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Keshao Govind Begde v. The State Of Maharashtra And Ors.

Bombay High Court
Aug 5, 1975
Judgment
Subsequent
References
CaseIQ
Case Information
CITATION CODES
citation codes
ACTS

Section 10 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings ) Act . 1961 (hereinafter called the ceiling Act)

Section 10 of the Ceiling Act. Section 10 of the Ceiling Act

provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 10 and Section 15)

subsection (1) of Section 16 , and sub-section (1)

provisions of Section 10 of the Ceiling Act.

Section 8 and 10 of the Ceiling Act. Notices

Section 14 and 17 of the Ceiling Act,

provisions of sub-section (1), persons

Section 10 of the Ceiling Act.

Section 17 of the Ceiling Act

Section 13 of the Ceiling Act,

Section 16 of the Ceiling Act

TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT

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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, a landlord residing at village Chimur, filed a return on September 12, 1962 under Section 10 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (the Ceiling Act), stating possession of 110.02 acres. The Collector referred the return to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Warora, who registered Revenue Case No. 32/60-A(3)/63-64, issued notices under Section 17, and after enquiry on April 4, 1965 held that the petitioner possessed 437.01 acres.

The petitioner appealed to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, which on June 28, 1966 set aside the Sub-Divisional Officer’s order and remanded the matter for further enquiry, granting the petitioner an opportunity to lead further evidence. Following the remand, a fresh enquiry (based on the earlier Section 17 notice) resulted in a Sub-Divisional Officer order on March 31, 1970 holding the petitioner in possession of 337.81 acres and declaring 229.81 acres surplus after allowing retention of 108 acres permissible under the Act.

Transactions (sales) made by the petitioner in favour of respondents 2 to 38 between December 28, 1959 and December 22, 1961 were challenged under Sections 8 and 10 of the Ceiling Act; notices were issued to those transferees who appeared and gave statements. The Tribunal heard the appeals (including those of some alienees) together and, by its common order dated February 1, 1972, partially allowed the petitioner’s appeal by excluding 24.24 acres from the petitioner’s holding. The Tribunal determined the petitioner’s holding to be 312.57 acres and the surplus to be 204.57 acres, directing that the surplus be taken by the State by taking 110.02 acres from what the petitioner actually possessed and 94.53 acres from transferees’ possession. The present writ petition challenges the Tribunal’s order of February 1, 1972.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether transfers and partitions made by the petitioner between August 4, 1959 and January 26, 1962 are to be treated under Section 10 of the Ceiling Act as made in anticipation of or in order to avoid or defeat the objects of the Act, and therefore included in calculating the petitioner’s holding unless the contrary is proved.
  2. Whether the petitioner discharged the burden of proof to rebut the statutory presumption under Section 10, such that the transfers should be excluded from his holding.
  3. Whether lack of knowledge of the legislative process (including that the Bill was introduced later on January 3, 1961) can rebut the statutory presumption created by Section 10.
  4. Whether circumstances relied upon by the petitioner (age, incapacity to cultivate, indebtedness, marriage expenses) suffice to show transfers were not made to avoid or defeat the Act.
  5. Whether failure by the Collector to issue a show-cause notice under Section 13(2) (penalty provision) vitiates subsequent enquiry and proceedings under Sections 14 and 17.
  6. Whether, for delimiting surplus land, the lands already transferred to third parties (and taken into account for calculating holding under Section 10) can be first taken to make up the surplus instead of taking land actually in the petitioner’s possession—having regard to Section 16(1) and (2).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Masodkar)

  • Section 10 creates only a statutory presumption; if the holder adduces evidence showing transfers were not made to avoid or defeat the Act, the transfers must be excluded from the holder’s calculated ceiling.
  • The petitioner had no knowledge that legislation was in prospect (the Bill was introduced earlier in 1959 in Bombay and later in Maharashtra on January 3, 1961), so the transfers could not be said to be in anticipation of the Act.
  • The petitioner was over 70, separated from his son, unable to cultivate lands properly, held lands in different villages and therefore sold off lands not on motorable roads—sales were made out of necessity (including indebtedness and marriage expenses for two daughters).
  • The Collector should have issued a show-cause notice under Section 13(2) when an allegedly false return was submitted; absence of such notice vitiates the proceedings that followed.
  • On delimitation, since transferred lands have been taken into account for calculating holding, those transferred lands should be the first source to meet the surplus; the petitioner should not lose the 110.02 acres actually in his cultivation and should be allowed to retain 120.02 acres (submission to limit taking from transferees first).

