Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

State Of Maharashtra v. Harshad K. Shah And Another

Bombay High Court
Sep 3, 1980
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

Eight Criminal Revision Applications were heard together because they involved the same point and the same accused. The two accused were alleged to be the Managing Director and Joint Managing Director of Laxmichand Bhagaji Limited, a company described as carrying on business as money-lenders.

Four of the Revision Applications (Criminal Revision Applications Nos. 790 of 1979, 792 of 1979, 793 of 1979 and 794 of 1979) related to charges under section 19(1) read with section 34 of the Bombay Money-Lenders Act, 1946, for failure to deliver annual statements of accounts and specified particulars to the Assistant Registrar. The remaining four (Criminal Revision Applications Nos. 791 of 1979, 795 of 1979, 796 of 1979 and 797 of 1979) concerned charges under section 18(1), (2) and (3) read with section 34 of the Act for failures such as not maintaining prescribed books, not delivering prescribed statements to debtors, and receiving payments without passing receipts.

On 26-6-1978 the Co-operative Officer (ML), Bombay, filed eight complaints in the Court of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (4th Court, Girgaum, Bombay). Summons were ordered the same day. On 27-2-1979 the accused filed written applications raising preliminary objections. They challenged the prosecution on three grounds:

  • that the accused could not be prosecuted for acts done in their capacity as directors of the company;
  • that the company's business did not fall within the definition of "moneylender" under section 2(2) of the Bombay Money-Lenders Act, 1946; and
  • that sanction to prosecute under section 35B of the Act was not produced before the Court when it took cognizance, and hence the Court lacked jurisdiction.

The trial Magistrate rejected the first two grounds but, regarding sanction, found that no proper sanction had been produced at the time cognizance was taken and that a purported sanction later produced was defective (it mentioned "section 91", a provision not in the Act). The Magistrate construed section 35B as mandating production of sanction before taking cognizance and dismissed the complaints by order dated 30-4-1979. The State filed the eight Revision Applications against that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Magistrate can validly take cognizance of offences under section 34 for contraventions of section 18 or section 19 of the Bombay Money-Lenders Act, 1946, without the previous sanction of the Registrar as required by section 35B of the Act.
  2. Whether the non-production (or belated production) of a sanction that is required by section 35B is a mere irregularity curable under section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (formerly section 537), or whether it is a jurisdictional defect that invalidates cognizance and cannot be cured.
  3. What constitutes a valid sanction under section 35B — specifically, whether the sanction must refer to the facts constituting the offence on its face.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / State (Public Prosecutor Shri Kamat)

  • Asserted that the Registrar had granted sanction prior to launching prosecution, but the sanction was not produced before the learned Magistrate at the time of taking cognizance.
  • Characterized this as a case of non-production of sanction rather than absence of sanction, contending that non-production is a mere irregularity.
  • Argued that the irregularity could be cured under section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (formerly section 537), and relied on the Calcutta High Court decision Abdul Rahman v. Emperor (36 Cri. LJ 1935).
  • Maintained that the legislature intended the sanction procedure to prevent frivolous prosecutions and not to provide an escape for those legitimately charged.

Opponents / Accused (Shri Desai)

  • Contended that sanction is not an "idle formality" but a condition precedent; the Magistrate must have the sanction before taking cognizance and applying judicial mind to issue process.
  • Argued that production of sanction is a jurisdictional requirement: without the sanction being produced, the Magistrate lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance and any cognizance taken is invalid.
  • Relied on the text of section 35B of the Bombay Money-Lenders Act, 1946, which states that no Court shall take cognizance of the specified offences except with the previous sanction of the Registrar.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abdul Rahman v. Emperor, 36 Cri. LJ 1935 Relied upon by the Public Prosecutor to suggest that non-production of sanction is an irregularity that can be cured. The court noted the reliance but did not accept that non-production was merely curable; it distinguished and placed greater weight on later authorities holding sanction to be a condition precedent.
R.R. Chari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1951-52 Cri. LJ 775 Considered on the question of when a Magistrate is said to have "taken cognizance" of an offence. The court observed that when a Magistrate applies his mind to commence proceedings under Chapter XVI (for example by issuing process under section 204), cognizance is taken; it concluded that in the present case cognizance had been taken.
Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. The King, AIR 1948 PC 82 Held that sanction to prosecute is a condition precedent, that the Government has absolute discretion to grant or withhold sanction, and that the sanction must refer to facts constituting the offence. The court treated this decision as authoritative: a sanction must appear on its face to refer to the facts constituting the offence; absence or defect in sanction means no jurisdiction and the defect is not curable under section 465 of the CrPC.
Gadhia Bhanuchandra Vallabhadas v. State, AIR 1954 Saurashtra 132 Applied the principle that absence of sanction for particular offences is fatal and warrants quashing of proceedings. The court cited this case as supportive of the conclusion that sanction confers jurisdiction and that failure to have sanction for particular counts invalidated proceedings; it reinforced the view that the Magistrate's dismissal was correct.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a step-by-step legal analysis grounded in statutory text and precedent provided in the opinion:

