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Laxmibai Sadashiv Date v. Ganesh Shankar Date

Bombay High Court
Apr 8, 1976
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Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a decree for partition and separate possession of a one-fourth share of the plaintiffs in two suit lands located in Ichalkaranji Taluka of Kolhapur District. The decree was passed in favor of the plaintiffs and accepted by defendants Nos. 1 to 5, while defendants Nos. 6 to 8 supported the plaintiffs and accepted the decree. Defendants Nos. 9 to 11, representing the seniormost branch of the family, felt aggrieved and filed this appeal.

The dispute concerns a service inam property originally granted to the Date family, held impartibly and governed by primogeniture. After abolition of the service inam under the Bombay Merged Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955 ("Abolition Act of 1955"), and payment of occupancy price, the plaintiffs claimed partition rights in the lands now re-granted as Rayatawa lands. Defendants Nos. 1 to 5 claimed exclusive ownership based on payment of occupancy price and possession, while defendants Nos. 9 to 11 contended the regrant was personal to Sadashiv alone and opposed partition. The trial court declared the property to be joint family property of the Date family and decreed partition, which was accepted by some defendants but challenged by defendants Nos. 9 to 11 in this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the service inam grant, originally to the Date family but recorded in the name of the seniormost member, was a grant to the family or to an individual.
  2. Whether the abolition of the service inam under s. 4 of the Abolition Act of 1955 extinguished the ordinary rights and incidents of alienation, including the application of personal Hindu law rights like partition and survivorship.
  3. Whether the re-grant of the land under s. 7 of the Abolition Act of 1955 is to the family as a whole or solely to the individual holder recorded in government records.
  4. Whether the impartible nature and succession by primogeniture of the original inam estate survived abolition or was extinguished.
  5. Whether partition of the re-granted lands among the four branches of the Date family is permissible.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants (Defendants Nos. 9 to 11)

  • The 1928 revival or regrant of the inam was a personal grant to Sadashiv alone, not to the Date family.
  • Even if granted to the family, it was limited to Sadashiv's branch only (himself, wife, and children), excluding other brothers.
  • The provisions of s. 4 (clauses (i) and (ii)) read with s. 7 of the Abolition Act of 1955 abolished the original alienation and its incidents, and the regrant under s. 7 was to Sadashiv alone, free from prior incidents like impartibility or joint family character.
  • Accordingly, only Sadashiv's heirs are entitled to the re-granted lands, and partition claims by junior branches are misconceived.

Respondents (Plaintiffs and Other Defendants)

  • The service inam was a grant to the Date family as a whole, recorded in the name of the seniormost member (Nawawala) representing the family.
  • The inam estate was impartible and succession governed by primogeniture, with junior members having survivorship rights.
  • On abolition under s. 4 of the Abolition Act, all alienations and their incidents ceased, but the land was resumed by the State and regranted under s. 7 to the original holder, i.e., the Date family.
  • The re-granted lands became Rayatawa lands and are now joint Hindu family property governed by Mitakshara law, allowing partition among the four branches.
  • Payment of occupancy price was made on behalf of the family; hence the State is bound to regrant the lands to the family.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shiba Prasad v. Prayag Kumari [1932] A.I.R P.C 216, S.C 84 Bom. L.R 1567 Clarification of impartible estates governed by custom with succession by primogeniture and limited survivorship rights; distinction from ordinary joint family property. Used to establish that the service inam was an impartible estate granted to the family with succession governed by primogeniture and survivorship rights, not ordinary joint family property.
Krishna v. Sarvagna Krishna, 1969 3 SCC 281 Reiteration of the legal position on impartible estates and survivorship rights as per Privy Council rulings. Reinforced the finding that impartible estates retain survivorship rights under Hindu law even after partition of other family property.
Dhondi Vithoba Koli v. Mahadeo Dagdu Koli, 1972 75 Bom. L.R 290 Held that abolition of watan and its incidents does not affect ordinary personal law rights like partition; regrant maintains continuity of interest. The Court preferred this view to hold that regrant under abolition acts does not extinguish Hindu personal law rights.
Kalgonda Babgonda Patil v. Balgonda Kalgonda Patil, 1975 78 Bom. L.R 720 Division Bench held that abolition extinguished all incidents including joint family character, and regrant was a fresh grant free of prior incidents. The Court expressed disagreement with this view but acknowledged it as binding on coordinate benches, hence referred the question to a Full Bench.
Rama Rao v. Raja of Pittapur [1918] A.I.R P.C 81, S.C 20 Bom. L.R 1056 Held that certain joint family property rights are superseded by custom in impartible estates. Supported the analysis of incidents of impartible estates in the case.
Baijnath Prasad v. Tej Bali [1921] A.I.R P.C 62, S.C 23 Bom. L.R 654 Confirmed that right of survivorship remains in impartible estates despite other joint family rights being excluded. Used to establish survivorship rights in the impartible inam estate.
Sartaj Ktiari v. Deoraj Kuari, 1888 I.L.R 10 All. 272 Held that right to restrain alienations is incompatible with impartible estate custom. Supported the finding that impartible estates exclude certain joint family rights.
Sri Raja Rao Venkata Surya Mahipati Rama Krishna Rao Bahadur v. Court of Wards and Venkata Kumari Mahipati Surya Rao, 1899 L.R 26 I.A 83, S.C 1 Bom. L.R 277 Similar to Sartaj Ktiari, confirming incompatibility of restraint on alienation with impartible estate custom. Supported the characterization of incidents of the inam estate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining the historical and documentary evidence, including orders of the Chief of Ichalkaranji and legal compilations on Kolhapur Inam Law, to determine the nature of the service inam. It found that the inam was a grant to the Date family as a whole, recorded in the name of the seniormost member (Nawawala), and was an impartible estate governed by the rule of primogeniture with survivorship rights for junior members.

The Court rejected the appellants' argument that the 1928 revival was a personal grant to Sadashiv alone, holding instead that Sadashiv was a representative holder for the family. The Court analyzed the provisions of s. 4 of the Abolition Act of 1955, noting its non-obstante clause and the abolition of alienations and their incidents from the appointed day.

However, the Court distinguished between the abolition of alienation incidents and the application of personal Hindu law, reasoning that the abolition extinguished the alienation and its specific incidents (such as the obligation to render service, impartibility, and primogeniture), but did not extinguish the personal law rights of the family members after regrant.

The Court held that upon regrant under s. 7, the land becomes Rayatawa land and is governed by the normal personal law of the parties, i.e., Mitakshara Hindu law, which provides for joint family property rights including partition. It found that the regrant must be deemed to be to the Date family as the original holder.

The Court considered conflicting precedents, notably the division Bench decision in Kalgonda Babgonda Patil v. Balgonda Kalgonda Patil, which held that abolition extinguished joint family incidents and the regrant was personal. The Court disagreed with that view and preferred the reasoning in Dhondi Vithoba Koli v. Mahadeo Dagdu Koli, which upheld continuity of joint family character post regrant.

Because the Court's view conflicted with an earlier division Bench ruling, it refrained from final disposal and instead referred the question to a Full Bench for authoritative resolution.

Holding and Implications

The Court answered the reference question in the negative: the provisions of s. 4 of the Bombay Merged Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955, do not extinguish the ordinary rights and incidents in respect of such alienation under the personal law of the parties.

Implications: The Court upheld the trial court's decree declaring that the re-granted lands are joint Hindu family property of the Date family and that partition among the four branches is permissible, subject to the Collector's permission under sub-section (3) of s. 7 of the Act. If such permission is denied, joint possession by the branches is to be maintained.

Since this view conflicts with a previous division Bench decision, the matter has been referred to the Full Bench for final authoritative determination. The present decision does not create new precedent but confirms the applicability of Hindu personal law to re-granted lands post abolition.

Show all summary ...

Deshmukh, J.:— This appeal arises out of a decree passed for partition and a separate possession of ¼th share of the plaintiffs in the two suit lands situate in the Ichalkaranji Taluka of Kolhapur District. The decree as passed in favour of the plaintiffs has been accepted by defendants Nos. 1 to 5. Defendants Nos. 6 to 8 had always supported the plaintiffs and, therefore, accept the decree for partition as well as declaration of the shares of various branches. Defendants Nos. 9 to 11 who represent the seniormost branch in the family felt aggrieved by the decree for partition and have filed this appeal. This appeal raises an important question regarding the real meaning and effect of the provisions of s. 4 read with s. 7 of the Bombay Merged Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Abolition Act of 1955’).

2. In order to understand the controversy between the parties, it will be necessary to note a few facts. The dispute relates to the service inam and the property thereof which initially stood in the name of one Narhar Gangadhar Date, and after his death in the year 1919 was resumed by the Chief of Ichalkaranji who regranted it in the name of his eldest son Sadashiv. The following genealogy will give the relationship of the parties:

3. The plaintiffs' case in brief is that the service inam which stood in the name of Narhar Gangadhar was an inam to the Date family, though under the conditions of inams. The inam stood in the name of the seniormost member of the family and it had the consequence of impartible estate and succession by the rule of primogeniture. However, service could be rendered by any member of the family who was accepted by the Chief Saheb and during such period as some other member of the family was rendering service, no was entitled to receive the income of the lands, as the income was specifically marked for the services rendered. After the demise of Gangadhar, an heirship enquiry was instituted in the year 1889 and as a result thereof Narhar's name came to be entered to this service inam. After the death of Narhar in the year 1919 the proceedings of the Chief Saheb of Ichalkaranji show that he was dissatisfied with the services rendered by the existing members of the Date family. He also found that there was no able person in the family who could render service. In the circumstances, the inam was resumed and the lands were being cultivated through the State.

