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Laxman Limbraj Rankhamb And Others Etc. v. State Of Maharashtra And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion — Dharmadhikari, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
Two writ petitions challenged Maharashtra Ordinance No. VIII of 1980 promulgated by the Governor, which (a) dissolved the Osmanabad and Parbhani Zilla Parishads, (b) postponed their general elections up to and inclusive of 30th June 1981, and (c) provided for appointment of an Administrator. Petitioners were office-bearers and councillors of the two Zilla Parishads.
Relevant chronology and statutory context as stated in the opinion: - The Zilla Parishads were constituted around 1974; their statutory tenure under Section 10 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishad and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961 expired by end March 1980. - The State Government extended the term under sub-sec. (3) of Section 10 to 30th June 1980 (order dated 24th March 1980), later further extended to 30th September 1980. - On 25th September 1980 the Governor promulgated Ordinance No. VIII of 1980 postponing elections to 30th June 1981 and providing for appointment of an Administrator. - The key procedural challenge: the Ordinance was issued when both Houses of the State Legislature were not in session and re-assembly was scheduled for 8th December 1980.
The petitions primarily challenged the Governor's legislative competence under Article 213 of the Constitution to postpone elections beyond six weeks from reassembly and also alleged that the Ordinance was promulgated mala fide / in colourable exercise of power.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Governor was competent under Article 213 of the Constitution to promulgate an Ordinance postponing the Zilla Parishad elections up to and including 30th June 1981, a date beyond six weeks from the re-assembly of the State Legislature (scheduled for 8th December 1980).
- Whether the Ordinance was issued in mala fide exercise of the Governor's power (i.e., whether the satisfaction required by Article 213 was tainted by bad faith, colourable exercise, or extraneous/political motives) and thus liable to be quashed.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The Governor lacked legislative competence under Article 213 to postpone elections beyond the expiration of six weeks from re-assembly — the Ordinance was therefore ultra vires.
- The Ordinance was issued mala fide and in colourable exercise of power: it was motivated by political considerations, pressure from Congress (I) workers and MLAs, and aimed to prevent removal of incumbents by way of elections.
- The stated administrative reasons (monsoon, administrative difficulty, and Census 1981 duties) were false or insufficient; if Assembly by-elections could be held during that period, the reasons for postponing Zilla Parishad elections were not persuasive.
- The Government was using Ordinances to avoid legislative scrutiny and to present a fait accompli to the Legislature (i.e., intending to secure post facto approval without meaningful debate).
Respondents' Arguments
- The Governor had power under Article 213 to promulgate Ordinances and such an Ordinance is co-extensive with legislative power (subject to sub-article (2) conditions); if the Legislature could postpone elections to that date, the Governor could do so by Ordinance.
- The factual basis for postponement (monsoon, administrative difficulty, and Census 1981 duties requiring collectors and staff until mid-March 1981) existed and was placed before the Governor; the Governor applied his mind.
- Allegations of mala fide were specifically denied in affidavits filed by the Under Secretary and Collectors; the Under Secretary stated all relevant facts were placed before the Governor and denied any pressure or corrupt motive.
- Courts cannot, by reason of Article 163(3), inquire into what advice ministers tendered to the Governor; moreover, the satisfaction required under Article 213 as to necessity for immediate action is a subjective matter for the Governor and not ordinarily justiciable.
