- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Commissioner Of Inco... v. Bai Savitagouri And ...
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Tulzapurkar, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a reference under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 made by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City II. The question referred was whether the Income-tax Officer (ITO) had validly reopened the assessment for the assessment year 1957-58 under section 34(1)(b).
Short facts (as stated in the opinion):
- The assessment year in question is 1957-58 (accounting year ended 31 January 1957).
- Maganlal Dahyabhai left a will dated 5 July 1943 appointing his wife Smt. Savitagouri and three others as executors/trustees. Sources of estate income included property income, interest on securities, dividends and interest from other sources.
- The original assessment for 1957-58 was completed on 3 February 1958: property income was assessed in the hands of the trustees (as an association of persons) while other income was allocated among beneficiaries.
- On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that section 41 applied and directed that the entire estate income be taxed in the hands of the trustees; the ITO complied and modified the assessment accordingly.
- While assessing for 1961-62 the ITO realised that clause 9(f) of the will gave the sons life interest only when the last son attained 21 years; enquiries showed the younger son, Mahendrakumar, would reach 21 on 14 September 1964. The ITO concluded there were no beneficiaries for the interim period and assessed trustee income under section 3 at total-income rates for 1961-62 (assessment order dated 23 July 1962).
- Believing the 1957-58 assessment had therefore "escaped proper assessment," the ITO issued a notice under section 34(1)(b) on 19 February 1962 and reopened the 1957-58 assessment, completing a reassessment on 21 February 1963 by taxing the entire estate income in the trustees' hands at total-income rates.
- The assessee appealed; the Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld the reassessment. The Tribunal, however, held that the reopening was based merely on a change of opinion (there was no fresh information) and set aside the reassessment. The Commissioner referred the question to this Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Officer had validly reopened the assessment for the assessment year 1957-58 under section 34(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act (i.e., whether the ITO had, in consequence of information in his possession, reason to believe that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment or had been under-assessed).
Arguments of the Parties
Revenue's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Hajarnavis)
- Although the will was produced in 1957-58, the specific fact that the younger son would attain 21 on 14 September 1964 had not been disclosed or placed before the ITO at the time of the original assessment (3 February 1958).
- That fact came to light during inquiries in the course of the 1961-62 assessment, and it materially affected the tax character of the estate income (i.e., that section 41 would not apply and trustees should be taxed under section 3 at total-income rates).
- Therefore, the reopening under section 34(1)(b) for 1957-58 was justified because new information had come into the ITO's possession which gave him reason to believe income had escaped assessment or been under-assessed.
Assessee's / Tribunal's Position
- The Tribunal (and the assessee in appeals) contended that the reopening was without jurisdiction because there was no new information: the relevant provisions of the will (including clause 9(f) and paragraph 4 recitals) had already been before the ITO in 1957-58 and would have disclosed the material facts (including the ages and number of children).
- Thus the reassessment amounted to a mere change of opinion by the ITO and not a reopening based on fresh information as required by section 34(1)(b).
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis focussed on the statutory requirement in clause (b) of section 34(1) that reopening may only be done if, "in consequence of the information in his possession," the ITO has reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment or has been under-assessed.
Key analytical steps the Court took (following the text strictly):
- Admitted factual premise: the reopening was effected pursuant to the notice dated 19 February 1962 under section 34(1)(b), so the statutory condition required by clause (b) must be satisfied.
- Considered the revenue's concession (recorded in the opinion) that the will dated 5 July 1943 must have been produced to the ITO during the original assessment in 1957-58 — because the original assessment allocated income to beneficiaries by name and assessed property income to the trustees, showing awareness of the testamentary provisions.
- Examined the will itself (as the Court describes it): paragraph 4 of the will recited that on the date of the will the testator had seven children (one son and six daughters) and that his son Jayendrakumar was then 8 years old. Applying these recitals together with clause 9(f) (life interest in favour of sons to arise when the last son attains 21), the Court reasoned that it would have been patent on a cursory reading of the will that any son born after the will could not have attained 21 by the accounting year ending 31 January 1957.
- The Court also noted that the original 1957-58 assessment order itself referred to both sons (Jayendrakumar and the younger Mahendrakumar) in allocating income among beneficiaries, which reinforced that the ITO knew of the existence and identities of the sons at the time of the initial assessment.