4. In this state of affairs, out of the four sons of Narhar as per their geneology, Sadashiv made an application dated January 5, 1928. Sadashiv brought to the notice of the Chief Saheb that the inam may be revived and services may be accepted from the Date family. Sadashiv himself was unable to render services and offered that his younger brother Balkrishna was able and competent as also willing to render services. After reviving the watan in his name the services of Balkrishna be accepted. Below such an application, Balkrishna gave in writing that he was willing to render service on behalf of his brother. Both the brothers thereafter repeat the contents of the application on oath as well as the willingness of Balkrishna to serve before the secretary of the Chief Saheb of Ichalkaranji. After these formalities were performed, the matter was placed before the Chief Saheb, who by his ordor dated January 7, 1928, exh. 104, restored the inam to Sadashiv, and Balkrishna was accepted as his life time deputy for rendering services in the private office of Chief Saheb. This arrangement continued till 1943, when the rendering of services was cancelled and it was thought not necessary to render service thereafter.

5. Balkrishna was put in possession of both the lands, one at Ichalkaranji and the other at village at for remuneration of services rendered by him. The possession of Balkrishna thereafter continued till after the passing of the Abolition Act of 1955 when the inam was abolished altogether. It appears that after the death of Balkrishna which came in 1952 both the service inam lands continued to be in possession of his heirs who are defendants Nos. 1 to 5.

6. Present plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 4 are the two sons of the second son of Narhar, Shankar and the sons of elder son Ganesh, who is plaintiff No. 1. To summarise the case of the plaintiffs briefly the original service inam was a grant in favour of the family. Ichalkaranji was a feudatory jahagiri under the Kolhapur State. According to inam laws prevalent in the Kolhapur State which in terms were applicable to the Ichalkaranji Jahagir, all such grants and inams relating to a service were grants to the family, but they were expressed in the name of the seniormost member of the seniormost branch. So long as the grant remained as a service inam, before its abolition, it carried with it all the incidences which wore normal with such inams. For instance the holder of the inam had to render services. That service can be rendered personally by him or by offering a deputy or substitute which could be accepted by the Chief Saheb. The income of the lands forming the inam or grant having been allocated for the purpose of rendering service, the person for the time being rendering service was entitled to receive the income thereof. The other incidences of such property were that it constituted impartible property and its succession was governed by the rule of primogeniture. Whatever were the incidences of such a property under Hindu law wore the incidences attached to the inam and its properties.

7. The plaintiffs, however, say that in the facts and circumstances of the case the inam no more exists and is abolished under the provisions of the Abolition Act of 1955. All the incidences attending upon the alienation constituting the inam now ceased and are extinguished. Save as expressly provided by or under the provisions of the Abolition Act of 1955 all rights legally subsisting on the said date in respect of such alienations and all other incidents of such alienations shall be deemed to have been extinguished as a result of the provisions of cls. (i) and (ii) of s. 4 of the Abolition Act of 1955. They further state that all lands have been resumed by the State but the State is obliged to regrant the lands to the holders in accordance with the provisions of s. 7 and the other sections that follow thereafter. The only condition is that the holders must pay the occupancy price as directed by sub-s. (2) of s. 7 within the prescribed period as laid down by the Rules framed under the Act. It is the case of the plaintiffs that on behalf of the family payment has been made in time but orders are already passed in respect of the re grant of one land, viz. S. No. 28/1 from Ichalkaranji, and the regrant in the case of S. No. 661/5 of village Lat is kept pending by the Revenue Authorities because of the dispute raised by the present defendants Nos. 9 to 11. Since, however, payment of occupancy price has been made on behalf of the family in time, the Government is bound to regrant the land and those S. Nos. are treated as a family land for the purpose of this litigation. On these allegations the plaintiffs say that the four branches of the Date family representing the four sons of Narhar now represented by the plaintiffs and the defendants are entitled to ¼th share each in this family property. They allege and admit that the two suit lands being impartible in their character before the passing of the Abolition Act of 1955 could not have been partitioned by the parties at all. The other partible property of the family has been initially partitioned in the year 1932 by way of partial partition and the partition in respect of the other property has been completed by the second partition of 1946. After 1946, the only immovable property of Dato family which remains to be partitioned is the inam lands which formed then the impartible estate. As the effect of the passing of the Abolition Act of 1955 and the payment of occupancy price on behalf of the family, both the lands have become now Rayatawa lands and are liable to be partitioned amongst all the branches of Date family. In the circumstances the plaintiffs claim a declaration that they have a ¼th share in the suit lands which are in the possession of Balkrishna's heirs defendants Nos. 1 to 5 and they further want a direction of the Court to effect a partition and direct defendants Nos. 1 to 5 to deliver possession of the ¼th share to the branch of the plaintiffs.

8. Defendants Nos. 6 to 8 representing the branch of the youngest son Madhav admit the claim and want a decree to be passed as desired by the plaintiffs. Defendants Nos. 1 to 5 representing the branch of the third son Balkrishna plead that in the year 1928 when the inam was revived it was a grant in favour of Balkrishna alone and both the suit lands represent the personal acquisition of Balkrishna. After the inam was abolished under the Abolition Act of 1955 both the lands now become the private property of Balkrishna's branch and defendants Nos. 1 to 5 alone are entitled to own the two lands as having paid the occupancy price thereof. Neither the plaintiffs nor the other defendants have anything to do with the suit property and the suit should be dismissed.

9. An altogether third plea is made by defendants Nos. 9 to 11 representing the branch of the oldest son Sadashiv. According to them revival of the inam in the year 1928 was in the name of Sadashiv alone and it was the personal grant to Sadashiv. While Sadashiv was the holder of the inam in this fashion, the Abolition Act of 1955 came to be passed. The alienation in favour of Sadashiv was, therefore, abolished and as a result thereof all the incidents attached to the alienation were extinguished. Sadashiv was alive in the year 1955 when the Abolition Act of 1955 was passed and died in the year 1959 only. Under the provisions of s. 7 of the Abolition Act of 1955, Sadashiv alone was entitled to the regrant of the disputed lands. The heirs of Sadashiv have applied in time prescribed under the Rules framed under the Abolition Act of 1955 and the regranting of the lands in their favour is under consideration of the Revenue Authorities of the Kolhapur District. Ordinarily the Revenue Authorities could have decided the question, but they are awaiting the result of the present litigation as also the other litigation commenced by them against defendants Nos. 1 to 5. As a result of the obligation on the State the lands will have to be regranted to Sadashiv alone and in the absence of Sadashiv on the date of the re-grant to the heirs at law of Sadashiv alone. It is in this manner that defendants Nos. 9 to 11 claim title in themselves alone. They say that after the abolition of the service inam Balkrishna and his heirs had no right to keep possession of the suit lands. Defendants Nos. 9 to 11 have filed a separate suit on title to recover possession of both the lands from defendants Nos. 1 to 5. They will obtain a decree on the strength of their independant title. So far as this suit is concerned, partition of the property which belongs to Sadashiv alone is not possible and the suit claim for partition on the footing that the property now represents to be the joint family property of Date family is misconceived and ought to be dismissed.

10. On these pleadings, the learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that the inam, as initially was in vogue in the Ichalkaranji State, a feudatory Jahagir of the Kolhapur State, was a service inam in favour of the Date family. It came down from generation to generation and the last of the holders was Sadashiv in whose name the inam was revived by the then Chief Saheb of Ichalkaranji. After considering the various orders on record and after taking into consideration the normal incidences of service inams prevalent in the Kolhapur State, the learned trial Judge found that the revival of the inam in the name of Sadashiv was a grant to the Date family as such and not an individual grant to Sadashiv. He then found that such grants of service inams constituted impartible estate with the consequential rights of succession by primogeniture. In the case of such estates, the junior members of the family who otherwise form a coparcenary have the only right of succession to the property by survivorship, if and when the appropriate occasion arises. The other incidences of joint family property, viz. partition and joint enjoyment, were not available in the case of such property. However, after the abolition of this service inam by the provisions of the Abolition Act of 1955 and the regrant envisaged by the provisions of s. 7 of the said Act the property has now become the private property of the entire Date family. He negatived the contention of Balkrishna and his branch that the grant in the year 1928 by the Chief of Ichalkaranji was an individual grant to Balkrishna alone, and the learned Judge also negatived similar contention of defendants Nos. 9 to 11. He therefore found that the regrant under s. 7 will operate for the benefit of all the members of the Date family and as such the four branches had ¼th share each. He, therefore, declared their shares accordingly. He further directed that the land be partitioned through the Collector after obtaining the requisite permission under sub-s. (3) of s. 7 of the Abolition Act of 1955. A further direction for awarding mesne profits to the plaintiffs under O. XX, r. 12(1)(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure was also added. It is this decree which, as we have stated earlier, is accepted by defendants Nos. 1 to 5 as they have not filed any appeal and is being disputed by defendants Nos. 9 to 11 who are the present appellants.

11. Shri Gadgil, learned counsel for appellants-defendants No. 9 to 11, pressed three points for our consideration in this appeal. According to him, on a proper construction of all the documentary and oral evidence on record, it should be held that the revival or regrant of inam in the year 1928 by the Chief of Ichalkaranji in the name of Sadashiv was a grant to Sadashiv alone, and not a grant to the Date family represented by Sadashiv. The second point urged by him is that even if we assume that this was a grant to the Date family, it would be to the limited family of Sadashiv, his wife and children alone and not to the larger family of Sadashiv and his brothers. The third point urged, according to him, is that assuming that the initial grant was to the Date family and the revival of that grant in the year 1928 was to the entire Date family as represented by Sadashiv, the effect of s. 4 cls. (i) and (ii) read with s. 7 of the Abolition Act of 1955 is that the original grant of the service inam was abolished. What is now being revived is a grant of Rayatawa lands to Sadashiv alone free from all incidences of earlier watan or alienations and free from all the rights then existing at the time of the appointed day under the Abolition Act of 1955. After the first of August 1955, which was the appointed day, both the lands now become private property of Sadashiv alone on a true construction of the provisions of that Act and no other member of the Date family can have any interest in these lands. It is the correctness of these submissions on behalf of the appellants which we are called upon to examine.

