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Smt. Sumanbai v. Anand Rao Onkar Panpatil .

Bombay High Court
Sep 23, 1975
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Factual and Procedural Background

This is a wife's Second Appeal attacking a decree of the Assistant Judge, Dhulia dated 2 August 1972, which had allowed the husband's appeal and granted restitution of conjugal rights. The Assistant Judge had set aside an earlier decree of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Dhulia (dated 25 February 1971) which had dismissed the husband's petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act on the ground that the husband had failed to prove that the wife's withdrawal from his society was without reasonable excuse.

The parties were married in 1963 and cohabited for about six to seven years. They had three children. Disputes arose around the time of the birth of the third child. The trial Judge's findings, reached after considering oral testimony and documents from both sides, recorded that relations between the parties had become extremely strained largely because of a feud between the fathers-in-law; the husband's father allegedly persisted in demanding items (a wrist watch, a cycle and a ring) from the wife's father, which led to ill-treatment of the wife. The wife's father obtained a removal under Section 100 of the Criminal Procedure Code and when the wife was produced before the magistrate she stated she would opt to reside with her father, alleging cruelty and fearing for her safety if she returned to the husband.

Since her removal under Section 100 CrPC (dated 11 August 1969), the wife has been living with her father. The husband filed a criminal case against the wife's father and another, which was later compounded. The wife instituted custody proceedings for the eldest son but lost those proceedings; the other two children remain with the wife.

The Civil Judge (trial Judge) found no evidence of adulterous connection on the wife's part but concluded that the wife's withdrawal was justified because of the husband's conduct (letters, allegations of unchastity, failure to provide allowance after removal, one child being detained). Accordingly the Civil Judge dismissed the husband's petition under Section 9 on 25 February 1971. The Assistant Judge, however, allowed the husband's appeal after the husband's counsel stated there was no satisfactory evidence that the wife had a reasonable excuse and that an averment in the petition doubting paternity was being withdrawn; the Assistant Judge believed the husband and reversed the trial Judge.

The present second appeal was filed by the wife challenging the Assistant Judge's reversal. The appeal was ultimately allowed by the appellate court, which set aside the Assistant Judge's judgment, restored the trial Judge's dismissal of the husband's petition, and ordered maintenance to the wife in the sum of Rs. 35 per month from 11 August 1969 for her life, and awarded costs to the wife in all three courts.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Assistant Judge was justified in reversing the trial Judge's findings of fact and allowing the husband's appeal in a case where the trial Judge had, after evidentiary appreciation, found that the wife had reasonable excuse to withdraw from her husband's society.
  2. Whether allegations of the wife's unchastity, when made by the husband and persisted in, constitute cruelty or a "reasonable excuse" within the meaning of Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, thereby disentitling the husband to a decree for restitution of conjugal rights.
  3. Whether it was permissible for the husband to make and then withdraw allegations of unchastity in the manner accepted by the Assistant Judge, and whether such withdrawal justified disbelieving the wife's account.
  4. Whether the Assistant Judge erred in recording a vague finding under Section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act without applying his mind to whether the husband was taking advantage of his own wrong (i.e., filing for restitution for an ulterior purpose to obtain later a divorce).
  5. Whether, in the circumstances, the appellate court should exercise the court's powers under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act to award maintenance to the wife and, if so, in what amount and from what date.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Wife's) Arguments

  • The Assistant Judge was not entitled to permit the husband to make allegations of unchastity and then to withdraw them in the way the Assistant Judge appears to have allowed; the withdrawal did not justify overturning the trial Court's credibility findings.
  • The allegation of unchastity itself amounted to cruelty and thus constituted a reasonable excuse within the meaning of Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act; the appellant relied on authority (Sarah Abraham v. Pyli Abraham and Iqbal Kaur v. Pritam Singh) to demonstrate that such imputations, if persisted in, disentitle the husband to restitution.
  • The Assistant Judge erred in recording a vague finding under Section 23 without considering that the husband was taking advantage of his own wrong and may have ulterior motives (i.e., using a decree for restitution as a step toward obtaining divorce).
  • The appellate court should exercise its power under Section 25 to award maintenance, noting the trial Judge's observation that the husband, a primary school teacher, had limited resources and the trial Judge had fixed interim maintenance at Rs. 35 per month but the Civil Judge's operative order omitted a maintenance direction; the husband had not paid anything to the wife.

