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Babarao Govindrao Shiribhate And Others v. The Collector, Amravati And Others

Bombay High Court
Jul 7, 1975
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns a petition challenging the co-option of six Councillors to the Amravati Municipal Council that was completed at a meeting on 30 December 1974. Petitioners seek, inter alia, a declaration that the co-option was illegal because the presiding authority rejected the nominations of Petitioners Nos. 2 to 5 arbitrarily and mala fide, and they also challenge the vires of Section 9(1) of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965.

Relevant facts stated in the opinion:

  • The co-option process was governed by the Maharashtra Municipal Council (Co-option of Councillors) Rules, 1967; nominations were called, scrutinised by the presiding authority, and voting by single transferable vote system was envisaged.
  • Notices were issued to co-opt 6 members under Section 9(1) of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965. Nominations were rejected by the presiding authority (respondent No. 2) for certain candidates (including Petitioners Nos. 2–5); after withdrawals, six persons remained and were declared co-opted without voting.
  • A prior writ petition (Special Civil Application No. 1 of 1975 — Prabhakar v. Collector, Amravati) filed on 1 January 1975 by 25 councillors (including the present petitioner No. 1) challenged the same co-option process and was dismissed by a Division Bench on 13 February 1975 on the ground that necessary parties (the co-opted councillors) were not joined and because of delay in constituting the Council; leave to add parties was refused and the Division Bench referred to Section 21 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act as the statutory remedy.
  • The present petition (filed after the Division Bench order) raises substantially the same challenge and adds petitioners who had been nominees for co-option; the State was added as respondent because of the challenge to Section 9. Respondents objected to the maintainability of the present petition under Article 226 on grounds including the earlier dismissal of the prior petition and the participation of Petitioners Nos. 2–5 in the earlier proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the co-option of six Councillors completed on 30 December 1974 was illegal because the presiding authority arbitrarily and mala fide rejected certain nominations (Petitioners Nos. 2–5).
  2. Whether Section 9(1) of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965 is ultra vires (constitutional validity of Section 9).
  3. Whether the present petition is maintainable in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 (and Article 227) in view of an earlier, substantially identical petition that was dismissed by a Division Bench — including the applicability of principles such as res judicata, laches, and judicial propriety/comity between coordinate benches.
  4. Whether the petitioners have an alternative efficacious statutory remedy (notably under Section 21 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act) that should be used instead of writ jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as presented for Mr. Manohar)

  • The individual right of Petitioners Nos. 2–5 to seek relief is independent of the earlier petition by 25 councillors; doctrines of res judicata and its general principles do not apply to bar this petition.
  • The earlier Division Bench dismissed the prior petition on procedural grounds (non-joinder of necessary parties) and not on merits; this procedural defect should not preclude the Court from entertaining the present petition.
  • The Court's discretionary and equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 should not be fettered by technicalities where there is patent lack of jurisdiction, arbitrariness, mala fides, or where the statute itself may be infirm (challenge to Section 9 as ultra vires).
  • The presiding authority manipulated the statutory process; the record will show arbitrariness in rejecting nominations.
  • Petitioners Nos. 2–5 did not acquiesce or sleep on their rights: their cause was sub judice in the earlier petition and delay is minimal (petition filed shortly after dismissal of earlier petition).
  • Authorities relied upon to show lack of jurisdiction and support petitioners' stance included English decisions (Johan Pritohard v. Mayor ... and Harfoed v. Linskey) and Ahmed Hossain v. Aswani Kumar (Calcutta High Court). For res judicata principles, counsel relied on Daryao v. State of U.P. and Aditya Kumar Singh v. Principal, Medical College, Ranchi.

Respondents' Arguments (as presented for Mr. Deshpande)

