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Pravin R. Gaglani v. Beharilal Beni Prasad Exports & Imports (Pvt.) Ltd.

Bombay High Court
Aug 1, 1977
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Judgment Summary — Naik, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a dispute over execution in India of an ex parte decree obtained by the plaintiff in Suit No. 172 of 1970 before the Supreme Court of Aden. The plaintiff obtained an ex parte decree for Y.D. 390 (approx. Rs. 9,080) after claiming Y.D. 423 (approx. Rs. 10,000). The plaintiff filed a certified copy of that decree in the Bombay City Civil Court and sought execution under the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). A notice under Order XXI, Rule 22 CPC was issued; the defendants resisted on several grounds, but the City Civil Court initially made the notice absolute by order dated February 17, 1976.

Defendants then applied for review on March 3, 1976, contending, inter alia, that by reason of Section 44A read with Section 2(4) of the CPC the City Civil Court did not have jurisdiction to execute the decree and that only the High Court in its original civil jurisdiction could do so. The learned Judge accepted that contention, set aside his February 17 order by order dated April 6, 1976, and discharged the notice under O. XXI, R. 22. The plaintiff (decree-holder) appealed against the April 6, 1976 order to the court of Naik, J.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Bombay City Civil Court is a "District Court" within the meaning of Section 44A of the Civil Procedure Code for the purpose of executing a certified copy of a decree of a superior court of a reciprocating territory (here, the Supreme Court at Aden).
  2. Whether the learned Judge of the City Civil Court erred in setting aside his February 17, 1976 order on the ground that execution must be undertaken only by the High Court in its original civil jurisdiction, having regard to the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948 (in particular ss. 3, 4 and 12) and the Government notification extending pecuniary jurisdiction to Rs. 25,000.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Plaintiff / Decree-holder)

  • The learned Judge of the City Civil Court lost sight of the provisions of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948 (counsel: Mr. Muchhala).
  • By virtue of Sections 3 and 4 of the Bombay City Civil Court Act and the Government notification of January 20, 1950 extending pecuniary jurisdiction to Rs. 25,000, and Section 12 which ousts High Court jurisdiction in respect of matters cognizable by the City Court, the Bombay City Civil Court is the principal civil court of original jurisdiction within Greater Bombay for matters up to Rs. 25,000 and therefore qualifies as a "District Court" under Section 2(4) read with Section 44A CPC for executing the foreign decree.

Respondents' / Defendants' Arguments

  • The City Civil Court does not qualify as the "District Court" under Section 44A CPC; instead, the High Court in its original civil jurisdiction is the District Court for the purpose of executing foreign decrees (argument advanced in review and supported by Mr. Sakhardande).
  • The earlier order making the notice under O. XXI, R. 22 absolute should be set aside because Section 44A read with Section 2(4) CPC deprives the City Civil Court of jurisdiction to execute the decree.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M. Swain v. B.P. Art Press, [1971] A.I.R. Cal. 455 Illustration that a City Civil Court constituted under a City Civil Court Act may be regarded as the "principal civil court of original jurisdiction" (and thus a "District Court" for specified purposes) where the Act confers exclusive jurisdiction within specified pecuniary and territorial limits. The court treated this authority as supportive of its view: it endorsed the reasoning that a City Civil Court, after statutory conferral of jurisdiction, can be the "principal civil court of original jurisdiction" and therefore the "District Court" for the purposes of Section 44A CPC.
Sheik Ali v. Sheik Mohamed, [1967] A.I.R. Mad. 45 (Full Bench) Interpretation of the phrase "as if it had been passed by the District Court" in Section 44A CPC (narrow interpretative focus). The court held this authority was not relevant to the specific question before it (which concerned whether the City Civil Court is the "District Court"); Sheik Ali dealt with a different interpretative point and therefore was not applied.
D.C.S. Bureau v. United Concern, [1967] A.I.R. Mad. 381 Consideration of whether the Madras City Civil Court was a principal court of original jurisdiction; discussion of potential lacunae if City Court is not principal court and the High Court's original jurisdiction. The court distinguished this authority. It noted D.C.S. Bureau concerned the Madras City Civil Court (which did not constitute the principal court of original jurisdiction as in Bombay) and so the decision did not apply to the Bombay City Civil Court situation under ss. 4 and 12 and the 1950 notification.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the statutory framework. Section 44A(1) CPC provides that when a certified copy of a decree of a superior court of a reciprocating territory is filed in a "District Court," it may be executed in India as if passed by that District Court. The Supreme Court at Aden was undisputedly a superior court of a reciprocating territory.