12. The first two submissions can be considered together. The learned trial Judge has considered the orders passed by the Chief of Ichalkaranji from time to time and has construed them in the light of the prevailing law governing the inam grants under the Kolhapur State. The earliest document on record is an order of the Chief of Ichalkaranji dated January 4, 1919. The occasion was that the last holder of this inam Narhar was dead and an heirship enquiry was to be held. The decision taken by the Chief of Ichalkaranji then was that the inam should be resumed and should not be regranted to the heirs of Narhar. While coming to this conclusion the order dated January 4, 1919, exh. 82, points out the nature of the inam and the incidents therefor. This order, exh. 82, appears to be a noting-cum-order. The opening portion of this order shows that on examination of the orders relating to the inam, it appears to be a part of Deshmukhi watan and all the while it is debited to the service account. Being a part of the Deshmukhi watan, it was not proper that it should go now in the hands of any outsider or stranger. This reference read in the context of the entire order obviously means that the service inam of the present type could not be permitted to go in the hand of a family other than the family of Dates. The order then makes a reference to the earlier noting of 1889 by the predecessor-in-title of the then Chief Saheb. That quotation of the earlier order shows that the income from service lands was reducing from time to time and it does not appear that there is an agreement to continue the watan generation after generation. It would have been, therefore, proper to cancel the watan and resume the lands. However, it was found in the year 1889 that from this income of the inam lands one post of a clerk in the private office of the Chief Saheb is being sustained and it was found necessary to have a clerk in the office. It is for these considerations that the inam was continued in the Date family after 1889.

13. Observations then made are that the service accepted under this inam was not being properly rendered but a substitute was being offered all along. It is then noted that the service rendered by the substitute is generally unsatisfactory. Taking these circumstances into account it was thought proper not to continue the inam in the name of the Date family, but it was considered proper to resume it. Directions were, therefore, issued that the lands be taken into possession and got cultivated like the other lands forming part of the Deshmukhi watan. This order should be kept in the papers relating to the earlier heirship enquiry regarding Date family. This is how the actual user of the watan came to an end in the year 1919 and this was in abeyance till the year 1928.

14. It appears that Sadashiv applied in the year 1928 by an application, exh. 103, for the revival of the watan. The first two-three sentences of this application are worth quoting in Marathi in their original.

15. The further recitals show that Sadashiv and his brothers had seen the Chief Saheb earlier and an oral assurance was given that the inam may be revived. Application exh. 103 seems to be the result of that earlier meeting with the Chief Saheb. The further recitals in the application show that the Date family was well aware of the responsible nature of the service to be rendered and therefore Sadashiv offered his younger brother Balkrishna as a life time substitute to render service and an assurance was given that since Balkrishna was going to render the service he was agreeable to keep the lands in possession of Balkrishna. Below such an application, Balkrishna notified his consent to the rendering of service throughout the life time of Sadashiv. As we have stated earlier, the statements of both the brothers were recorded on oath by the secretary of the Chief Saheb. This application, exh. 103 was dated January 5, 1928.

16. On the above application the Chief Saheb passed an order of which two copies seem to be on record. Exhibits 83 and 104 are the two certified copies of the same order. This order again reiterates the earlier noting up to the year 19.19 when the inam was resumed. It appears that during the life time of Narhar his youngest son Madhav was rendering service. However, Madhav did not pass the departmental examination as per rules and it was found that he was incapable of passing that examination thereafter. There was no able person in the family and the inam was cancelled and resumed. After a summary of the earlier noting in this manner the order says that the demised son of the Chief Saheb as also his wife all the while felt that this inam should be revived. The family of Dates was a respectable family and was associated with the house of the Chief Saheb from generation to generation. They were also loyal to the house of Ghorpades, the Chief of Ichalkaranji. The order then notes that in due course of time the economic condition of Date family is not well and it is necessary in the interests of economic condition of the family that the service inam be revived. The order then states that the work in the private Secretariate of the Chief Saheb had increased and it was necessary to have some officer of the type of A.D.C in the private establishment. For such a type a man from a respectable family having landed property is needed. Sadashiv has also applied that he is in a position to supply an able person from the family and to render such service with responsibility.

17. The order then proceeds to state that the thread ceremony of Chi. Kumar Jeshavrao Tatya was in the offing on account of the blessings of family deity Venkatesh. Considering this auspicious occasion, if new grants are not possible to create, at least old grants and inams in favour of respectable and loyal families should be continued. Taking these circumstances into account, it has been decided to continue ‘as before’ the service inam relating to this service and, therefore, a resolution is made that the income of the service inam lands should be recorded in the name of the eldest son of deceased Narhar Gangadhar, viz. Sadashiv Narhar Date. Then follows the usual endorsement that the income being service inam it should not be mortgaged or gifted away and is controlled by all the rules applicable to service inams. The peculiar term used in the case of such inams to the holder is Nawawala, viz. a person in whose name the inam has been restored. Since Balkrishna was going to render service the order notes that the service lands should be entered in the name of Balkrishna for and on behalf of the Nawawala and as he was going to render actual service they should be handed over in the possession of Balkrishna. Copies of these orders were issued to the relevant Revenue Officers of the Chief Saheb.

18. The arrangement worked throughout with a slight change in the substitute in the year 1942. Sadashiv and Balkrishna jointly applied by an application dated November 9, 1942, exh. 106, that Balkrishna wants to retire from service and offers his son Govind Balkrishna as a substitute. He may be accepted. This was done by the Chief Saheb by a separate order dated November 11, 1942 produced at exh. 107. There is some other correspondence or application for leave from rendering this service, but they are not important.

19. On the basis of the above documents consisting of the orders of the Chief of Ichalkaranji along with the references from the compilation of V.S Desai relating to the Kolhapur Inam Law, the learned trial Judge felt that this was a grant to the family and not individually either to Narhar or to Sadashiv. The grantee of the service inam was the family of Dates and this was an inam which had the same incidences which were common to other inams under the Kolhapur State. When the expression ‘Nawawala’ is used in the grant of such lands, the usual implication is that it is a grant to the family represented by the seniormost member of the seniormost branch. Such inams are usually accompanied by impartible nature of the estate and the succession being governed by the rule of primogeniture, there is no right of partition in the other members of the family nor is there a right of enjoyment of income. Junior members had a right of taking the inam by survivorship only if the Nawawala had no male issue.

20. Mr. V.S Desai in his compilation called ‘The Kolhapur Inam Laws’ published in the year 1953 has tried to put together the effect of several Vathukums issued in the Kolhapur State from time to time and summarise the effect thereof. In relation to the service inams where the record of the inam was to stand in the name of Nawawala who was the seniormost member of the seniormost branch the following information appears at pages 11 and 12 of the compilation:

“(c) Nawawala, lineal primogeniture and Succession inquiries

Partition is the normal right accompanying joint property and, when that is denied, the rule of impartibility is generally wedded to the rule of succession by lineal primogeniture unless law or custom sanctions otherwise. Inam properties in the Kolhapur State were declared to be impartible from time to time. There was no Summary settlement as such in the Kolhapur State and Sanads were not forthcoming. Major Reeves, who was the Political Agent at Kolhapur, had framed certain rules for a temporary settlement and they were sanctioned by Bombay Government Resolution No. 331, dated 23-1-1882, in the Political Department. Titles, in respect of a few Inams, had been settled even before that but the intended summary settlement was not put into operation. It, therefore, became necessary to undertake a succession inquiry whenever the holder of an Inam died, in order to ascertain the person upon whom the Inam should descend and the person so designated was called the Nawawala. He was to be the holder of the Inam and had the right to render service, if service had to be rendered.”

21. It may be noted that all the Vathukums of the Kolhapur State were not automatically applicable to the feudatory jahagir of Ichalkaranji and, therefore, from the Rules appearing in the Kolhapur State it could not be at once inferred that the service inams were under Ichalkaranji feudatory jahagir were also hereditary. However, apart from the general trend of the nature of service inams, which were being created under the Kolhapur State and under the regimes which were subordinate to Kolhapur State, there is inherent evidence in this case that the service inam in dispute was a hereditary inam in the name of Date family, though it could be resumed if service was not properly rendered. It was not an inam which could be bestowed upon some one else. The noting of 1919 as also of 1928 make it amply clear that being a part of Deshmukhi watan, which means Revenue Administration, the watan could not be transferred to a stranger to the Date family . Either therefore it was resumed or if it was to be recontinued only the Date family alone was entitled to receive it. According to the normal manner in which the inam grant could be made, the seniormost member of the seniormost branch was found out who would ordinarily be the heir apparent to deceased Narhar and the inam was revived in the year 1928 in the name of Sadashiv the eldest brother in the family.

22. From the above documents and looking to the manner in which such grants were made in those times, we are satisfied that the inam in dispute was a service inam granted to the Date family but it was always recorded in the name of the seniormost member of the seniormost branch, which was also the customary manner of recording the rights under the inam. We are thus satisfied that Narhar as the grantee of the inam represented the Date family and Sadashiv became the grantee in the year 1928, as representative of the family consisting of himself and his three brothers.