  • The doctrine of res judicata (and related principles) precludes the petitioners from approaching the Court again where an earlier petition raising substantially the same cause and reliefs was dismissed by a Division Bench by a speaking order.
  • The petitioners could and should have impleaded themselves in the earlier petition and improperly took the chance of remaining outside the earlier proceedings; their conduct and delay disentitle them to relief in this Court.
  • Successive challenges after a speaking dismissal by a coordinate Division Bench would undermine finality and public policy; relief should not be granted merely because new or additional grounds are advanced.
  • Authorities cited in support of the bar principle included Madho Das v. Mukand Ram, Devilal v. Sales Tax Officer, and Tilokchand v. H.B. Munshi.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Prabhakar v. Collector, Amravati (Special Civil Application No. 1 of 1975) Earlier writ petition by 25 councillors challenging the same co-option process; dismissed by Division Bench for non-joinder and delay; referred parties to statutory remedy under Section 21. The Court treated this earlier decision as central to the question of maintainability: it emphasised that entertaining the present petition would circumvent that order and impair comity between benches. The earlier order's reasoning (non-joinder, delay, statutory remedy) weighed heavily in the Court's discretionary refusal to entertain the present petition.
Ahmed Hossain v. Aswani Kumar (AIR 1953 Cal 542) Invoked by petitioners (through counsel) in support of the proposition that a presiding authority may lack jurisdiction; the Calcutta High Court decision had referred to English cases on jurisdiction. The Court noted this authority was relied upon by petitioners to support lack-of-jurisdiction arguments, but did not decide the merits on this basis; instead the Court declined to enter upon merits because of procedural/comity and laches considerations.
Johan Pritohard v. Mayor, Aldermen and Citizens of the Borough of Bangor ((1888) 13 AC 241) English authority cited by petitioners to support alleged lack of jurisdiction of the presiding authority. Cited as an antecedent relied upon by petitioners for jurisdictional objections; the Court recorded that these authorities were placed before it but did not adjudicate the jurisdictional point on merits.
Harfoed v. Linskey ((1899) 1 QB 852) English authority cited alongside Johan Pritohard in support of jurisdictional arguments. Noted by the Court as relied upon by petitioners; the Court did not resolve jurisdictional issues on the basis of these cases because it declined to enter upon merits.
Daryao v. State of U.P. (AIR 1961 SC 1457) Supreme Court decision cited on the principle of res judicata. The Court acknowledged this authority was placed before it; it observed that although res judicata principles were argued, it would not base its decision solely on those doctrines but rather on judicial propriety, comity, and laches; the Court also observed that res judicata might not strictly apply to all petitioners now before it.
Aditya Kumar Singh v. Principal, Medical College, Ranchi ((1972) 4 SCC 267 : AIR 1971 SC 1005) Supreme Court authority cited in relation to res judicata and related principles. Recognised by the Court as one of the authorities referred to by petitioners on res judicata; the Court declined to rest its decision exclusively on res judicata and did not make a final pronouncement on applicability to all petitioners.
Madho Das v. Mukand Ram (AIR 1955 SC 481) Supreme Court authority relied upon by respondents in support of the proposition that successive petitions raising substantially the same cause should be barred. The Court noted this authority (and others cited by respondents) in support of the respondents' submission on the bar arising from earlier dismissal; the Court ultimately exercised discretion to refuse to entertain the petition consistent with the public-policy and finality concerns raised.
Devilal v. Sales Tax Officer (AIR 1965 SC 1150) Authority cited by respondents for the principle that successive or repetitive petitions on same cause may be barred. Referred to by the Court as part of respondents' reliance; the Court relied on wider considerations of judicial propriety, laches, and statutory remedy rather than deciding purely on this authority.
Tilokchand v. H.B. Munshi ((1969) 1 SCC 110 : AIR 1970 SC 898) Supreme Court authority cited by respondents on principles limiting successive litigation. The Court acknowledged this citation; it concluded by refusing to entertain the present petition on discretionary grounds (comity, laches, delay, alternative remedy) and therefore did not rest its decision solely on this precedent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in several interlinked steps, strictly following the facts and submissions recorded:

  1. Jurisdictional and equitable nature of Article 226: The Court reiterated that jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary and equitable, and that the conduct of the party, availability of alternate remedies, and propriety of entertaining successive petitions must inform that discretion.
  2. Importance of the earlier Division Bench order: The prior writ (Prabhakar v. Collector, Amravati) involved substantially the same cause and reliefs and was dismissed by a speaking order on grounds of non-joinder of necessary parties and the need not to delay constitution of the Council; that order expressly refused leave to add parties and pointed to Section 21 as the statutory remedy. The Court treated that order as a decisive restraint on entertaining another petition raising substantially identical challenges.
  3. Comity and finality among coordinate benches: The Court emphasised the necessity of judicial harmony and comity between coordinate Division Benches. Entertaining the present petition would risk circumventing the earlier decision and produce disharmony, amounting in substance to a review of one Bench by another.
  4. Conduct of petitioners, laches and delay: The Court scrutinised the behaviour of Petitioners Nos. 1–5. It found that Petitioners Nos. 2 and 4 had actively participated in the earlier proceedings by instructing counsel, and Petitioners Nos. 2–5 had appeared in court with the municipal councillors in the earlier petition. These averments were not denied. The Court concluded that these petitioners slept over their remedy, exhibited laches, and filed the present petition only after the dismissal of the earlier petition — the present petition was filed about 1½ months after the decision.
  5. Availability of statutory remedy: The Court observed Section 21 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act provides an alternate and efficacious remedy (including a 10-day period to move an election petition upon gazette notification). The statutory scheme manifests a legislative policy favouring the speedy constitution of electoral bodies without unnecessary judicial intervention.
  6. Interaction with res judicata arguments: Although both sides argued applicability of res judicata and numerous authorities were cited, the Court stated it would not base its decision solely on res judicata. It observed that res judicata might not strictly apply to all petitioners (particularly some newly arrayed parties), but nonetheless declined to re-open the cause in the interests of judicial propriety and finality.
  7. Discretion exercised to refuse relief: Considering the earlier order, the petitioners' conduct (laches, delay), the availability of statutory remedy, and the need for comity between benches, the Court exercised its discretionary jurisdiction to refuse to entertain the petition and discharged the rule.
  8. Consequential directions: The Court directed that parties bear their own costs, vacated the interim injunction previously granted on 18 February 1975, refused leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and rejected the request to extend any interim relief.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

THE COURT DISMISSED THE PETITIONS AND DISCHARGED THE RULE.

Specific immediate orders and effects arising from the holding (as stated in the opinion):

  • The rule was discharged and the petition was not entertained on discretionary grounds (judicial propriety, comity, laches, delay, and availability of statutory remedy).
  • Parties were directed to bear their own costs.
  • The interim injunction granted on 18-2-1975 was vacated.
  • Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused, and the request for an extension of interim injunction was denied.
  • Final disposition: "Petitions dismissed."

Implications:

  • The decision emphasises that the constitutional writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary and that courts will take into account the conduct of litigants (including laches and participation in earlier proceedings), the existence of efficacious statutory remedies (here Section 21 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act), and the need to preserve comity and finality between coordinate benches.
  • The Court expressly refrained from adjudicating the merits of the challenge to the co-option or the constitutional validity of Section 9(1); it did not strike down or uphold Section 9(1) on merits in this opinion. Instead, it directed petitioners to the statutory forum and declined to entertain this successive writ petition.
  • The judgment discourages attempts to circumvent an earlier speaking order of a coordinate Bench by filing a fresh writ petition in the same Court without leave or appeal, and it signals that such attempts may be treated as an abuse of process when accompanied by laches or delay.
  • No broad new precedent on the substantive validity of the co-option or on Section 9(1) was authoritatively decided in this opinion; the Court's ruling is a discretionary dismissal grounded in propriety, delay, and the availability of alternative statutory remedy.
Show all summary ...

Masodkar, J.:— By the present petition the petitioners seek reliefs inter alia that the co-option of Councillors to the Amravati Municipal Council which met to co-opt six Councillors on December 30, 1974, should ‘be declared illegal upon finding that the rejection of the no mination of the petitioners Nos. 2 to 5 for that co-option is vitiated being arbitrary, mala fide as well lacking in authortiy in law relevant lor that purpose. We may mention that in the prayer there is also a challenge to the legality of the provisions of Section 9(1) of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965 and it is prayed that it should be declared ultra vires. Petitioner No. 1 seeks to approach this Court mainly as the elected councillor of the said Municipal Council while others rest their right upon the fact they were duly nominated candidates for co-option and feel aggrieved by the decision taken by the respondent No. 2 acting as Presiding Authority in rejecting their nominations on the ground that they lack the qualification or otherwise are not eligible under Section 9 of the Act to be the co-opted Councillors. The procedure with regard to co-option is regulated by the Maharashtra Municipal Council (Co-option of Councillors) Rules, 1967 which prima facie permits calling for nominations, its scrutiny by the presiding authority and further voting by single transferable vote system. Petitioners claim that the co-option has been brought about in disregard and in violation of these rules.