The court then focused on the definition of "district" and "District Court" in Section 2(4) CPC: "'district' means the local limits of the jurisdiction of a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction (hereinafter called a 'District Court'), and includes the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court." The critical question, therefore, was which court in Greater Bombay should be regarded as the "principal civil Court of original jurisdiction" for the matters at hand.

The court analysed the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948, in particular:

  • Section 3 — empowers State Government to establish the Bombay City Civil Court and grants it jurisdiction over civil suits not exceeding Rs. 10,000 (subject to specified exceptions), with a proviso enabling extension of jurisdiction for certain matters after consultation with the High Court.
  • Section 4 — permits the State Government, by notification, to invest the City Court with jurisdiction up to a higher pecuniary limit (specified in a notification).
  • Section 12 — provides that, notwithstanding anything in any law, the High Court shall not have jurisdiction to try suits and proceedings cognizable by the City Court, subject to a proviso allowing removal to the High Court for special reasons.

The court noted that a Government notification dated January 20, 1950 extended the City Civil Court's pecuniary jurisdiction to Rs. 25,000. Reading ss. 3, 4 and 12 together with that notification, the court concluded that Section 12 effectively ousts the High Court's jurisdiction in respect of matters falling within the City Court's statutory jurisdiction (i.e., suits and proceedings up to Rs. 25,000 arising in Greater Bombay, subject to the exceptions in s. 3).

Consequently, the combined effect of s. 12 and the 1950 notification is to make the Bombay City Civil Court the "principal civil Court of original jurisdiction" within Greater Bombay for matters within the notified pecuniary limits, and therefore the "District Court" as contemplated by Section 44A CPC for the purpose of executing foreign decrees in respect of such matters.

The court considered authorities relied upon by the City Civil Court judge and respondents. It accepted M. Swain v. B.P. Art Press as supporting the proposition that a City Civil Court may be regarded as the principal civil court of original jurisdiction when the City Court Act confers exclusive jurisdiction, and it distinguished Sheik Ali (which addressed a different interpretive point in s. 44A) and D.C.S. Bureau (which concerned the Madras City Civil Court and a different statutory situation) as inapposite to the Bombay facts.

On that statutory reading and by analogy to the Calcutta authority, the court concluded the learned Judge of the City Civil Court had erred in not applying the effect of ss. 4 and 12 of the Bombay City Civil Court Act (and the 1950 notification) when determining whether the City Civil Court was a "District Court" for s. 44A CPC purposes.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed. The court held that the Bombay City Civil Court is the "District Court" within the meaning of Section 44A of the Civil Procedure Code for the execution of the certified copy of the decree in question. The order of the City Civil Court dated April 6, 1976 (which set aside the earlier order) is set aside, and the earlier order dated February 17, 1976 (making the notice under Order XXI, Rule 22 CPC absolute) is restored. Costs were awarded in both Courts.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the decree-holder's earlier success before the City Civil Court (order of February 17, 1976 making the notice absolute) is restored, permitting execution proceedings to proceed in the Bombay City Civil Court.
  • The court distinguished other High Court precedents and applied the statutory scheme of the Bombay City Civil Court Act together with the 1950 notification to reach its decision. The opinion does not purport to set out a broader declaratory principle beyond the statutory application in the facts of this case; the direct consequence is the confirmation of the City Civil Court's competence to execute the foreign decree under Section 44A CPC for matters within the notified pecuniary limits.

Result recorded in the opinion: "Appeal allowed." The February 17, 1976 order is restored and the April 6, 1976 order is set aside.

Show all summary ...

Naik, J.:— This is an appeal by the original plaintiff in suit No. 172 of 1970 on the file of the Supreme Court of Aden, against the order of the learned Judge of the City Civil Court at Bombay dated April 6, 1976 by which he set aside his own order dated February 17, 1976, making the notice under O. XXI, R. 22 of the. Civil Procedure Code, absolute.

2. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to this appeal are these: It appears that the plaintiff filed a suit against the defendants in the Supreme Court at Aden. After serving the defendants an ex parte decree was passed. The plaintiff had claimed an amount of Y.D 423 i.e about Rs. 10,000 and he got an ex parte decree for Y.D 390 equivalent to Rs. 9,080. After securing the certified copy of the decree passed by the Supreme Court at Aden, the plaintiff filed the certified copy of the decree in the City Civil Court and sought for its execution. A notice under O. XXI, R. 22 having been issued the same was resisted by the defendants-respondents on several grounds. None of those grounds found favour with the learned Judge with the result he made the notice under O. XXI, R. 22 absolute by his order dated February 17, 1976.

3. Soon thereafter the defendant-respondents filed an application on March 3, 1976 for a review of the order dated February 17, 1976. Among other grounds the review was sought on the ground that having regard to the provisions of s. 44A read with s. 2(4) of the Civil Procedure Code, the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction to execute the decree and that it is only the High Court on its Original side which could execute the decree. This contention found favour with the learned Judge and, he, therefore, set aside his earlier order dated February 17, 1976 and discharged the notice under O. XXI, R. 22 of the Civil Procedure Code.

4. It is the correctness of that order which is challenged by the plaintiff-decree holder by this appeal.

5. Mr. Muchhala, learned advocate for the appellant has assailed the order of the learned Judge of the City Civil Court. In particular, he contends that the learned Judge has lost sight of the provisions of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948. Mr. Sakhardande on the other hand has supported the reasoning of the learned Judge of the City Civil Court.

6. Section 44A(1) of the Civil Procedure Code, is to this effect:

“Where a certified copy of a decree of any of the superior Courts of any reciprocating territory has been filed in a District Court, the decree may be executed in India as if it had been passed by the District Court.”

7. There is no dispute that the Supreme Court at Aden is one of the superior Courts of a reciprocating territory.

8. The expression “District Court” has not been defined in the Civil Procedure Code. section 2(4) of the Civil Procedure Code is to this effect:

“‘district’ means the local limits of the jurisdiction of a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction (hereinafter called a ‘District Court’), and includes the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court:”

9. What was held by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court and what is pressed before me by Mr. Sakhardande is that the City Civil Court is not the District Court inasmuch as it is the High Court in its original civil jurisdiction which can be considered as the District Court. Mr. Sakhardande has gone one step further and submits that after all the City Civil Court in Bombay is subordinate to the High Court and it is therefore the High Court on the Original Side which is the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction in Bombay. In the assumption which was made by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court the provisions of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, have been clearly overlooked.

10. Section 3 of the Act reads as under:

“The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, establish for the Greater Bombay a court, to be called the Bombay City Civil Court. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, such court shall have jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of all suits and other proceedings of a civil nature not exceeding ten thousand rupees in value, and arising within the Greater Bombay, except suits or proceedings which are cognizable—

(a) by the High Court as a Court of Admiralty or Vice-Admiralty or as a Colonial Court of Admiralty, or as a Court having testamentary, intestate or matrimonial jurisdiction, or

(b) by the High Court for the relief of insolvent debtors, or

(c) by the High Court under any special law other than the Letters Patent, or

(d) by the Small Cause Court:

Provided that the State Government may, from time to time, after consultation with the High Court, by a like notification extend the jurisdiction of the City Court to any suits or proceedings which are cognizable by the High Court as a court having testamentary or intestate jurisdiction or for the relief of insolvent debtors.”

11. Section 4 provides that:

“Subject to the exceptions specified in section 3, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, invest the City Court with jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of all suits and other proceedings of a civil nature arising within the Greater Bombay and of such value not exceeding twenty-five thousand rupees as may be specified in the notification.”

12. A Notification dated January 120, 1950 bearing No. 2346.V, published in the Bombay Government Gazette Part IV-B at page 165, extended the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court to Rs. 25,000.

13. Section 12 of the Act provides as under:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, the High Court shall not have jurisdiction to try suits and proceedings cognizable by the City Court:

Provided that the High Court may, for any special reason, and at any stage remove for trial by itself any suit or proceeding from the City Court.”

14. There is no doubt that the certified copy of a decree of a foreign Court as in this case has to be filed in a District Court as that expression occurs in s. 44A of the Civil Procedure Code. There is also no doubt that in the absence of provisions in the Bombay City Civil Court Act, the Original Side of the High Court would have been the District Court as defined in s. 2(4) of the Civil Procedure Code, read with the provisions of the Letters Patent. But the question to be considered is, as to what is the effect of the establishment of the Bombay City Civil Court by the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948, and the provisions of ss. 3, 4 and 12 of the said Act. It would appear that s. 12 clearly ousts the jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of matters of which cognizance is required to be taken by the City Civil Court in view of the provisions of ss. 3 and 4 read with the notification extending the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court to Rs. 25,000.

