Evidence Act (particularly sections 24–27 and section 27).
  2. Whether mere discovery of stolen articles by an accused, when the place of concealment was accessible to others or when the discovery is not preceded by an informative statement, is sufficient to sustain convictions for dacoity (section 395/396 IPC) or whether only an offence under section 411 IPC (receiving stolen property) could possibly be inferred.
  3. Whether the credibility of police officers (investigating P.S.I.) can be preferred over the evidence of panch witnesses when the panchas directly contradict police testimony and there are indications of irregularities in investigation and in preparation of panchnamas.
  4. Whether procedural irregularities—alleged false panchnamas, detention dates misrepresented to the magistrate, searches carried out while accused were already in custody—vitiate the investigation and require acquittal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants / Accused (Defence) — Principal Contentions

  • They denied participation in the dacoity; their defence was total denial of the prosecution's case.
  • They alleged arrest and detention by police on 20-12-1976 (contrary to prosecution's stated arrest date), beating while in custody, and false implication by police.
  • They denied making any informative statements or discovering any incriminating articles; some personal items (e.g., dhoti) were admitted to be theirs but jewellery and utensils were disowned.
  • Accused No. 1 alleged that Rs. 3,000 was demanded from him and that that amount was in fact paid by his uncle to the police.

Prosecution — Principal Contentions

  • The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence, primarily the "discoveries" allegedly made by each accused in the presence of two panchas (P.W.8 and P.W.10) and recorded in various panchnamas (Exhibits 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27, 28, 30, 32).
  • The prosecution's own concession (via learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Deshmukh) was that there were no eye-witnesses who could identify any accused committing the dacoity; therefore the case depended on the recoveries/discoveries.
  • Where panch evidence contradicted police testimony, the prosecution (through Mr. Deshmukh) urged the court to accept the P.S.I.'s evidence in preference to the panch in specific instances, though the prosecutor acknowledged difficulties on this point.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Babboo v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1042 Establishes that a mere discovery by the accused, unaccompanied by an informative statement pursuant to which the discovery was made, is of no legal evidentiary value under section 27 of the Evidence Act. The court relied on this authority to hold that mere production/discovery of incriminating articles by accused Nos. 4 and 5 (without a genuine informative statement) could not be treated as admissible evidence to sustain conviction.
Bahadul Alias Ghanshyam Padhan v. State of Orissa, (1979) 4 SCC 346 : A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1262 Holds that production/discovery of an article from a place accessible to others, without a statement showing that the accused concealed it in a place known only to him, is not sufficient to convict; reliance on section 27 requires a prior informative statement. The court applied this principle to the facts where recoveries were from open or publicly accessible places and where no convincing evidence showed the accused alone knew the concealment location, undermining the prosecution's reliance on such recoveries.
Pohalya Motya Valvi v. State of Maharashtra, (1980) 1 SCC 530 : A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1949 Where information given by an accused leading to a discovery is capable of two constructions, the one favorable to the accused should be adopted; the discovery alone is not determinative if alternative inferences are possible. The court used this authority to emphasize that when discovery can be interpreted in ways benefitting the accused—especially given police conduct and contradictions—the favorable interpretation must be adopted, weighing against conviction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in a stepwise manner grounded in evidence law and assessment of witness credibility:

  1. Absence of eyewitness identification: The complainant (P.W.1) had stated in the F.I.R. and in court that he could not see the faces of the dacoits as they had covered their faces; accordingly, there was no evidence of any witness identifying any accused at the time of the offence. The prosecution itself conceded that the evidence was purely circumstantial.
  2. Centrality of "discoveries": Because there were no eyewitness identifications, the prosecution's case depended on alleged discoveries/recoveries by each accused and the corresponding panchanamas. Thus admissibility and reliability of those discoveries became decisive.
  3. Legal standard for admissibility of discoveries: The court emphasized statutory and precedential law (sections 24–27 and section 27 of the Evidence Act and cited Supreme Court decisions) that an informative statement by the accused leading to the discovery is the admissible element; mere physical recovery by the accused from a place accessible to others is not sufficient.
  4. Examination of panchas' testimony and police evidence: The court found material contradictions between the testimony of panch witnesses (notably P.W.8 and P.W.10) and the investigating police officer (P.W.12, the P.S.I.). In particular:
    • P.W.8 (the panch) explicitly denied that accused Nos. 4 and 5 made informative statements in his presence and described the police-driven and directed nature of the so-called discoveries. This directly contradicted the police narrative of voluntary informative statements by the accused.
    • P.W.10's evidence (used for discoveries by accused Nos. 1–3) had internal contradictions and the witness was shown to be a chance witness with unexplained presence at the Gram Panchayat; his testimony was held to be unreliable in the circumstances.
  5. Police misconduct and investigative irregularities: The court recorded several serious investigatory defects:
    • Conflicting dates of arrest (police claimed 28-12-1976; panch said accused were arrested on 20-12-1976) and concealment of custody facts from the Magistrate.
    • Searches said to be conducted in presence of panchas were denied by panch testimony; panchnamas relating to searches were asserted to be false by the panch witness P.W.8.
    • All accused were detained in police custody for several days before production to the Magistrate, and the prosecution failed to confront or treat panchas as hostile when their testimony undermined police accounts.
    The court treated these matters as gravely undermining the prosecution case and the credibility of police testimony.
  6. Application of precedents: Relying on the cited Supreme Court authorities, the court applied established principles that mere production/discovery by an accused, particularly from a place accessible to others or when unsupported by an informative statement, is not sufficient to convict. Where two constructions are possible, the one favourable to the accused must be adopted.
  7. Conclusion of analysis: Given the absence of eyewitness identification, the unreliability of panch testimony (or panch testimony that negated police claims), the tainted character of the P.S.I.'s evidence, and the investigative irregularities (false panchnamas, misrepresented dates, detention while searches allegedly took place), the court concluded the circumstantial case built on discoveries was too weak and suspect to sustain convictions for dacoity. The trial court's reliance on the panchanamas and police evidence for conviction was therefore rejected.

Holding and Implications

Final Ruling: The appellate court allowed the appeal. All the accused are acquitted of the offence with which they were charged.

Direct consequences expressly stated in the opinion:

  • The appeal is allowed and all accused are acquitted.
  • The bail bond stands cancelled.
  • Any fine paid, if any, is to be refunded.

Broader legal implications: The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal precedent; it applies existing principles (from the cited Supreme Court decisions and the Evidence Act) to the facts to conclude that the prosecution's reliance on unsupported discoveries and tainted investigative procedure could not sustain convictions. The decision's effect is thus to reverse the convictions in this case on the specific factual and credibility findings detailed above.

Show all summary ...

Sharad Manohar, J.:— This is an appeal by the original accused Nos. 1 to 5 who have been convicted by the learned Sessions Judge, Parbhani of the offence under section 396 of the Indian Penal Code. Since I am allowing the appeal, it is not necessary to stats the sentences imposed on each of the accused.

2. The prosecution case was as follows:—

Baburao Ganpatrao Gaikwad, P.W 1, is the resident of the village Walur where weekly bazar is held. He claims to be quite affluent person. He has a joint Hindu family and lives with his brother Both the brothers are married. Patornal aunt of the said P.W 1 is also residing with him.

On the night of 17th December 1976, at about 1,00 A.M about 15 to 16 unknown persons committed dacoity in the house of P.W 1. They broke open the house and smashed the electric bulbs. Upon the noise P.W 1 and his brother rushed out from the upper floor where he was sleeping. He was mercilessly beaten by the dacoits, and, likewise, other members in the family were also beaten,. The dacoits looted the house by helping themselves with various articles such as utensiles, jewellery, etc. and cash of Rs. 3500/- After the dacoits took to their heels, P.W 1, lodged a report at the Police Station, Manwat, which is just a few miles away from Walur, on the next day i.e on 18-12-1973. It is the case of the prosecution, that white the dacoits made their escape, at the out-skirts of the village, they left certain articles such es empty bags and utensils etc. After the FIR was registered the police visited the place of offence and also saw the spot near about the outskirts of the village where the said articles were lying. The police ordered that those articles should not be touched by any one else and brought into service Dogs Squad on 20-12-1976. The dog took the police to the hut of accused No. 3 on the very day. Thereafter hut of accused No. 3 was searched and certain articles were found from the hut of accused No. 3 which were taken into their possession by the police under panchanama Exhibit 16, on 25-12-1976, the houses of accused Nos. 1 and 2 were also searched and certain articles were recovered from their houses. Panchnama in respect of articles found in the house of accused No. 1 is at Exhibit 17 and panchnama in respect of the articles found in the house of accused No. 2, is at Exhibit 18.