Respondent's (Husband's) Arguments

  • Before the Assistant Judge the husband's advocate stated that there was no satisfactory evidence to show the wife had a reasonable excuse for withdrawing from the husband's society and asserted that an averment in the petition impugning the wife's chastity had been withdrawn; the advocate argued the husband was only pressing for restitution of conjugal rights.
  • Beyond the statement recorded before the Assistant Judge (that allegations were withdrawn and that there was insufficient evidence of reasonable excuse), no further detailed respondent arguments appear in the opinion; the husband's counsel who filed vakalatnama did not appear at the hearing of the appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sarah Abraham v. Pyli Abraham, AIR 1959 Ker 75 Held that an imputation of unchastity by the husband, if persisted in, can disentitle him to marital rights; such imputations may give the wife a ground to resist restitution. The court regarded this decision as correctly decided and relied on it to hold that light or persistent allegations of unchastity by the husband amount to conduct that disentitles him to relief under Section 9.
Iqbal Kaur v. Pritam Singh, AIR 1963 Punj 242 Stated that where a husband alleges the wife lives a life of prostitution or in environments of immorality without proof, the wife may legitimately claim a reasonable apprehension that living with the husband will be harmful — i.e., such imputations can amount to cruelty. The court relied on this authority to support the view that imputations of immoral behaviour without proof can amount to cruelty and a reasonable excuse for withdrawal from matrimonial society.
Narbada Prasad v. Chhaganlal, AIR 1969 SC 395 Principle that findings of the trial Judge, who sees and hears witnesses, should not be lightly disturbed on appeal; reversal requires exceptional circumstances (errors susceptible to argument or material omissions in appreciation of evidence). The court applied this principle to criticise the Assistant Judge's reversal of the trial Judge, holding that the trial Judge's evaluation of credibility and reliance on letters and conduct should not have been set aside without exceptional justification.
Sarkar on Evidence, 12th Ed., pp. 52–53 (textbook authority) Support for the proposition that appellate courts should not lightly disturb the trial Judge's findings on oral testimony and that reversal is permissible only in rare cases. The court invoked this authority in conjunction with Narbada Prasad to underline the limited scope for appellate interference with trial findings of fact and credibility.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court's analysis proceeded along two principal lines: (1) the proper standard for appellate interference with trial findings of fact and credibility, and (2) the legal effect of the husband's conduct (notably allegations of the wife's unchastity and other behaviour) on the wife's entitlement to resist a petition for restitution under Section 9.

On the standard of appellate review the court reiterated established principles (citing Narbada Prasad and Sarkar on Evidence) that a trial Judge's findings based on oral testimony and contemporaneous conduct should not be lightly disturbed; reversal on appeal is justified only in exceptional circumstances such as omission to account for material circumstances or manifest inconsistency in testimony.

Applying that standard, the court observed that the trial Judge had considered not only oral testimony but also documentary evidence (letters) and surrounding circumstances: the feud between the fathers-in-law, the wife's removal under Section 100 CrPC, the husband's letters and allegations impugning the wife's chastity, the husband's failure to pay allowance after removal, and the detention of one child by the husband. The trial Judge concluded these matters amounted to cruelty and gave the wife a reasonable excuse to withdraw.

The Assistant Judge's reversal was principally based on the husband's advocate's statement that an averment doubting the paternity of the third child had been withdrawn and that there was no satisfactory evidence of reasonable excuse. The appellate court found this insufficient: the Assistant Judge ignored the trial Judge's careful appraisal of conduct and documentary material and failed to apply the limiting principles governing appeals from findings of fact.

On the substantive law under Section 9, the court analysed that no relief under Section 9 can be granted where the respondent (here, the wife) has a reasonable excuse for withdrawing from the petitioner's society. The court accepted the appellant's reliance on Sarah Abraham and Iqbal Kaur and held that imputations of unchastity are a grave and insulting injury; if such allegations are lightly made and persisted in by the husband, he is not entitled to relief under Section 9. The court concluded that the husband's conduct (including the persistent allegation of unchastity and other behaviour) amounted to cruelty and justified the wife's withdrawal.

The appellate court further reasoned that granting restitution in these circumstances would allow the husband to take advantage of his own wrong and possibly to use a decree for restitution as an instrument for an ulterior purpose (e.g., subsequent divorce). The Assistant Judge's vague reference to Section 23 was criticised as insufficiently reasoned and not properly applied to the facts.