15. The combined effect of s. 12 of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, read with the notification of the Government dated January 20, 1950 is to constitute the Bombay City Civil Court as the principal civil Court of original side within the limits of Greater Bombay in respect of suits and other proceedings of civil nature not exceeding Rs. 25,000 in value and arising within the Greater Bombay subject however to the exceptions specified in s. 3 of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948. In other words in respect of such matters the City Civil Court is the District Court, and, therefore, it is the City Civil Court which has jurisdiction to execute the decree as provided in s. 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure.

16. My attention has been drawn by Mr. Muchhala to a division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in M. Swain v. B.P Art Press . [1971] A.I.R Cal. 455.. In that case the appellant-plaintiff had filed two suits for damages, injunction and other reliefs in respect of alleged infringement of the plaintiff's copyright against the defendants. The City Civil Court dismissed the suits on the preliminary ground that the suits were not entertainable by the said Court. The suits were obviously under s. 62 of the Copyright Act and, under that section, such suits have to be instituted in the “District Court having jurisdiction”. For the meaning of the expression “District Court” one has to turn to s. 2(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, and, on the question of jurisdiction, the immediately relevant sections which were considered were ss. 19 and 20 of the Code. It was observed that the Copyright Act, in sub-s. (2) of s. 62, contains an extension of that jurisdiction. The Court observed that it is clear from the above that, in order that the City Civil Court would be entitled to entertain the present suits under the above law, it must be a “district Court having jurisdiction” within the meaning of sub-s. (1) of s. 62, read with or in the light of s. 2(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure and the relevant jurisdictional provisions, as mentioned hereinbefore. The Court therefore observed that the immediate enquiry, would be whether the City civil Court would, in the instant case, satisfy the above test. In para. 7, the Court observed that the point, therefore, would be whether the City Court could be held to be “the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction” for the aforesaid purpose within the meaning of s. 2 sub-s. (4) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

17. The question was answered as under in para. 8 of the judgment (p. 455):

“It is obvious that, under s. 5 of the Calcutta City Civil Court Act, the instant suits, being of value, less than Rupees 50,000/-, would be entertainable only by the City Civil Court under sub-section (2) of the said Section 5 to the exclusion of all other courts, including the High Court. In the circumstances, the City Court may well be regarded as ‘the principal civil court of original jurisdiction’ for purposes of the instant suits within the meaning of Section 2, sub-section (4) of the Code of Civil Procedure.”

18. In para. 9, the Court observed as under (p. 455):

“In the above view, the Calcutta City Civil Court will be ‘the principal civil court of original jurisdiction’, within the local limits of which the defendants of the instant suits reside and the plaintiff also carries on business. That court, therefore, will be the appropriate court and the proper forum for entertaining and trying the present suits, it being, for that purpose, the ‘district court having jurisdiction’, within the meaning of Section 62(1) of the Copyright Act, satisfying, as it does, the relative tests under sections 2(4) and 20 of the Code.”

19. Further on in para. 10, it is observed as under (p. 456):

“The matter, considered above, may also be looked at from another point of view to lead to the same result. Prior to the Calcutta City Civil Court Act, this High Court, in its original jurisdiction, would have been the principal civil court of original jurisdiction, within the local limits of which the defendants reside and the plaintiff also carries on business, and, accordingly, these suits would have been entertainable by this High Court in its original jurisdiction. After the enactment of the City Civil Court Act, however, in view of Section 5 of the said Act, that jurisdiction has clearly been taken away from this High Court and vested in the City Civil Court under sub-section (2) of Section 5, read with sub-section (1). This is clear, on a reading of the said Section 5, the two reservations in sub-section (3) and (4) not being relevant for our present purpose. That position is also affirmed by sub-section (5) of the said section 5. Clearly, therefore, the change, introduced by the City Civil Court Act to the relevant law, as noticed above, would make the City Civil Court, for purposes of the present suits, the ‘principal civil court of original jurisdiction’ within the local limits whereof the defendants reside and the plaintiff also carries on business. From this point of view also, the City Civil Court will be the court in which the present suits ought to be filed.”

