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Techni Glass Limited v. Union Of India And Ors.

Bombay High Court
Nov 26, 1978
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Summary of Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners are a company manufacturing a thermal insulation product marketed under the trade name "Cell-O-Therm." The product is manufactured from broken glass which is powdered, mixed with chemicals (such as carbon black), flamed in an electric furnace and annealed to produce a final block or brick of a light, rough, opaque, grey-black material. The central dispute is whether this material, sold under the trade name "Cell-O-Therm," is to be classified as "glass" or "glassware" for the purposes of excise duty under Item 23A of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.

The excise authorities (Assistant Collector of Central Excise) held that Cell-O-Therm was covered by both "glass" and "glassware" and liable to duty under Tariff Item 23A(4). That order was confirmed on appeal by the Collector of Central Excise, and the revisional authority (Joint Secretary to the Government of India) also upheld the excisability. The petitioners challenged these administrative decisions in this Court contending that the approach and conclusions of the three authorities were perverse and unsustainable.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the product "Cell-O-Therm" falls within the statutory meanings of "glass" or "glassware" for the purpose of attracting excise duty under Item 23A of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
  2. Whether the orders of the Assistant Collector, the Collector in appeal, and the Joint Secretary in revision — which held the product to be excisable under Item 23A(4) — were perverse or otherwise legally unsustainable and therefore liable to be quashed by the Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The product Cell-O-Therm is an insulation material available in the hardware market and not in the glassware market; in appearance and properties it is totally different from what is ordinarily meant by "glass." (See para 9 of the opinion.)
  • The petitioners contended before the excise authorities that their product can never be classified as "glass" or "glassware," but they were not successful before the Assistant Collector, the Collector (on appeal), or in revision. They sought judicial review of those administrative decisions as being perverse. (See para 1.)
  • The petitioners relied strongly on the decision of the Orissa High Court in State of Orissa v. Janata Medical Stores (37 S.T.C. 33) to support a narrower, ordinary-parlance meaning of "glassware" excluding specialised scientific or industrial products such as the petitioners' product. (See para 12 and para 11.)

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents (revenue/excise authorities) contended that the product could be properly regarded as a special type of glass which can assume various shapes (sheets, rolls, tubes, etc.) and therefore can be treated as "glassware" for excise purposes. They referred to trade material (a trade brochure) shown to the Court. (See para 4 and para 5.)
  • The respondents' counsel relied on technical literature — Glass Engineering Handbook by H. B. Shand (2nd Edn. 1958) — which describes "cellular glass" made by heating pulverised glass with a gasifying substance (such as finely divided carbon), producing rigid blocks with voids; the description parallels the petitioners' manufacturing process and suggests a scientific classification of the product as a form of glass. (See para 10 and quoted excerpt at para 15.)
  • The respondents relied strongly on several judicial authorities that had interpreted "glassware" broadly in sales-tax contexts to include a wide range of articles made of glass. (See para 12.)

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Tribuwandas Gulabchand and Brothers, Nagpur v. The State of Maharashtra, 16 S.T.R. 452 The term "glassware" may be given an enlarged meaning to include articles such as glass sheets; courts have accepted a wide amplitude for "glassware" based on ordinary/dictionary meaning. (As discussed by the Nagpur Bench.) The opinion records this authority as one relied upon in prior sales-tax litigation. The Court noted that some High Courts had given the term a wide meaning, but in the present case the Court did not adopt the extreme scientific meaning urged by the revenue and instead preferred the approach of the Orissa High Court. (See paras 6, 11, 12.)
Haji Jameluddin v. The State, 6 S.T.C. 141 (Nagpur High Court) Held that glass bangles could be considered "glassware" within the relevant statutory entry; the decision endorsed the use of ordinary meanings (quoting R. v. Peters regarding reliance on dictionaries for ordinary meanings). The Court recounts this decision as part of authorities giving "glassware" a broad meaning. The present Court considered these authorities but distinguished the scientific/industrial product before it and relied more on the Orissa High Court's narrower approach in the present excise context. (See paras 6–9, 11–12.)
R. v. Peters, 16 Q.B.D. 636 Principle (quoted): words in statutes should be taken in their ordinary sense and dictionaries may be used for instruction as to ordinary meanings (subject to the caveat that dictionaries are not authoritative on every statutory context). The quotation from Lord Coleridge was recorded and applied to show that ordinary meaning is a proper starting point. The Court relied on ordinary parlance meanings rather than extreme scientific definitions for "glass" and "glassware" in Item 23A. (See paras 7, 11.)
Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P. Lucknow v. Banaras Bead Manufacturing Co., Varanasi - 25 S.T.C. 100 Considered whether glass beads and similar products fell within the expression "glassware"; supported giving "glassware" the widest possible meaning in that sales-tax entry, especially where excepting words suggested a broad ambit. The Court recorded this authority as part of the line of decisions interpreting "glassware" broadly. Nonetheless, in the present excise classification the Court declined to extend the statutory term to include Cell-O-Therm on the basis of ordinary parlance and purpose of Item 23A. (See paras 7, 11–12.)
State of Orissa v. Janata Medical Stores, 37 S.T.C. 33 Held that specialised scientific glass articles (thermometers, lactometers, glass syringes, eyewash glasses, measuring glasses) did not fall within the meaning of "glassware" as ordinarily understood for the relevant sales-tax entry; emphasised that extreme, peculiar and scientific meanings should not override ordinary parlance in taxing statutes. The present Court expressly aligned with the approach and observations in this Orissa High Court decision (referenced repeatedly). The Court accepted that specialised scientific meaning may classify the product as a form of glass for technical purposes, but rejected that meaning for interpreting Item 23A; the Court found the Orissa approach persuasive and applied it to exclude Cell-O-Therm from "glassware." (See paras 11–12.)