Finally, on maintenance, the court noted that the trial Judge had fixed interim maintenance at Rs. 35 per month (observing the husband's limited means as a primary school teacher) but the Civil Judge's operative order did not include a maintenance order. The appellate court considered the wife had received nothing from the husband and exercised the court's power under Section 25(1) to order maintenance at Rs. 35 per month from 11 August 1969 for the wife's life, while leaving open the wife's right to seek enhanced maintenance under Section 25(2) before the competent Civil Judge.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The second appeal was allowed. The judgment and decree of the Assistant Judge dated 2 August 1972 are set aside, and the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge dismissing the husband's petition for restitution of conjugal rights are restored.

Consequential Orders and Immediate Implications:

  • The husband's petition for restitution of conjugal rights is dismissed.
  • The court directed that the husband must pay maintenance to the wife at the rate of Rs. 35 per month from 11 August 1969 (the date of the wife's removal under the Section 100 CrPC warrant) for the wife's life, without prejudice to the wife's right to claim enhanced maintenance under Section 25(2) before the competent Civil Judge.
  • The husband was ordered to pay the costs of the wife in all three courts.

Broader implications: The opinion reaffirmed that persistent imputations of unchastity by a husband can constitute cruelty and a reasonable excuse under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, thereby disentitling the husband to restitution. It also emphasised the limited scope for an appellate court to upset the trial Judge's credibility findings absent exceptional justification. The opinion did not purport to lay down any novel legal principle beyond applying the cited authorities to the facts of this case.

Show all summary ...

1. This is a wife's Second Appeal challenging the validity and propriety of a decree passed by the learned Assistant Judge, Dhulia, on August 2, 1972, passed in favour of the husband for restitution of conjugal rights. The decree was passed by the learned Assistant Judge, Dhulia who set aside the decree passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Dhulia dismissing the husband's petition under Section 9 on the ground that the husband had failed to prove that wife's withdrawal from his society was without reasonable excuse.

2. The findings of the trial Judge were based on careful appreciation of the oral evidence of the husband and his witness on the one band and the wife and her witness on the other and also the documents on record produced by both the sides. The learned trial Judge observed:

“It is not disputed that the parties were married in 1963. It appears that they cohabited at Nawapur for about 6 or 7 years. There are three issues out of the marriage. At the time of the birth of the third issue (a daughter) disputes appear to have arisen between the parties. It appears from the evidence that the relations between the father of the petitioner and the father of the respondent became strained and this in turn caused a friction between the petitioner and the respondent. It is also the case of the respondent that the cause of quarrel between the two fathers-in-law was the alleged demand by the petitioner's father for wrist watch, a cycle and a ring. The respondent's case is that although her father had not agreed to give these articles or the price thereof to the petitioner or his father, the latter made this an issue and persisted in demanding the same time and again from the respondent's father. When the persistent demands were not fulfilled by the respondent's father, the petitioner's father started illtreating the respondent and that is how the controversy arose. It is not disputed that the father of the respondent commenced proceedings under Section 100 of the Cr PC and got the respondent removed from the house of the petitioner under a search warrant. It is now established that when the respondent was produced before the Magistrate concerned, she made a statement that she would opt to go to her father, i.e to reside with him and not with the petitioner; at that time she alleged that the petitioner was treating her with cruelty and she became apprehensive as to her personal safety and security at his hands, if she returned to him.”

3. Since then she has been residing with her father. It is also undisputed that a criminal case was filed by the petitioner against the respondent's father and another; and that case was ultimately compounded. The wife had commenced proceedings for the custody of her eldest son who was not allowed to accompany her when she went to her father's place. Before she went to her father's place that son was taken to the petitioner's brother at a different place. The custody proceedings ended against the wife. The other two children are with the wife.

4. The learned Civil Judge, therefore, rightly came to the conclusion that the relations between the parties were extremely strained. The learned Civil Judge also relied on the fact that though the husband was asking for restitution of conjugal rights in para. 5 of the petition he averred as follows:—

5. The learned Judge therefore held that this amounted to doubting the paternity of the third child though the learned Advocate for the husband stated before the learned Civil Judge that he was not pressing that issue and he was pressing only for the return of the respondent i.e, restitution of conjugal rights.

6. The learned Judge fully considered the oral and documentary evidence and found that there was no evidence in respect of the allegation that the respondent was guilty of any adulterous connection in any relevant period; but having regard to the relation between the parties it cannot be said that the wife left the husband without any fault on his side. According to the learned Judge the evidence of the wife showed that she would not have left but for the harsh and cruel attitute of the petitioner and for the attack on her character by the petitioner.

