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Mohanshet Purushottam Gujar v. Mrs. Jayashri Vasantrao Mahagaonkar .
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner is a tenant occupying one room in house No. 836, Shukrawar Peth, Pune. Prior to 21 December 1966 the house belonged to Baburao Balwant Gokule. The respondent asserted that Gokule, through a power of attorney dated 14 March 1966 (Exhibit 89), authorized Yadav Krishnaji Konde to execute a registered sale-deed dated 21 December 1966 (Exhibit 90), by which the house was sold to the respondent.
After the alleged sale the new owner (respondent) instituted several proceedings against various tenants for arrears and eviction. Multiple suits relating to different tenants were tried together; evidence was recorded in one suit and a common judgment was delivered by the III Additional Judge, Court of Small Causes, Pune, on 15 December 1971 in respect of seven suits. The respondent obtained decrees for eviction and rent against some tenants, including the present petitioner. Appeals and a civil revision followed; three appeals and one civil revision were disposed of by the IV Extra Assistant Judge, Pune, by common judgment dated 27 February 1973. The petitioner's appeal against eviction was dismissed in the lower appellate court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial Court properly applied the presumption in Section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act to treat Exhibit 89 (the power of attorney) as authenticated, given the form of the Magistrate's endorsement and the fact that the document bore only the executant's thumb impression.
- Whether, in the absence of properly proved power of attorney, title could be said to have passed to the respondent by reason of the registered sale-deed executed by the purported attorney (Konde).
- Whether the joinder and common trial of multiple tenants with differing factual positions produced an unfair result for the petitioner (i.e., procedural propriety of the joined trial in this case).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's (tenant's) contentions
- The rent claimed by the respondent was not payable to her because Baburao Gokule had written to the tenants asserting that he remained the owner and that the sale-deed had been procured by fraud.
- There were disputes regarding the correct rent and other tenant-specific issues which made joint disposal with other tenants inappropriate.
- The power of attorney (Exhibit 89) and its authentication were doubtful and should not be treated as proving the respondent's title.
Respondent's (landlady's) contentions
- The respondent relied on the registered sale-deed (Exhibit 90) executed by Konde for Gokule and on the power of attorney (Exhibit 89) which was endorsed by the Taluka Magistrate, Pune; the trial Court accepted these as proof of title, aided by the presumption under Section 85 of the Evidence Act.
- By adducing the registered sale-deed and the exhibited power of attorney the respondent maintained she had proved title and was entitled to the decrees for eviction and arrears.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Wali Mohammed Chaudhari v. Jamal Uddin Chaudhari, AIR 1950 All 524 | Authority indicating that a power of attorney's authentication must show that the person authenticating has assured himself of the identity of the person who signed the instrument. | The Court relied on this decision to emphasise that authentication requires more than mere endorsement; the authenticator must have satisfied himself as to identity, a requirement not met by the Magistrate's rubber-stamp endorsement here. |
| Jugraj Singh v. Jaswant Singh, (1970) 2 SCC 386; AIR 1971 SC 761 | Holds that when a notary endorses a power of attorney, it may be immaterial that the notary does not expressly state he identified the executant; the presumption of regularity of official acts can supply that assurance; power of attorney valid under Section 85 and Section 33 Registration Act in that case. | The Court noted this Supreme Court authority as favourable to the respondent in principle but distinguished it: the facts here (thumb impression, unsatisfactory endorsement, identification by an advocate, unavailability of the executant) made the presumption under Section 85 inappropriate. |
| Smt. Kulsumunnisa v. Smt. Ahmadi Begum, AIR 1972 All 219 | Contains observations that largely recite the provision of Section 85 of the Evidence Act. | The Court observed that paragraph 29 of this judgment merely recites Section 85 and does not set out a distinct rule or ratio it could apply to validate the Magistrate's endorsement in the present case; thus it carried little weight. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's reasoning proceeded in a series of connected steps grounded in facts and the statutory presumption in Section 85 of the Evidence Act:
- The Court first observed procedural unfairness arising from joinder and common trial of several tenants whose individual factual positions differed; while title was a common issue potentially suitable for joint disposal, tenant-specific matters required separate consideration and the combined trial proceeded in a haphazard manner affecting the petitioner adversely.
- The pivotal legal question became whether the respondent had proved title to the suit house in the present suit. The trial Court had accepted Exhibit 89 (the power of attorney) on the basis of the presumption in Section 85 and thus accepted the registered sale-deed (Exhibit 90) executed by Konde as passing title.
- The Court examined the power of attorney and its Taluka Magistrate endorsement: Exhibit 89 bore only the executant's thumb impression (not a signature) and a rubber-stamp endorsement stating the executant was "identified by Shri N.K. Navgire, Advocate, whom I personally know," followed by the Magistrate's signature and date (14/3/66).