- The appointment of an Administrator and dissolution of the Zilla Parishad were consequential measures to give effect to the main objective (postponement of elections) and to ensure free and fair elections when feasible.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Haran Chandra v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1952 Cal 907 (Calcutta High Court) | Held that an Ordinance-making power is not limited so as to prevent the Ordinance making provisions which endure beyond the life of the Ordinance; the Governor can legislate by Ordinance in the manner the Legislature can (subject to duration limits). | The Court expressed respectful agreement with the observation that an Ordinance can enact provisions whose effects continue beyond its life, supporting the validity of extending a body's term by Ordinance. |
| State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose, AIR 1962 SC 945 | Held that rights created by a valid Ordinance endure after expiry of the Ordinance and are not automatically undone by expiry. | The Court relied on this decision to reject the petitioners' contention that validity created by the Ordinance would cease upon its expiry and thereby revive the prior invalidity. |
| K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa, AIR 1953 SC 375 | Addresses the non-justiciability of the Governor's subjective satisfaction in promulgating Ordinances (as relied upon by respondents). | Respondents relied on this decision to support that the Governor's motive/subjective satisfaction is not ordinarily examinable; the Court recorded this reliance as part of the respondents' submissions. |
| R.M.D.C. (Mysore) Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Mysore, AIR 1962 SC 594 | Again cited for the proposition that the Governor's satisfaction under Article 213 is generally his subjective domain and not open to court scrutiny. | Respondents placed reliance on this decision; the Court noted the submission but addressed mala fide allegations on the facts. |
| S.K.G. Sugar Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1974 SC 1533 | Sets out that (barring cases where Governor must obtain instructions from President) the Governor's satisfaction under Article 213 is subjective and not justiciable; existence of circumstances necessitating immediate action is for the Governor to judge. | The respondents relied on this authority; the Court noted its tenor but also recorded that later developments (legislative amendment deleting sub-article (4) of Article 213) had been urged by petitioners — the Court did not resolve that complex question as it was unnecessary for the decision. |
| State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, AIR 1977 SC 1361 | Cited by petitioners for the proposition that if the Governor's satisfaction is mala fide or based on wholly extraneous/irrelevant grounds, the Court can examine the satisfaction because there is then in law no satisfaction. | The petitioners relied on this case to contend reviewability of the Governor's satisfaction in instances of mala fides; the Court recorded the submission but found no sufficient proof of mala fides on the facts and did not have to resolve the broader conflict. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in a sequence tied closely to Article 213 and the statutory scheme:
- Interpretation of Article 213: The Court emphasized that Article 213(1) empowers the Governor to promulgate an Ordinance during the Legislature's recess when he is satisfied that immediate action is necessary; sub-article (2) subjects that power to conditions (e.g., lay before Legislature and lapse after six weeks from reassembly). The Court stressed that an Ordinance has the same force and effect as an Act of the State Legislature assented to by the Governor.
- Co-extensiveness with Legislature: Because an Ordinance is co-extensive with legislative power (subject to sub-article (2) limitations), if the State Legislature could validly postpone elections to 30th June 1981 then the Governor could achieve the same result by promulgating an Ordinance. The Court reasoned there was no provision in Article 213(1) prohibiting postponement beyond six weeks from reassembly, as long as the Ordinance is laid before the Legislature within the six-week period.
- Validity of effects beyond Ordinance life: The Court accepted precedent (Calcutta High Court and Supreme Court decision in Orissa) that rights or effects created by a valid Ordinance can endure after the Ordinance has expired, and that an Ordinance can enact provisions whose consequences persist beyond its life.
- Mala fides and burden of proof: The Court observed that allegations of mala fides were made but that the petitioners bore the heavy burden of proving mala fides. The Court noted the absence of specific allegations against the Governor in his personal capacity and found the petitioners had not produced credible, high-order proof of mala fides.
- Evidence and affidavits: The Under Secretary's affidavit and affidavits of Collectors denied mala fide motive, stated that all relevant facts were placed before the Governor, and explained the administrative impediments (Census duties and monsoon) that made immediate elections impracticable. The Court accepted those factual assertions as undisputed and sufficient for the Governor's satisfaction.
- Limits on judicial inquiry into ministerial advice: The Court invoked Article 163(3) to state that it cannot inquire into what advice ministers tendered to the Governor. The Court also referenced authorities indicating the Governor's subjective satisfaction under Article 213 is generally not justiciable, while acknowledging a line of authority (State of Rajasthan) that allows review when satisfaction is alleged to be mala fide. Nevertheless, the Court held that on the material before it mala fides were not established.
- Consequential measures and administrative rationale: The Court treated dissolution and appointment of an Administrator as consequential measures reasonably adapted to the Ordinance's main object (postponement and ensuring proper administration pending elections). It rejected the argument that the use of Ordinances here was a device to avoid legislative scrutiny, given that petitioners had already enjoyed full statutory term and an additional six months extension and that, per the affidavit evidence, elections could not be held within the extended period for administrative reasons.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
PETITIONS DISMISSED. The Rule (writ petitions) is discharged in both petitions and the petitions fail. There will be no order as to costs.
Immediate legal consequences and implications as stated in the opinion:
- The Governor's Ordinance No. VIII of 1980 (postponing elections to 30th June 1981 and providing for dissolution/appointment of Administrator) is upheld as valid on the facts and legal reasoning given.
- The Court concluded the Governor was competent to promulgate the Ordinance under Article 213 and that the petitioners failed to establish mala fides or colourable exercise of power.