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court’s analysis proceeds by addressing each principal contention in light of the statutory scheme of the Ceiling Act and the factual findings of the lower authorities:

  1. Application of Section 10 and burden of proof:

    The court accepts the statutory presumption of Section 10 that transfers/partitions made between August 4, 1959 and the appointed day (January 26, 1962) are deemed, unless the contrary is proved, to have been made in anticipation of or in order to avoid or defeat the objects of the Act. The effect is that transferred land in that period is to be taken into account when calculating the ceiling area of the transferor. The court emphasizes that although the presumption is rebuttable, the burden lies on the holder to prove the contrary and that whether he has done so is a question of fact.

  2. Deference to factual findings of lower authorities:

    The Sub-Divisional Officer and the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal separately considered oral and documentary evidence, issued notices to transferees, recorded statements and examined each transfer in detail. Both authorities found that the petitioner failed to establish that transfers were not made to avoid or defeat the Act; the transfers were therefore held void under Section 10 for the purpose of calculating the holding. The court treats these findings of fact as binding in the writ petition and finds them justified on the record.

  3. Knowledge of proposed legislation not material:

    The court rejects the submission that absence of knowledge of the Bill or legislative process negates the statutory presumption. It observes Section 10’s temporal trigger is August 4, 1959 (when the first Bill was moved in the bilingual Bombay State) and that the statutory presumption makes knowledge immaterial. The court further notes that Chandrapur district was part of Maharashtra as of August 4, 1959 and thus the contention that transfers occurred in ignorance of the Act must fail.

  4. Necessity, age, indebtedness and marriage expenses:

    The court treats these as factual contentions which were examined by the Tribunal. The Tribunal rejected claims of indebtedness for lack of satisfactory evidence and rejected the marriage-expenses justification because the marriages occurred between 1963 and 1965 whereas the transfers took place between August 12, 1959 and December 22, 1960. Given the Tribunal’s detailed examination and negative findings on these factual defenses, the court upholds the conclusion that the petitioner did not rebut Section 10’s presumption.

  5. Procedural contention under Section 13:

    The petitioner argued that because he filed a return suggesting possession of 110.02 acres, the Collector should first have issued a notice under Section 13(2) (penalty provision) before proceeding. The court rejects this argument, explaining that Section 13 deals only with penalties and that the absence of a Section 13(2) notice does not vitiate enquiries under Sections 14 and 17. The Collector’s powers under Section 14 are wide and permit enquiry into the correctness of a return; the Collector may refer the matter for enquiry without first issuing a penalty show-cause notice. The court also notes that the Tribunal had earlier remanded the matter and that after remand the Sub-Divisional Officer and Tribunal again considered the question in detail.

  6. Delimitation and Section 16:

    The petitioner urged that once transferred lands are included in his holding for calculation purposes, those transferred lands should be the source first used to meet the determined surplus so that the petitioner would not lose the 110.02 acres in his actual possession. The court analyzes Section 16(1) and (2): Section 16(2) allows a landholder to select lands to retain up to the ceiling area, but that selection is subject to Section 16(1), which obliges a landholder to retain encumbered land (up to the ceiling area) if the land is subject to an encumbrance. The court reasons that where alienations have already occurred, it is difficult to permit the petitioner to insist that transferred lands be used first to meet the surplus; moreover, if transferred lands were taken to meet the surplus, transferees would be entitled to recover purchase money from the petitioner and the property would effectively be encumbered under the Transfer of Property Act. The court considers such a result inequitable and not acceptable in a writ petition under Article 227.

