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Commissioner Of Sales Tax v. Cutchi Dasha Oswal Mahajan Graha Udyog Committee

Bombay High Court
Jan 7, 1975
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Case Summary — Reference under Section 61(1) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959

Factual and Procedural Background

The reference arises under section 61(1) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. One Cutchi Dasha Oswal Mahajan is a public charitable trust registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. The trust conducts an institution called Udyog Griha, whose affairs were managed by the respondent (a committee of the trust). The committee employed poor and destitute women of the community to prepare eatables; these eatables were sold in the market and the money realised was given to the destitute women for their maintenance. The Tribunal found that any surplus from these sales was utilised by the respondent to extend its activities so that more destitute women could be provided relief. The eatables were sold like other market articles and not at concessional rates.

Procedurally, the respondent applied on 10 October 1968 under section 52 requesting the Commissioner of Sales Tax to determine whether Gnati Mahajan was a dealer and whether the supply of goods amounted to a sale. The Deputy Commissioner concluded the activity was carried on with a view to earn profit, that the respondent had not sold eatables at subsidised rates, and that continuous profits and turnover exceeding prescribed limits rendered the respondent liable for registration as a dealer. The respondent appealed to the Sales Tax Tribunal (Appeal No. 14 of 1969). The Tribunal reversed the Deputy Commissioner's order, holding that the activity was in direct furtherance of the trust's charitable purpose and that surplus could not be treated as commercial profits; therefore the respondent was not a dealer under section 2(11). The Commissioner of Sales Tax made the present reference challenging the Tribunal's decision.

The precise question referred to the court was: “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in law in coming to the conclusion that the respondent is not a dealer within the meaning of section 2(11) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959?”

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in law in concluding that the respondent is not a dealer within the meaning of section 2(11) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's (Commissioner) Arguments — as presented by Mr. Cooper

  • The respondent got eatables prepared by poor and destitute women and sold them in the market like ordinary commercial articles.
  • That activity should be considered a business; selling like any trader indicates a business carried on with a profit-motive.
  • The fact that profits were ultimately utilised for charitable purposes is irrelevant; the nature of the activity (commercial sale with profit) is determinative for sales tax liability.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments presented in adversarial form; rather, the Tribunal's factual findings and conclusions reflecting the respondent's position are recorded.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Abdul Bakshi & Bros., [1964] 15 S.T.C. 644 (S.C.) To regard an activity as "business" there must be a course of dealings actually continued or contemplated to be continued with a profit-motive; "profit-motive" predicates an intention that pervades the series of transactions and does not require that profit in fact be earned. The court relied on this formulation to assess whether the respondent's activities exhibited a profit-motive. It concluded that the Tribunal's findings showed the activity was carried out to further the trust's charitable purpose, not as a business with a profit-motive.
State of Gujarat v. Surat Panjarapole, [1966] 23 S.T.C. 57 (Gujarat High Court) Sales incidental to the direct purpose of a charitable institution (e.g., selling animal products produced in the course of preserving animals) do not convert the institution's activities into a business carried on with a profit-motive. The court expressed respectful agreement with this principle and applied it by treating the respondent's sales as incidental transactions arising in the course of carrying out the trust's principal purpose; therefore they did not amount to carrying on a business.
V.K.S.V. Sangh Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (Division Bench of this Court) An organization carrying on a principal activity (transport of members' fish) may supply ancillary goods (ice) in the course of that activity without thereby becoming a dealer in those goods; the supply was incidental to the main activity and not a business carried on in ice. The court treated this decision as supportive: the eatables were prepared and sold in the course of carrying out the trust's main object (employment/maintenance); the sales were incidental and did not convert the trust into a dealer under section 2(11).
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Evangelical Literature Service (Madras High Court) Where the buying and selling of goods is carried out with the aim of making profit (profit intended as the primary aim of the activity), such activity constitutes a business for sales tax purposes even if the profits are ultimately used for the society's charitable objects. The court distinguished this case: there the primary aim in buying and selling books was to make profit and those sales were not carried on as a direct implementation of the society's object. In the present case, the court found the converse — sales were in direct furtherance of the trust's object and profits were incidental.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by examining the statutory definition of "dealer" in section 2(11), emphasising that to be a dealer a person must be carrying on the business of buying or selling goods in the State — and that mere buying or selling is insufficient unless it is done "as a business."