- The decision had the direct effect of leaving the Ordinance in place and rejecting the petitioners' claims; the Court ordered no costs.
- The Court did not purport to lay down a novel constitutional rule: it applied established principles about the co-extensiveness of Ordinance-making power with legislative power, the endurance of rights created by Ordinances, and the heavy burden on parties alleging mala fides.
- The Court expressly did not decide certain broader questions of constitutional law pressed (for example, the full consequences of the deletion of sub-Article (4) of Article 213 by the 44th Amendment) because it found it unnecessary to do so for disposing of these petitions.
Petition dismissed.
This summary is confined strictly to the material and statements contained in the provided opinion and does not add information beyond what the Court reported in the text.
Dharmadhikari, J.:— In these two writ petitions the Ordinance issued by the Governor viz. the Maharashtra Ordinance No. VIII of 1980 providing for the dissolution of Osmanabad and Parbhani Zilla Parishads, temporary postponement of elections and appointment of Administrator is challenged by the office bearers as well as Councillors of the Osmanabad and Parbhani Zilla Parishads. The main challenge to this Ordinance is based on the legislative competence of the Governor to issue such an Ordinance which provides for postponement of the General Elections to these two Zilla Parishads up to and inclusive 30th June, 1981 i.e beyond six weeks from the reassembly of the Legislature which is scheduled to assemble on 8th Dec., 1980. The said Ordinance is also challenged on the ground that it is issued in the mala fide exercise of the power conferred upon the Governor by Article 213 of the Constitution of India.
2. It is an admitted position that these two Zilla Parishads were constituted some time in the year 1974 and their tenure as prescribed by Section 10 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishad and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961 (hereinafter called “the Zilla Parishad Act”) expired by end of March 1980. Thereafter the State Government exercised its power under sub-sec. (3) of Section 10 of the Zilla Parishad Act and initially extended the period up to 30th June 1980 vide Order dated 24th March, 1980. This period was subsequently extended up to 30th Sept., 1980. Thereafter on 25th September, 1980 the Governor of Maharashtra in exercise of the power conferred upon him under Art. 213 of the Constitution of India, promulgated an Ordinance No. VIII of 1980 postponing the elections till 30th June, 1981 as well as for making a provision for appointment of an Administrator. Thus, admittedly the term of office of the Councillors came to an end by the 1st of April, 1980 and under the second proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Zilla Parishad Act it was not open for the Government to extend the term of Councillors beyond six months, and this seems to be the occasion for issuing the impugned Ordinance. It is an admitted position that both the Houses of the Legislature were not in session when the impugned Ordinance was issued. However, it is contended by Mr. Deshmukh as well as Mr. Bhimrao Naik, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners that under Article 213 of the Constitution of India and particularly in view of the provisions of sub-article (2) of the said Article it was not open to the Governor to postpone the elections beyond the expiration of six weeks from the re-assembly of the Legislature which is scheduled to be held on 8th December 1980. Thus, according to the learned Counsel the postponement of the elections up to and inclusive of 30th June, 1981 is ultra vires the powers conferred upon the Governor under Article 213 of the Constitution of India, which only confers a power upon the Governor to issue an Ordinance to make a transitory provision when both the Houses of the Legislature are not in session.
3. It is not possible for us to accept this contention. Article 213(1) of the Constitution of India confers a power upon the Governor to promulgate an Ordinance during the recess of the Legislature when he is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action. The power conferred upon the Governor is subject to the conditions referred to in sub-article (2) of Article 213 of the Constitution which reads as under:
“(2) An Ordinance promulgated under this article shall have the same force and effect as an Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by the Governor, but every such Ordinance—
(a) shall be laid before the Legislative Assembly of the State, or where there is a Legislative Council in the State, before both the Houses, and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of the Legislature, or if before the expiration of that period a resolution disapproving it is passed by the Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Legislative Council, if any, upon the passing of the resolution or, as the case may be, on the resolution being agreed to by the Council; and
(b) may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor.
Explanation.— Where the Houses of the Legislature of a State having a Legislative Council are summoned to reassemble on different dates, the period of six weeks shall be reckoned from the later of those dates for the purposes of this clause.