  1. Definition and timing of "taking cognizance": The court observed that the phrase is not defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure but relied on section 190(1) and the established understanding that a Magistrate "takes cognizance" when he applies his judicial mind to the alleged offence for the purpose of commencing proceedings under Chapter XVI (e.g., by issuing process under section 204). The court concluded that the trial Magistrate had, in fact, taken cognizance by applying his mind and initiating action under Chapter XVI.
  2. Status of section 35B: The court treated section 35B of the Bombay Money-Lenders Act as an exception to the general rule in section 190 of the CrPC, designed as a protective measure against vexatious proceedings (a "safety measure").
  3. Authority and principle on sanction: The court relied on the Privy Council decision in Gokulchand Morarka to state that sanction to prosecute is an important condition precedent to institution of prosecution; the government has discretion to grant or withhold sanction; and the sanction must refer to the facts constituting the offence on its face. The Privy Council's expression that "the giving of sanction confers jurisdiction on the Court" was emphasized.
  4. Curability of defects: From Gokulchand Morarka and the Saurashtra High Court decision in Gadhia Bhanuchandra, the court concluded that a defect in sanction affecting jurisdiction is not curable under section 465 of the CrPC (formerly section 537). A defect in jurisdiction cannot be remedied by invoking provisions for cure of irregularities.
  5. Application to the present facts: In the present case the sanction was not produced when the Magistrate took cognizance on 26-6-1978. The sanction was produced only much later (on 30-4-1979) when the preliminary objection was heard, and when produced it referred to "section 91" — a provision not in the Bombay Money-Lenders Act — such that it was not clear the sanctioning authority had the relevant section 19 in mind. There was also no allegation in the complaint that a sanction had been granted. The court held that belated production of a sanction cannot confer jurisdiction retrospectively and the result is the same as there being no sanction at the time cognizance was taken.
  6. Conclusion from the analysis: Because the Magistrate took cognizance without the requisite sanction being before the Court (and because the later-produced instrument was defective), the Magistrate correctly held there was no proper sanction and correctly dismissed the complaints.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Revision Applications fail and are dismissed.

Implications:

  • The order of the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate dismissing the complaints for want of a proper sanction is sustained.
  • The court held that production of a sanction is a jurisdictional precondition to taking cognizance under section 35B; a sanction not produced when cognizance is taken, or a sanction defective on its face (for example, by referring to a non-existent section), does not confer jurisdiction even if produced later.
  • The court treated defects in sanction that undermine jurisdiction as not curable under section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
  • No broader or novel precedent was declared by this opinion beyond applying the established principles from the cited authorities; the direct effect is to dismiss the Revision Applications and uphold the magistrate's dismissal of the complaints.

Rules discharged. Rale discharged.

Show all summary ...

1. These eight Criminal Revision Applications are disposed of by this common judgment as the Point involved is the same and the accused in all the eight Revision Applications are also the same.

2. The two accused are alleged to be the Managing Director and Joint Managing Director respectively of Laxmichand Bhagaji Limited, a Company carrying on business as money-lenders. In four Revision Applications, viz., Criminal Revision Applications Nos. 790 of 1979, 792 of 1979, 793 of 1979 and 794 of 1979 the charge against the two accused is under section 19(1) read with section 34 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act 1946, in that they failed to deliver annual statement of accounts signed by the money-lender or his agent of any amount that may be outstanding against a debtor and failed to deliver statement containing particulars, specified in clauses (i) to (iv) of sub-section (1) of section 19 to the Assistant Registrar. The charge in the remaining four Revision Applications, viz., Criminal Revision Applications Nos. 791 of 1979, 795 of 1979, 796 of 1979 and 797 of 1979 is under section 18(1), (2) and (3) read with section 34 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act, 1946, for not maintaining Cash Book and Ledger in the prescribed form, for not delivering to the debtor statement of the amount, the date of the loan and of its maturity, the nature of the security, if any, for the loan, to the debtor within the prescribed time and a statement containing the particulars referred to in clause (a)(i) to the Assistant Registrar and receiving payment from the debtor without passing receipt. On 26-6-1978 Shri A.H Shaikh, Co-operative Officer (ML), Bombay, filed eight complaints in the Court of the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 4th Court, Girgaum, Bombay, for the alleged offences under sections 18(1), (2) and (3) read with section 34 and section 19(1) read with section 34 of the Bombay Money-Lenders Act, 1946. On the same day viz., on 26-6-1978, the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate ordered issue of summonses to the two accused persons, viz., the opponents. On 27th February 1979, the accused filed written applications raising preliminary objections. The two accused challenged the validity of the prosecution on three grounds; firstly, that the accused could not have been prosecuted for whatever acts of commission or omission committed by them in their capacity as Director and Joint Director of the said company; secondly, that the business which the Company in question carried on cannot be considered to be falling within the meaning of the expression “moneylender” of section 2(2) of the Bombay Moneylenders Act, 1946; and thirdly, that at the time the Court took cognizance of the offence, the sanction to prosecute as required by section 35B of the said Act was not produced before the Court and since the sanction was not before the Court, the Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence and, therefore, the complaints should be dismissed. The first two grounds did not find favour with the learned Magistrate; but on the question of sanction, the trial Magistrate observed:—