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds by reference to (a) ordinary parlance meanings of "glass" and "glassware," (b) the statutory structure of Item 23A of the tariff schedule, (c) relevant judicial authorities, and (d) technical literature describing cellular glass.

  1. Ordinary meaning: The Court sets out the ordinary parlance conception of "glass" as "a transparent, lustrous, hard, and brittle substance produced by fusing sand (silica) with soda or potash," and "glassware" as articles made of such substance. The Court treats ordinary meaning as the appropriate starting point for interpreting the tariff entry. (See para 5.)
  2. Precedent analysis: The Court reviews several High Court decisions that, in sales-tax contexts, have given "glassware" a wide amplitude (including sheets, bangles, beads). However, the Court finds persuasive the Orissa High Court's approach that specialised scientific meanings should not displace ordinary parlance meanings in a taxing statute; specialised scientific items may be excluded from "glassware" if they are not readily understood as such in ordinary usage. The Court expressly agrees with the Orissa Court's observations (cited at para 11 and para 17).
  3. Technical classification: The respondents relied on technical literature (Glass Engineering Handbook) describing "cellular glass" — a product produced by heating pulverised glass with a gasifying substance to form rigid blocks with voids. The Court accepts that, for scientific or technical purposes, Cell-O-Therm may be considered a special type of glass (see para 11 and quoted passage at para 15).
  4. Statutory structure and scope of Item 23A: The Court examined Item 23A and noted that sub-item (1) makes excisable only two limited varieties of glass (sheet and plate glass). The remaining sub-items (2), (3), and (4) make excisable "glassware" (articles made of glass) at various rates. The Court reasoned that the tariff distinguishes between specific varieties of glass and "glassware" understood in ordinary parlance — meaning articles made of glass — and that blocks or bricks of a processed product made from broken glass do not fall within those descriptions. (See para 3 and para 12.)
  5. Application to Cell-O-Therm: The Court concluded that although technically Cell-O-Therm is a product derived from glass and may be classified as a type of glass in a technical sense, it is not an article "made of glass" in the ordinary sense and is not sheet or plate glass specified in the tariff. The Court emphasised that Cell-O-Therm is a product "from glass" rather than an item or article "made of glass." (See paras 13 and 18–19.)
  6. Standard of review and perversity: The Court acknowledged the principle that courts should not lightly interfere where administrative authorities choose between two reasonable meanings. However, the Court emphasised its duty to intervene where an adjudicating authority gives a strained meaning to a statutory expression or acts contrary to settled rules of interpretation. The Court determined that the orders of the three excise authorities were perverse and contrary to the clear and obvious meaning of Item 23A. (See para 14.)
  7. Ancillary materials: The Court noted that entries in the Brussels Nomenclature attached to the respondent's affidavit might suggest a scientific classification of the product as glass, but even if so, that would not justify treating the product as "glassware" for tariff purposes. (See para 13.)

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the decisions of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, the Collector of Central Excise (on appeal), and the Joint Secretary in revision — insofar as they held that Cell-O-Therm attracts excise duty under Item 23A(4) — were perverse and legally unsustainable. The Court made the rule absolute in terms of the petitioners' prayers (a) and (b) as sought in the petition. (See paras 14–15.)