23. Shri Gadgil, learned counsel for the appellants, canvassed that his was a grant to Sadashiv alone. The application was made by Sadashiv alone and the inam was granted to him. It is difficult for us to accept this submission. Prima facie it was clear that the order was in favour of Sadashiv and the grant itself mentioned Sadashiv as the holder thereof. However, he is described as the Nawawala, which clearly shows that he was a mere representative of the family and the inam for the time being stood in his name as a representative. This obviously means that the inam property was a joint family property of the members of the Date family. When we say that the inam property became joint family property, we do not mean that it had all the incidences of the joint family property under the Mitakshara Hindu law prevalent in this part of the country. There were distinguishing features which were the incidents of such grants to the family where the seniormost member of the seniormost branch representing the family held the inam for the time being. What those incidents are and how they operate in favour of or against the junior members of the family will now be considered.

24. Since inams by custom are impartible the succession thereof is usually governed by the rule of primogeniture. In fact the impartible character of the estate is itself a matter of custom. When a family gets a grant of this type what precisely is the nature of the property that the grant represents? In our view it is the joint family property but does not have all the incidences of normal joint family property under the Mitakshara law. For the purposes of taking the income and alienating the property it is clothed with incidents of self-acquired and separate property, in that the holder for the time being is entitled to receive the income alone and is also in a position to dispose of the property without being questioned by any junior member of the family.

25. Normally the joint family property under the Mitakshara law conceives of the four incidents of the right to effect partition, the right to restrain alienation except for legal necessity, the right of maintenance of certain members and the right of survivorship. In the case of impartible property the first two incidents are inconsistent with the nature thereof. No junior member can claim partition as the property itself is impartible. A junior member also cannot restrain an alienation because the property to that extent is clothed with the individual and separate property of the holder. The third incident of maintenance is again purely a matter of custom which must be proved in relation to a particular inam property. The last right, however, of survivorship is the only right which is effectively possible. This right is not a mere spes successionis but is a real right which can be exercised when the circumstances so permit. For the purpose of exercising the right of survivorship to impartible property of an inam, that property had to be treated or has to be deemed as a joint family property. If these are the incidents of the impartible estate, which is also to a limited extent joint family property, when does this right of survivorship come to an end? It can come to an end only when an intention is proved either express or implied on behalf of the junior members of the family to renounce or surrender the right to succeed to the estate. This can take place in several ways. While partitioning the total family property including the impartible estate, if the impartible estate is put in the share of the holder and other members are compensated by other partible property, it is possible to say that by an express arrangement the right to survivorship in the impartible estate has been given up by the other members of the family. Even otherwise by a declaration the right could be surrendered or renounced, but such surrender or renouncement must be in favour of the remaining body of heirs or in favour of the head of the family which surrender operates for the benefit of all other members.

26. This legal position is firmly established by long chain of judicial pronouncements. We may refer with advantage to a judgment of the Privy Council in Shiba Prasad v. Prayag Kumari . [1932] A.I.R P.C 216, S.C 84 Bom. L.R 1567. where the following passage appears at p. 222 of the report:

“Impartiality is essentially a creature of custom. In the case of ordinary joint family property, the members of the family have: (1) the right of partition; (2) the right to restrain alienations by the head of the family except for necessity; (3) the right of maintenance; and (4) the right of survivorship. The first of these rights cannot exist in the case of an inpartible estate, though ancestral, from the very nature of the estate. The second is incompatible with the custom of impartibility as laid down in Sartaj Ktiari v. Deoraj Kuari . 1888 I.L.R 10 All. 272., and Sri Raja Rao Venkata Surya Mahipati Rama Krishna Rao Bahadur v. Court of Wards and Venkata Kumari Mahipati Surya Rao . 1899 L.R 26 I.A 83, S.C 1 Bom. L.R 277. and so also the third as held in Rama Rao v. Raja of Pittapur . [1918] A.I.R P.C 81, S.C 20 Bom. L.R 1056.. To this extent the general law of the Mitakshara has been superseded by custom, and the impartible estate, though ancestral, is clothed with the incidents of self-acquired and separate property. But the right of survivorship is not inconsistent with the custom of impartibility. This right therefore still remains, and this is what was held in Baijnath Prasad v. Tej Bali . [1921] A.I.R P.C 62, S.C 23 Bom. L.R 654.. To this extent the estate still retains its character of joint family property, and its devolution is governed by the general Mitakshara law applicable to such property. Though the other rights which a co-parcener acquires by birth in joint family property no longer exist, the birthright of the senior member to take by survivorship still remains. Nor is this right a mere spes successionis similar to that of a reversioner succeeding on the death of a Hindu widow to her husband's estate. It is a right which is capable of being renounced and surrendered. Such being their Lordships view, it follows that in order to establish that a family governed by the Mitakshara in which there is an ancestral impartible estate has ceased to be joint, it is necessary to prove an intention, express or implied, on the part of the junior members of the family to renounce their right of succession to the estate. It is not sufficient to show a separation merely in food and worship.”

27. This judgment of the Privy Council refers to several other earlier judgments where the law relating to impartible estates was reviewed from time to time. The Supreme Court of India in the case of Krishna v. Sarvagna Krishna . 1969 3 SCC 281 has reiterated the same position and has relied upon the several judgments of the Privy Council which are referred to in the earlier quoted judgment. Thus there is no difficulty in holding that wherever there is impartible property of an inam of the type mentioned above, the incidents would be the same as pointed out by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court. It may be incidentally noted that mere partition of other partible property by itself would not lead to a conclusion that right of survivorship available under the above mentioned legal position comes to an end. The right of survivorship will still remain as the family will be still treated as a joint family and the impartible estate is a joint family property for the purpose of exercise of the right of survivorship. In addition to the partition of the other property, if it could be shown that the right of survivorship itself was either surrendered or renounced, the right can come to an end as indicated earlier.

28. Reverting to the facts of the present case, we have already held that the service inam or the alienation was in favour of the Date family as such, though grant may stand in the name of Sadashiv alone in the year 1928. He was merely a Nawawala and was entitled to take the income and alienate the property as permitted by law. However, if he died intestate without leaving a male issue, the right of survivorship would be a live right exercisable by the surviving junior members of the Date family. The evidence of the record shows that in the year 1928 all the four brothers were not only alive but formed a joint Hindu family. They were joint in estate though there is some evidence to show that Balkrishna for a while was separate in residence. Mere separate residence of one of the brothers does not amount to partition or disruption of the joint family. It is admitted by all the parties to the litigation that there was a partition of the portion of the other partible property in the year 1932 and the rest of the other partible property was divided in the year 1946. The only property that remained to be divided was the suit inam lands as the property itself was impartible. The subsequent partitions in the family would not in any manner affect the right of survivorship and to the extent of the impartible property of the service inam, the joint character thereof must be deemed to have continued until the inam was itself abolished by the Abolition Act of 1955. Be it noted that at that time out of the four brothers only Sadashiv alone was alive, but each of the three brothers was survived by their sons. If the inam was not abolished succession would open for the first time in 1959 when Sadashiv died. It appears that Sadashiv died intestate and left only a widow and two daughters. He had no son. Ordinarily therefore if the succession was to be governed by the rule of primogeniture, Ganesh the seniormost son of the seniormost next brother Shankar would have succeeded to the inam. However, the inam was abolished in the year 1955 and the Abolition Act of 1955 intervened to effect legal change in the character of the property. How, the succession of this property should now be governed is the question which requires to be resolved.

29. The learned trial Judge has concluded that on the abolition of the inam and on the extinction of all the incidents of the alienation and as a result of the compulsory regrant of the property, the two survey numbers in the suit became ordinarily joint family property of the Date family. On that assumption the learned trial Judge has declared the ¼th share of each of the branches of the four sons of Narhar and has further passed a decree for partition Shri Gadgil, learned counsel for the appellants, claimed that the widow and daughters of Sadashiv alone are entitled to the property as the initial grant was to Sadashiv alone. On that footing he claimed that the heirs of Sadashiv alone will be entitled to succeed. He alternatively argued that the grant to Sadashiv could be at best a grant to the joint family of himself and the other members of his branch. In either of these ways, the widow or daughters of Sadashiv are alone entitled to the grant. We are unable to accept this argument. We have already found on the construction of the several orders on record as also from the historical background of such alienations in the southern Maharashtra region that the grant was to the Date family and Sadashiv was the Nawawala only. If this was a grant to the family after the alienation is abolished and the lands are re-granted the re-grant under s. 7 of the Abolition Act of 1955 must be deemed to be to the same holder, viz. the family of Dates.

30. The language of s. 7 of the Abolition Act of 1955 is clear enough. The opening clause of that section says that all land held under a watan is hereby resumed and shall be re-granted to the holder in accordance with the provisions that follow hereafter. The first effect of the abolition of the alienation or inam is that the land which was granted as a part of the inam or watan is resumed by Government. It reverts back to Government. The second clause says that after resumption it shall be re-granted to the holder in accordance with the provisions that follow. The provisions that follow relate to the payment of the occupancy price within the prescribed period. There is no dispute in this case that the occupancy price has been offered by some members of the family and within time. What is stated is that there has been a re-grant in favour of Balkrishna's branch so far as the S. No. 28/1 at Ichalkaranji is concerned. With respect to the other land at Lat bearing S. No. 661/5 the members of the various other branches and more particularly Sadashiv's heirs have raised a dispute before the Revenue Authorities and the Revenue case has been kept pending by the Revenue Authorities in view of the civil litigation going on between the parties. In other words the Revenue Authorities want to know what pronouncement the civil Courts will make regarding the respective rights of the members of the Date family and accordingly re-grant the land.

31. The principal question is that under s. 7 of the Abolition Act of 1955 the land has to be re-granted to the holder, who this holder is, is a question being hotly debated before us and it is this question which will decide the title of the respective members of the Date family.