- Given these matters, the Court concluded that the supposed "discovery" in the 1961-62 proceedings (that the younger son would reach 21 only on 14 September 1964) did not constitute fresh information that was not already available or patent from the will and earlier records; rather, the 1961-62 view represented a change of opinion about the tax consequences.
- Therefore, the statutory precondition for reopening under section 34(1)(b) — that the ITO, in consequence of information in his possession, should have reason to believe income had escaped assessment — was not satisfied. The reopening was held to be based on a mere change of opinion rather than on fresh information.
- On that basis the Court agreed with the Tribunal's conclusion that the reassessment should be cancelled and answered the referred question against the revenue.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The question was answered in the negative; the Court held that the Income-tax Officer had not validly reopened the assessment for the assessment year 1957-58 under section 34(1)(b).
Direct consequences and immediate implications for the parties:
- The reassessment of 1957-58 made pursuant to the reopening was invalid on the ground that the reopening was based on a change of opinion and not on fresh information as required by section 34(1)(b).
- The revenue (Commissioner of Income-tax) was ordered to pay the costs of the reference, as recorded in the opinion.
The opinion does not discuss broader precedent or far-reaching implications beyond the direct effect on the parties; the decision resolves the reference by confirming the Tribunal's view that reopening was impermissible in the circumstances.
Disposition: Question answered in the negative. Revenue to pay costs of the reference.
Tulzapurkar, J.:— This is a reference under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and at the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City II, Bombay, the following question has been referred to us for our opinion:
“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, could it be said that the Income-tax Officer had validly reopened the assessment for the assessment year 1957-58 under section 34(1)(b)”
2. The short facts giving rise to this question may be stated: The question relates to the assessment year 1957-58, the accounting year of which was the year which ended on 31st of January, 1957. One Maganlal Dahyabhai left a will dated 5th July, 1943, in respect of his estate under which he appointed his wife, Smt. Savitagouri, and three others as executors and trustees to manage the estate and to administer it till the residue was handed over to the beneficiaries mentioned therein. The sources of income for the estate were property income, interest on securities, dividends and interest from other sources. The original assessment for the assessment year 1957-58 was completed by the Income-tax Officer on 3rd February, 1958, in such manner that he assessed the property income alone in the hands of Bai Savitagouri and the three trustees in the status of “association of persons” and allocated the balance of the income from other sources amongst the beneficiaries. Consequently, tax was demanded in respect of the property income alone from the trustees, whereas in regard to the balance, the beneficiaries were called upon to pay the tax. In appeal, which was preferred by the assessee, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that section 41 was attracted inasmuch as the trustees had received the income on behalf of the beneficiaries and he, therefore, directed the Income-tax Officer to tax the entire income derived from the estate of the deceased in the hands of the trustees and to levy tax on them in the like manner and to the same extent as it would be leviable upon and recoverable from the beneficiaries on whose behalf such income was receivable. The Income-tax Officer, accordingly, carried out the directions of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.