“At the time the Court took cognisance of the offence, the complainant did not produce the sanction given by the Registrar to prosecute the accused.”

3. It appears that at the time of the hearing of the preliminary objection the sanction, purported to have been given by the Registrar was produced before the learned Magistrate. On a perusal of the sanction produced the learned Magistrate has observed:

“In the sanction ‘section 91’ has been mentioned.”

4. And this error in the section was sought to be explained, by the learned Additional Police Prosecutor by submitting before the learned Magistrate that section 91 mentioned in the said sanction is a typographical error and that it should be read as section 19 since there is no section 91 in the said act. On this submission, the learned Magistrate has observed:

“……… We cannot at this stage assume that this is a typographical error. It is difficult to make out from the sanction itself whether the sanctioning authority had section 19 also in mind when it gave the sanction.”

5. The learned Magistrate, therefore, found that the sanction was not proper. On the question of the competency of the Court to take cognizance of the offence without the production of the sanction before it, the trial Magistrate has stated—

“……… it is obvious that the cognizance was taken without perusal of any sanction.”

6. The learned Magistrate construed the provisions of section 35-B of the said Act as casting a mandatory duty on the party launching the prosecution to produce sanction for the perusal of the Court before the Court takes cognizance. Since cognizance was taken without the production of the sanction, the complaints were dismissed by order dated 30-4-1979. Against the said orders of dismissal, the State has filed the eight Revision Applications.

7. Shri Kamat, the learned Public Prosecutor has argued that in the present case, the Registrar had granted sanction prior to the launching of the prosecution. But that sanction remained to be produced before the learned Magistrate. He has submitted that this is not a case of no sanction at all, but this is a case of non-production of sanction and that, therefore, it is a mere irregularity which can be cured under section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Shri Kamat has submitted that the intention of the Legislature in providing for sanction to prosecute is to protect offenders against frivolous aad vexatious prosecution. The Legislature did not intend to provide the means of escape for persons against whom charge is levelled and in support of this proposition Shri Kamat has relied upon the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Abdul Rahman v. Emperor . 36 Cri. LJ 1935..

8. Shri Desai, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused, has, on the other hand, contended that sanction is not an idle formality. The Court taking cognizance of an offence in respect of which sanction is required has to apply its mind to see vis-a-vis the complaint whether process should be issued. If so, whether process would be issued against all the persons mentioned in the sanction and in the complaint. Whether process should be issued in respect of the offences mentioned in the sanction and the complaint and it is only then that the Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence. If the sanction is not produced, a condition precedent to the taking of cognizance is violated and it is the sanction which gives jurisdiction to the Magistrate to take cognizance. The absence of sanction would not confer jurisdiction upon the Court to take cognizance of the offence and cognizance, according to Shri Desai, being the first step in the application of the judicial mind to commence proceedings as provided in Chapter XVI, viz., issue of process, section 204 etc., at the very initial stage of the proceedings it was incumbent upon the prosecution to produce the sanction since it is a condition precedent to taking cognizance of the offence and since cognizance has been taken without production of the sanction, the learned Magistrate was right in dismissing the complaints. Section 35B of the Bombay Money-Lenders Act, 1946, provides—

“No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 34 for contravening the provisions of section 18 or section 19, except with the previous sanction of the Registrar.”

9. The expression “taking cognizance” is not defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 190(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, provides—

“2(1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any offence—

(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence;

(b) upon a police report of such facts;

(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed.”