2. Now few facts which are not in dispute and necessary to state for the purpose of our present premises are that the constitution of the Amravati Municipal Council was taken up by holding an election of 60 members in November, 1974 under the provisions of Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965. Section 9 requires and contemplates co-option of member. Initially a notice of meeting as required by Section 9(1) of the Act to co-opt 6 members to the Council was issued on December 19, 1974 and process of co-option was completed in the meeting of December 30, 1974. For the purpose of this co-option nominations were called for and in the scrutiny the presiding authority, respondent No. 2 rejected the nominations of Sarvashri B.S Pund (petitioner No. 2), S.B Nagar (petitioner No. 4), K.M Joshi, Afsal Hussain and G.L Mudgal (petitioner No. 3). After withdrawal, 6 persons remained in the field and they were declared without any voting to have been co-oipted. It may be mentioned that petitioners do challenge the motives of respondent No. 2 in adjourning the meeting earlier called and further challenge the coprectness of the proceedings as recorded.

3. Special Civil Application No. 1 of 1975 was immediately filed in this Court on January 1, 1975, challenging all these steps and eventual process of co-option and we get from the record of that petition that as many as 25 councillors including present petitioner No. 1 were the petitioners in that petition, That petition (Spl. Civil Appln. No. 1 of 1975 (Bom), Prabhakar v. Collector, Amravati) came UP for hearing eventually and the Division Bench of this Court (Chandurkar and Dharrriadhikari, JJ.) by its order of 13-2-1975, dismissed the same holding that no relief could be given in the said petition for in that co-opted Councillors who were entitled to justify co-option on all possible grounds were not made parties thereto. It appears from that order that request was made to grant time to join the co-opted Councillors as parties to the petition but the Court specifically refused the same. It was pointed out there that the said petition has been pending since January, 1975 and since the holding of elections of the Councillors considerable time had elapsed and the council is not being duly constituted, such a belated prayer cannot be granted. It was also observed that aggrieved petitioners had also an alternate remedy of the petition as provided by Section 21 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act In the result, therefore, the Division Bench of this Court discharged the rule in that matter which raised substantially the same challenge that is now being agitated before us once again in the present petition. It cannot be disputed that the present petitioners are seeking the same said relief which was substantially sought in the earlier petition, though by 25 Councillors, the petitioner No. 1 in the present petition being also the petitioner there. To the present petition other Councillors who were petitioners in earlier petition are not parties so also all those who participated in the meeting of co-option. Respondents arrayed including the persons duly declared as co-opted being respondents Nos. 4 to 9. As indicated above there being additional prayer in the present petition regarding the vires of Section 9 of the Act, State is added as party-respondent No. 10. In the return an objection is raised on behalf of resipondent No. 3 and also other respondent to the tenability of such a petition raising the same challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution because of the earlier dismissal of the petition filed for the same said relief It is specifically stated that the petitioners Nos. 2 to 5 were not only aware of the earlier proceedings but were assisting in its prosecution in this Court. It is submitted that in fact the earlier petition was identical and based on same cause and title and sought identical reliefs and its dismissal’ on any ground is fatal to the present petition.

4. We will briefly indicate the approach of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners to the question of ten ability of such a petition agitating, inter akia the same same cause Mr. Manohar urges that the right of the petitioners Nos. 2 to 5 to get relief and as such to file the present petition is an independent right, not affected by the right that was agitated by the 25 Councillors and as such neither the doctrine of res judicata nor its general principles are attracted. This is more so for the decision of the earlier writ petition was not on merits but because of the improper constitution of the petition itself, the defect being non-joinder of necessary parties. Apart from this the learned counsel submits that the jurisdiction of this Court which is itself discretionary and equitable under Article 226 of the Constitution is not fettered by rules of technicalities. The learned counsel further submits that neither there is any principle nor policy that should stand in the way of the petitioners because according to him, here is a case where want of jurisdiction on the part of the Presiding Authority is patent. It is urged that after all, the earlier petition failed because of a defect of technical nature and that should not be treated as an obstacle for entertaining the present petition. Learned counsel suggests that by refusing to interfere we would permit illegalities to perpetrate in the affairs of public authority and its constitution. Upon clear considerations it is submitted that the presiding authority herein has manipulated statutory process to the advantage of a given party in power. It is further urged that there is a possibility to uphold the challenge that Section 9 being ultra vires, there being no guideline legislatively laid down to determine the so-called special knowledge spoken to by Section 9 itself. He submits that by a look at the record the arbitrariness of the decision brought before this Court will ‘be fully demonstrable. In such cases where there is a lack of jurisdiction and further where it is possible to strike down the action as being arbitrary and mala fide and further more when the statute itself may be found upon scrutiny to be infirm, the submission/proceeds that the rule of technicality should not stand in the way of giving relief to the petitioners like the present ones. As to the conduct of the petitioners Nos. 2 to 5, the learned counsel explains that their cause was already sub judice in the earlier petition and this Court should not treat that conduct as either giving rise to acquiescence on their part or inferring laches against them. According to him, there is no case of delay as the petition is filed almost within few days after the dismissal of the earlier petition. For the proposition that patently there is lack of jurisdiction in the Presiding Officer, the learned counsel has relied on two English decisions and the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Ahmed Hossain v. Aswani Kumar, (AIR 1953 Cal 542), wherein those decisions have been referred being Johan Pritohard v. Mayor, Aldeermen and Citizens of the Borough of Bangor ((1888) 13 AC 241) and Harfoed v. Linskey ((1899) 1 QB 852). He has further relied on the decision of the Supreme Court on the principle of res judicata, being Daryao v. State of U.P (AIR 1961 SC 1457) and Aditya Kumar Singh v. Principal, Medical College, Ranchi, ((1972) 4 SCC 267 : AIR 1971 SC 1005).