It is the further contention of the prosecution that all the accused were arrested on 28-12-1976 and on that very day all the accused agreed to show the places where they had concealed certain articles. The prosecution wants the Court to believe that all the accused one after the other, made statements before two celebrated panchans. The first was P.W 8 and the other was P.W 10. The contention was that each of the accused, one after the other, made statement before the Panchas that he would point out the places where he had concealed the article. The police took each of the accused, one after the other, in the company of the same panchas to the spot to which the relevant accused directed them. The contention of the prosecution is—

(a) that accused No. 1 took the police party and the panchas to his house and that behind the house below a tree he dug up and took out certain articles which were taken into their possession by the police under the panchnama Ex. 30.

(b) That accused No. 2 took the police party and the panchas in the police jeep to his own field and that he dug up a portion below Bal tree in the field and took out certain articles which were taken by the Police in their possession under the panchnama Exhibit 32.

(c) That accused No. 3 followed suit. He took the police party and the panchas to his hut in his field and dug out a portion in the hut and took out certain articles which ware taken by the police in their possession under the panchnama Exhibit 28.

(d) That accused No. 4 followed similar suit. He took them to his field, dug out under a Bal tree and took out certain articles which the police took in possession under the panchnama Exhibit 22.

(e) That accused No. 5 similarly took the entire police party and Panchas to the field of accused No. 4 and he dug up below a Palas tree and took out certain articles which the Police took in possession under the Panchnama Exhibit 20. The investigating police thereafter practically put a full stop to the investigation with an evident sense of fulfilment in due season the charge sheet was framed against all the accused and that is how all the accused faced the music of the trial of the offence mentioned above.

3. The defence of the accused was one of total denial. They denied that they took part in the dacoity. They denied that any articles were discovered by them as alleged by the prosecution. They contended that all of them were arrested by the police on 20-12-1976. They stated that they had gone to village Bori for marketing purposes. After their purchases were over, they were coming back by a bus when the P.S.I made them to get down and they ware detained in the Police Station. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 are brothers. Accused Nos. 3, 4 and 5 just happened to be travelling with them. All of them were detained at the Police Station and were mercilessly beaten. They denied having pointed out any properly and denied any concern with the incriminating articles. Some of the articles such as Dhoti etc. were claimed by them to be of their own but articles such as Jewellery, utensils etc. were wholly disowned by them and they denied that they had discovered the same as contemplated by the Evidence Act. Accused No. 1 also alleged that a sum of Rs. 3000/- was demanded from him and that amount was in fact paid by accused No. 1's uncle to the police. They contend that they have been falsely implicated.

4. It may be stated here that so far as the evidence led by the prosecution is concerned, it was entirely of circumstantial character. In the first information report itself the star witness, P.W 1 has stated in so many words that he could not see the faces of the dacoits because all the dacoits had covered their faces with pieces of cloth. In this evidence also he stated in so many words that he could, not identify any of the dacoits. He no doubt stated that he knew all the accused. But he did not utter a word to the effect that he had seen any of the accused on the date of the occurrence while committing the dacoity. No other witness was examined by the prosecution to state that he had seen any of the accused committing the offence of dacoity at the particular time. In this view of the matter the prosecution had to rely exclusively upon the so called discovery made by each of the accused. The articles of jewellery and utensils discovered by the accused were identified by the complainant and the members of his family to be their own. From the identification marks of certain articles, it could not be denied that those articles did belong to the complainant or his family. The other articles of jewellery and utensils etc. were identified by the complainant and there was no serious quarrel on behalf of the accused as regards the correctness of the identification of the said articles. The only question that therefore, remained was as to whether those articles of jewellery and utensils were in fact found in the possession of any of the accused and if they were so found in his possession, as to what offence could be imputed to them.