10. A Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance of an offence when he applies his mind to the offence for the purpose of commencement of proceedings under Chapter XVI of the Code by issue of process under section 204 of the code. It is only when the Magistrate takes notice of an offence and takes steps to see whether there is any basis for initiating judicial proceedings, that it can be said that the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence. It does not involve any formal action but occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his judicial mind to the alleged commission of the offence. In the present case, the Magistrate has applied his judicial mind to the complaints that were lodged before him by the Co-operative Officer and had initiated action under Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure by issue of process under section 204 of the said code. It is, therefore, needless for me to consider the authority that has been cited before me on the question as to when is a Magistrate said to have taken cognizance. The case cited is R.R Chari v. State Of Uttar Pradesh . 1951 52 Cri. LJ 775., where it is held that when a Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of the Chapter but for taking action of some other kind, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence. As already stated above, in the present case since cognizance has been taken, the question that arises is whether the learned Magistrate could have taken cognizance without the sanction.

11. Section 35B of the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946, is an exception to the general rule laid down in section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, that any offence may be taken cognizance of by the Magistrates enumerated therein. Section 35B appears to be a safety measure against vexatious proceedings. As stated by the Privy Council in the case of Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. The King . AIR 1948 PC 82.,—

“The sanction to prosecute is an important matter; it constitutes a condition precedent to the institution of the prosecution and the Government have an absolute discretion to grant or withhold their sanction. They are not, as the High Court seem to have thought, concerned merely to see that the evidence discloses a prima facie case against the person sought to be prosecuted. They can refuse sanction on any ground which commends itself to them, for example, that on political or economic grounds they regard a prosecution as inexpedient.”

12. The sanction to be given must be in respect of the facts constituting the offence charged and the facts should be referred to on the face of the sanction. If this is not done, there is no valid sanction and the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence. A sanction given without reference to the fact constituting an offence is no compliance with the actual terms of section 35-B. However, the charge need not follow the exact term of a sanction though that to an offence essentially different from that to which the sanction relates. The defect in the sanction is not curable under section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In Gokulchand Morarka's case the accused was charged for contravening the provisions of clause 18(2) of the Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order, 1943, and section 23 of that order provided—

“No prosecution for the contravention of any of the provisions of this order shall be instituted without the previous sanction of the Provincial Government……..”.

13. The sanction in that case specified the appellant as the person to be prosecuted and the clause of the Order which he was alleged to have contravened, but did not specify the acts of the appellant alleged to have constituted such contravention. The question which arose for determination before the Privy Council was whether the sanction constituted due compliance with the provisions of Clause 23 of the said Order. Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed—

“The sanction to prosecute is an important matter; it constitutes a condition precedent to the institution of the prosecution and the Government have an absolute discretion to grant or withhold their sanction.”

(Emphasis supplied).

14. It was further observed—

“The giving of sanction confers jurisdiction on the Court to try the case and the Judge or Magistrate having jurisdiction must try the case in the ordinary way under the Code of Criminal Procedure.”

(Emphasis supplied).

15. The contention that the failure of the Crown to prove the facts on which the sanction was granted amounted to no more than an irregularity did not find favour with their Lordships for the reason that a defect in the jurisdiction of the Court can never be cured under section 537 (Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973). This decision was referred to by the Saurashtra High Court in the case of Gadhia Bhanuchandra Vallabhadas v. State . AIR 1954 Saurashtra 132.. In that case, before the Saurashtra High Court sanction to prosecute the accused in respect of illegal gratification of Rs. 5,700/- was given but no sanction to prosecute the accused in respect of attempt to receive Rs. 1,150/- as illegal gratification nor in respect of the offence under section 5(1)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, habitually receiving illegal gratification, was given. The Saurashtra High Court after considering the Privy Council decision in Gokulchand Morarka's case quashed the proceedings. As stated by the Privy Council, it is only the sanction that gives jurisdiction to the Court. In the present case, the sanction given by the Registrar was not produced before the learned Magistrate along with the complaint. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on 26-6-1978 without the sanction having been produced before him. It was for the first time on 30-4-1979 when the learned Magistrate heard the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the accused that the sanction was produced before the learned Magistrate. As stated by the Privy Council in Gokulchand Morarka's case the sanction to prosecute constitutes a condition precedent to the institution of the prosecution. The giving of sanction confers jurisdiction on the Court to try the case. Since the sanction was not produced before the learned Magistrate at the time the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence, the belated production of sanction cannot confer jurisdiction upon the learned Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence. If a sanction is given but it is not produced at the time the learned Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence, the result would be the same as if there was no sanction. In fact, in the present case, there is not even a mention in the complaint that a sanction as required by the said section 35-B was given by the Registrar. As observed by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, had the sanction been produced before him, the learned Magistrate may perhaps have refused to take cognizance of the offence as the sanction, according to the learned Magistrate was not a proper sanction there being no section 91 in the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946. In this view of the matter, the learned Magistrate was right in holding that there was no sanction and the sanction was not proper and the order passed by the learned Magistrate must, therefore, be sustained.

16. In the result, the Revision Applications fail and are dismissed. Rules discharged.

Rale discharged.