5. As against this Mr. Deshjpande learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3 urged that on the general principle applicable on the basis of the doctrine of res judicata petitioners have no right to approach this Court once again. He relies on the observations of the earlier decision of the Division Bench to point out that it was a dismissal proper by a speaking order and further he relies on the conduct of the present petitioners who could have impleaded themselves as parties but took their chance by waiting outside the arena of litigation. According to the learned counsel it will neither further ends of justice nor any principle of public/Policy to entertain such successive challenges only because for submissions are made taking some more additional grounds. The learned counsel has relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Madho Das v. Mukand Ram, (AIR 1955 SC 481). Devilal v. Sales Tax Officer (AIR 1965 SC 1150) and Tilokchand v. H.B Munshi ((1969) 1 SCC 110 : AIR 1970 SC 898).

6. After giving our careful consideration to the submissions made, we feel it difficult to overlook the conduct of the present petitioners and the logical results likely to follow upon the propriety of entertaining such successive petitions having identical interest and same said challenges. Undoubtedly, the jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 is an equitable one and its exercise discretionary. Eventually the conduct of party seeking relief, infringement of right complained of, availability of alternate remedy along with questions of propriety do have its own importance. Although such fetters of given doctrines may not affect jurisdiction in appropriate cases brought before this Court to do justice, judicial propriety demands that we do not disrupt the pattern of uniform, harmonious and final adjudication in matters brought before us.

7. Firstly in this we feel right in emphasising that our processes of writs amongst others be not subjected to abuse by litigants sleeping over their rights quietly as the cause itself is entertained and is being decided. Secondly and further more we must not create a situation while exercising our co-ordinate jurisdiction with other Division Benches of this Court which will have a semblance of entertaining a cause which for a given reason the other Bench by a speaking order declined to entertain. Lastly it should be impermissible course in the administration of justice to permit parties to circumvent the decisions of this Court by resort to independent petition on the same cause without leave being given therefor and without challenge to the same in higher forum, which in substance would be tantamount to judicial review of the decision of one Bench by another Bench. We take these principles implicit and inhere in this equitable and extraordinary jurisdiction. Comity between co-ordinate divisions of Court above all commends to follow the collision-free course so that administration of justice has a real look of uniformity and life of unison.

8. We feel that because of all these reasons and also looking to the conduct of the petitioners that brings out purposeful laches and unexplained delay, it would be’ proper exercise of discretion not to entertain the challenge nor enter upon the merits of the present matter.

9. Now a closer scrutiny of the earlier order made by the Division Bench of this Court (supra) clearly indicates that the cause was the same and petitioners therein which included petitioner No. 1 herein had challenged the process of co-option almost on the identical grounds. The petition was dismissed by a speaking order and after hearing. The reasons that weighed with the Court were that necessary parties were not joined and as the process of constitution of the Council was being delayed, it was not proper to permit joinder of parties and that request was expressly rejected. It was also pointed out that petitioners could agitate their grievances in the forum prescribed by the statute under which they were claiming the relief. The total result of this order, to our mind is, to direct the parties to have the remedy provided by the Act and refuse to entertain a petition in spite of their readiness to cure the defect of nonjoinder of parties because of the fact that constitution of the statutory Council was likely to be further delayed.