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The administrative orders holding Cell-O-Therm to be excisable under Item 23A(4) were set aside and the petition was allowed in the terms prayed. The respondents were ordered to pay the petitioners' costs quantified at Rs. 500. (See para 15.)
  • Interpretive consequence: The Court reaffirmed the principle that ordinary parlance meanings of words in a taxing statute are to be applied and that a specialised or scientific classification will not be permitted to broaden the tax net where the statutory language and ordinary meaning exclude the product. The Court also reiterated that where an adjudicating authority adopts a strained meaning not warranted by settled rules of interpretation, the Court has the duty to intervene. (See paras 11, 14.)
  • Precedential note: The opinion applies existing interpretive principles (including reliance on ordinary meaning and the rule that fiscal provisions should be construed in favour of the subject where ambiguities exist) and aligns with the Orissa High Court's approach in State of Orissa v. Janata Medical Stores. The opinion does not claim to create a novel rule beyond applying these principles to the facts of this case.

Disposition

The petition was allowed in the terms prayed (rule made absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b) of the petition) and the respondents were ordered to pay costs of Rs. 500 to the petitioners. (See para 15.)

Show all summary ...

1. At all times material for purposes of this miscellaneous petition, the petitioners company were manufacturing a product to which they gave the name "Cell-O-Therm". This was a thermal insulation product which could be cut and shaped in various forms to serve various insulating needs. It is manufactured from broken glass which is powdered and then mixed with certain chemicals such as carbon black, and flamed in electric furnace and annealed in an 'annealing lelu'. After these processes we have the final product to which the petitioners gave the trade name of 'Cell-O-Therm.' A brick or block of this product has been produced in Court and a block of light, rough, opaque, grey black material is observed. The question involved in this petition is whether this material going by the trade mark is 'glass' or 'glassware' for purposes of excise duty. The petitioners' contention throughout their dispute with the excise authorities has been that their product can never be classified as 'glass' or 'glassware', but the petitioners have not succeeded in establishing their contention before the Assistant Collector of Central Excise and thereafter in appeal before the Collector of Central Excise and finally in revision before the Joint Secretary to the Government of India. It is thereafter that they have moved the Court contending that the approach and the conclusions to be found in these three orders are perverse and cannot and ought not to be sustained by a Court of Law. It is these grievances and contentions of the petitioners which require investigation.

2. The excisability of the article is claimed by the Excise authorities under Item 23A(4) of the first Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944; the entire item may be set out and it reads as under :

A perusal of this Item indicates that two types of glass mentioned in sub-item (1) are made excisable as glass and the remaining three sub-items provide for levy of duty at different rates for glassware. Sheet glass, plate glass, glass shells, glass globes and chimneys for lamps and lanterns attract an excise duty of 10 %, under sub-items (1) and (3), laboratory glassware attract an excise duty of 5 % under sub-item (2) and other glassware including tableware, which is the residuary sub-item (4) attracts an excise duty of 15 %. The Assistant Collector in his order, after considering the various contentions, held that the product manufactured by the petitioners viz. Cell-O-Therm was covered by both 'glass' and 'glassware'. He, therefore, held that the product was liable to Central Excise duty under Tariff Item 23A(4). The aggrieved petitioners preferred an appeal to the Collector of Central Excise who after setting out the respective contentions, observed that all these have been considered by the Assistant Collector. No fresh grounds, according to the Collector, had been raised before him (the Collector) and in the circumstances he confirmed the order of the Assistant Collector. As the matter will be decided fully in this Court on the materials submitted by the parties, it is unnecessary to make detailed observations on these orders, but it becomes necessary to observe that the learned Collector of Central Excise exercising his appellate jurisdiction has passed the order in a manner that does not inspire any confidence in his appellate powers. On the other hand, the manner in which the order is made casts grave doubt on his capacity to understand the nature of the appellate functions he performs. The revisional order by the learned Joint Secretary is not as vulnerable as the order of the Collector, but even then many of the observations made in the said order are startling and do not reveal care and caution which should be revealed by such high functionaries exercising revisional powers in a serious manner.

3. As stated earlier, the matter has been fully argued before me and all the points which were canvassed before these authorities have again been canvassed before me. Accordingly, since the rival arguments will be set out and discussed it is futile to deal with all these three orders. The latter two of which can be called very unsatisfactory.

4. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents, submitted that the product manufactured by the petitioners could be properly regarded as a special type of glass and since that product could assume and did assume various shapes and could be made in sheets, rolls, tubes and several other shapes as are indicated in the trade brochure shown to the Court the final product could be regarded as 'glassware' and would attract excise duty under Item 23A(4). At first glance the submission appears unusual, if not startling, but a closer investigation in many a disputed question may serve to remove erroneous first impressions and that has been the purpose of the learned Counsel for the respondents.

5. In ordinary parlance 'glass' represents and conjures picture of a transparent, lustrous, hard, and brittle substance produced by fusing sand (silica) with soda or potash (or both), usually with the addition of lime, alumine, or lead exide, 'Glassware' in ordinary parlance means articles or items made of such brittle, lustrous and transparent substance.

6. The word 'glassware' has come up for consideration before the Courts in several case particularly in connection with the levy of sales-tax and normally the Courts have accepted and are inclined to give to the said term the widest amplitude covering within its ambit all items made of glass. This has been principally based on the dictionary meaning of the term 'glassware'. In Tribuwandas Gulabchand and Brothers, Nagpur Vs. The State of Maharashtra, 16, S.T.R. 452, the Nagpur Bench of this Court was required to consider the term 'glassware' in Entry No. 15 of Schedule I, Part X to the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act. It held that the term would include glass sheets. It had been contended before that Court that in trade parlance 'glassware' would not include glass sheets and Counsel had placed reliance on the classification of various articles in Indian Trade Classification for the year 1956 and in the rate book published in connection with the Import Trade Control Orders. The Court, however, observed that this was matter of evidence and necessary evidence had not been brought on record. On that footing the argument was thwarted and the term 'glassware' given an enlarged meaning as including even sheets of glass or glass pates. The Court also relied upon decisions of other High Courts to come to the conclusion that the term or expression 'glassware' was wide enough to include all articles made of glass. Accordingly, the Sales Tax Reference was answered against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. Haji Jameluddin v. The State. 6 S.T.C. 141, was a decision given by the Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in which it was held that glass bangles can be considered as glassware within the meaning of Entry No. 15 in Part I of the amended Schedule I to the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947. The Court quoted with approval the observations of Lord Coleridge in R. Vs. Peters, 16 Q.B.D. 636 at 641, which were to the following effect :

"I am quite aware that dictionaries are not to be taken as authoritative exponents of the meanings of the words used in Acts of Parliament, but it is well-known rule of Courts of law that words should be taken to be used in their ordinary sense, and we are therefore sent for instruction to these books"
.

Accordingly the Nagpur High Court held that the expression 'glassware' was wide enough to include all articles made of glass. It further observed that if there was any doubt, that was removed by the addition of the words "excepting bottles and lamp and lantern chimneys" in Entry No. 15 which addition was suggestive that but for the addition these items could have been covered by the entry and could have been covered only if glassware have understood in an enlarged sense.

7. Whether glass beads would be 'glassware' came to be considered by the Allahabad High Court in Commissioner, Sales Tax. U.P. Lucknow, Vs. Banaras Bead Manufacturing Co. Varanasi - 25 S.T.C. 100. The phraseology of the entry was similar as the entries earlier considered by the High Court at Nagpur and glassware was required to be given the widest possible meaning particularly by the use of the excepting words following the entry and excluding from its purview hurricane lantern, chimneys and bottles. The very same High Court came to consider whether the entry would cover glass sheets manufactured and sold for use as window and door panes and not as raw material for manufacture or fabrication of other articles out of it and it was held that such panes would be encompassed in the expression 'glassware'.

8. The Orissa High Court was required to consider the expression 'glassware' in State of Orissa v. Janata Medical Stores, 37 S.T.C. 33. The Orissa High Court in the aforesaid decision was considering thermometers, lactometers, glass syringes, eyewash glasses and measuring glasses. The Court confirmed the decision of the Sales Tax Tribunal that these items did not come within the meaning of the expression 'glassware' and, therefore, not within the purview of Item 38 of the Schedule of taxable goods. In Orissa at the relevant time sale of glassware was taxable at 7 per cent of the price, but in respect of these items the assessee had collected the paid tax at 5 per cent. The Orissa High Court has observed relying upon the three Supreme Court decisions noted in the said judgment that where an expression had not been defined in a taxing statute it had to be given the meaning which it held in common parlance. It was further observed that the extreme, peculiar and scientific meaning of the goods, which might sometimes deviate from the popular meaning, cannot be permitted to prevail. After finalising the approach, the Court applied its mind to the question before it and held that all these items were specialised materials which could not be understood to be glassware as ordinarily understood.

