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Emil Webber v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Vidarbha

Bombay High Court
Jun 15, 1978
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Concise, Structured Summary of the Opinion (Desai, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The reference arises from an assessee's (Emil Webber) appeal concerning the tax treatment of amounts of income-tax paid by Ballarpur Paper & Straw Board Mills Ltd. ("Ballarpur") on the assessee's behalf for assessment years 1974–75 and 1975–76. Ballarpur had entered into an agreement with Krebs & Cie ("Krebs") for supply of machinery and services to set up a Caustic Soda/Chlorine plant; Krebs, in turn, arranged with Escher Wyas Zurich to supply certain plant and personnel, and the assessee was one of the engineers supplied via that arrangement.

Under the agreement between Ballarpur and Krebs (annexed to the statement of case), Ballarpur were obliged to pay certain salaries and daily allowances through the mechanism set out in that agreement; Ballarpur were also to provide free lodging and the agreement stated that "salaries are understood free of any Indian tax or duty". The agreements between Krebs and Escher Wyas Zurich, and between Escher Wyas Zurich and the assessee, were not produced to the Tribunal and did not form part of the statement of case.

For 1974–75 Ballarpur paid Rs. 3,32,481 (against delegated invoices) and for 1975–76 Rs. 67,200; Ballarpur also paid daily allowances and provided other facilities. The Income-tax Officer assessed the assessee and treated the income-tax and surcharge borne by Ballarpur as a perquisite added to salary. On appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner disagreed with the ITO's view that Ballarpur had paid the tax on behalf of Krebs; he held that Ballarpur had discharged the assessee's liability under contract and that the tax paid by Ballarpur should be treated as the assessee's income from other sources. Two appeals to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal were disposed of by a common order; the Tribunal agreed that Ballarpur was under a legal obligation to pay and concluded that the tax paid could be income under the head "Income from other sources" (section 14). The single question of law referred to the court was whether the tax paid by Ballarpur on behalf of the assessee for the two assessment years was income taxable under "Other sources".

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the amount of tax paid by Ballarpur on behalf of the assessee in the assessment years 1974–75 and 1975–76 is income taxable under the head "Other sources" (section 14 of the Income-tax Act, 1961)?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Assessee's) Arguments

  • Primary contention: Such payment by Ballarpur, if it is a benefit or perquisite to the assessee, would fall within the definition of "income" only where specifically covered by the enumerated parts of section 2(24). In particular, benefits of the type in question are taxable only under clauses already specified — viz., under section 17 (salaries) if arising as perquisites/profits in lieu of salary, or under section 28(iv) if arising from business or profession, following the inclusion in section 2(24) (sub-clause (iii) and (va)). Absent a specific provision covering the present situation in clause (24) of section 2, the benefit could not be regarded as income liable to assessment under other heads.
  • Secondary submission: If the benefit is to be treated under the head "Salaries", Ballarpur cannot be regarded as the assessee's employer; therefore it would be improper to treat this payment as income under "Other sources" when it is essentially a salary-related benefit and no employer-employee relationship existed between Ballarpur and the assessee. Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Nalinikant Ambalal Mody v. S.A.L. Narayan Row, Commissioner of Income-tax [1966] 61 ITR 428 (as relied on by counsel).

Respondent's (Revenue / Tribunal / Appellate Assistant Commissioner) Position as Reflected in the Opinion