10. Needless it is to state by entertaining the fresh petition wherein the defect of non-joinder is removed and some other additional parties have arrayed themselves in the same cause and title would clearly lead to circumventing what was held by this Court earlier and to allow such attempt would in our view be an abuse of the process of this Court. Moreover the ground that prevailed with the Bench that constitution of the Council was being delayed and that parties should follow the statutory remedy provided for when the permission to add parties was refused, will have to be annulled in this petition for entertaining the challenge and that in our view would tend to indicate nonetheless disharmony and conflict in exercise of co-ordinate jurisdiction. Question is not, what we would have done while presiding over that Bench but question is where lies the interests of judicial harmony which must of necessity be zealously guarded and which has all its juridical roots in public policy in this regard. In substance we would by entering the controversy in the circumstances doing what could alone be done only by exercise of powers of review for which neither there is any ground nor any appeal to us. Only because another Division Bench (Deshmukh and Lalit, JJ.) of this Court issued rule in this petition it does not follow that these principles are not available to us. Non-dismissal of the petition at that stage does not involve the result that the matter once decided is open to review on merits and must be so examined. We would only observe that once this Court by its co-ordinate division rejects a cause by a speaking order it would not be a correct exercise of our power while sitting in equal authority to entertain causes that may affect the finality of the earlier orders and raises possibility of conflict of judicial decisions in’ the same Court. Neither on the count of compunction nor because of any inbuilt compulsion some other approach is indicated. We would, therefore in our discretion prefer to refrain from retreading upon the cause which is no more virgin under the facts and circumstances herein obtaining.

11. Though we were addressed on both sides on the applicability of doctrine of res judicata and its general principles and were referred to the decision stated supra, we are not inclined to consider the same as, we have indicated above that judicial propriety in such matters require us to uphold the orders made by the coordinate division of this court and not to permit any circumvention thereof by such successive writ petitions. This is more so when there is identity of cause and similarity in the relief sought from the Court. Suffice it to observe that had we been called upon to apply the doctrine of res judicata upon its closer scrutiny we might have been inclined to hold in favour of the petitioners that the same doctrine is not strictly available as far as the parties arrayed as/petitioners being Nos. 2 to 5 as well the newly added party-respondents, being Nos. 4 to 9. In the matter of assertion of right and its cause every one of the petitioners now before us will have to be independently considered and the doctrine would not be answered except as far as the petitioner No. 1 is concerned. Mere defect in the frame of the petition such as that of non-joinder of necessary parties and refusal on that count to interfere, would not be a decision’ on merit and? thus such disposal would prima facie be out of the bar of res judicata or its principles in writ matters. We wish to make it clear that these observations have become necessary only because we were addressed by parties in that regard, though we do not propose to express ourselves finally on this topic.

12. In our view, the ends of judicial propriety in the matter of such successive petitions filed in writ jurisdiction would be sufficiently subserved by discharge of rule and expressly discouraging such attempts.

13. As we must, we may now proceed to examine the conduct of the petitioners who seek to be the relators of the writ of this Court. That question too is closely knit with the propriety of entertaining causes in this extraordinary jurisdiction and ends of justice in that regard.