- The Court found multiple defects in the endorsement: (a) use of a rubber stamp was inappropriate for authenticating a thumb impression; (b) the endorsement indicated the Magistrate did not personally know the executant and relied on identification by an advocate; (c) there was no proper affirmation before the Magistrate; and (d) authentication under Section 85 requires more than mere execution before or a bare endorsement by a designated official — the authenticator must have satisfied himself of the identity of the executant.
- The Court applied authority: it relied on Wali Mohammed Chaudhari for the proposition that the authenticator must assure him/herself of identity. It acknowledged Jugraj Singh, where a notary's endorsement was held sufficient by the Supreme Court by invoking regularity of official acts, but distinguished that case on its particular facts and found the present endorsement too doubtful to attract the Section 85 presumption. The Court further observed that Kulsumunnisa only recited Section 85 and did not supply a controlling ratio for the present facts.
- The Court noted evidentiary opportunities the respondent did not take: neither Konde (the purported attorney) nor the advocate who identified Gokule was called to give evidence. Additionally, Gokule (the alleged executant) was dead at trial, and his earlier letter to tenants denying the sale and alleging fraud meant tenants could not prove fraud without Gokule's testimony. Given these circumstances, the Court considered reliance on the Section 85 presumption unjustified.
- On these bases the Court concluded the presumption under Section 85 had been wrongly applied to admit Exhibit 89 as proof of the power of attorney for the purpose of this suit; consequently, Exhibit 90 (the sale-deed executed by Konde) could not pass title to the respondent in this proceeding.
- The Court stressed limited scope of its finding: it was a determination of failure to prove title in this particular case and did not amount to a general finding that the respondent lacked title in every other proceeding. The respondent remains free to prove title properly in other or later proceedings (for example, by calling Konde or other witnesses).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Rule is made absolute; the respondent's suit against the petitioner is dismissed and the decree obtained in Civil Suit No. 1687 of 1968 (and the related Civil Appeal No. 183 of 1972) is quashed as regards the present petitioner.
Direct consequences for the parties
- The decree for eviction and the decree for arrears of rent previously obtained against the petitioner are quashed for the purposes of this special civil application.
- Parties will bear their own costs in the trial Court, in the lower appellate Court, and in this Court.
Broader implications and limits of the decision
- The Court's finding is fact-specific: it rests on the form and circumstances of the Magistrate's endorsement, the thumb impression on the power of attorney, the unavailability of Gokule at trial, and the respondent's failure to call Konde or the identifying advocate. It does not amount to a general adjudication that the respondent lacks title in every forum.
- The respondent remains at liberty to establish title in other proceedings by properly proving the power of attorney (for example by calling Konde or other witnesses) without relying on the Section 85 presumption.
- The Court noted that tenants who have accepted the respondent's title in earlier proceedings might be estopped from denying that title in later proceedings; thus the decision's application may be limited as to other tenants or cases.
Rule made absolute.
1. The petitioner before me is the tenant in a house situate at Shukrawar Peth, Pune 2; the number of the house is 836. The tenant was occupying one room therein at a small rent. The said house belonged prior to 21st December, 1966 to one Baburao Gokule. It is the respondent's case that by a deed of a sale dated 21st December, 1966 executed on behalf of Gokule by his constituted attorney, one Yadav Krishnaji Konde, the said house was sold by Gokule to the respondent. The sale-deed is duly registered. This Konde purported to act on behalf of Gokule under a power of attorney dated 14th March, 1966. The sale deed was Exhibit 90 and the power of attorney was Exhibit 89 in the trial Court. It appears that thereafter the new owner instituted several proceedings against the, tenants in the said house. Ultimately after exchange of notice a number of suits were filed. In all these suits the allegation was that the tenants were defaulters inasmuch as they failed to pay the rent to the new owner. The tenants had contended that the rent claimed was not payable to the respondent landlady, and this was based on a letter addressed by Gokule actually contending that he remains to be the owner and that the sale-deed had been procured by the respondent by practising fraud. The tenants also raised disputes regarding their rents. Ultimately at the trial the respondent succeeded against some of the tenants including the petitioner before me but failed in respect of other tenants. In the case of the petitioner it was held that the respondent was the owner and entitled to the rent and that the dispute as to standard rent raised in the written statement was not available to the petitioner. Ultimately, therefore a decree for eviction was passed against him, there was also a decree for certain amount being the arrears of rent. It may be mentioned that all the several suits against the various tenants were tried together, evidence was recorded in only one of them and there was a common judgment by the III Additional Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Pune, dated 15th December, 1971, dealing with as many as seven suits. From this judgment various appeals were preferred and three such appeals and one civil revision application were disposed of by the learned IV Extra Assistant Judge. Pune, by his common judgment dated 27th February, 1973. The petitioner's appeal against the decree for eviction was dismissed by the learned Extra Assistant Judge.