  • The Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that Ballarpur paid the Indian tax by reason of Ballarpur's contractual obligation to discharge the assessee's liability (and not as employer payment for Krebs), and therefore the tax paid could not be treated as a perquisite; rather, it was to be treated as income of the assessee under the head "Income from other sources".
  • The Tribunal observed (and the parties admitted) that Ballarpur were under a legal obligation to pay and had done so; the Tribunal considered whether sums paid by one person on behalf of another may constitute income of the latter and, relying on Mrs. Roma Bose (Calcutta High Court), concluded that such payments can constitute income assessable under the head "Income from other sources" (section 14).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mrs. Roma Bose v. Income-tax Officer, [1974] 95 ITR 299 (Cal) That sums collected or paid by third parties (example given: money directly collected by garnishee orders from parties who were debtors of the assessee's husband) were regarded as income of the taxpayer. The Tribunal and this court treated the decision as authority for the proposition that payments made on behalf of a taxpayer can constitute income of that taxpayer; the court explicitly relied on the Calcutta High Court's observations (page 307 of report) to support the conclusion that Ballarpur's payment of tax constituted income of the assessee.
Nalinikant Ambalal Mody v. S.A.L. Narayan Row, Commissioner of Income-tax, [1966] 61 ITR 428 (Supreme Court) Relied upon by the assessee's counsel in support of the submission that the payment should be treated under the head "Salaries" and that employer-employee relationship (or its absence) is material to taxation under that head. The court noted counsel's reliance but rejected the underlying assumption that the benefit must be treated as salary; the court held that the argument based on this precedent was fallacious in the present context and did not accept it as a bar to treating the payment as income from other sources.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by examining (i) the nature of the payments, (ii) the statutory definition of "income" in section 2(24) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and (iii) the character of Ballarpur's obligation to pay the tax.

Key steps in the court's analysis, limited strictly to what the opinion states, are:

  1. The definition of "income" in section 2(24) is an inclusive, not exhaustive, definition. The court therefore rejected the submission that only benefits specifically enumerated in section 2(24) could ever constitute income for other heads.
  2. The court accepted the fact (as found and admitted) that Ballarpur were under a legal obligation to pay the assessee's tax liability and had made payments in discharge of that legal obligation.
  3. The court reasoned that Ballarpur's payment resulted in discharge of the assessee's legal liability to pay tax; such discharge, even though payment was made directly to the revenue, amounted to a benefit conferred on the assessee.
  4. Relying on the principle illustrated in Mrs. Roma Bose (where money collected from third parties was treated as the taxpayer's income), the court concluded that the payments by Ballarpur must constitute income of the assessee.
  5. The court rejected the argument that because sections 17 and 28 deal with salaries and profits/gains of business or profession respectively, and those provisions are specifically referred to in section 2(24)(iii) and (va), benefits not falling within those clauses cannot be assessed under other heads. The court held there is no cogent reason why a benefit not covered by those clauses could not be regarded and assessed as income under another head if it fairly constituted income of the assessee.
  6. The court further rejected the second-line argument that the benefit must be regarded as pertaining to the head "Salaries" such that absence of an employer-employee relationship between Ballarpur and the assessee precluded assessment under "Income from other sources". The court found no warrant for the assumption that the benefit necessarily belonged to the "Salaries" head and therefore dismissed that contention.

The court's analysis is constrained to the facts and authorities before it; it explicitly noted that some agreements (between Krebs, Escher Wyas Zurich, and the assessee) were not produced and did not form part of the statement of case.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court answered the referred question in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue — i.e., the amounts of tax paid by Ballarpur on behalf of the assessee for the assessment years 1974–75 and 1975–76 are income taxable under the head "Income from other sources" (section 14).

Direct consequence for the parties: The assessee (Emil Webber) is held liable in respect of those amounts as income taxable under "Other sources" for the relevant years, and the assessee was ordered to pay the costs of the reference to the revenue.

Broader implications: The opinion does not set out any expansive new principle beyond applying the inclusive character of the statutory definition of "income" and the precedents relied upon; it treats payments by a third party that discharge an assessee's legal obligation as constituting assessable income where they can fairly be regarded as such. The opinion itself does not state any further or novel precedent beyond the application of these principles to the facts of this case.

Show all summary ...

Desai, J.:— This is a reference at the instance of the assessee. The question of law which has been referred to us reads as follows:

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the amount of tax paid by Ballarpur on behalf of the assessee in the assessment years 1974–75 and 1975–76 is income taxable under the heading ‘Other sources’?”