The court considered the applicant's contention (presented by Mr. Cooper) that the respondent sold eatables in the market and therefore engaged in business; Mr. Cooper argued that the use of realised profits for charitable purposes was irrelevant to the characterisation of the activity as business.

The court then turned to the Tribunal's factual findings: the trust's main object was to ameliorate living conditions of poor and destitute women of the community; the respondent employed those women to prepare eatables as part of implementing that object; sales and surplus flowed from carrying out that purpose and the surplus was reinvested to further the same charitable object. These factual findings were crucial.

Applying the legal principle from State of Andhra Pradesh v. Abdul Bakshi & Bros., the court assessed whether a "profit-motive" pervaded the respondent's series of transactions. The court interpreted profit-motive not as requiring actual profit but an intention to pursue profit as the driving purpose of the activity.

The court then considered analogous authorities. It expressed respectful agreement with the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat v. Surat Panjarapole, which held that incidental sales of products produced in the course of furthering a charitable object do not convert the institution's activities into a business carried on with a profit-motive. It also relied on the Division Bench decision in V.K.S.V. Sangh Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, where supply of ice was held incidental to the society's transport activity and did not render the society a dealer in ice.

The court distinguished the Madras High Court decision in Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Evangelical Literature Service on the ground that, in that case, factual findings established that the buying and selling activity was carried out with the aim of making profit (profit being the operative aim), whereas in the present case the selling of eatables was part of directly implementing the trust's charitable object and profit was incidental and reinvested for the same purpose.

Weighing the statutory test, the Tribunal's factual findings, and the cited precedents, the court concluded that the sales were incidental transactions arising in direct furtherance of the trust's principal purpose and did not evidence a profit-motive sufficient to characterise the respondent's activity as a business under section 2(11).

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The court answered the referred question in the affirmative — i.e., it held that the Tribunal was correct in law in concluding that the respondent is not a dealer within the meaning of section 2(11) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959.

Direct consequences:

  • The Tribunal's order setting aside the Deputy Commissioner's decision is upheld; the respondent is not required to register as a dealer on the basis of the activity described.
  • The applicant (Commissioner of Sales Tax) was ordered to pay the costs of the reference to the respondent.

Broader implications: The opinion applies established principles limiting the characterization of charitable institutions as "dealers" where sales are incidental to the direct implementation of charitable objects and where there is no underlying profit-motive pervading the activity. The court distinguished instances where buying and selling is carried on with the primary aim of making profit, even if profits are devoted to charitable ends. The opinion does not purport to announce a novel test beyond those judicially articulated principles.

Show all summary ...

M.H Kania, J.:— This is a reference under section 61(1) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”).

2. The facts giving rise to this reference are as follows: One Cutchi Dasha Oswal Mahajan is a public charitable trust registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. This trust conducts an institution known as Udyog Griha, whose affairs were managed by the respondent, which is a committee of the said trust. This committee was started mainly with the object of providing employment to the poor and distressed women of the said community, who have no source of income.

