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Hanmanta Laxman Thorat v. Dhondavvabai Hanmanta Thorat

Bombay High Court
Sep 30, 1976
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Factual and Procedural Background

The suit concerned two survey fields (Nos. 36/1 and 145/1) in village Malkavathe, Taluka Sholapur, held to be ancestral coparcenary property of the appellant No.1's family and obtained by him in partition in 1958. The plaintiffs (respondent No.1 and her minor son respondent No.2) claimed one-third shares each in the two fields and alleged that a sale of survey No.36/1 by appellant No.1 to original defendant No.5 was effected without legal necessity and was not binding on their shares. The Civil Judge (Junior Division), Akkalkot, decreed partition, holding each of appellant No.1 and respondents Nos.1 and 2 entitled to one-third and that the sale was not binding on the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed; the Extra Assistant Judge, Sholapur, affirmed the trial court's decree. The present appeal challenges that appellate decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Courts below erred in granting a decree for partition without being satisfied that partition was necessary and for the benefit of the minor coparcener (respondent No.2).
  2. Whether children born of appellant No.1's second marriage (appellants Nos.3 and 4) are deemed legitimate under s. 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act and therefore entitled to shares equal to respondent No.2 in the coparcenary property.
  3. Whether the sale of survey No.36/1 by appellant No.1 to original defendant No.5 was effected without legal necessity and was not binding on the plaintiffs.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The Courts below erred in ordering partition without being satisfied that partition was necessary and for the benefit of the minor coparcener (respondent No.2).
  • Relying on s. 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, even if appellant No.1's second marriage is void, the children of that marriage (appellants Nos.3 and 4) are to be deemed legitimate and hence entitled to shares equal to respondent No.2.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments beyond the plaintiffs' pleaded claims described in the factual background.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court accepted the factual findings of the Courts below that the properties were ancestral coparcenary property obtained by appellant No.1 in partition in 1958 and that a joint family existed immediately prior to the suit. It noted the trial court's findings that each of appellant No.1 and respondents Nos.1 and 2 were entitled to one-third shares and that the sale of survey No.36/1 by appellant No.1 was without legal necessity and not binding on the plaintiffs. Addressing the first contention, the court observed that although plaintiff No.2 was a minor and inquiries into the minor's benefit were required, the courts' satisfaction was evident from the facts and manner of handling the case, so an express finding of benefit was not necessary. On the s.16 contention, the court held that the appellant had not shown the circumstances required for s.16 to operate in favour of appellants Nos.3 and 4; moreover, the property in dispute was coparcenary property of appellant No.1 and respondents Nos.1 and 2 (not property of the father of appellants Nos.3 and 4), so appellants' claim to shares based on s.16 was incorrect. The court therefore rejected the appellants' submissions and affirmed the findings below.

Holding and Implications

Appeal dismissed; appellate decree affirmed.

Direct consequences: the partition decree standing for one-third shares each in the suit land in favour of respondent No.1, respondent No.2 and appellant No.1 is maintained, and the sale of survey No.36/1 was held not binding on the plaintiffs. The court ordered no costs. The opinion does not state or establish any broader precedent beyond the decision in this case.

Show all summary ...

Hajarnavis, J.:— This is defendants' appeal against an appellate decree of the Extra Assistant Judge, Sholapur, dismissing their appeal against the decree passed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Akkalkot, declaring that the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and the appellant No. 1 have ⅓rd share each in the suit land and the sale effected by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 5 in respect of survey No. 36/1 was not binding on the plaintiffs.