5. Evidently the prosecution could prove the possession of the accused in respect of incriminating snides only by independent evidence. It is only if the accused were found in possession of the said articles and it their possession was conclusively proved by the prosecution that some kind of offence could be imputed to them. The investigation agency, therefore, naturally followed the usual procedure of persuading the accused to “discover” the incriminating articles. For this purpose they employed the assistance of two panchas. Everything would, therefore, depend upon the evidence of the Panchas and the genuineness of the panchanama in respect of the statement made by each of the accused in the presence of the Panchas and in respect of the discovery made by each of the accused. As one silts the evidence, one finds that this where the police in the instant case, earned for themselves the dubious distinction of having run amock and of engineering actions which cannot but be described as shady and suspect, thus vitiating the entire investigation and the prosecution in this case and I will refer to that aspect of the evidence presently.

6. The learned Sessions Judge was, however, impressed by the fact that the accused had discovered incriminating articles. He believed the various panchanamas in respect of the discoveries made by various accused and on the basis of this circumstantial piece of evidence he held that the offence had been fully brought home against each of the accused. He, therefore, passed an order of conviction and sentence as mentioned above.

7. Before discussing the prosecution evidence in this case and reliability of the same one aspect of the evidence may be clarified. In the present case, there is no eye-witness who could identify any of these accused in the set of the commission of the offence. The complainant himself stated in the F.I.R that the dacoits had concealed their faces with a piece of cloth. Even in his oral evidence before the Court he has stated in so many words that he could not identity any of the accused as these nocturnal dacoits. Even the learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Deshmukh has clearly stated before me that it is not the case of the prosecution that the charge could be substantiated on the basis of any evidence of eye-witness. He frankly stated that the evidence against all the accused is purely circumstantial, the incriminating circumstances being the discovery of the articles which were the subject matter of the theft by the concerned accused. It therefore, follows that if the evidence relating to these various discoveries at the hands of the various accused is of any weak or suspicious or unconvincing character and if on the basis of such evidence it is not possible to coma to a definite conclusion that the accused had themselves concealed the said articles at the particular place, then the prosecution could not be said to have brought home any offence against any of the accused. But it can be stated further that even if it was proved that the accused themselves were in possession of these stolen articles and had kept them congealed at the particular place's and had discovered them all by themselves later on, then the further question would arise as to what her the offence of dacoity under section 395 of the Indian Penal Code could be attributed to them or not of as to whether they could be let off with a conviction of offence under section 411 for having received stolen property knowing that the same was stolen. The entire evidence has got to be scanned and examined to find out the above position only. There is no dispute about this legal position before me.

8. Coming then to the question of the said circumstantial evidence against each of the accused. I will first deal with the case of accused No. 4 who has been convicted by the learned Sessions Judge along with other accused, though, as I will presently point out, the evidence against him of having discovered arty stolen article is “nil”.

9. It can be hardly doubted that unless—.

(a) the accused had stated that he would point out the relevant article himself, and

(b) he had actually discovered the article meaning thereby that he had pointed out the article from a place not readily accessible to any one else, the alleged offence could not be imputed to him at all.

10. For showing both the above positions, it is not enough that the police should say that he made any such statement before them and that he discovered the article before them. The evidence as a normal rule must be of independent persons. That is precisely the reason why the police requisitioned the help of the Panchas and the accused in question was required to discover the article in the presence of such Panchas. In the instant case so far as accused No. 4 is concerned, the panch in question is SK. Ameer. What the witness has stated vis-a-vis is a statement before the Panchas and vis-a-vis the article discovered by him is something astonishing. It is to be noted that so far as this accused No. 4 is concerned, according to the police, he was arrested on 20th of December 1976, further, it is to be noted that the house of this accused was never searched. The prosecution wants the Court to believe that the accused was arrested on 20th December 1976 and that on the very day he volunteered to make a discovery in respect of certain relevant articles and that he made a statement to that effect before the Panchas, P.W 8 is the relevant panch. But, he says in so many words that accused No. 4 made no such statement before him at any time at all. This is what he has stated in para 5 of his deposition:—

“On the same day, in my presence, Parashram accused No. 4 was not interrogated by the police, nor he gave the information about the articles. Memorandum is signed by me (Exhibit 21). Contents are not correct. Accused No. 4 did not give information us mentioned therein.”