7. The learned Judge observed in para. 6 of his judgment:

“On the last aspect when pressed the learned advocate for the petitioner could not properly explain how the allegations were made originally and as to why they were allowed to be there. In the circumstances, there is no doubt that if restitution is allowed in this case it would be putting a premium on the fault of the petitioner himself and it would be allowing the petitioner to take advantage of his own wrong towards the respondent. There was an offer on the side of the petitioner to take back the respondent even with the last child, but he did not appear to be frank enough to own its paternity; but offer was a sort of patronising and as if condoning the alleged marital fault of the respondent.”

8. The learned Civil Judge, therefore, dismissed the petition filed by the petitioner on February 25, 1971.

9. Before the learned Assistant Judge, the Advocate appearing for the husband, who had carried the appeal against the dismissal, appears to have made a statement that there was no satisfactory evidence on record to show that the wife had reasonable excuse to withdraw from the society of the husband and the learned trial Judge had unnecessarily made much of the averment that the wife was not carrying when she left the residence of the husband and that he was unnecessarily prejudiced because of the said averment in the petition. The learned Advocate argued before the learned Assistant Judge that the husband had withdrawn the said averment made in the petition. The learned’ Assistant Judge therefore, ignored the allegation of unchastity made against the wife and reversed the findings recorded by the learned trial Judge believing the husband and disbelieving the wife.

10. Mrs. Shenoi, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant challenged the findings recorded by the learned Assistant Judge firstly on the ground that it was not open to the respondent to make allegations and then withdraw such allegations of unchastity in the manner in which the learned Assistant Judge appears to have permitted.

11. Secondly, she urged that the very allegation of unchastity was sufficient to amount to cruelty and reasonable excuse within the meaning of Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act. In support of this proposition, she relied on a decision of a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Sarah Abraham v. Pyli Abraham, AIR 1959 Ker 75, in which it was laid down that imputation of unchastity to disentitle a husband of marital right must be persisted in by the husband and then the fact in certain circumstances will certainly entitle the wife to resist a petition for restitution of conjugal rights filed by the husband.

12. Mrs. Shenoi also relied on a decision of single Judge of the Punjab High Court in Iqbal Kaur v. Pritam Singh, AIR 1963 Punj 242 wherein it was laid down that when the wife is stated by the husband to be living the life of a prostitute and in the environments of immorality without any proof of these allegations, she can ligitimately ask the Court to give a finding that she has a reasonable apprehension in her mind about the harmful or injurious effect of living in the matrimonial home. In such a case, the wife is treated with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in her mind that it will be harmful or injurious for her to live with the other party.

13. Thirdly, Mrs. Shenoi submitted that the learned Assistant Judge erred in law in recording a vague finding with regard to Section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act without applying his mind to the facts and circumstances, which clearly showed that the petitioner-husband was taking advantage of his own wrong in filing the petition for restitution of conjugal rights without any desire for restitution of conjugal rights and with an ulterior motive of obtaining subsequent divorce on the basis of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights.

14. Mr. Kotwal, who has filed Vakalatnama has not cared to appear for the husband. The appeal is, therefore, heard ex parte against the respondent husband. On considering the two judgments, I find that the learned Assistant Judge failed to bear in mind the important principles laid dwn from time to time by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court regarding the limitation and restrictions which should not be ignored by a Court of appeal in matters of appreciation of evidence and credibility of the witnesses.

15. It is well settled that the opinion of the trial Judge should not be lightly disturbed in appeal. It requires circumstances of exceptional character to justify a reversal. A trial Judge sees, hears and questions witnesses and a finding of fact arrived at by him on oral testimony should not be disturbed except in rare cases where some error susceptible of being dealt with wholly by argument is disclosed, such as omission to take account of circumstances or probabilities material to an estimate of the evidence or giving credence to testimony which turns out on more careful analysis to be substantially inconsistent with itself or with indisputable fact. See Narbada Prasad v. Chhaganlal, AIR 1969 SC 395; and Sarkar on Evidence, 12th Edition, pp. 52 to 53.

16. In the present case, I find that the learned trial Judge had taken into consideration not only the testimony of the husband and the wife but also the facts and circumstances which clearly showed that it was the husband who was illtreating the wife. As the relations between the two parties were strained on account of the strained relations between the respective fathers-in-law, the learned trial Judge found that the letters written by the husband to the wife were heinous. He referred to the allegations of unchastity, made by the respondent and the general conduct of the husband in not paying any allowance after she was removed to father's house under Section 100 of the old Cr PC. He also referred to the fact that one of the three children was detained by the husband and was not allowed to join the mother.