3. In order to provide maintenance to such women, the respondent employed them for preparing eatables. These articles were sold and the money realised was given to the destitute women employed by the respondent. From the judgment of the Tribunal it appears that the surplus amount out of the said realisations was utilised by the respondent for extending its activities so that more destitute women of the community could get relief. It is common ground that the eatables prepared in the Udyog Griha were sold like any other articles in the market and not necessarily at a concessional rate or at the cost price. It has been found by the Tribunal that the main object of the trust was to ameliorate the living conditions of the poor and destitute women of the said community, viz., cutchi dasha oswal caste. The respondent made an application on 10th October, 1968, under section 52 of the said Act requesting the Commissioner of Sales Tax to determine whether the Gnati Mahajan was a dealer and whether the supply of the goods by the Udyog Griha amounted to a sale. The Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax came to the conclusion that the activity of preparing eatables was with a view to earn profit and the purpose for which the profit was utilised was not relevant. He held that as the respondent had not sold the eatables at a subsidised rate but according to the trade practice and profits had been made continuously for the previous four years, the respondent was a dealer, and as the turnover of purchases and sales had exceeded the prescribed limits, the respondent was liable for registration under the said Act. The respondent filed an appeal against this decision before the Sales Tax Tribunal being Appeal No. 14 of 1969. The Tribunal took the view that as the main object of the said trust was to ameliorate the living conditions of the poor and destitute women of the community and as the said trust was registered as a charitable trust for this purpose, the activity which the trust had undertaken to do through the respondent could not be described as a commercial activity of sale. The Tribunal accepted the conclusion of the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax that there was surplus resulting from the activity of sale of the eatables and also that the eatables prepared were sold in the market like any other articles and not at any concessional rate. The Tribunal, however, held that the surplus which resulted to the respondent from these sales could not be termed as profits in the commercial sense, because that surplus was utilised to extend similar activities so that the living conditions of a larger number of poor and destitute women of the community could be ameliorated. The Tribunal further held that it was not the intention of the charitable institution to carry on the business of selling edible articles and the profits made as aforesaid were incidental. The Tribunal set aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax and held that the respondent was not liable to be registered as a dealer under the said Act. This reference has been made at the instance of the Commissioner of Sales Tax against this decision of the Tribunal. The question referred to us for our consideration is as follows:

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in law in coming to the conclusion that the respondent is not a dealer within the meaning of section 2(11) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959?”

4. The definition of the term “dealer” contained in section 2(11) of the said Act makes it clear that in order to be considered as a dealer, a person must be carrying on the business of buying or selling goods in the State. There is no dispute that in order to be considered as a dealer, the person concerned must not merely be buying or selling goods or both but doing so as a business. The submission of Mr. Cooper, the learned counsel for the applicant, is that in the present case, the respondent was getting eatables prepared by the poor and destitute women of the community and was selling them in the market like any other commercial articles. It was submitted by him that this activity must be considered to be a business and the fact that the profit realised therefrom was utilised for a charitable purpose was of no consequence. In appreciating the contention of Mr. Cooper one cannot lose sight of the fact that the findings of the Tribunal clearly show that in the case before us the charitable purpose, which was one of the main purposes of the said trust and for the carrying out of which the respondent committee was formed, was to ameliorate the living conditions of the poor and destitute women of the community. It was in the carrying out of that purpose that the respondent employed poor and destitute women of the community and got eatables prepared by them. These eatables had necessarily to be sold, and the surplus realised was again utilised for carrying out that very purpose, viz., of getting employed a larger number of destitute women of the community with a view to give them maintenance. It is, therefore, not a case where a charitable trust has undertaken an activity of a commercial nature, which is not an activity directly in furtherance of the purposes of the charitable trust, and has merely utilised the profits realised from such activity for carrying out its objects. In the case before us, it is the carrying out of one of the main objects or purposes of the trust which has resulted in the profits being made and these profits have again been utilised in the furtherance of that purpose. In this connection, it may be useful to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Abdul Bakshi & Bros. [1964] 15 S.T.C 644 S.C. The observations of the Supreme Court in this decision show that to regard an activity as business there must be a course of dealings, either actually continued or contemplated to be continued with a profit-motive, and not for sport or pleasure. By the use of the expression “profit-motive”, their Lordships have clarified, it was not intended that profit must in fact be earned. It predicates a motive which pervades the whole series of transactions effected by the person in the course of his activity.