14. As far as petitioner No. 1 is concerned, his conduct with regard to the steips in procedure and the proceedings before this Court stands already adjudicated by the earlier decision of this Court wherein his petition along with others was found to be defective and leave to add additional parties was refused directing him to the remedy of filing the petition under, Section 21 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965. As far as the conduct of petitioners Nos. 2 to 5 is concerned, there is nothing better. In the affidavits filed in reply to the petition, the respondents have specifically stated that out of these petitioners, petitioner No. 2 Mr. Bhaurao Pund and petitioner No. 4 Mr. Sheochandra Nagar had been actively instructing the counsel in the earlier petition and that all the petitioners Nos. 2 to 5 were appearing in court along with Municipal Councillors who were the petitioners in the earlier petition. These averments have not been denied and no counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the petitioners Nos. 2 to 5. We, therefore, take it that these petitioners Nos. 2 to 5 were not only aware of the earlier proceedings but were in fact participating along with the petitioners therein, though they did not think it fit to join themselves as the proper petitioners. Their complaint is in substance relating to the decision of the Presiding Authority in rejecting their nominations on 30th of December, 1974. From then onwards, by themselves, they did not feel aggrieved and did not seek any relief by filing any petition before this Court. Though they were so participating in the earlier petition, they chose to stand by and waited and allowed that petition to take the course it has taken as indicated above. The only inference that can be drawn from the conduct of the petitioners Nos. 2 to 5 is that they slept over their remedy all along and that they did not move with purpose at least in the process of earlier petition and allowed it to frustrate. Furthermore their attempt to file present proceedings after the dismissal of earlier one is an attempt to circumvent the decision already reached. Similarly their conduct clearly suffers from laches and the present cause too is affected by unexplained delay. It was faintly suggested for the petitioners that they might be awaiting the decision of the earlier petition and the period taken by those proceedings should not be taken into account while considering the delay. It has to be observed that such stand is in fact self-contradictory on the showing of the petitioners themselves. On the one hand they are trying to assert apart from the earlier proceeding their independent right to approach this Court and seek their remedy and when the question of delay comes, on the other they want to rely on the time exhausted by the earlier proceedings. This trite antilogy speaks volumes as far as the conduct of these petitioners with regard to the present proceedings is concerned The only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the facts and circumstances available to us is that these petitioners Nos. 2 to 5 had not been zealous about their so-called right nor felt aggrieved by the decision of the Presiding Authority until the earlier petition was dismissed. Both on the ground of undue delay as well because of laches the petitioners Nos. 2 to 5 are not worthy relators of any relief from this Court under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution under which they have purported to move the present petition. The right to move this Court in this extraordinary jurisdiction is not a right of course. In every case that arises, within this jurisdiction it will be legitimate enquiry as to Whether the cause suffers, from undue and unexplained delay and what is the conduct of the (petitioners who seek the remedy. In this regard we have no doubt that the petitioners Nos. 1 to 5 have little to satisfy us on both these counts. The decision to reject their nomination was taken as back as December, 1974 and their petition lies been filed on 17th of February, 1975. But for the injunction in the earlier proceedings, the names of the co-opted Councillors would have been gazetted and the Municipal Coimcil would have been fully constituted. Even the remedy under Section 21 would have been available upon the gazette notification to everyone concerned That provision also requires the petitioners therein to move the election petiturn within a period of ten days from such notification. That shows that even the policy underlying the parent statute under which the petitioners are asserting the right requires challenges to be brought before the Court within shortest ipossible time. This policy cannot be overlooked while considering the petition filed after about 1½ months. We should be loath to consider such a petition which ought to have been filed expeditiously, Looking to the provisions of the statute and under the circumstances, therefore, it would not be a proper exercise of discretion to encourage such filing of petitions.

15. By deciding to so discharge the rule issued in the present petition for the reasons indicated above, we do not think that the petitioners are being subjected to any grave injustice or unforeseen hardship with regard to their grievance. In fact under the provisions of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965, an efficacious remedy to ventilate such challenges has itself been provided for. It is clear that the underlying legislative anxiety under the provisions of that Act appears to be that the process of election once started should as far as possible be allowed to take its own course without any judicial intervention and the challenge should be only in the forum provided for by the provisions of that Act. However, it is undoubtedly well established that the remedies provided’ by the Constitution under Article 226 or under Article 227 are not nor can be barred by the provisions of such statute. But the Court called upon to exercise its constitutional power can always take into account the fact that the petitioner does have efficacious remedy provided by the law under which the grievance is set up.

16. We are not unmindful to the fact that before such a forum the petitioners may not be in a position to assail the validity of the provisions of Section 9 of the Municipalities Act, but we have our doubts whether having asserted right under that provision (petitioners would at all be entitled to make such challenge. Whatever that may be, this is by itself no reason to hold that by refusing to interfere in the present petition petitioners are without remedy or are subjected to process that tends to be onerous or inequitable. The substantial relief for which the petitioners filed the petition is directed against the decision of the Presiding Authority rejecting their nomination and the validity of that can well be gone into under the provisions of Section 21 of the said Act. In the sum, therefore, we hold that neither in principle nor under any policy the present petition can be entertained after the dismissal of the earlier petition arising out of the same cause.

17. We have also found that the conduct of the petitioners suffers from laches and the present petition to this Court is unduly delayed. Taking the view in this manner, we discharge the rule though we direct that the parties shall bear their own costs.

18. As a result of this, the interim injunction granted on 18-2-1975 will stand vacated.

19. Leave to appeal to Supreme Court was sought by one of the petitioners along with a prayer that the period of interim injunction should at least be extended by three weeks. We are unable to grant either of the prayers. The leave is refused

20. Petitions dismissed.