17. It is true that the learned trial Judge has not discussed at length the evidence of the wife and the husband and the witnesses. But the learned trial Judge has relied on the general conduct as evidenced from the letters and from the behaviour of the husband towards the wife and the allegations made in the petition and particularly the allegation against the chastity of the wife. He rightly held that those allegations amounted to cruelty and justified the wife in withdrawing herself from the society of the husband.

18. Before passing a decree for restitution the court must be satisfied that the respondent has, without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the society of the petitioner and there is no legal ground why the decree should not be passed. The legal ground for refusing to grant relief may consist of any of the grounds on which the respondent could have asked for a decree for judicial separation or for nullity of marriage or for divorce, any conduct on the part of the petitioner or fact tantamount to the petitioner taking advantage of his or her own wrong or any disability for the purpose of such relief; collusion with the respondent; and unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceeding. It is clear from Sec. 9(1) that no relief can be granted to the husband if the wife had reasonable excuse or what is often spoken of in this context as just cause for withdrawing from the society of the husband. What would be reasonable excuse will depend on the facts of each case. The reason must be grave and convincing.

19. The cases cited by Mrs. Shenoi, in support of her argument that allegation of unchastity by the husband would amount to such reasonable excuse are, in my opinion, with respect, rightly decided. There can be no more insulting injury to the wife than her own husband doubting her chastity. It must be held that if those allegations are lightly made and persisted in filing the petition, the husband is not entitled to any relief under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act. It may be that the learned Assistant Judge found it difficult due to absence of material evidence to believe her when she said that she was kicked, confined or starved by the husband which made her father to remove her from the custody of the husband under Section 100 of the Cr PC. But it is clear that having regard to the various proceedings between the parties there cannot be any love lost between the husband and wife. The husband has not tried to send any amount either to his wife for that period or to his two children who were with her. The learned Assistant Judge, in my view, was not right in reversing the findings recorded by the trial Judge in the present case ignoring these cruelties inflicted by the husband.

20. It was clear from the facts and circumstances that the wife was compelled by the conduct of the husband to leave him and the husband persisted in making allegation of unchastity even when filing the petition in the trial Court. Hence the relief of restitution of conjugal right ought not to have been granted under section 23(1)(a) as he was trying to secure relief under Section 9 for ulterior purpose taking advantage of Ms own wrong towards the wife. I, therefore, uphold all the grounds urged by Mrs. Shenoi in support of the appeal.

21. I find that the judgment and decree passed by the learned Assistant Judge are contrary to law and must be set aside; and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge must be restored.

22. Mr. Shenoi further submitted that under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act any court exercising jurisdiction under this Act may at the time of passing any decree or at any subsequent thereto on application made to it for the purpose by either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, order that the respondent shall, while the applicant remains unmarried, pay to the applicant for her or his maintenance and support such gross sum or such monthly or periodical sum for a term not exceeding the life of the applicant as, having regard to the respondents own income and other property, if any, the income and other property of the applicant and the conduct of the parties, it may seem to the court to be just.

23. Mrs. Shenoi has drawn my attention to para. 7 of the judgment of the trial Judge where the learned trial Judge held that having regard to the fact that the husband was a teacher In a primary school, he had no ample resources to maintain the wife though the wife was not earning and was being maintained by her father but the primary liability to maintain her was on the husband. The learned trial Judge, therefore, fixed only interim maintenance at the rate of Rupees 35/- per month. Strangely, however, the learned Civil Judge did not pass in the operative part of the order any order with regard to the maintenance.

24. Mrs. Shenoi submitted that the husband has not paid anything to the wife till now. In the facts and circumstances of the case, notwithstanding that the wife has not filed any appeal against the order passed by the Civil Judge, I think that this court has power to pass a just and proper order under Section 25(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act awarding maintenance to the wife from the date of her removal under Section 100 of the Cr PC at the rate of Rs. 35/- per month as fixed by the learned Civil Judge as interim maintenance, without prejudice to the rights of the wife to ask for enhanced maintenance under Section 25(2) before the Civil Judge competent to hear such petition.

25. In the result, the second appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the learned Assistant Judge on August 2, 1972, are set aside. The husband's petition for restitution of conjugal rights is dismissed and a decree is passed against the husband ordering him to pay maintenance at the rate of Rs. 35/- per month from August 11, 1969, when she was removed from her husband under a warrant under Section 100 of the old Cr PC, for her life to the wife without prejudice to her rights to claim enhanced maintenance for herself and for maintenance of her children in the court of Civil Judge competent to exercise powers under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act or under any other law. The husband to pay the costs of the wife in all three courts.

26. Appeal allowed.