32. The re-grant once made will relate back to the appointed day under the Abolition Act of 1955. The ten years period permitted under the rules to pay the occupancy price is an enabling provision for the ex-watandars to make up their mind whether they want to accept the land on payment of the occupancy price. There does not seem to be compulsion upon an ex-watandar to pay the occupancy price and accept the land. If, however, he is willing to accept the re-grant and signifies his assent therefor by offering the occupancy price, the land must be re-granted to him. Even though the Revenue record of re-grant under s. 7 is incomplete in this case, since the payment of the occupancy price has been made, it would stand to reason that the State Government will have to re-grant the lands. In whosoever's name it would be, the re-grant would be treated as the regrant to the holder and upon interpretation who that holder is, the further incidents of that property would have to be determined.

33. Since Sadashiv was alive on the appointed day it was he who was the holder and was thus entitled to a re-grant under s. 7 of the Abolition Act of 1955. If on the appointed day when the re-grant is being made and Sadashiv is not available, it may be that the Revenue officers will make the grant in the name of the heirs of Sadashiv. However, in the eyes of law it will be the re-grant to the holder and the nature of the property which is being re-granted in this manner requires close examination.

34. In the light of our discussion earlier, it may appear that Sadashiv was the holder of the property and the re-grant ought to be to Sadashiv. However, the estate in the hand of Sadashiv was ancestral joint family property. He represented the entire Date family. In that event logically re-grant to Sadashiv would also be the re-grant of the lands to Date family. This re-grant is preceded by certain legal effects. They are that on the appointed day not only all alienations are abolished but save as expressly provided by or under the Act, viz. Abolition Act of 1955 all rights legally subsisting on the said date in respect of such alienations and all other incidents of such alienations shall be deemed to have been extinguished. What precisely is the implication of these provisions of s. 4 of the Abolition Act of 1955, must now be considered.

35. On behalf of the appellants Shri Gadgil urged that the learned trial Judge was in error in thinking that though the incidents of the earlier alienation were extinguished and the alienation itself was abolished, the regrant constituted a grant of partible joint family property of the normal type under the Mitakshara Hindu law. The grant being to the family, though in the name of Sadashiv, the normal incidents of the joint Hindu family property would operate and each of the branches would obviously have ¼th share in the property. According to Shri Gadgil, this interpretation of the provision of the Abolition Act of 1955, is erroneous. He claims support from the reasoning of a division Bench judgment in Kalgonda Babgonda Patil v. Balgonda Kalgonda Patil* . 1975 78 Bom. L.R 720.. There was an earlier judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court (Malvankar, J.) in Dhondi Vithoba Koli v. Mahadeo Dagdu Koli* . 1972 75 Bom. L.R 290., which had taken a contrary view. In fact the conclusion reached by the trial Court is in accordance with the judgment of the learned single Judge in the above, quoted case. However, that judgment of the learned single Judge has been overruled by the subsequent division Bench judgment in Kalgonda Babgonda Patil v. Balgonda Kalgonda Patil*. Shri Gadgil adopts the reasoning of the division Bench judgment and urges that it lays down the correct law. On the contrary the learned counsel for the respondents argue that the view taken by the learned single Judge is a better view of the matter. There have been several re-grants of inam and watan properties in the State under the provisions of the various Alienations Abolition Acts passed from time to time. The decision of the division Bench deals with the interpretation of s. 4 of the Bombay Inferior Village Watans Abolition Act, 1958.

36. It has been a settled policy of our State to eliminate a middle man and abolish all, kinds of alienations and bring about a situation where the land will be held by the occupier, popularly known as the owner, directly from the State. For that purpose various exproprietary measures have been adopted and all grants, inams and alienations by whatever name known, accompanied by service or otherwise, have been abolished. It is also a common feature of all these legislations that wherever land forms part of the watan or inam, it was re-granted to the original holder by converting it into a Rayatawa land. We were told that large number of matters are pending in this Court arising under the various Abolition Acts of this type. The learned counsel for the respondents, therefore, urge that it would be appropriate to reconsider the judgment of the division Bench which ordinarily would bind this Court and if found fit a reference to larger Bench may be made. It is from this point of view that we shall have now to examine the arguments of either side and also to see whether the view propounded by Justice Malvankar should be accepted in preference to the view taken by the division Bench in Kalgonda Babgonda Patil v. Balgonda Kalgonda Patil*.

37. In order to appreciate the controversy it would be better to have the wording of s. 4 of the Abolition Act of 1955 before our eyes. It is as follows:

“4. Notwithstanding anything contained in any usage, settlement, grant, agreement, sanad, order, rule, notification or Vat Hukum or any decree or order of a Court or any law for the time being applicable to any alienation in the merged territories, with effect from and on the appointed date—

(i) all alienations shall be deemed to have been abolished;

(ii) save as expressly provided by or under this Act all rights legally subsisting on the said date in respect of such alienations and all other incidents of such alienations shall be deemed to have been extinguished.”

38. According to Shri Gadgil, learned counsel for the appellants, s. 4 opens with a non-obstante clause. It has a large sweep and the effect of abolition, as also the effect of extinction of the incidents of alienation as also the subsisting right is to be brought about notwithstanding anything contained in any usage, settlement, grant, agreement, sanad, order, rule, notification, or Vat Hukum or any, decree or order of a Court or any law for the time being applicable to any alienation in the merged territories, with effect from and on the appointed day. Undoubtedly, therefore, the abolition of the alienations contemplated by cl. (i) as also the extinction as contemplated by cl. (ii) are to take effect notwithstanding any of the things mentioned above. All laws, decree, notification, Vat Hukum and all customs, settlement, grant etc. are to be over-ridden and in spite of them the extinction is to be brought about. Shri Gadgil therefore argues that the provision of s. 4 of the Abolition Act of 1955 has a very large sweep and the object of the Legislature seems to be pretty clear. In cl. (i) it is provided that all alienations shall be deemed to have been abolished. A grant like the service inam now under discussion, therefore, ceases to exist and is abolished from and on the appointed day. The second clause of that section provides that all rights legally subsisting on the said date in respect of the said alienations and all other incidents of such alienations shall be deemed to have been extinguished. The effect is supposed to be total. Not only the alienation as such is to be abolished but all subsisting rights in relation to the alienations and all incidents of the alienations are also to be extinguished. The further effect which is laid down in the opening clause of s. 7 of the Abolition Act of 1955 is that all land held under a watan is hereby resumed by the State on the appointed day. According to Shri Gadgil, therefore, the effect on the appointed day is that the alienation is abolished and is non-existant, all rights and incidents attending upon the alienation are also extinguished and the land where it formed part of the watan, is resumed by the State. When re-granted it is a Rayatawa land under the terms and conditions of s. 7.

39. Having made this broad submissions Shri Gadgil argued that it would be necessary now to find out what precisely comes to an end. It is easy to understand that the alienation itself comes to an end. However, what precisely is the implication of cl. (ii) of s. 4. What are the rights which could be deemed to be subsisting and what are the incidents of alienations which are supposed to be extinguished by this Act. The effect of cl. (i) undoubtedly is that the grant or the inam itself comes to an end. There is no more grant and therefore no more service to be required. There is no land also, as it is resumed. We are conveniently stopping at this stage before considering the question of re-grant where some arguments are raised about the effect of re-grant and the attending rights that follow the re-grant. In our view the effect is the cessation of the inam which is a very natural consequence of cl. (i). Whatever rights are created or were subsisting on the appointed day in respect of such alienations are also extinguished. In addition all incidents of alienations are also extinguished. What could these rights and the incidents be? If a proper analysis is made of the rights and incidents it would be easy to understand what precisely has been extinguished by the provisions of cl. (ii) of s. 4.

40. In our view, when a service inam like the one under dispute was granted to Date family, the incidents of such an alienation were obvious. The first incident was that service was to be rendered by the grantee of the inam. It may be that under the arrangement permitted by the Chief of Ichalkaranji a substitute could be offered from the family itself. However, that was a manner of discharging the obligation of rendering service but the fact remains that rendering service was an incident of alienation. As against this rendering of service, the holder of the inam had a right to receive the income of the land. That would be the right in the holder subsisting during the continuance of the inam. However, the inam lands were non-transferable and could not be mortgaged or otherwise alienated as per the conditions applicable to the service inams. That has been expressly stated in the orders itself. These are therefore the other incidents of the alienation, viz. the incapacity to mortgage or transfer even by the holder. Then again by custom as also by the law prevalent under the feudatory jahagir of Kolhapur, property of the inam became impartible property and the succession to it was governed by the rule of primogeniture. These, therefore, were the incidents of the alienation directly flowing from it. They supplant in a sense the normal Hindu law. All these bundles of rights as also the incidents are extinguished on the appointed day as a result of the provisions of s. 4. There is no need to render service and there is no more right to receive the income. The impartible nature of the estate comes to an end and the rule of primogeniture is no more applicable. All these incidents are extinguished and when the property is re-granted it is a Rayatawa land restored to the holder by the State.

41. We may now briefly refer to the position of re-grant under s. 7 of the Abolition Act of 1955, and then consider the main argument of Shri Gadgil in this behalf. Section 7 contemplates that either on payment or without payment of occupancy price, as provided by various sub-sections thereof, the holder is to be re-granted the land where there is a land under a watan. The land which now becomes Rayatawa land is liable to pay full assessment under the provisions of the Land Revenue Code. The earlier privileges of exemption of land revenue or the levying of certain fees etc. which were the incidents of inam are not hereafter available to the holder. If the holder gets the land in this manner by re-grant, who gets it and what is the nature of this property. Prirm facie, according to us, it is the prior holder who must be restored the land. Who that holder is, is a question, which we have already answered in our earlier discussion. That holder of the inam was the family of Dates, though it was represented in Government records by Nawawala who was the seniormost member. Since the holder is thus the family, the re-grant under s. 7, though in the name of the former Nawawala, must be deemed to be a re-grant to the family of Dates.