  7. Conclusion of analysis:

    Because each of the petitioner’s points either fails on statutory grounds or has been negatived by detailed factual findings of the lower authorities, the court concludes that the transfers must be included in calculating the petitioner’s holding and that the Tribunal’s order on delimitation of surplus land is correct.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is dismissed and the rule is discharged. The Tribunal’s order (determining the petitioner’s holding and delimiting surplus land) is maintained. There will be no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • The court affirms that transfers/partitions made between August 4, 1959 and January 26, 1962 are presumptively in anticipation of or to avoid the Ceiling Act under Section 10 and, unless rebutted by satisfactory evidence, must be taken into account in calculating ceiling holdings.
  • The decision upholds the factual findings of the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal that the petitioner failed to rebut the statutory presumption; those findings are treated as binding in the writ petition.
  • The court rules that a failure to issue a penalty notice under Section 13(2) does not vitiate enquiry powers under Sections 14 and 17 and does not invalidate subsequent proceedings into the correctness of a return.
  • The tribunal’s method of delimiting surplus (taking 110.02 acres from lands actually in the petitioner’s possession and the remainder from transferees’ possession) is upheld in view of Section 16 and equitable considerations; the petitioner’s plea to first apply transferred lands to the surplus is rejected.
  • No broader new precedent or departure from statutory interpretation is announced beyond upholding the statutory scheme and the factual conclusions reached by the lower authorities; the immediate effect is that the petitioner’s challenge to the Tribunal’s order fails and the surplus determination stands.

Disposition: Petition dismissed.

Show all summary ...

1. The petitioner is a landlord residing at village Chimur. He filed a return on September 12, 1962. under Section 10 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings ) Act . 1961 (hereinafter called the ceiling Act) That return was sent by the Collector to the Sub-Divisional Officer. Warora, for an enquiry according to the provisions of the ceiling act. The Sub-Divisional Officer registered the case as Revenue Case No. 32/60-A (3) /63-64 . In the return the petitioner had mentioned that he was in possession of lands to the extent of 110.02 acres. The Sub-Divisional Officer issued a notice under Section 17 , made an enquiry and passed an order on April 4, 1965. whereby he held that the petitioner was holding lands to the extent of 437.01 acres. Against that order the petitioner filed an appeal before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The tribunal by its order dated June 28, 1986 set aside the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer and remanded the case for further enquiry. The Tribunal also by its order granted an opportunity to the petitioner to lead further evidence. After the remands, a fresh enquiry was made on the basis of the earlier notice under Section 17. The Sub-Divisional Officer then passed an order on March 31,1970 whereby he held that the petitioner was in possession of 337.81 acres of land. By allowing the petitioner to retain 108 acres permissible under the Ceiling Act, the Sub-Divisional Officer declared that 229.81 acres of land was surplus. It may be stated that in this enquiry before the Sub-Divisional Officer, a number of transactions made by the petitioners in favour of the present respondents 2 to 38 were being challenged as being contrary to Section 8 and 10 of the Ceiling Act. Notices had been issued to these respondents and they had appeared before the Sub-Divisional Officer dated March. 31, 1970 was challenged by the petitioner by filing an appeal before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. Some of the alienees of the petitioner also filed appeals. All these appeals were heard together and a common order was passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on February 1, 1972. The Tribunal partially allowed the appeal filed by the petitioner and excluded an area of 24.24 acres from the holding of the petitioner's holding was 312.57 acres and directed that the surplus land of the petitioner was 204.57 acres. It further directed that this surplus of 204,57 acres should be given to the State by taking 110.02 acres which was in the actual possession of the petitioner and 94.53 acres to be taken from the possession of the transferees of the petitioner. The present petition has been filed to challenge this order of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal.

2. The petitioner has made a number of sale transactions in favour of respondents 2 to 38. All these transactions are between the period. December 28, 1959 to December 22, 1961. They are admittedly made after August 4, 1959. These transactions are prima facie hit by Section 10 of the Ceiling Act. Section 10 of the Ceiling Act provides thus:

"10(1) if-

(a) any person after the 4th day of August 1959 but before the appointed day, transfers or petitions any land in anticipation of, or in order to avoid or defeat, the object of this Act or

(b) X X X X X then, in calculating the ceiling area which that person is entitled to hold, the area so transferred or partitioned shall be taken into consideration, and land exceeding the ceiling area to calculated shall be deemed to be in excess of the ceiling area for that holding - notwithstanding that the land remaining with him may not in fact be in excess of the ceiling area"

Explanation -- For the purposes of clause (a) transfer and partition have the same meaning as in Section 8.