2. In order to appreciate the question and the proper answer to be given to the same, a few facts may be stated:

The matter relates to the assessment of the assessee, Emil Webber, for the two assessment years 1974–75 and 1975–76. The Ballarpur Paper & Straw Board Mills Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Ballarpur” for the sake of brevity) is a public limited company doing considerable business and having its factory at Ballarpur in India. It undertook the setting up of a Caustic Soda/Chlorine manufacturing plant, and for the purpose entered into an agreement for purchases of certain machinery and equipment with Krebs & Cie (hereinafter referred to as “Krebs”), a French concern. There was a further agreement between Ballarpur and Krebs to the effect that Krebs should make available services of certain personnel including engineers for setting up the plant at Ballarpur. It appears that thereafter Krebs entered into a further arrangement in their turn with a Swiss concern, Escher Wyas Zurich, for the supply of certain machinery and plant as also for making available the services of certain personnel including engineers for setting up the plant. The assessee was one of the engineers whose services were accordingly made available by the Swiss concern for setting up the plant and machinery at Ballarpur. The agreement between Ballarpur and Krebs has been annexed to the statement of case as annexure “A”.

3. It is found that the agreements between Krebs and Escher Wyas Zurich and between Escher Wyas Zurich and the assessee were not made available to the Tribunal and, therefore, have not formed part of the statement of case. According to the agreement, Ballarpur were under obligation to pay by the device indicated in the agreement to Krebs certain amounts of salaries at the agreed rate. In addition, it was provided that certain daily allowances would be paid to each of the personnel only by Krebs. Ballarpur also were obliged under the agreement to provide for free lodging. Lastly, it was provided that “…… salaries are understood free of any Indian tax or duty”.

4. The assessee, as stated ??? ??? ??? of the personnel delegated and he worked at the town of By ??? ??? evious years ended 31st March, 1974, and 31st March, 19 ??? ??? ??? mentioned arrangement.

5. Ballarpur made payments and discharged the obligation in accordance with the terms of the agreement in relation to the services rendered by the assessee. Thus, in respect of the assessment year 1974–75, the sum of Rs. 3,32,481 was paid against delegated invoices and similarly for the next assessment year, i.e, 1975–76, the sum of Rs. 67,200 was paid. Certain daily allowances were also paid to the assessee as provided for in the agreement. Other facilities were also made available to him. Before the Income-tax Officer, the assessee had contended that he was exempt from tax. When such a contention was not accepted initially, returns of income-tax for the two years were filed maintaining the contention that he was not taxable. This contention was finally also not accepted and assessments were made for both the years. Ballarpur, thereafter, paid the tax of Rs. 3,23,400 and Rs. 35,546, which was the income-tax determined by the Income-tax Officer for the two years 1974–75 and 1975–76, respectively. In his assessment orders, the Income-tax Officer considered the income-tax and surcharge borne by Ballarpur as perquisite which was added to the amount of salary; this was done in both the years. The matter was carried in appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. We are not concerned with various other points dealt with in the appeal but only with the amount of tax and surcharge which had been paid by Ballarpur. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner disagreed with the Income-tax Officer who had held that Ballarpur had paid the tax on behalf of Krebs, the foreign employers. According to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the Indian tax was paid by Ballarpur by reason of their contract to discharge the liability of the assessee and not that of Krebs. Accordingly, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner came to the conclusion that the tax paid by Ballarpur could not be treated as a perquisite. He, however, made it clear that the said amount of tax paid by Ballarpur was to be treated as the assessee's income from other sources. Similar was the order passed in respect of the second assessment also.

6. Two appeals were filed before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, which were dealt with by the Tribunal by a common order. It was observed by the Tribunal and appears to be the admitted position that Ballarpur were under a legal obligation to pay the tax and had done so. It was also the admitted position between the two sides that Ballarpur could not be regarded as the employers of the assessee. The point dealt with by the Tribunal, which is referred to us for our consideration, is whether the amount of tax paid by Ballarpur under the terms of their agreement with Krebs was taxable under the head ??? ??? Income from other sources”. The Tribunal applied its mind to the ??? ??? hether any sum of money paid by one person on behalf of ??? ??? the obligation of the latter could be treated as income ??? ??? It referred to the decision of a single judge of the Calcutta High Court in Mrs. Roma Bose v. Income-tax Officer, [1974] 95 ITR 299, and considering the observations to be found at page 307 of the above report, came to the conclusion that such a payment made on behalf of a taxpayer could constitute an income which accrued to the taxpayer. It was further of the opinion that the proper head under which the income was required to be assessed was the final head to be found in section 14 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, viz., “Income from other sources It is the correctness of these conclusions of the Tribunal which has been questioned in this reference before us.