11. In para 9, he states as follows:—

“The driver stopped the vehicle near the field. P.S.I asked him what tree is this? Accused No. 4, said that it is a Bal tree. We saw one stone. P.S.I asked him to remove the stone. Parashtram accused No. 4 removed the stone, Parashtram accused No. 4 voluntarily started digging and removing the earth by his hands. Panchanama (Exh. 21) was made in the Gram Panchayat at Walur.

12. The above evidence is extremely of a tell-tale character. The above evidence clearly shows that so far es accused No. 4 is concerned, he himself never indicated that he would point out the place where the articles wars concealed. He on his own accord did not go to that place. He did everything as was directed by the police. Such an act of digging out the articles in this manner and in these circumstances to be described as an act of “discovery” within the meaning of section 27 of the Evidence Act is nothing but travesty of the said expression. I am surprised that the learned Judge ignored this basic aspect of the evidence. Even Mr. Deshmukh, the learned Public Prosecutor, had to make a frank statement that the conviction of this accused on the basis of such evidence could not be sustained. He stated that no doubt the Police Officer had tried to give evidence regarding the “discovery” made by accused No. 4. But he frankly stated that the conviction could not be based upon the evidence of the Police Officer when the evidence of the Panch. P.W 8, militated against the evidence of Police Officer. The order of conviction and sentence passed against accused No. 4, therefore, has got to be set aside.

13. Coming to the evidence against accused No. 5, the position may not be as bad but the evidence given by the Panch against even that accused must be held to be wholly unacceptable if not inadequate. Even as regards this accused No. 5, the panch is the same. Even as regards this accused, the Panch has stated the same thing so far as the statement alleged to have been made by the accused before him expressing his intention to discover was concerned. This is what P.W 8, has stated in relation to the alleged statement made by accused No. 5, while showing his willingness to point out the incriminating articles:

“On 28-12-1976. I and Jankiram were called as panchas by the police Ambu accused No. 5, was in custody of police. I know Ambu accused No. 5. In my presence, Ambu accused No. 5, was not interrogated. He did not give me any information about the articles”.

14. In the last portion of the same para 4, he has further stated as follows:—

“The accused No. 5, did not give information in my presence as stated by me. The memorandum (Ex. 19). The Panchanama is at Exhibit 20”.

15. No doubt, the witness states later on as follows:—

“I and other, panch Jankiram, policemen and Ambu-accused No. 5, went by police vehicle. The spot was about 21 miles away from walur village. It was within the limits of Rawa village. We all got down from the vehicle and while going by the way Ambu-accused No. 5, pointed out a Palas tree. Ambu-accused No. 5, himself removed the earth from the spot and took out one brass lota, one steel glass one steel wati, one gold, ‘tops’ and one gold Panadi. These articles were buried in the ground. Ambu-accused No. 5, himself took them out and produced before the police the above articles”.

16. The act of pointing out Palas tree, the act of removing the earth from, the particular spot and the act of taking out the articles are no doubt imputed to accused No. 5 directly by P.W 8. But as one refers to the mandatory character of the provisions of sections 24 to 27 of the Evidence. Act, it will be seen that it is not enough that the discovery should have been made by the accused. What is necessary is the discovery must have been made “in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence”.

17. It is the statement giving information leading to the discovery which is admissible in evidence. The mere discovery by the accused cannot be said to be of any legal consequence, if it is not proceeded by the informative statement on the part of the accused. It is the informative statement which is evidence. The discovery by the accused in the absence of such informative statement is for all practical purposes barren and Court would hardly be able to draw any inference from the mere discovery. Mr. Agrawal urged this aspect of the evidence quite strenuously and to my mind with quite soma force and justification. Mr. Agrawal invited my attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in 1(Babboo v. State of Madhya Pradesh), reported in A.I.R 1979 S.C 1042 wherein it has been held that mare discovery by the accused would be of no evidentiary value. It has been held that mere discovery un-accompanied by a statement by the accused person, pursuant to which alone discovery made, could have been was no legal evidence.