20. With respect the above observations support my view that having regard to the provisions of s. 12 of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948, read with the notification of 1950, issued under s. 4 of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948, it is the Bombay City Civil Court which is the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction in respect of the matters covered by the notification of 1950, and, therefore, it would be the District Court referred to in s. 44A of the Civil Procedure Code.

21. Clearly therefore the learned Judge was in error when without taking into consideration the effect of the provisions of ss. 4 and 12 of the Bombay City Civil Court. Act, 1948, he concluded that the City Civil Court at Bombay was not the District Court as that expression occurs in s. 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure and that it is the High Court on its original civil jurisdiction alone which can be considered as a District Court.

22. Reliance was placed by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court and is also placed by Mr. Sakhardande on the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court reported in Sheik Ali v. Sheik Mohamed . [1967] A.I.R Mad. 45, F.B.. In that case the Court was only concerned with the interpretation of the expression “as if it had been passed by the District Court” occurring in s. 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court was not at all concerned with the question which arises for my decision in this appeal and, therefore, this authority is not at all relevant for the point for decision.

23. One more authority which is relied upon by Mr. Sakhardande in support of the order passed by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court is reported in D.C.S Bureau v. United Concern . [1967] A.I.R Mad. 381.. In that case at the fag end of para. 5 of the judgment it is observed as under (p. 384):

“…So far as Madras City is concerned, the City Civil Court is not the principal Court of original jurisdiction. Its powers are limited to what have been conferred on it by Act VII of 1892 within the upper limits of valuation of suits specified by notifications issued thereunder. If the interpretation given by learned Counsel is accepted, the anomalous result would follow that when a case of infringement of copyright arises within the area of the original jurisdiction of the High Court, there will be no Tribunal competent to try the suit. No doubt if such an anomalous result ensues because of a real lacuna in the legislative provisions, the Court cannot step in to fill up that lacuna. Therefore, it is necessary to consider whether such a lacuna really exists, or whether the existing provision is not sufficient to give jurisdiction to the High Court.”

24. The Court thereafter went on to point out that there is no such lacuna and further observed as under (p. 384):

“Clauses 11 and 12 of the Letters Patent confers ordinary original civil jurisdiction to the High Court, over the Presidency Town of Madras. Therefore, the area of the Presidency Town will be a District as defined in section 2(4) of the Civil Procedure Code, and when the High Court exercises its original civil jurisdiction over the city limits, it can be deemed to be a District Court, in those cases where resort to the definition in section 2(4) of the Civil Procedure Code, is permissible for the purpose of fixing jurisdiction. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code gives power to every civil Court to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognisance is either expressly or impliedly barred, and the explanation to that section says that a suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of civil nature. It is well recognised that copyright is property, and therefore, a suit seeking reliefs for infringement of copyright is a suit of a civil nature. If such infringement occurs, and the cause of action for a suit based on the infringement arises within the area of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court, that Court can be deemed to be a District Court as per definition in section 2(4) of the Civil Procedure Code and will have power to try the suit,”

25. This judgment also is not relevant for our purpose. That was not at all a case where it was or could have been contended that the City Civil Court at Madras was the District Court within the meaning of s. 2(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the other hand, it was contended and rightly contended that inasmuch as the City Civil Court of Madras constituted under the Act No. VII of 1892 having had a limited jurisdiction and it being not a principal Court of original jurisdiction it was the High Court which is the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction.

26. That is not at all a case where unlike the City Civil Court at Bombay which has exclusive jurisdiction under s. 12 of the Act. The City Civil Court of Madras as then constituted had exclusive jurisdiction over the matters in dispute. Therefore, the question of considering, the conflict of jurisdiction did not at all arise in that case. That authority also therefore has no application to the facts of our case.

27. Differing therefore from the learned Judge of the City Civil Court, I hold that for the purpose of executing the decree in question, it is the City Civil Court which is the District Court within the meaning of s. 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure.

28. The result, therefore is, the appeal is allowed. The order of the learned Judge of the City Civil Court dated April 6, 1976 setting aside his order dated February 17, 1976, is set aside and his order dated February 17, 1976 making the notice under O. XXI, R. 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure absolute is restored with costs in both the Courts.

29. Appeal allowed.