7. The learned counsel for the assessee has very strenuously urged that the Tribunal was in error in coming to the conclusion that such payment by Ballarpur constituted the income of the assessee which could be assessed under the head “Income from other sources”. In the first place, our attention-was drawn to the definition of “income” to be found in clause (24) of section 2 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. According to this Sub-section, “income” includes:

“(iii) the value of any perquisite or profit in lieu of salary taxable under clauses (2) and (3) of section 17;……

(va) the value of any benefit or perquisite taxable under clause (iv) of section 28……”

8. The argument which was urged for our acceptance was that such a payment would obviously, and at the highest, be a benefit which was given to the assessee and where such benefit was to be made liable to assessment of tax, it was done by specific provision under the definition as also by provisions under sections 17 and 28 of the Act. In other words, what was submitted was that such a benefit given by the employer would amount to salary and be liable to assessment and payment of tax thereafter by reason of the provision to be found in section 2(24)(iii) read with section 17 of the Act. Similarly, it was argued that such a benefit arising from business or exercise of a profession could be considered as income liable to assessment and tax only by reason of the provision to be found contained in section 2(24)(va) read with section 28(iv). It was submitted that, in the absence of similar provision in section 2(24), such a benefit could not be considered as income for the other four heads of income to be found in the classification contained in section 14 of the Act.

9. It was very fairly stated by Dr. Pal that the matter was one of first impression and counsel at the bar were unable to refer us to any decision of an Indian court in which a similar point had been considered. We are afraid that we cannot accept Dr. Pal's submission that, in the absence of a specific provision in clause (24) of section 2, such a benefit which the assessee has received from Ballarpur could not be regarded or considered to be his income which is liable to be assessed and taxed. The definition of “income” in section 2(24) is an inclusive definition and not an exhaustive one. Dr. Pal urged that as the clause originally stood, such a benefit could be assessed as part of the income of an assessee only if it was received from his employer and it was only in 1964 that sub-clause (va) was added when such a benefit could also be considered and assessed as income under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession”. We are unable to accept this contention based on the legislative history of the provision. Ballarpur, it has been found, was under a legal obligation to discharge this liability to pay tax which was the legal liability of the assessee. It made payments of the amounts of tax for the two years in pursuance of its legal obligation. The result of such payment was a discharge of the legal liability of the assessee to pay tax. It is true that the payment was directly made to the revenue. But to our mind it makes no difference. In Mrs. Roma Bose's case, [1974] 95 ITR 299 (Cal), the money was directly collected by means of garnishee orders from parties who were the debtors of the assessee's husband. This was regarded as his income. In our view such payments in our case must constitute income of the assessee. Merely because the inclusive definition of “income” to be found in section 2(24) provides only for the two heads of income, viz., “salaries” dealt with in section 17 and “Profits and gains of business or profession” dealt with in section 28, it would not follow that the benefits or perquisites which are not covered by these two heads of income would not be assessable if they can be fairly regarded as income of the assessee. We have not been shown any cogent reason why the benefit received by the assessee ought not to be so regarded. There remains for our consideration only one other argument which was rather faintly submitted by the learned counsel for the assessee for our consideration. It was submitted that such a benefit is required to be considered under the head “Salaries”. It was further submitted that since the relationship of employer-employee did not exist between Ballarpur and the assessee, it was not permissible for the revenue to claim that this income should be regarded as “income from other sources”. Reliance was sought to be placed oh the decision of the Supreme Court in Nalinikant Ambalal Mody v. S.A.L Narayan Row, Commissioner of Income-tax, [1966] 61 ITR 428. The fallacy underlying this argument is the starting point thereof that such a benefit has to be regarded as pertaining to income from the head “Salaries”. There is no warrant for such an assumption. Unless this is assumed there is no basis in the second argument advanced by Dr. Pal.

10. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference to the revenue.