18. In 2(Bahadul Alias Ghanshyam Padhan v. State Of Orissa), reported in (1979) 4 SCC 346 : A.I.R 1979 S.C 1262, it has been held by the Supreme Court that mere discovery by the accused of a weapon from a place accessible to all if not evidentiary value for proving the offence of the accused. This is what the Supreme Court in para 4 of its judgment held in this behalf:—

“In these circumstances, therefore, we are not in a position to rely on the judicial confession. As regards the production of the tangia by the accused before the police, the High Court seems to have relied on it as admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. As there is nothing to show that the appellant had made any statement under section 27 of the Evidence Act relating to the recovery of this weapon hence the factum of recovery thereof cannot be admissible under section 27 of the Evidence Act Moreover what the accused had done was merely to take out the axe from beneath his cot. There is nothing to show that the accused had concealed it at a place which was known to him alone and no one else other than the accused had knowledge of it. In these circumstances the mere production of the tangia would not be sufficient to convict the appellant”.

19. The above observations apply with equal force to the facts of the present case.

20. Thirdly Mr. Agrawal relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in 3(Pohalya Motya Valvi v. State Of Maharashtra) reported in (1980) 1 SCC 530 : A.I.R 1979 S.C page 1949. In that case the recovery of the incriminating weapon was made at the instance of the accused. Even then the Supreme Court held as follows:—

“But where two accused are charged for murder and the information given by one leading to the discovery of modern weapon is capable of two constructions the one beneficial to the accused will have to be adopted”.

21. In other words it was held that if the discovery was not made necessarily in pursuance of the information given by the accused the fact of discovery by itself could not be said to be an incriminating circumstance.

22. To my mind, hawing regard to the above authorities it can be safely stated that there existed no legal evidence on the strength of which accused Nos. 4 and 5 could be convicted of the offence with which they charged, it thus follows that so far as the informative statement by the accused is concerned, there is no evidence worth the name that can be said, to have been led by the prosecution. All the same on this point, Mr. Deshmukh was rather emphatic in contending that though the Panch Witness had denied any such informative statement having been made by accused No. 5, the Police Officer P.W 12 had Mated before the Court that the accused had made such statement in the presence of Panchas, Mr. Deshmukh wanted me to believe the P.S.I in this case and not the Panch P.W 8. I find myself wholly unable to do so. Normally this will be so in all cases when the Police Officer stated that the accused made the incriminating statement before the Panch but the Panch himself states that no such statement made in his presence by the accused. The Court will be slow to rely upon the evidence of the Police Officer in preference to the evidence given by the Panchas. But this would be particularly so in the present case. Firstly the note-worthy aspect of this case is that the Panch witness has given a most revolting evidence against modus operandi resorted to by the prosecution and inspite of that fact the prosecution has not even made an attempt to make an application to the Court for declaring the witness to be a hostile witness and for permission to cross-examine the said witness. Evidently everything that was stated by this panch witness, P.W 8, has been accepted by the prosecution to be true and correct. If that was so, then the evidence given by P.W 12, which runs counter to the evidence of P.W 8, must be held to be wholly unacceptable.

23. Secondly, the outstanding fact that strikes the eye. In the instant case is the unholy enthusiasm shown by the investigating agency in bringing home the conviction against the accused and the manner in which the statements, which turned out to be patently false statements, have been made by the Investigating P.S.I before the Court. The entire evidence of the P.S.I turns put to be a tainted piece of evidence unworthy of any credence. I will have more to say about this aspect of the prosecution evidence a little later.

24. It, therefore, follows that there is absolutely no evidence regarding any informative statement being made by accused No. 5, on the strength of which the discovery of the incriminating article could be said to have been made by the accused No. 5. The prosecution case against accused No. 5 must fail on this ground itself.