2. Now, going through the judgment I have found that considerable injustice has been done to this petitioner by reason of his trial being joined along with other tenants whose cases were not identical and the matter had proceeded. In a haphazard manner. It is true that as far as the respondent's title was concerned, there was a common issue and an agreement could have been reached as regards joint disposal of that issue. Thereafter, however, as for as the case of each tenant was concerned, it would surely differ, and the way in which it has been disposed of by the learned Judge of the Court of Small Causes is not to be commended.
3. It appears to me, however, that it is unnecessary to go further into this aspect of the matter inasmuch as in the view that I have taken, which I will presently indicate, the respondent had failed to prove (at least for the purpose of this suit) her title to the suit house. If that be so, then it is clear that he was not entitled to the decree which she obtained against the petitioner, and which decree will be required to be quashed in this special civil application. Now, it appears from the proceedings before the trial Court that the trial Court held the title of the respondent proved on the basis of the power of attorney executed by Gokule in favour of Konde, which bears the endorsement of the Taluka Magistrate, Pune, together with the registered sale-deed. As far as the proof of the power of attorney is concerned, the same was marked as an exhibit by the Court on the basis of the provision contained in Section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act. Neither the previous owner Gokule nor his attorney Konde was examined, and it may be mentioned that the tenants were faced with an additional difficulty at the trial, which was that Gokule in fact, who had disputed the title of the respondent and addressed a letter to that effect to the tenants, was dead by the time of the trial. It was Gokule's contention in the said letter that the sale-deed was the result of a fraud practised on him, which obviously the tenants would be unable to prove or substantiate in the absence of Gokule. As the parties to the said fraud would be the said Konde and the landlady's husband It became impossible for the tenants to substantiate the allegation of fraud.
4. Now, Section 85 of the Evidence Act contains a presumption as to powers of attorney and the presumption is couched in the following language:
“85. Presumption as to powers of attorney: The Court shall presume that every document purporting to be a power of attorney, and to have been executed before, and authenticated by, a notary public or any Court, Judge, Magistrate, Indian Consul or Vice-Consul, or representative of the Central Government was so executed and authenticated.” For this presumption to apply it is clear then that the power of attorney is required to be executed before and authenticated by one of the persons mentioned in Section 85, and we are concerned in this case with the endorsement made by the Taluka Magistrate, Pune.
5. Now, turning to the power of attorney (Exhibit 89), we find in the first place that the same purports to bear the thumb impression and is not signed by the executant Baburao Balwant Gokule; it, however, bears the usual endorsement, which is in the following words:
“Solemnly affirmed and signed before me by Shri Baburao Balwant who is identified by Shri N.K Navgire, Advocate, whom I personally know.
Sd/- xxxxxxxx
Taluka Magistrate, Poona City.”
Poona:
14/3/66.
6. Two comments may be made as far as this endorsement by the Magis trate is concerned. It is clear that the use of the rubber stamp is inappropriate and this would be on two grounds: In the first place, what we have is a thumb impression though it may sometimes be called or could be regarded as equivalent to signature. Further, there was no question of any affirmation before the Magistrate. It is clear, however, that the rubber stamp which would be proper in case of ordi nary affirmation has been utilised for the purpose of the alleged authentication under Section 85.
7. Ignoring these aspects which show a regrettable lack of care and attention by the Magistrate concerrid, can it be held that the signature or the thumb impression of the executant is authenticated by the Magistrate as is required by S. 85? The fact that the Magistrate wants some identification by the advocate whose name is mentioned seems to suggest that the Magis trate is unsure of the identity of the person whose thumb impression is borne by the document. It is now well settled that authentication is more than mere execution before one of the persons designated in Section 85. In this connection I was referred by the learned advocate for the petitioner to a decision of a single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Wali Mohammed Chaudhari v. Jamal Uddin Chaudhari, AIR 1950 All 524, (Para 3). It is indicated in the aforesaid decision that, a power of attorney must show that the person authenticating has not merely certified that it is executed before himself but that he has further assured himself of the identity of the person who has signed the instrument. In this connection my attention was drawn by the learned advocate for the respondent to a decision of the Supreme Court in Jugraj Singh v. Jaswant Singh. (1970) 2 SCC 386 : AIR 1971 SC 761. In para 7 of the report it has been observed that if a power of attorney is endorsed by a notary public, the fact that the notary does not say in his endorsement that the executant has been identified to his satisfaction is immaterial and it would flow from the fact that he had endorsed the document that it had been subscribed and sworn before him. Reliance was placed on the presumption of regularity of official acts, and the Supreme Court was pleased to hold that it was satisfied that the notary must have satisfied himself in the discharge of his duties that the pereon who was executing it was the proper person. Accordingly it was held that the power of attorney with which it was dealing was valid and effective both under Section 85 of the Evidence Act and Section 33 of the Indian Registration Act.