3. Later on, another Income-tax Officer, while dealing with the assessment for the assessment year 1961-62, realised that under clause 9(f) of the will, the sons, who were the beneficiaries, were to get life interest in the trust property, that is to say, they were to enjoy the surplus of the rents out of the trust property during their lifetime. But this life interest was to arise only when the last son would attain the age of 21 years. On inquiries the Income-tax Officer learnt that the testator had left two minor sons, four daughters and wife, Bai Savitagouri, and that the younger son, Mahendrakumar, was to attain the age of 21 on 14th September, 1964. It was, therefore, clear to him that there was no beneficiary in the intervening period up to 14th September, 1964, and hence section 41 of the Income-tax Act need not come into operation till then. In other words, since the administration of the estate was till then not complete, he came to the conclusion that the entire income from the estate was earned by the trustees and executors in their own right and not on behalf of the beneficiaries and as such the entire income in the hands of the trustees and executors was chargeable to tax under section 3 of the Act at the rate applicable to the total income and not under section 41. Consistent with his aforesaid view he passed an appropriate assessment order on 23rd July, 1962, whereby he charged to tax the entire income from the trust in the hands of the trustees and executors for the assessment year 1961-62 under section 3 of the Income-tax Act the rate applicable to the total income. It appears that during the assessment proceedings that were held by the Income-tax Officer for the assessment year 1961-62, the Income-tax Officer had realised that the life interest was to arise only when the last son was to attain the age of 21 years and since he discovered the fact that the youngest son, Mahendrakumar, would attain the age of 21 years on 14th of September, 1964, he took the view that in the original assessment for 1957-58, which was done in compliance with the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order, the income in the hands of the trustees and executors, which had come to be assessed in the same manner as the income in the hands of the beneficiaries and not at the rate applicable to the total income, as held by him for the assessment year 1961-62, had escaped proper assessment and he, therefore, reopened the assessment for 1957-58 under section 34(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act after issuing a notice in that behalf on 19th February, 1962. After reopening the assessment in the above manner the Income-tax Officer completed the assessment by levying tax on the entire income from the trust in the hands of the trustees and executors at the rate applicable to the total income. Such assessment for the year 1957-58 under section 23(3) read with section 34(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act was made on 21st of February, 1963. Aggrieved by this assessment, made on 21st of February, 1963, the assessee filed an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and one of the objections raised in the appeal was that there was no information in possession of the Income-tax Officer in consequence of which he could have come to the conclusion that the income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment or was under-assessed and the reopening of the assessment was merely based on the change of opinion on the part of the Income-tax Officer and as such the Income-tax Officer had no jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. This contention was rejected by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the order passed by the Income-tax Officer was confirmed. In the further appeal that was carried to the Tribunal the same contention was raised, viz., that the reopening of the assessment by the Income-tax Officer was without jurisdiction. The Tribunal observed that the original assessment for the assessment year 1957-58 was modified by the Income-tax Officer in accordance with the decision given by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in the concerned appeal, but that in the assessment order for the assessment year 1961-62, the Income-tax Officer had taken a view different from the one that had been taken by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in the appeal relating to the assessment for the assessment year 1957-58, and that except a mere change of view in the latter year, there was no fresh information before the Income-tax Officer for coming to the conclusion that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment or was under-assessed for the assessment year 1957-58. The Tribunal, therefore, accepted the assessee's contention and cancelled the said assessment order passed by the Income-tax Officer on 23rd of July, 1963. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City II, has approached this court by a reference for decision on the question which has been set out at the commencement of this judgment.
4. It cannot be disputed that the assessment for the year 1957-58 was reopened by the Income-tax Officer under section 34(1)(b) of the Act pursuant to the notice issued by him in that behalf on 19th of February, 1962, and, therefore, the condition precedent indicated in clause (b) of section 34(1) must be satisfied before the assessment could be reopened and that the Income-tax Officer must have, in consequence of the information in his possession, reason to believe that income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment for any year, or have been underassessed and the only question that was debated at the Bar before us was whether the Income-tax Officer could be said to have had in his possession fresh or new information in consequence whereof he could come to the conclusion that the income chargeable to tax had either escaped assessment or had been under-assessed or whether the reopening had been done by the Income-tax Officer merely on the basis of a change of opinion, the opinion which he had formed during the assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1961-62.