42. The property in the re-grant is a Rayatawa land and since the Date family is a Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law as administered in the Bombay area, the property must be now treated as the joint Hindu family property with the normal incidents accompanying the Mitakshara joint family property.

43. However, Shri Gadgil says that such a conclusion is not possible in view of the express language of s. 4. He says that all rights legally subsisting and all incidents of such alienations are extinguished by the provisions of s. 4. The re-grant is to be free from all rights and all incidents of such alienation, and as such it must be treated to be a grant to Sadashiv and his branch alone without any rights in favour of the other members of the Date family. In other words, to the re-granted land the normal personal law of the party would not apply, but it must be deemed to be a grant to the individual alone as a separate property.

44. Having considered the provisions of s. 4 very closely we are unable to accept such a far reaching interpretation of those provisions. The first non-obstante clause though has a very wide sweep, it would appear from the provisions that follow that the non-obstante clause has to serve as a certain function and its sweep must be confined to the performance of that function alone. The two clauses that follow the main clause want to abolish the alienation and also want to extinguish certain incidents and rights attending upon the alienation so long as they exist. All these abolitions and extinctions are to be brought about and if there is any of the things in existence of the description contained in the non-obstante opening clause of s. 4, those are to be disregarded and the effect of abolition and extinction is to be brought about. That is the limited function of that expression. For the purpose of achieving that function, no obstruction in the way of bringing about that result is to be countenanced and notwithstanding anything that may be of the nature described in the non-obstante clause the result is deemed to have boon brought about. The non-obstante clause thus presents no difficulty in the way of the re-grant which is to follow after the effect of s. 4 is achieved.

45. We have already pointed out what are the incidents and what could be the rights legally subsisting at the time of the abolition of the alienation. If the holder of the inam could create some obligation, the counterpart in that contract would have a right to enforce the same, and that would be a subsisting right, so far as the alienation is concerned. All such existing rights are to be brought to an end. The incidence which we have also discussed above are to cease to exist and that is what is contemplated by cl. (ii) of s. 4. When once the function of s. 4 is achieved and the land is resumed, we are unable to understand how the re-grant cannot be controlled by the normal personal law of the parties to whom the property is being re-granted? There cannot be any transaction either on resumption of re-grant, which is not governed by some law. If Government is granting Rayatawa lands as if they were unalienated lands (which would be the result of resumption) the re-grant of property to a particular person must be controlled by the law of the land. If the Mitakshara joint family is getting a re-grant of the family property in the name of Sadashiv, the member representing the family, can that family property not automatically become the joint Hindu family property under the Mitakshara law which is the personal law of the parties? This has nothing to do with the abolition and extinction contemplated by the Abolition Act of 1955. That a property while subjected to alienation should have the character of being impartible with the right of succession governed by the rule of primogeniture and a limited right of survivorship in the junior members of the family are the only incidents of alienation itself. When that alienation is withdrawn and a fresh grant is made of the land alone, by what stretch of imagination could it be said that application of the personal law of the recipient of the property to the property received by him is also held in abeyance or suspended or extinguished by the provisions of s. 4 of the Abolition Act of 1955? The moment inam is abolished and all its incidents are extinguished and the land is resumed, the first part of the function of the Abolition Act of 1955 is over. The very title of Chapter II of this Act shows that it deals with abolition of alienations and conferment of occupancy rights. The moment abolition of alienation is achieved and land is resumed which partakes the character of the unalienated land, Government is free to re-grant by way of conferring occupancy rights though under the provisions of s. 7, it is an obligatory duty cast upon the State to re-grant those lands. We do not see how the re-grant could be construed in any other manner than in the light of the law of the land and the personal law of the parties on whom the property is being bestowed by the State.

46. Shri Gadgil argued that the incidents of the Mitakshara joint Hindu family are the incidents of the inam itself and this is also abolished or extinguished by the provisions of s. 4. It is very difficult for us to accept this argument. Alienations represent existing state of affairs. There were attending incidents upon the alienations and perhaps some rights created legally. All these bundles or rights in alienation are to be abolished and that is the first part of the function of Chapter II of the Abolition Act of 1955. To confirm the occupancy rights is a consequence of the abolition of alienation as per the second part of the Chapter. While the second part is being followed by the State under the legislative enactment in s. 7, we do not find any such restriction accompanying the re-grant. In other words, s. 7 speaks of re-grant simpliciter without any qualification. When no qualification as such has been added by the Legislature to the re-grant contemplated under s. 7, the re-grant must be considered under the normal law of the land and such personal law as may be applicable to the recipient of the re-grant. It is not the function of s. 4 to override the personal Hindu law applicable to the grantee when the resumed land is being re-granted on the basis of the occupancy right alone. In fact when the alienation existed, the normal Mitakshara joint Hindu family law never applied to the impartible property under grant. It is impossible to say that even the normal Mitakshara Hindu law was an incident of grant which was sought to be overriden by the provisions of s. 4. In our view on the proper analysis of s. 4 read with s. 7 which represents the complete scheme of re-grant, it is not possible to carry the provisions of s. 4 which acts exclusively in the field of abolition, to the second phase of the function of the Chapter, viz. conferment of occupancy rights.

47. If this is the actual analysis of the provisions of ss. 4 and 7 read together, it would appear that the view taken by the learned single Judge in Dhondi Vithoba's case is a view consistent with the analysis made by us above. The learned single Judge in the case of Dhondi Vithoba was dealing with the provisions of the Bombay Inferior Village Watans Abolition Act (Act 1 of 1959) and ss. 4, 5, 6 and 9 thereof. The learned Judges of the division Bench in Kalgonda Babgonda Patil v. Balgonda Kalgonda Patil* were also dealing with the same Act. Section 4 in that Act is very much similar to the provisions of s. 4 of the Abolition Act of 1955, though there is some difference in the wording thereof. They are undoubtedly comparable provisions and similar considerations are bound to govern their interpretation. According to the learned single Judge, even though the watan is abolished and its incidents are extinguished under the Act, the lands are resumed under s. 7 of the Act and the Act maintains the continuity of interest in the lands of the persons before and after the coming into force of the Act, provided the holder pays the occupancy price. That is precisely what is being done under the present Act also. We have already pointed out that whosoever was the “holder” was to be re-granted the land on payment of the occupancy price. The continuity of holding the property is undoubtedly there. The learned single Judge further points out that, what the Act does is only to effect a change in the nature of the tenure or in the nature of the holding, in that before the abolition of the watan, the land was being held by the watandars in consideration of rendering service and non-payment of assessment, but after the abolition of the watan and its incidents he holds it in consideration of the payment of occupancy price and the land revenue. This does not affect any other change in any other rights of the holders in such lands. In other words, if the watan property was the family property, may be with the limitations that follow upon the nature of the property being impartible, the property continues to be family property after the re-grant without the incident of impartibility and other consequent incidents.

48. As against this, the learned Judges of the division Bench come to the conclusion that the effect of the Abolition Act of the watan and the extinction of all the incidents is that the land is resumed by the State free from all incidents except those mentioned in sub-s. (2) of s. 4. They take the view that abolition of incidents and rights also mean the abolition of the joint family character of the property itself due to resumption and even though re-granted, it is a fresh grant, as if of un-alienated government land forgetting the history which necessitated the measure of abolition accompained by the re-grant of property. According to the learned Judges of the division Bench, the plain wording of s. 4 does not admit of any construction by which the re-grant of the land will carry with it a personal law of the parties along with the incidents of that personal law. On the facts and circumstances before the learned Judges constituting the division Bench, it appeared that the family was not joint so far as the rest of the estate is concerned when the re-grant was to be made. That position obtains here also. That fact has considerably weighed with the learned Judges in coming to the conclusion that the re-grant to the individual holder could not be in the nature of the grant to the family. We have already pointed out the actual legal position in the case of impartible estates. The facts that the rest of the family property is partitioned is no indication that the right of survivorship is also given up or surrendered by the junior members of the family. So long as this does not happen, the family continues to be joint in respect of the impartible piece of property. A partial partition of property is not unknown to Hindu law and when other partible property is partitioned leaving the impartible property alone as joint family property, this is at best a case where the family has chosen partial partition and has retained its joint character only in respect of one piece of property which was the impartible estate.

49. In our view, therefore, neither the language of s. 4 nor the fact that resumption is complete in favour of Government nor that the rest of the partible property is partitioned, can lead to the conclusion that the re-grant is a personal grant to the holder and is not a restoration of the property in the same manner in which the original grant was given.

50. We think the main point that is being missed is to construe the word ‘holder’ in s. 7 under the Abolition Act of 1955 or the expression “watanedar of the watan to which it appertained” in s. 5(1) of the Abolition Act of 1958. If the holder, as we have concluded earlier, was the family, though only one name was registered in the Government records under the law prevalent, viz. the law of impartible estates, in the same manner only one watandar has been representing the watan as the representative watandar in the watan Register. The holding, however, is on behalf of the family and the real holder is the family as such. If this is the correct meaning of the word ‘holder’ in s. 7 of the Abolition Act, 1955, as also the expression ‘Watandar of the watan to which it appertained’ in s. 5(1) of the Abolition Act of 1958, the view taken by the learned single Judge is undoubtedly preferable to the view taken by the learned Judges of the division Bench.

51. According to us, therefore, the proper view in the facts and circumstances of the present case is that the re-grant which would be in favour of Sadashiv or his heirs or even in the name of the other members of the family because of the disputes which are being raised by the members before the Revenue Officers would be a re-grant to the original ‘holder’ and that holder was none else but the Date family. We would, therefore, assume in this case that the re-grant is or is being made to the Date family and on that assumption this litigation for partition will have to be disposed of.