Understandably, Counsel on behalf of the Respondents relied strongly on the first four of the authorities above referred to, whereas the learned Counsel for the petitioners placed strong reliance on the observations of the Orissa High Court in 37 S.T.C. 33.

9. In this context it may be mentioned that in para 4 of the petition it has been averred that the product Cell-O-Therm would be available in the hardware market and not in the glassware market, that it is insulation material and that both in appearance and in properties it is totally different from what is ordinarily cannoted by the expression 'glass'.

10. Learned Counsel for the Respondents, however, contended that the material manufactured by the petitioners was a special type of glass and I was referred to the observations to be found in Glass Engineering Handbook by H. B. Shand (2nd Edn. 1958). The aforesaid chapter deals with cellular glass and the learned author makes the following observation :

"Cellular glass is made by heating pulverise glass together with a gosifying substance, such as finely divided carbon, to a temperature which causes the glass to flor. The evolution of gas forms voids in the material, which swells to fill a closed container. The product is removed in the form of rigid blocks, which are cut to a variety of shapes. The voids amount to more than 90 per cent of the total volume."

The author then deals with the various applications of this special product viz. Cellular glass.

11. It will have to be accepted that for scientific purposes this product Cell-O-therm which is made from broken glass in the manner earlier indicated, may be considered to be special type of glass and certainly it would be required to be so considered for the purposes of a scientific work on glass engineering technology; but this would not justify the application of this extreme, peculiar and scientific meaning to be given to the expression 'glass' and 'glassware' in Item 23A. To that extent I am in full agreement with the observations to be found at page 34 of the decision of the Orissa High Court in 37 S.T.C. 33. For the purpose of giving the proper meaning in the expressions 'glass' and 'glassware' to be found in Item 23A, glass will have to be understood as understood in ordinary parlance as indicated earlier and in such parlance this special scientific type of glass which may be scientifically put within the category of 'glass' though it may bear little resemblance to glass, will have to be excluded.

12. There is one further aspect of the matter which will be required to be mentioned. Even assuming that the special product obtained from crushed pieces of broken glass after addition of carbon black and after heating and processing the mixture may be considered (through I will not accept that this is a proper conclusion) to be a class of glass, is not made excisable under Item 23A. Item 23A(1) makes excisable only two limited varieties of glass viz. sheet glass and plate glass and in the remaining sub-items (2), (3) and (4) what is made excisable is glassware viz. articles made of glass, which must mean articles made of glass in the ordinary sense and not blocks or bricks of a product made from pieces of crushed glass after undergoing several physical and chemical processes. The product Cell-O-Therm, in my opinion, cannot be considered by any reasonable adjudicating authority to be either glass or glassware for the purposes of tariff item 23A.

13. Before parting with the matter it may be mentioned that I was referred to the relevant entries in Brussel's Nomenclature. These entries which are annexed as Ex. 2 to the affidavit in reply, may at the highest suggest that this product can be considered to be glass in-ints peculiar scientific meaning, but even if the product were to be so considered, in my judgment it can never be regarded made by any adjudicating authority as glassware. It is a product from glass and not an item or article made of glass.

14. It is well settled that where the adjudicating authorities, be they in customs matters or excise matters, have preferred one of two possible meanings or placed a product in one category which could perhaps be better placed in another, the Court ordinarily ought not to interfere. However, if the adjudicating authorities have given a strained meaning to an expression used in ordinary parlance or acted in a manner not warranted by settled rules of interpretation then the Court has not merely the right to interfere but also a duty. In this connection the well settled rule of interpretation of fiscal provisions and reaffirmed on a number of occasions by the Supreme Court may be set down viz. that where a provision is ambiguous in its ambit and effect, the Revenue must suffer and the subject must get the benefit. In my opinion, it is unnecessary even to rely on such rule as I do not find any ambiguity or lack of clarity in Item 23A. It is only the interpretation and application of this Item by the adjudicating authorities earlier referred which is unsatisfactory and against the clear and obvious meaning of the expression. In the circumstances, the decisions of all the three authorities holding that this item Cell-O-Therm attracts excise duty under Item 23A(4) must be held to be perverse, totally improper and in this view of the matter, the rule is required to be made absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b) of the petition.

15. There will be an order accordingly. The Respondents will also pay to the petitioners the costs of the petition which are quantified at Rs. 500 (Rupees five hundred).