(3) If and so far as an Ordinance under this article makes any provision which would not be valid if enacted in an Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by the Governor, it shall be void:
Provided that, for the purposes of the provisions of this Constitution relating to the effect of an Act of the Legislature of a State which is repugnant to an Act of Parliament or an existing law with respect to a matter enumerated in the Concurrent List, an Ordinance promulgated under this article in pursuance of instructions from the President shall be deemed to be an Act of the Legislature of the State which has been reserved for the consideration of the President and assented to by him.”
Sub-article (2) in terms lays down that the Ordinance promulgated under this article shall have the same force and effect as an Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by the Governor. Therefore, the power of the Governor to issue an Ordinance is co-extensive with the power conferred upon the Legislature of the State.
4. It is not disputed before us, nor it could be disputed that it is open to the Legislature to postpone the elections to any date inclusive of 30th June 1981. If this is so, then in our opinion it is also open to the Governor to exercise the same power by promulgating an Ordinance, obviously subject to the conditions laid down in sub-article (2) of Article 213 of the Constitution of India, viz. that the said Ordinance will have to be laid before the Legislative Assembly or the Council before the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of the Legislature, etc. The Assembly is to reassemble on 8th Dec., 1980 and in the normal course this Ordinance will be placed before the Legislature. So far as the competence of the Governor in the matter of issuing of an Ordinance is concerned, as there is no prohibition in Article 213(1) of the Constitution of India in this behalf, in our opinion, it was quite competent for the Governor to postpone the elections even beyond the expiration of the six weeks from the reassembly of the Legislature. This is more so in view of sub-art. (2) of Article 213 of the Constitution of India which in specific terms lays down that the Ordinance promulgated shall have the same force and effect as an Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by the Governor. In this connection a reference could also be made to the provisions of Cl. (3) of Article 213. Under that clause, if and so far as an Ordinance under this Article makes any provisions which would not be valid, if enacted in an Act of the Legislature of the State, assented to by the Governor, it shall be void. Thus both in negative and positive form the power of the Governor to legislate by an Ordinance is made co-extensive with that of the State Legislature except the fact that the Ordinance can have only limited duration. Hence the object which can be achieved by means of regular legislation by the Legislature can also be achieved by an Ordinance. Therefore an Ordinance may enact provisions, the effect of which may continue even after the expiry of the Ordinance. Therefore by an Ordinance the term of the Zilla Parishad can be extended even beyond the life of the Ordinance itself. A similar view seems to have been taken by the Calcutta High Court in AIR 1952 Cal 907 (Haran Chandra v. State of West Bengal). While dealing with such a contention this is what the Calcutta High Court observed in paragraph 27 of the said decision:
“27. It was also contended by Mr. Sen that the proviso to Section 6 of the Ordinance 3 of 1948 is ultra vires as the Governor had no power by an Ordinance to make a provision which would endure beyond the life of the Ordinance. Consequently the provision that the term of office of members of the District Board may extend up to two years is bad. This argument also appears to me to have no substance. As I have pointed out before, there is no limitation put upon the Ordinance-making power of the Governor and so he can legislate by Ordinance in any manner in which the Provincial Legislature can legislate subject to this that the duration of the Ordinance shall be limited as prescribed in the Government of India Act.”
We are in respectful agreement with these observations of the Calcutta High Court.
5. In this context a reference could also be usefully made to a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose, AIR 1962 SC 945, wherein the Supreme Court has upheld the validity of the Orissa Municipal Election Validation Ordinance. By this Ordinance the election held to the Cuttack Municipality which had been declared invalid by the High Court by its earlier judgment was validated. While negativing the contention that as soon as the Ordinance expired the validity of the election came to an end and their invalidity was revived, the Supreme Court held that the rights created by the Ordinance endure and last even after the expiry of the Ordinance. Therefore there is no substance in this contention raised on behalf of the petitioners.
6. The petitioners have also challenged this Ordinance on the ground that it has been issued in colourable exercise of the powers vested in the Governor and is actuated by the corrupt motive and bad faith. In substance it is the contention of the petitioners that the Ordinance is issued by the Governor at the instance and on the advice given by the Ministry headed by Congress (I) Group. It is also alleged that the reasons given for issuance of the Ordinance viz. that due to the monsoon season and other administrative difficulties, it has not been convenient and feasible to hold the general elections before 30th September 1980 and thereafter the Collectors and their staff and other concerned Officers in these two districts are now required to direct their efforts towards discharging their duties connected with the 1981 Census of India operations, can hardly stand to reason, and are also false.