52. However, the view which we incline to take is directly in conflict with the view already taken by a division Bench of this Court. It is not therefore permissible for us to immediately dispose of this appeal. However, before we indicate what course we adopt, it would be proper to dispose of another objection which was raised before us on behalf of the appellants. What is stated is that the lands regranted become the Rayatawa lands and are not transferable or partible by metes and bounds without the Collector's sanction and except on payment of such amount as the State Government may by general or special order determine. This is provided by sub-s. (3) of s. 7 of the Abolition Act of 1955. This objection need not be very seriously countenanced. The re-granted lands are not made impartible property but there is a restriction on the partition thereof without the sanction of the Collector as contemplated by sub-s. (3) of s. 7 of the Abolition Act of 1955. Similar objection was raised before the learned single Judge to whose judgment we have referred to earlier and he overruled the objection by saying that the Court can pass a decree for partition of land by metes and bounds of the land subject to the previous sanction of the Collector which the parties may obtain. Similar objection was raised before the learned Judges of the division Bench also and they have taken a view similar to the learned single Judge. We also are inclined to take the same view of the matter. There is therefore agreement on this point and subject to the course we are inclined to adopt, if the decree passed by the trial Court could be confirmed, a conditional decree for partition subject to the Collector's permission can always be passed.

53. Since on the main question of the real nature of the re-grant we are inclined to take a view which is contrary to the view already taken by a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, and since we think that the view taken by the earlier division Bench requires reconsideration, we would direct that the papers of this appeal be placed before the learned Chief Justice for considering whether a reference to a larger Bench would be appropriate, so that the conflict in the views expressed by the two division Benches would be resolved?

54. The question which we formulate for the reference to the Full Bench is as follows:

When an alienation like the service inam in this case was a grant to a family in the name of senior member and the same is abolished, whether the provisions of s. 4 of the Bombay Merged Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955, extinguish the ordinary rights and incidents in respect of such alienation under the personal law of the parties?

55. If this reference could be answered in the affirmative which means that the view propounded by the earlier bench is accepted, the present suit for partition by members of the junior branches in the Date family is liable to be dismissed. If, however, the reply to the question could be in the negative, which means the view propounded by the learned single Judge as accepted by us prevails, the decree for declaration of rights and partition as awarded by the trial Court will have to be confirmed with a rider that the decree for partition be subject to the permission of the Collector. A further rider may be added that, if permission is not granted, there should be a decree for joint possession.

56. We, therefore, direct that the papers be placed before the learned Chief Justice for appropriate directions.

57. The reference was heard by Kantawala, C.J and Tulzapurkar and Kania, JJ.

58. M.V Paranjpe, with V.N Damle, for the appellants Nos. 1, 2 (A to D).

59. M.L Pendse, with N.D Hombalkar, for the respondents Nos. 1 to 4.

60. G.B Sathe, for the respondent No. 5.

61. Kantawala, C.J:— The division Bench consisting of Deshmukh and Sapre, JJ. by its judgment and order dated July 14/15, 1975 has referred the following question for determination by the Full Bench.

“When an alienation like the service inam in this case was a grant to a family in the name of senior member and the same is abolished, whether the provisions of s. 4 of the Bombay Merged Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955, extinguish the ordinary rights and incidents in respect of such alienation under the personal law of the parties?”

62. The dispute in this appeal relates to lands pertaining to service inam. Originally the grant was to one Garigadhar and after his death an heirship enquiry was started in the year 1889. As a result thereof, the name of Narhar, his son, was entered as Nawawala in respect of service inam by an order dated May 10, 1889. The genealogy of Narhar Gangadhar is as under.

63. After the death of Narhar in the year 1919 the proceedings initiated at the instance of the Chief Saheb of Ichalkaranji showed that he was dissatisfied with the services rendered by the existing members of Date family i.e Narhar's family. It was also found that there was no able person in the family who could render service. In view thereof the inam was resumed and the lands were cultivated through the State. On or about January 5, 1928, Sadashiv the eldest son of Narhar, made an application to the Chief Saheb that the inam may be revived and services may be accepted from Date family. Sadashiv himself was unable to render service and offered that his younger brother Balkrishna was able and competent as well as willing to render such service. After reviving the watan in the name of Sadashiv the services of Balkrishna were accepted. Balkrishna also gave a writing to the effect that he was willing to render service on behalf of his brother. This arrangement continued till 1943 when the rendering of services was cancelled. Thereafter it was not necessary to render such service. There were two pieces of land pertaining to this inam, one being survey No. 28/1 situate at Ichalkaranji and other being survey No. 661/5 situate at village Lat. As Balkrishna was put into possession of these lands upon revival of watan, his possession continued till the Bombay Merged Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) was passed whereby alienation was abolished altogether. Balkrishna died in the year 1952 and after his death the two inam lands continued to be in possession of his heirs who are defendants Nos. 1 to 5. The plaintiffs who are the sons and grandsons of Shan-karrao, one of the sons of Narhar, filed a suit for partition and possession of their one-fourth share in the two inam lands and for past and future mesne profits. They pointed out that orders were already passed in respect of re-grant of one of the pieces of land, namely, survey No. 28/1 from Ichalkaranji and the re-grant in the case of survey No. 661/5 of village Lat was kept pending by the Revenue Authorities as the disputes raised by defendants Nos. 9 to 11 were pending. The plaintiffs alleged that upon payment of occupancy price on behalf of the family during the time stipulated in the Act Government was bound to re-grant the land and these two survey numbers were treated as family lands. According to the plaintiffs the four branches of Date family representing the four sons of Narhar were each entitled to one-fourth share in these two survey numbers. The plaintiffs accordingly asked for a declaration of their one-fourth share in these two lands which were then in possession of Balkrishna's heirs, the defendants Nos. 1 to 5, and they sought a direction of the Court to effect a partition and for delivery of possession of their one-fourth share therein. Defendants Nos. 6 to 8 who represented the branch of Madhav, the youngest son of Narhar, admitted the claim of the plaintiffs and were agreeable to a decree being passed. Defendants Nos. 1 to 5 representing the branch of Balkrishna, the third son of Narhar contended that in the year 1928 when the inam was revived it was a grant in favour of Balkrishna alone and both the pieces of land represented the personal acquisition of Balkrishna. After the abolition of the inam under the Act both the pieces of land became the private property of Balkrishna's branch and defendants Nos. 1 to 5 were solely entitled to the said two pieces of land as they alone paid the occupancy price in respect thereof.

64. The plea of defendants Nos. 9 to 11 who represented the branch of Sadashiv, the eldest son of Narhar, was that in the year 1928 the inam was revived in the name of Sadashiv alone; that it was personal grant to Sadashiv; that while Sadashiv was the holder of the inam the Act came into force and the alienation was abolished; that Sadashiv was alive at the time when the Act came into force and that having regard to the provisions of s. 7 of the Act, Sadashiv alone was entitled to the re-grant of these two pieces of land.

65. The trial Court took the view that the inam in respect of these two pieces of land was a service inam in favour of Date family; that it came down from generation to generation and the last holder thereof was Sadashiv in whose name the inam was revived by the then Chief Saheb of Ichalkaranji. According to the trial Court the revival of the inam in the name of Sadashiv was a grant to Date family as such and not individual to Sadashiv; that such grants of service inam constituted impartible estate with consequential rights of succession by the rule of primogeniture; that in respect of such grant the junior members of the family who otherwise formed a coparcenary had only right of succession to the property by survivorship if and when an appropriate occasion arose. As a result of the regrant under s. 7 of the Act the property became the private property of the entire Date family. Thus the trial Court rejected the contentions of the members of the branches of Balkrishna as well as Sadashiv and gave a declaration that each of the four branches was entitled to a one-fourth share therein and partition should be effected by the Collector in the normal manner.

66. An appeal was preferred by the defendants Nos. 9 to 11 who are the heirs of Sadashiv. This appeal came up for hearing before the division Bench consisting of Deshmukh and Sapre, JJ. The division Bench in the referring judgment gave a clear finding that the inam in dispute was a service inam granted to Date family, but it was always recorded in the name of the seniormost member of the seniormost branch which was also the customary manner of recording the rights under the inam. The division Bench further held that Narhar was the grantee of the inam as representing Date family and Sadashiv became the grantee in the year 1928 as representative of the family consisting of himself and his three brothers. This clear finding of the division Bench has been reaffirmed at the later stage in paragraph 37 of the judgment where it is observed:

“…Prima facie, according to us, it is the prior holder who must be restored the land. Who that holder is, is a question, which we have already answered in our earlier discussion. That holder of the inam was the family of Dates, though it was represented in Government records by Nawawala who was the seniormost member. Since the holder is thus the family, the re-grant under section 7, though in the name of the former Nawawala, must be deemed to be regrant to the family of Dates.”

67. In view of the said clear finding, according to the division Bench, the legitimate conclusion to be arrived at was that the property in the re-grant was a Rayatawa land and since Date family was a Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law as administered in the Bombay area, the property must be now treated as a joint Hindu family property with the normal incidents accompanying the Mitakshara joint family property.

68. It was, however, urged by Mr. Gadgil who appeared for the appellants before the division Bench that the above conclusion was not possible in view of the express language of s. 4 of the Act. He contended that all rights legally subsisting and all incidents of alienations were extinguished by the provisions of s. 4 of the Act and that as such it must be treated to be a grant to Sadashiv and his branch alone without any rights in favour of the other members of Date family; that in other words, to the re-granted land the normal personal law of the party would not apply, but it must be deemed to be a grant to the individual alone as a separate property. Before the division Bench the judgment of Malvankar, J. in the case of Dhondi Vithoba Koli v. Mahadeo Dagdu Koli* and the judgment of the division Bench (consisting of Vaidya and Lentin, JJ.) in Kalgonda Babgonda Patil v. Balgonda Kalgonda Patil*, were cited. The view taken by Malvankar, J. was the one which supported the claim of the plaintiffs while that view was dissented from by the division Bench. When the appeal came up for hearing before Deshmukh and Sapre, JJ. they felt that the view taken by Malvankar, J. was preferable to the one taken by Vaidya and Lentin, JJ. and therefore referred the above question for determination by the Full Bench.