All transfers and partitions made after the 4th Day of August 1959 but before the appointed day, shall be deemed (unless the contrary is proved) to have been made in anticipation of or in order to avoid or defeat the objects of this Act".

The appointed day is defined as the day on which the Act comes into force. This date is January 26, 1962. The effect of Section 10 , therefore is that the transfers or partitions between August 4, 1959 and January 26, 1962 are deemed to have been made in anticipation of or in order to avoid or defeat the objects of the Ceiling Act, unless the contrary is proved. Section 10 also further lays down the consequence in respect of transfers in calculating the ceiling area which the person is entitled to hold. The area so transferred or partitioned under transfers between August 4, 1959 and January 26, 1962 shall be taken into consideration and the holding of the person concerned would be calculated as if the land under the concerned transfers belonged to him. As stated above, all these transfers in favour of respondents 2 to 38 are between the period December 28, 1959 to December 22, 1961. They are therefore, clearly governed by Section 10 of the Ceiling Act. The land so transferred will, therefore have to be included in the holding of the petitioner and all these transfers will be deemed to be made in anticipation of or to avoid or defeat the provisions of the ceiling act unless the petitioner establishes it to the contrary. The authorities below have given notices to the concerned transferees. The transferees appeared and their statement are recorded. The evidence-- oral as well as documentary-- was led in this behalf and after the entire evidence was considered, it was found that these transfers made by the petitioner were contrary to the provisions of section 10, It was found that the petitioner had failed to establish that those transfers were not in anticipation of or to avoid or defeat the provisions of the ceiling act. It was ultimately held that those lands will have to be taken into account for calculating the ceiling area of the petitioner. On the footing the Tribunal has now found that the total land with the petitioner was 312.57 acres, though in the return the petitioner has disclosed 110.02 acres. On this footing the Tribunal has made a further consequential order with regard to the area to be determined as surplus land.

3. Mr. Masodkar, the learned advocate for the petitioner, has strenuously argued that under Section 10, there is only a presumption that the lands transferred are for the purposes of avoiding or defeating the provisions of the ceiling act. He submits that if the holder establishes that the transfers were not made to avoid or defeat the provisions of the ceiling act, or that they were not in anticipation of the Ceiling Act, then even if the transfers are between August 4, 1959 and January 26,1962 those transfers will have to be excluded from the holdings of the petitioner . It is true that Section 10 only raises a statutory presumption. It may be possible in given cases to lead evidence to show that those transfers were not in anticipation of or to avoid or defeat the provisions of the ceiling act. But it is clear that the burden to establish it clearly lies on the holder and it is for the holder to establish it to the contrary. Whether the holder has satisfactorily established or not is a question of fact. In the present case, both the authorities have considered the evidence in respect of each transfer. Notices were issued to the transferees and the transferees also gave their statements. The transferees were also vitally interested and were protecting their rights and both the petitioner and the transferees led evidence oral as well as documentary. That entire evidence was considered and both the Courts found that these transfers were void under Section 10 of the Ceiling Act. The findings are that the petitioner failed to establish that these transfers were not in anticipation of or to avoid or to defeat the provisions of the Act. Such a finding is a pure finding of fact and will be binding on me in this writ petition. In fact it appears to me that on merits each transfer has been separately dealt with by the lower authorities in great details and the entire evidence connected with each transfer has been minutely taken care of. These findings, therefore, have to be accepted. Accordingly, it will follow that in calculating the holding of the petitioner, the lands so transferred will have to be taken into account.