7. During the course of arguments it was contended by the learned Counsel that if the assembly bye-elections could be held during this period, these are hardly reasons for postponement of Zilla Parishad elections. An allegation is also made in the petition that the Ordinance is issued as a result of the pressure brought by the Congress (I) workers and M.L.As in the District. The petitioners have made a reference to certain facts from which according to the petitioners it is clear that every attempt was made by the Congress (I) workers to remove the present office bearers and ultimately when they could not succeed, they thought it fit to resort to the remedy of issuing Ordinance through the Governor of Maharashtra. The petitioners further alleged that the concerned Ministry has not apprised the Governor of all the facts and, therefore, it was not possible for the Governor to apply his mind to the relevant facts before issuing the Ordinance and he is only guided by the advice given to him by the concerned Ministry which is actuated by corrupt motives. It is also alleged by the petitioners that because of the rising prices and the failure of the Government to administer the State properly, the ruling party is not sure of success in the election and, therefore, they have resorted to the method of ruling the State by Ordinances and the present Ordinance is the outcome of this political manoeuvring. It is not possible for us to accept any of these contentions.
8. From the bare reading of these allegations it is quite obvious that no specific allegations are made against the Governor in his personal capacity. These allegations are denied by the respondent in the affidavit filed on their behalf. The Under Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra in the Rural Development Department as well as the Collectors of the Districts have filed the affidavits in reply. The Under Secretary has denied the allegation that the Ordinance is motivated by bad faith or corrupt motive. He had also denied that there has been any mala fides on the part of the Ministers or ministry concerned. According to the Under Secretary, the Administrative staff would be busy with the Census work from September 1980 to December 1980. He has also stated in his affidavit that all the relevant facts were placed before the Governor before the impugned Ordinance was issued. He has further clarified the position by saying that the Councillors of these Zilla Parishads have already enjoyed full term of six years, and therefore, there could be no complaint. According to him as the staff required for holding elections is busy with the Census operations which are of national importance and had to be completed within the prescribed time limit, it is not possible for the State to hold fresh elections immediately. The Government also came to the conclusion that as the full term is already enjoyed by the Councillors of the Zilla Parishads, it would not be feasible nor desirable to give them any further extension. According to the Under Secretary the elections held after the Census work is over and when the Administrator is in charge of the Zilla Parishad, would be more democratic and would reflect the views of the people in better manner. He denied the allegations that pressure of any nature was brought on the Governor for issuing the Ordinance. He has further stated on oath that in any event this Ordinance will be placed before the next Session of the Assembly and the Council to be held at Nagpur. Thus in substance all the allegations made in the petition are denied by the respondents.
9. It cannot be forgotten that in view of the provisions of Article 163(3) of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot enquire into the question as to whether any and if so what advice was tendered by the Ministers to the Governor. From the recitals of the Ordinance itself it is quite clear that after applying his mind the Governor came to the conclusion that as the Collectors and their staff and other concerned officers of the District are required to direct their efforts towards discharging their duties connected with the 1981 census till the middle of March 1981, it would not be practicable to hold general elections and to complete all the stages thereof before the end of June 1981. As to why the elections could not be completed before 30th of September 1980, it is stated in the Ordinance that due to the monsoon season and other administrative difficulties it has not been convenient and feasible to hold the elections before that day. The existence of these circumstances is not disputed. Further, the burden of proving the mala fides heavily lies on the petitioners. The petitioners have obviously not discharged the said burden. Further it is well established that mere allegations of mala fides would not be enough. The burden to establish the said mala fides is upon the person who alleges. The allegations of mala fides are often made very easily and light-heartedly without placing any material in support of such plea. Normally the very seriousness of the allegations demands credible proof of high order in support of such allegations. Such proof is wholly lacking in the present case.
10. In view of the proviso to sub-sec. (2) of Section 10 of the Zilla Parishad Act, if the further extension of the terms was not possible then issuance of an Ordinance was obviously necessary for making a provision for postponement of elections. If while making such a provision the Governor thought it expedient in the interest of the administration of the Zilla Parishad that a provision should be made for dissolution of the Zilla Parishad and also for appointment of the Administrator, then these provisions could safely be termed as consequential to achieve the main object of the Ordinance itself. The appointment of an Administrator will obviously be helpful in holding of fresh elections in a free and fair atmosphere. It is no doubt true that the bye-elections to the Legislative Assembly are being held during this period but it cannot be forgotten that the authority to hold these elections is not vested in the State Government, or Governor. These elections are held by the Election Commission upon which the State Government had no direct control, therefore, for that reason only it cannot be said that the Ordinance is issued in the colourable exercise of the power.