25. However, even assuming that the more discovery by the accused was a circumstance enough to prove the offence on the part of the accused, still in the context of the evidence in the instant case even that part of evidence relating to the actual discovery is very much suspect. Mr. Agrawal in this connection contended that the common evidence for proving this discovery at the hands of the accused No. 5, was the evidence of Panch P.W 8. He contended that there were a number of circumstances which indicated the suspicious character of the evidence given by this Panch in the first place. It is to be noted that even according to this witness the spot from where the articles were discovered cannot be said to have been pointed out by accused No. 5, in the cross-examination he has stated that the driver stopped the vehicle near the field. It is not stated that the accused asked the driver to stop there. We do not know as to what the accused was Informed previously by the police when he was in the police custody for nearly 8 days. The P.S.I wanted the Court to believe that accused No. 5, was arrested on 28-12-1976. But what has come out by virtue of the evidence of prosecution's own witness No. 8, is that all the accused were arrested on 20-12-1976. There is every possibility that to the knowledge of the police the articles concerned, ware either lying or planted in the spot it is quite likely that while in police custody accused No. 5, was property informed and briefed as to what he was to do when the Jeep stopped at a particular place near a Bal as tree, in the light of the evidence that has been revealed anything was possible at the hands of the police. This has made the entire evidence relating to discovery also by accused No. 5 extremely suspect.

26. This takes me to the evidence against accused Nos. 1, 2 and 3. The evidence against these accused is of two-fold character. Firstly, it is contended that the house of accused No. 3, was searched on 20-12-1976. Likewise the houses of accused Nos, 1 and 2 were searched on 25-12-1976. Remarkably enough the prosecution would want the Court to believe that the accused were at that time at large and that the searches were made while they were absconding and even then nothing incriminating was found in the said searches. But there is something more in this act of searches of the houses of accused Nos. 1 and 2 and of the hut of accused No. 3 than what meets the eye. The prosecution would want the Court to believe that the house of these accused were searched when they are at large. The point is that in fact the accused were under police custody at that time. The prosecution has concealed this fact from the Court even after a statement to that effect has been made by P.W 8 in so many words. In this cross-examination. It is admitted that nothing incriminating was found in those searches. But the further point is that the search was alleged to have been made in the presence of Panchas. P.W 8 is one of the Panchas and he has made a clean breast of the fact that no search was made in his presence at all. It thus becomes an extremely intriguing and mystifying a matter as to why the police should have indulged in the said search in the first instance, and should try to give an air of verisimilitude, when no search was made in the presence of the panchas at all and nothing incriminating was alleged to have been found in the search at all. But the more important circumstance alleged against accused Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are the discoveries alleged to have been made by each of them on 28th December 1976. This fact has to be considered in the light of the other fact that the accused were already in custody from 20-12-1976. The prosecution wants the Court to believe that on 28-12-1976 all the five accused volunteered to make discovery of some incriminating articles concealed by themselves separately. The prosecution would want the Court to believe that from the Gram Panchayat Office, each of the accused started in the company of the Panchas and Police Officer and went to the spot and discovered the articles. The allegation is that so far as accused No. 1 was concerned, he had discovered some of the incriminating articles from his own house. The house of the accused was already searched on 25-12-1976 and the police had not established that anything incriminating was buried in any portion of the house at that time. On 28-12-1976, on the other hand, according to the prosecution, accused No. 1 took the party of the police and Panchas to his own house and he took out the in cremating articles buried from a corner of the house. The evidence of P.W 10 is that on 28th December 1976, accused No. 1 stated in his presence that he had buried the incriminating articles such as jewellery and brass glass in his field and that he was willing to produce them. P.W 10 has also stated that accused No. 1 led them to a field near a hut in the field and he took them to a place about 10 to 15 ft. away from the hut. Thereafter he dug out earth and took out jewellery and utensils etc. from that place. In the cross-examination further he admitted that while the accused, the police personal and the panch were being driven in the Jeep towards the place of concealment, the driven of the Jeep was asked not by the accused but by the Police Officer to stop at the particular place. This means that the police were already in the know of the place where the articles were allegedly lying concealed. Moreover the place was on open space accessible to any body else.