5. In State of Gujarat v. Surat Panjarapole [1966] 23 S.T.C 57., a similar question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court. The assessee, the Surat Panjarapole, was a public charitable institution founded with the object of keeping and preserving the lives of stray dogs, stray cattle and other stray animals. The assessee had agricultural lands which it cultivated personally through its servants and sold the cotton grown on those lands. The assessee also sold the carcasses of animals dying in the institution, milk from the pedigree cattle and the dung for use as fertilizer. It was held by the Division Bench that the assessee was actuated entirely by a charitable or religious or philanthropic motive and it did not carry on any business activity with any profit.-motive; and merely because incidental sales were done of the animal products, it could not be considered as carrying on the business of selling those goods. Hence it was not a dealer within the meaning of section 2(11) of the said Act. It has been pointed out by the Division Bench that it was in the course of carrying out of the purpose of the institution that such animals were kept and, incidentally, the institution sold the animal products like milk, carcasses of dead bodies and the cow-dung. This activity can never amount to a business activity carried on with a profit-motive which would change the essential character of the philanthropic activity or charitable activity of the institution so as to convert it into a business activity.

6. In our view, the aforesaid principle laid down by the Gujarat High Court, with which we are in respectful agreement, is directly applicable to the case before us. As we have already pointed out, the profits have resulted to the respondent in the course of carrying out an activity in direct furtherance of the main purpose of the trust. In these circumstances, the sale transactions, which resulted in these profits, must reasonably be regarded as incidental transactions and these transactions would not convert the activity of getting the eatables prepared and sold into a business activity.

7. Reference may also be made, in this connection, to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in V.K.S.V Sangh Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra. The question in that case was whether the applicant, a society registered under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, could be considered to be a dealer within the definition of the said term under, section 2(11) of the said Act. The object of the applicant-society was to transport fish belonging to the members of the society from fishing centres to the market and vice versa. For the purpose of transporting fish, the society had to maintain a fleet of transport vehicles and, for preserving the fish in the course of transport, the society used to purchase ice, and the members, whose fish was transported, were charged for the quantity of ice required in respect of their baskets of fish. For the year 1959-60 the purchase of ice by the society was of the value of Rs. 20,534, while the society received from its members a sum of Rs. 32,819 for the supply of ice. It was, inter alia, held that the business of the applicant-society was to transport fish belonging to its members and it supplied ice only for the purpose and in the course of carrying on that business. It could not be said that the society supplied ice to its members with the intention of carrying on business in ice and, therefore, the society was not a dealer within the definition of that term in section 2(11) of the said Act in regard to the supply of ice by it to its members. In the case before us also, we are of the view that the eatables were got prepared and sold by the respondent not with the intention of carrying on business in the preparation and sale of these eatables, but in the carrying out of the main object of the trust, viz., to give employment to the destitute women of the community for whose benefit the trust was founded and, hence, the respondent cannot be regarded as a dealer within the meaning of the said term in section 2(11) of the said Act in connection with this activity.

8. Strong reliance was placed by Mr. Cooper on the decision of the Madras High Court in Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Evangelical Literature Service. The assessee in that case, the Evangelical Literature Service, purchased Bibles and other Christian literature at a discount and sold them at the price marked in the books, thereby making a profit which was utilised for the propagation of the objects of the assessee and dissemination of Christian literature. It was held that the aim of the assessee-society in buying and selling the books was to make a profit and that alone was material for the purpose of assessment to sales tax and it ought not to be confused with the ultimate object of the society which was to propagate Christian literature and the assessee was, therefore, liable to sales tax. In our view, this decision must be distinguished from the case before us. In that case, the ultimate object of the assessee was to propagate Christian literature. The findings of fact, however, clearly show that the aim of the assessee in buying and selling the books in question was to make a profit and that these profits were ultimately to be utilised in the furtherance of the aforesaid object of the assessee. The findings, therefore, indicate that the intention in carrying out the activity in question in that case was the making of the profits and the argument urged was that as these profits were intended to be utilised towards the ultimate charitable or religious object of the assessee-society, the assessee should not be considered to be a dealer. It must be noticed that, in that case, the books were purchased and sold by the assessee like any commercial book-seller and it was not the case of the assessee that these purchases and sales were made in the course of the direct implementation of the object of the assessee-society, as in the case before us. This case, therefore, is altogether different from the case before us.

9. In the result, the question referred to us for our consideration must be answered in the affirmative. The applicant must pay to the respondent the costs of this reference.

10. Reference answered, in the affirmative.