11. Shri C.J Sawant, the learned Counsel for the respondents has also contended before us that it is not open to this Court to enquire into the motive behind the issuance of the Ordinance. In this context Shri Sawant has placed strong reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in K.C Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa, AIR 1953 SC 375 as well as R.M.D.C (Mysore) Private, Ltd. v. State Of Mysore , AIR 1962 SC 594. Relying upon these decisions it is contended by Shri Sawant that if the Governor was competent to issue the impugned Ordinance men the motives which impelled him to act are really irrelevant. He has also placed reliance upon the following observations of the Supreme Court in S.K.G Sugar Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1974 SC 1533:
“15. We shall take the last contention first. Barring those cases where the Governor has to obtain previous instructions from the President, the Governor's power to promulgate Ordinances under Article 213 is subject to two conditions, namely:
(a) that the house or houses, as the case may be of the State Legislature must not be in session when the Ordinance is issued; and
(b) the Governor must be satisfied as to the existence of circumstances which render it necessary for him to take immediate action.
16. There is no dispute with regard to the satisfaction of the first condition. Existence of condition (b) only is questioned. It is however well settled that the necessity of immediate action and of promulgating an Ordinance is a matter purely for the subjective satisfaction of the Governor. He is the sole Judge as to the existence of the circumstances necessitating the making of an Ordinance. His satisfaction is not a justiciable matter. It cannot be questioned on ground of error of judgment or otherwise in Court. The contention is devoid of merit. Moreover, after the coming into force of the President's act 8 of 1969, this question had become merely academic.”
12. On the other hand reliance was placed by Shri Bhimrao Naik the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner upon certain observations of the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, AIR 1977 SC 1361. According to Shri Naik from this decision of the Supreme Court it is quite clear that if the satisfaction is mala fide or is based on wholly extraneous and irrelevant grounds, then this Court has jurisdiction to examine it, because in that case there is no satisfaction in regard to the matter regarding which the Governor is required to be satisfied. The Ordinance cannot be issued unless the Governor is satisfied about the circumstances existing which render it necessary for him to take immediate action of promulgating an Ordinance. When the satisfaction is challenged on the ground of mala fides then in the eye of law there is no satisfaction at all, and therefore it is open to the petitioners to challenge the Ordinance on the grounds of mala fides. Shri Naik has further contended that this position is made further clear by the legislature itself by omitting sub-Article (4) of Article 213 of the Constitution of India by Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978. According to Shri Naik this amendment to sub-Article (4) of Article 213 makes the intention of the legislature very clear. According to the learned Counsel in view of the deletion of sub-Article (4) of Article 213 the law laid down by the Supreme Court in S.K.G Sugar Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1974 SC 1533, is no more good law. In the view which we have taken it is not necessary for us to probe into this question any further.
13. It is also not possible for us to accept the contention of the petitioner, that to avoid normal course of legislation by Legislature the Government is indulging in rule of ordinances only, so as to avoid debate or scrutiny, before the enactment is passed by the houses of Legislature. It was strenuously contended by the petitioners, that by dissolving the Zilla Parishads and thereafter by making appointments of the Administrators the Government wants to approach the Legislature with a fait accompli, leaving no alternative for the Legislature but to approve the action. According to the petitioner any debate which can now take place before the Legislature will be in the nature of postmortem. It is not possible for us to accept this contention in view of the peculiar facts of this case. In the present case it cannot be forgotten that the petitioners have enjoyed their full term of six years as Councillors or office bearers. Not only this, they have also enjoyed the extended term of six months beyond which in no case the said term could be extended in view of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Zilla Parishad Act. Therefore, as a matter of fact the petitioners could have no complaint. It is no doubt true that under sub-section (3) of Section 11 the terms of the outgoing Councillors is deemed to extend to and expire with, the day before the first meeting of the Zilla Parishad; but, if the present Ordinance was not issued, it was obligatory on the part of the concerned authorities to bold the elections before the expiry of the extended period. Holding of such an election was not possible for the reasons disclosed in the Ordinance itself. Therefore at least in this case it cannot be said that the Ordinance was wholly unwarranted.
In the result therefore the petition must fail. Hence Rule is discharged in both the petitions. However, in the circumstances of the case there will be no orders as to costs.
Petition dismissed.
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