8. A further decision was Telied up on by the learned advocate for the re spondent, and this was Smt. Kulsumunnisa v. Smt. Ahmadi Begum, AIR 1972 All 219. My attention was drawn to the observations ih paragraph 29 of the said judgment. But these observations merely recite the provision of Section 85 of the Evidence Act and lay down no rule of law or indicate the ratio of the decision.
9. It is true that to a certain ex tent the observations in the Supreme Court judgment above referred to are in favour of the respondent. The following facts, however, are required to be borne in mind when the question of applying S. 85 in the present case presents itself to the Court: (1) The power of attorney bore the thumb im pression of the executant who was alleged to be Gokule. (2) Gokule had addressed letters to the tenants denying the sale to the respondent and alleging a fraud played on him which obviously would be between the actual person who entered into the transaction presuming to act on behalf of Baburao Gokule i, e. Konde and the respondent's husband who acted for her, it being admittedly the position that the respondent being throughout represented by her husband. (3) Gokule was not available to give evidence at the time of the trial inasmuch as he was dead. Now, I have already pointed out earlier that the endorsement by the Magistrate has been made in a somewhat unsatisfactory manner and it will be difficult to hold that such an endorsement must be accepted as authentication by the Magistrate of the thumb impression of Gokule. It is clear from the rubber stamp that the Magistrate does not know the executant. As far as the identity of the executant is concerned, the Magistrate in fact indicates that he was personally unaware of the executant but puts his signature on the basis of identification made by an advocate. It is true that such identification by the advocate is mentioned in the rubber stamp and one may presume that it is on the basis of such identification that the Magistrate proceeded to put the rubber stamp. But will this amount to authentication by the Magistrate? Section 85 contains a presumption, a presumption which may operate in favour of the party relying on a document and to the prejudice of the party alleging that the document is not a genuine one. (For the purpose of such presumption to operate, particularly in the background of the facts above ascertained, the authentication must be clear, specific, more decisive and bereft of the features which I have indicated earlier. If there, is the slightest doubt, then the Court must be loathe to rely on the presumption contained in S. 85 and must be equally loathe in applying such presumption in favour of the party relying on the document. In my opinion this was a case in which the pre-sumption tinder S. 85 should not have been raised in favour of the respondent. It was not difficult for the respondent to have proved the execution of the power of attorney by calling Konde or some other person who might have been present at the time when Gokule had put his thumb impression on the power of attroney. That was not sought to be done.
10. The advocate who identified Gokule must certainly have been available to the respondent; he was also not called. In this view of the matter, it is clear that the presumption under S. 85 was wrongly made available to the respondent for exhibiting Exhibit 39, the power of attorney; and if that power of attorney is held to be not properly proved, no title would pass to the respondent by reason of the registered sale-deed, Exhibit 90, which is executed not by Gokule but by Gokule's purported attorney Konde. The learned advocate for the respondent informs me that in other proceedings the title of the respondent has been properly proved. What I have held earlier is only the failure to prove the title in a particular case and not the want of title generally. In any other proceedings and even in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties it will be open to the respondent to prove her title by properly proving the power of attorney as indicated, without relying on the presumption under S. 85. Further, it may be that in the several cases where the tenants have chosen to accept the decision of the Court, they would be held to have accepted the title of the respondent and by reason of such estoppel would be prevented from denying her title at a subsequent stage. Thus, what is observed in the case of the petitioner may have very limited application to other cases and other proceedings. Even in a subsequent proceeding between the respondent and the petitioner, which the respondent may adopt, it would be open to the respondent to prove her title properly.
11. If It is held that in the present proceedings the respondent had not proved her title to the suit house, the decree passed by the learned Judge of the Court of Small Causes in favour of the respondent and against the present petitioner, which decree was subsequently confirmed by the learned Assistant Judge in appeal, must be held to be Improper and will be required to be quashed.
12. This is a decree passed in Civil Suit No. 1687 of 1968, which decree was the subject-matter of Civil Appeal No. 183 of 1972. The Rule is made absolute with regard to both the above decisions and the respondent's suit against the present petitioner will stand dismissed. The parties, however, will bear their own costs in the trial Court, in the lower appellate Court and in this Court.
13. Rule made absolute.
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