4. Mr. Masodkar argued that there was no intention on the part of the petitioner to defeat or avoid the provisions of the Act and it could not be said that the transfers were made in anticipation of the Act because the petitioner did not know that the Bill was moved and the Legislation in that behalf was in the offing. It must be stated that the first Bill in this behalf was moved in the Bi-lingual State of Bombay on August 4, 1959 . Nothing substantial followed till May 1, 1960 , when the present State of Maharashtra was formed. On January 3, 1961 a second Bill which now forms the Act was introduced. Mr. Masodkar submits that the transfers have been made before January 3, 1961 and no knowledge could be imputed to the petitioner to defeat the provisions of the Act. It is not possible to accept this submission of Mr. Masodkar. In fact, it appears from the provisions of Section 10 of the Ceiling Act., that the question of knowledge in this behalf is immaterial. The statutory requirement is that al transfers between August 4, 1959 and January 26, 1962 are statutorily presumed to be made in anticipation of the Act, or with a view to avoid or defeat the provisions of the Act. The situation cannot change merely because the Bill was introduced on January 3, 1961 , in the Legislature of the State of Maharashtra. It has to be noted that the Bill was first introduced on August 4,1959 and that has been the relevant date with reference to which the provisions have been made in the Ceiling Act. Want of knowledge on the part of the petitioner cannot possibly alter the situation in the face of the statutory presumption created under Section 10 of the Ceiling Act. It has also to be noted that this matter comes from Chandrapur district and Chandrapur district was a part of Maharashtra State even on August 4, 1959. The contention of Mr. Masodkar that the transfers were made in ignorance of the provisions of the Act must, therefore, be rejected.

5. Mr. Masodkar then argued that the petitioner was over 70 years of age. He was separate from his son and he was not in position to cultivate the lands properly. The petitioner holds lands at different villages and as he was not in a position to cultivate the lands, he keep with him the lands which were on the motarable road and sold off the remaining lands. It was also argued by Mr. Masodkar that the petitioner was indebted and there were passing demands from the creditors. The petitioner had also to make expenses for the marriage of his two daughters. On account of these circumstances the petitioner was required to sell the lands. It is , therefore, submitted by Mr. Masodkar that the existence of these circumstances will clearly show that there was no intention to defeat or avoid the provisions of the Act. It is not possible for me to accept this submission of Mr. Masodkar. The case made out by the petitioner in this behalf about the reasons which required the petitioner to make the transfers has been considered in great details by both the authorities. Whether such circumstances existed or not, or whether on account of such circumstances the transfers were justified or not, is a question of act. The Tribunal has found that the petitioner did not lead satisfactory evidence about the fact of his indebtedness. The claim that the lands were required to be transferred for the marriage expenses was also rejected as the two marriages were celebrated between the years 1963 to 1965 , whereas the transfers in question between August 12, 1959 to December 22, 1960. The Tribunal, therefore, felt that the sales could not be justified on account of the marriage expenses. The petitioner also has failed to give details about his indebtedness. It was not also shown as to how much income the petitioner appears to be highly interested evidence as one witness examined was the son-in-law of the petitioner. The petitioner had transferred about 300 acres of land for nearly 20,000 rupees within a span of about five months. Therefore, after a consideration of the entire circumstances, the Tribunal found that the petitioner was not in a position to take of his case out of the provisions of Section 10 of the Ceiling Act. As I find that this is essentially a question of fact and all the circumstances in that behalf have been taken into consideration, the contention of Mr. Masodkar that the transfers were required to be made on account of necessity has to be rejected. The entire evidence shows that the findings made by the authorities are correct. The result is that the lands transferred by the petitioner will have to be taken into account. for calculating his holdings.

6. Mr. Masodkar then argued that proper procedure has not been followed in the present case. His submission was that the petitioner in his return under Section 12 of the ceiling Act, had disclosed that 110.02 acres of land was with him. According to Mr. Masodkar, after the return was filed, straightway a notice under Section 17 of the Ceiling Act was issued by the Collector. Mr. Masodkar contends that it was not open for the authorities to find out whether the petitioner was in possession of lands in excess of 110.02 acres. Mr. . Masodkar advanced this argument by drawing my attention to Section 13 of the Ceiling Act, the material part of which is to this effect:

"13 (1) Where a person required by Section 13 to furnish a return-

(a) fails without reasonable cause so to do , within the time specified in that section , or

(b) furnishes a return which he knows, or has reason to believe, to be false, he shall be liable to pay a penalty which may extend in the former case to one hundred rupees, and in the latter case of five hundred rupees.