27. The position about the discovery of article by accused No. 3 is in no way different. He is alleged to have made before the Panch P.W 10 the informative statement 3rd regards the concealment made by him. But while the accused was being driven to the place of concealment, it was the P.S.I who gave instructions to stop jeep at the particular place, not accused. As to how the P.S.I knew about the whereabouts of the place is a matter ??? The but of accused No. 3 was searched previously on 20-12-1976. The incriminating articles are alleged to have been discovered by accused No. 3 in an open piece of land behind that hut accessible to all persons in the world.

28. So far as accused No. 2, is concerned, it is not elicited from the cross-examination that the Jeep wag stopped by the driver at the place of concealment at the instance of the P.S.I So far as a accused No. 2, is concerned, if the evidence of the Panch witness P.W 10, is to be believed the discovery could be said to have been made in pursuance of the information given by accused and it could be perhaps be said that accused No. 2 himself led police party to the place of concealment.

29. But Mr. Agarawal advanced serious arguments against the entire evidence of this Panch witness P.W 10 and it must be said that his objections to the evidence of the said Panch witness have got to be accepted and the evidence of the said Panch witness shall-have to be rejected even in connection with the evidence of accused No. 2. Mr. Agrawal's first contention in this behalf is that on his own showing this Panch witness is a chance witness. Admittedly he is a resident of Manwath. He says that he came to this village. It is not explained in what circumstances, he happened to be in that village for the purpose of acting as Panchas, Surprisingly enough one and the same Panchas is used by the police for witnessing the discovery made by accused Nos. 1 to 3. So far as accused No. 3 was concerned, this witness initially stated that accused No. 3 was not interrogated about the articles in the office of Gram Panchayat. He stated that accused No. 3 gave no information about the article in the office of Gram Panchayat. He admits that all the accused were taken for the purpose of discovery from the office of the Gram Panchayat Mr. Agrawal contends that in the context of all these facts and especially at the matter, it is extremely unsafe to convict the accused on the sworn testimony of such panch witness.

30. I am of the view that Mr. Agrawal's contention is well founded; To my mind, the initial statement of the witness in para 1 of his deposition stating that accused No. 3 was not interrogated about the article in the office of the Gram Panchayat and that he did not give any information in that behalf in the office of the Gram Panchayat cannot be reconciled with his subsequent statement that accused No. 3 had given the Information as mentioned in the memorandum Exhibit 27. This patent contradiction is not even explained by prosecution in any manner. This fact coupled with the fact that he is chance witness makes his evidence extremely suspect. The witness had admitted that he had given evidence on behalf of the police in another case as well. No doubt, he denied that he was a customary police witness. To my mind in the light of the facts of the case this evidence cannot be said to be so reliable that on the basis of that evidence the accused could be convicted of such a serious offence as of dacoity. To my mind his evidence is not even sufficient for the purpose of conviction for the offence under section 411 of the I.P.C This is particularly so in the context of the fact that the evidence of the prosecution ??? made by the accused is of extremely trained and suspicious character. In the first place, the police had arrested all the accused on 20-12-1976. But by following 100 illegal and unconstitutional procedures, all the accused were detained for a period of 9 precious days in the police custody. It was on 29th that the accused were produced before the Magistrate and while so producing them it was represented to the Magistrate that the accused were detained not on 20th but on 28th of that month. The search of the house of the accused Nos. 1, 2 and 3 was made while the accused were in police custody. The search was not made under any Panchanama at all. Still a false panchnama was prepared by the police relating to the search, Panch witness P.W 8, who was examined, has bluntly deposed to this falsehood practiced by the prosecution and even then not a word is uttered in protest against the said panch witness. All the statements made by the said Panch witness P.W 8 put the prosecution itself in the dode. Lastly all the accused are taken on one and the same day namely 28th December 1981 and they were taken to various places one after the other, one in the presence of a chance witness and the other, two, in the presence of a witness who has candidly revealed the machination of the police. The entire investigation is a lanted place of investigation and the evidence led by the prosecution in this behalf cannot be accepted at all. For all these reasons mentioned above, it is impossible for me to sustain the conviction against any of the accused.

31. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. All the accused are acquitted of the offence with which they are charged.

32. The bail bond stands cancelled.

33. The fine, paid, if any, should be refunded.

34. Appeal allowed.