69. Mr. Paranjpe on behalf of the appellants (defendants Nos. 9, 10 and 11) contended that the finding of the division Bench that the service inam was granted to Date family, that Narhar as grantee of the inam represented Date family and Sadashiv became the grantee in the year 1928 as representative of the family consisting of himself and his three brothers, is not justified if regard be had to the special features of an impartible estate and he wanted to challenge the correctness of the said finding. As this finding was given by the division Bench after considering the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Shiba Prasad v. Prayag Kumari, and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Krishna v. Sarvagna Krishna, we have not permitted Mr. Paranjpe to go behind this finding as it is a considered finding of the division Bench upon appreciation of evidence and the position in law. The reference had to be made to the Full Bench because it was contended before the division Bench by Mr. Gadgil that in view of the non-obstante clause used in s. 4 of the Act all rights legally subsisting in respect of alienations like inam and all other incidents of such alienations were deemed to be extinguished. Even the incidents qua partition in respect of joint Hindu family property were also extinguished and therefore when after resumption of the inam a re-grant was made it was a re-grant only to the seniormost member of the branch, who was in possession of the land and enjoyment of the income therefrom at the time when the Act came into force. The submission of Mr. Paranjpe is that s. 4 whereby alienations and rights and incidents in respect thereof are abolished starts with the non-obstante clause to the effect “Notwithstanding anything contained in any usage, settlement, grant, agreement, sanads, order, rule, notification or Vat Hukum or any decree or order of a Court or any law for the time being applicable to any alienation in the merged territories” which is very comprehensive in its nature, and thereby not only all rights and incidents in relation to alienations of the lands are extinguished, but even the rights of the holder under the personal law like Hindu law, to ask for partition, are taken away. In support of this contention, reliance was placed by him upon the decision of the division Bench of Vaidya and Lentin, JJ., above referred to and he submitted that in view of this non-obstante clause as the right of a member of a joint Hindu family in respect of an impartible estate is taken away it is only the seniormost member of the seniormost branch who will be entitled to the re-grant and the other members of the joint family will not be entitled to claim any share by demanding a partition of the land on the footing that it is a joint family property.

70. The Act was amended with a view to abolish some of the alienations of miscellaneous character prevailing in the merged territories and to provide for matters consequential and incidental thereto. The word “alienation” in the Act meant a grant or recognition as a grant (I) of a village, portion of a village or land to any person, whether such grant be of soil with or without exemption from payment of land revenue or of assignment of the whole or a share of land revenue thereof, (II) of total or partial exemption from payment of land revenue to a person in respect of any land held by him, or (III) of cash allowance or allowance in kind to any person by whatever name called, by the ruling authority for the time before merger or by the State Government after merger. Chapter II of the Act deals with abolition of alienation and conferment of occupancy rights. Section 4 of the Act deals with abolition of alienations and rights and incidents in respect thereof. Its provisions are as under:

“4. Notwithstanding anything contained in any usage, settlement, grant, agreement, sanad, order, rule, notification or Vat Hukum or any decree or order of a Court or any law for the time being applicable to any alienation in the merged territories, with effect from and on the appointed date—

(i) all alienations shall be deemed to have been abolished;

(ii) save as expressly provided by or under this Act all rights legally subsisting on the said date in respect of such alienations and all other incidents of such alienations shall be deemed to have been extinguished.”

71. Under s. 5 all alienated lands are made liable for payment of land revenue in accordance with the provisions of the Code and the rules made thereunder and the provisions of the Code and the rules relating to unalienated lands shall apply to such lands. The provisions as regards re-grant of such lands are contained in ss. 6 and 7. We are concerned in the present case with s. 7(2) and its provisions are as under:

“7. All land held under a watan is hereby resumed and shall be regranted to the holder in accordance with the following provisions, namely:—

(2) in the case of a watan to which clause (1) does not apply, the land appertaining to the watan shall be regranted to the holder on payment of the occupancy price equal to twelve times the amount of the full assessment of such land within the prescribed period:…”

72. In the referring judgment a clear and unequivocal finding is given by the division Bench that so far as the holder prior to the abolition of the alienation was concerned, it was Date family, that Narhar was grantee of the inam as representing Date family and Sadashiv became the grantee in the year 1928 as representative of the family consisting of himself and his three brothers. The short question that was canvassed before the division Bench was that in view of the non-obstante clause in s. 4 the ordinary incident under the personal law of Hindus relating to partition of joint family property was extinguished and therefore when a re-grant was made under s. 7 it was Sadashiv alone who was entitled thereto and the other members of the family had no right to ask for a share therein by way of partition. It is undoubtedly true that s. 4 starts with a non-obstante clause, but it is a well recognised canon of construction to give effect to a non-obstante clause having regard to the object with which it is enacted in a statute. The non-obstante clause is contained at the inception of s. 4 and the sole object of s. 4 is to abolish alienations and rights and incidents in respect thereof. The right of a member of joint Hindu family to ask for partition of a joint family property cannot be regarded as a right relating to grant of land as service inam or as an incident in respect thereof. The sole object underlying s. 4 is to abolish all alienations defined in the statute and to extinguish all rights legally subsisting on the appointed date in respect of such alienations and all other incidents thereof. These provisions have nothing to do with the normal rights of a member of a Hindu family under the personal law applicable to Hindus.

73. Provisions similar to those in the Act, contained in the Bombay Inferior Village Watans Abolition Act (Act 1 of 1959) came up for consideration before Malvankar, J. in Dhondi Vithoba Koli v. Mahadeo Dagdu Koli*. He held that after the abolition of a watan, held as joint family property or held by tenants-in-common, under the Bombay Inferior Village Watan Abolition Act, 1958, the resumption and re-grant of the land to the watandar of the watan, does not take away the character of the land as joint family property or as held by tenants-in-common. He has further taken the view that even though the watan is abolished and its incidents are extinguished under the Act and the lands are resumed under s. 4 of the Act, the Act maintains the continuity of the interest in the lands of the persons before and after the coming into force of the Act, provided the holder pays occupancy price. What the Act does is only to effect a change in the nature of the tenure or in the nature of the holding, in that before the abolition of the watan the land was being held by the watandar in consideration of rendering service and non-payment of assessment, but after the abolition of the watan and its incidents he holds it in consideration of the payment of occupancy price and the land revenue. It does not effect any other change in any other rights of the holders in such lands. At page 293 after summarising the provisions of the Bombay Inferior Village Watans Abolition Act, 1958 Malvankar, J. points out:

“… It seems to me, therefore, that what s. 4, sub-ss. (1) and (2) seek to abolish and extinguish is the inferior village hereditary office together with the tenure of Watan property held, acquired or assigned under the Watan law for providing remuneration for the performance of the duty appertaining to an inferior village hereditary office and all the incidents thereto including the rights to hold office or to levy customary fees or perquisites in money or in kind, and the liability to render service. It does not affect the ordinary incidences of the property under personal law. In other words, if such property is joint family property or the property held by tenants-in-common, its incidences are not extinguished by the abolition of the Watan and extinction of its incidents.”

74. The decision of Malvankar, J. was cited before Vaidya and Lentin, JJ. while disposing of Kalgonda Babgonda Patil v. Balgonda Kalgonda Patil*. The learned Judges disagreed with the conclusion arrived at by Malvankar, J. It may be observed that before Vaidya and Lentin, JJ. Mr. Paranjpe who appeared for the appellants in that appeal made submissions totally inconsistent with the submissions made before us. Actually his submissions were in consonance with the view which has been expressed by Deshmukh and Sapre, JJ. in the referring judgment in the present case. The question that came up for consideration before Vaidya and Lentin, JJ. related to interpretation of the provisions of s. 4 of the Watans Abolition Act. The learned Judges pointed out that on a plain reading of the section along with the definition of the words “existing watan law” and “inferior village watan” contained in s. 2, they found no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that by the section the Legislature intended to extinguish all rights and incidents in Sanadi Inam lands in suit with effect from February 1, 1959 on which date the Act was brought into force in Kolhapur State by a Gazette Notification, R.D No. PKA. 1058-IX/205276-L, dated January 21, 1939, published in the Government Gazette, Part IV-B, page 160, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-s. (4) of s. 1 of the Watans Abolition Act and that the words “all incidents appertaining to the said watans shall be and are hereby extinguished” must include every kind of incident, including the so-called incident of a right to partition as claimed by the plaintiff in that case, even if such right existed. With respect, we are unable to concur with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judges. The object of s. 4 was not to affect in any manner rights created under the personal law relating to the parties and if the property belonged to joint Hindu family, then the normal rights of the members of the family to ask for partition were not in any way affected by reason of the non-obstante clause contained in s. 4. In our opinion, the view that has been taken by Malvankar, J. in Dhondi Vithoba's case is the correct view and the resumption and re-grant of the land to the watandar of the watan does not take away the character of the land as joint family property or as held by tenants-in-common.

75. Accordingly, the question referred to us is answered in the negative.

76. In paragraph 52 of the referring judgment it is made clear that if the question referred to is answered in the negative, then the decree for declaration of rights and partition as awarded by the trial Court will have to be confirmed with a rider that the decree for partition be subject to the permission of the Collector.

77. In case such permission is not granted, all the parties will be entitled to join possession each of the branches having one-fourth share in the property.

78. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs, subject to the aforesaid rider.

79. Order accordingly.