2. The respondent No. 2-original plaintiff No. 2 is a son of respondent No. 1-original plaintiff No. 1 and the appellant No. 1 Hanmanta. It is the case of the plaintiffs that this Hanmanta married appellant No. 2-original defendant No. 2 Nagawa while the marriage between him and respondent No. 1 Dhondawabai was subsisting. The appellants Nos. 3 and 4 are the sons of appellants Nos. 1 and 2. Original defendant No. 5 was the purchaser of survey No. 36/1. It is not disputed and both the Courts below have found that survey No. 36/1 and survey No. 145/1 of village Malkavathe, Taluka Sholapur, District Sholapur were ancestral property of the appellant No. 1's family. It was also found as a fact by both the Courts below and it is not disputed in the Second Appeal that this property was obtained by the appellant No. 1 in partition with his father and brothers in 1958. It was also not disputed that just prior to the filing of the suit, the appellant No. 1 and the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 formed a joint family. It appears that the appellant No. 1 took appellant No. 2 as a wife while the marriage between appellant No. 1 and respondent No. 1 was subsisting and that led to the disputes between the appellant No. 1 and respondent No. 1. She, therefore, instituted a suit on behalf of her minor son and herself claiming ⅓rd share each in the two fields mentioned above. She has also stated in the plaint that survey No. 36/1 was sold by appellant No. 1 to respondent No. 3-original defendant No. 5 without any legal necessity and that sale was not binding on their shares. The suit was resisted by the defendants on numerous grounds which it is not necessary to enumerate.

3. The learned trial Judge, on consideration of the evidence led by the parties, held that the property was ancestral property and that the appellant No. 1 had got this property in partition with his father and brothers. The trial Judge also held that the plaintiffs and appellant No. 1 were entitled to ⅓rd share each in the property. He also held that the sale effected by the appellant No. 1 in favour of the defendant No. 5 was effected without any legal necessity and was not binding on the plaintiffs. He, therefore, decreed the plaintiffs' suit. Aggrieved by that decree, the defendants filed an appeal which was heard by the Extra Assistant Judge, Sholapur. He affirmed the finding recorded by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. It is against this judgment and decree that the present appeal has been filed by the appellants.

4. Mr. Patankar, the learned counsel for the appellants, urged that both the Courts below have committed an error in granting decree for partition without being satisfied that it was necessary in the interest of the minor coparcencer and that it was for his benefit that the partition should be effected. It is true that the plaintiff No. 2 was and is a minor and, therefore, the Courts below ought to have made enquiries into the matter. The appellant No. 1 has taken appellant No. 2 as a wife while his marriage with the respondent No. 1 was subsisting. It does appear that he was more devoted to appellant No. 2 than to the respondent No. 1 and her child. The satisfaction of the Courts was eloquent from the facts of this case and the manner in which they have dealt with this case. It was not necessary to record any finding in terms that it was for the benefit of the minor. The Courts below have, therefore, not committed any error in ordering the partition.

5. Mr. Patankar, the learned counsel for the appellants, then invited my attention to s. 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act which reads:

“Where a decree of nullity is granted in respect of any marriage under Section 11 or section 12, any child begotten or conceived before the decree is made who would have been the legitimate child of the parties to the marriage if it had been dissolved instead of having been declared null and void or annulled by a decree of nullity shall be deemed to be their legitimate child notwithstanding the decree of nullity:

Provided that nothing contained in this section shall be construed as conferring upon any child of a marriage which is declared null and void or annulled by a decree of nullity any rights in or to the property of any person other than the parents in any case where, but for the passing of this Act, such child would have been incapable of possessing or acquiring any such rights by reason of his not being the legitimate child of his parents.”

6. He submitted that even if the second marriage of the appellant is void, his children born out of that marriage will be deemed to be legitimate children as provided by the section. Therefore, appellants Nos. 3 and 4 will be entitled to shares equal to that of respondent No. 2 who is a legitimate child of appellant No. 1. It is not possible to accept this contention. He has not shown how circumstances under which the children begotten of the marriage which was null and void and which was declared to have been void and which entitled them equal share in the parents' property exist in the case. Then again in the present case, it is not the property of the father of the children, viz. appellants Nos. 3 and 4 and respondent No. 2 but it is a coparcenary property of appellant No. 1 and respondents Nos. 1 and 2. That being so, it is not correct for the appellants to say that the appellants Nos. 3 and 4 are also entitled for a share in the property. These are the only points which were urged by the learned counsel for the appellants.

7. In the result, the appeal is dismissed and the decree passed by the appellate Court is affirmed. Under the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

8. Appeal dismissed.