(2) Where the Collector has reason to believe that a person, required by Section 12 to furnish a return has, without reasonable cause, failed so to do, or has submitted a return which he knows or has reason to believe to be false, the Collector shall issue a notice calling upon such person to show cause within fifteen days of the service thereof, why the penalty provided by sub-section (1) should not be imposed upon him......"

Relying on Section 13 (1), Mr. Masodkar argues that when the petitioner submitted his return, the Collector did not communicate to the petitioner that he had failed to furnish a correct return. A notice should have been given to the petitioner under Section13(2) and, as such a notice was not given , the further proceedings are vitiated. It is not possible for me to accept this submission of Mr. Masodkar. Where a person fails to furnish a return or files a return which is false, the Collector can under Section 13 (2) issue and notice and call upon the concerned party to show cause why penalty should not be imposed. Section 13 deals only with regard to the powers to impose penalty and it does not follow that merely because notice under Section 13(2) has not been given, the procedure followed by the Collector is vitiated. In fact, under Section 14 and 17 of the Ceiling act, an enquiry and notice are provided. Under Section 14 the Collector is empowered to make enquiries on the basis of a return and on such records as he may deem necessary to refer it for the purposes of that enquiry. The powers, under Section 14 of the Collector are wide enough and the Collector are wide enough and the Collector can ascertain whether the return is correct or not. It is not obligatory for the Collector to issue a notice as the powers under Section 14 and 17 of the Ceiling act authorise the Collector to dispute the correctness of the return filed by the petitioner. Therefore, the submission of Mr. Masodkar in this behalf must fail. It has also to be stated that this matter, had first gone to the Tribunal and the Tribunal had remanded the matter. After the remand the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Tribunal have again considered the question of the holding of the petitioner in great details and their findings as I have already discussed, appear to be clearly justified . In view of this position, it is difficult for me to entertain such an argument in this writ petition. In fact such an argument was not made even before the Tribunal. This contention must therefore, fail.

7. Then Mr. Masodkar made a grievance about the order delimiting the surplus. It is his submission that if 204.57 acres is the determined surplus. It was not necessary to take 110.02 acres from the petitioner which are in his actual cultivation. Mr. Masodkar submits that this surplus 204.57 acres to land can be taken from the lands which the petitioner had transferred to the various transferees, Mr. Masodkar submits that as these lands have already been taken into account for calculating the holding of the petitioner, they should also be taken into account while delimiting the surplus and the petitioner should be allowed to retain 120.02 acres. It is not possible for me to accept this submission of Mr. Masodkar, Section 16 of the Ceiling Act provides:

"16 (1) Where a person holds land in excess of the Ceiling area, and the whole or part of such land is subject to an encumbrance, then (subject to the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 10 and Section 15) he shall retain such encumbered land (whether he is the owner or tenant thereof) upto the extent of the ceiling area.

(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1), persons shall be entitled to select the lands he wishes to retain with himself, upto the ceiling area".

section 16(2) gives a choice to the landholder in the matter of retaining the land. However, sub-sec (2) is subject to subsection (1) of Section 16 , and sub-section (1) makes it obligatory that the landholder (whether he is the owner or tenant) shall retain encumbered land if the whole or part of the land is subject to encumbrance. The policy is , therefore, clear. If it is obligatory on the holder to retain the encumbered land with him., it is difficult to see how the petitioner can insist that the lands which have been sold already should be taken in the first instance for delimiting the surplus land. It has to be noted that though under Section 10, the land will be taken into consideration after calculating the transferred lands. It does not mean that the transfer is to be entirely ignored for all purposes, At any rate, it will be extremely difficult to allow the petitioner to make a choice when he has already made alienations. It may also be noted that in case the transferred lands are taken up to meet the surplus, the transferees will be entitled to recover the purchase money from the petitioner and for the refund of the consideration money which they have paid under the Transfer of Property Act, the property would be under an encumbrance. Considered from any point of view, it seems difficult to accept the submission of Mr. Masodkar . Such inequitable pleas cannot be accepted in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution . It therefore, follows that the order with regard to the delimiting of this surplus made by the Tribunal is correct and will have to be maintained.

8. As all the points canvassed by Mr. Masodkar fail, this petition will have to be dismissed. The rule is discharged. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

9. Petition dismissed.

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