5. Mr. Hajarnavis, for the revenue, fairly conceded before us that the will of Maganlal Dahyabhai dated 5th of July, 1943, must have been produced by the assessee before the Income-tax Officer when the original assessment for the year 1957-58 was done by him, for obviously without knowing the contents of the will the separate assessments of the income, namely, assessing the property income alone in the hands of the trustees and executors and allocating the balance of the income from other sources among several beneficiaries named in the assessment order, could never have been done by the Income-tax Officer when he passed his initial assessment order on 3rd of February, 1958. If that be so, it would be reasonable to assume that even clause 9(f), under which life interest created in favour of the sons of the testator was to arise only when the last of the sons attained the age of 21, must have been noticed by the Income-tax Officer. However, Mr. Hajarnavis contended that the fact that the younger of the two sons would attain the age of 21 on 14th of September, 1964, had not been disclosed or placed before the Income-tax Officer when he passed the initial assessment order on 3rd February, 1958, and in fact it was on the basis of this fact which was discovered by the Income-tax Officer when he carried out the assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1961-62, that the Income-tax Officer realised that the entire income of the trust property in the hands of the trustees and executors would have to be charged to tax under section 3 of the Act at the rate applicable to the total income and that section 41 was not attracted. He pointed out that in the assessment order passed by the Income-tax Officer on 23rd of July, 1963, for the assessment year 1961-62, the Income-tax Officer has observed as follows:
“………On enquiries it is learnt that the youngest son, Shri Mahendrakumar, would attain the age of 21 on September 14, 1964. It is, therefore, very clear that there are no beneficiaries in the intervening period up to September 14, 1964, and hence section 41 of the Income-tax Act does not come into operation”
6. And even this aspect of the matter has been alluded to by the Tribunal in drawing up the statement of the case, viz, that it was on the later occasion, that is to say, when the assessment for the year 1961-62 was being put through by the Income-tax Officer that he “discovered that the eldest (sic younger) son of the testator attained the age of 21 on September 14, 1964, and the administration of the estate was not till then complete…” According to Mr. Hajarnavis, therefore, this was not a case of mere change of opinion based merely on a proper construction being placed on clause 9(f) of the will, but it was a case of some information having come into the possession of the Income-tax Officer, the information being the fact that the younger of the two sons of the testator was to attain the age of 21 on 14th September, 1964, and which fact came to his notice during the course of the inquiries which he conducted during the assessment proceedings for the year 1961-62, and, therefore, the reopening of the assessment for the assessment year 1957-58 was justified. In our view, it is not possible to accept this submission for the reasons which we shall presently indicate.
7. If the will dated 5th of July, 1943, was before the Income-tax Officer when he carried out the assessment for the assessment year 1957-58— Mr. Hajarnavis has fairly conceded that it must have been produced before the Income-tax Officer at that time—not only clause 9(f) of the will would have been present to the mind of that officer, but even the recitals of paragraph 4 must have been known to him, and even a mere glance at the recitals contained in paragraph 4 of the will would have clearly brought to the notice of the Income-tax Officer that the testator had stated that on the date of the will he had 7 children in all (one son and six daughters) and that his son, Jayendrakumar, was, at that time, 8 years of age. In other words, the eldest son who was the only son was 8 years old on the date of the will of 5th July, 1943. Obviously, therefore, any son who may have been born to the testator after the making of the will could never have attained the age of 21 in the accounting year ending 31st January, 1957. It did not require any special enquiries to be conducted by the Income-tax Officer to realise this fact which should become patent to anyone who peruses paragraph 4 and clause 9(f) of the will. In our view, these facts are patent even on a cursory reading of the relevant paragraphs of the will. Moreover, the fact that during the accounting year ending 31st of January, 1957, the deceased had two sons, one Jayendrakumar, and the younger one, Mahendrakumar, is quite clear from the assessment order itself passed by the Income-tax Officer on 3rd of February, 1958, for in the allocation of the other income from other sources among the beneficiaries, which he has done, he has mentioned the names of both the sons. Having regard to these facts, it seems to us very clear that the fact that the testator had two sons, the elder being Jayendrakumar and the younger being Mahendrakumar, was known to the Income-tax Officerwhen he passed the initial assessment order on 3rd February, 1958. The fact that the younger son could not have attained the age of 21 during the accounting year ended on 31st of January, 1957, was also very patent from the recitals contained in paragraph 4 of the will. If that be the position which emerges from the testamentary document that was produced before the Income-tax Officer when he made the initial assessment order on 3rd of February, 1958, it is difficult to accept Mr. Hajarnavis's contention that any fresh or new information came into the possession of the Income-tax Officer when he issued the notice on 19th of February, 1962, for the purpose of reopening the assessment for the assessment year 1957-58 and, in our view, therefore, it is clearly a case of change of opinion and not the case of any information having come into the possession of the Income-tax Officer in consequence of which he could be said to have realised that either the income had escaped assessment or that the same had been under-assessed. In this view of the matter, we feel that the Tribunal was right in the view which it took and the question before us will have to be answered in the negative and against the revenue. The revenue will pay the costs of the reference.
8. Question answered in the negative.
Alert