Union Of India (Representing Central Railways) v. Samuel Peters And Another

Padhye, J.:— This petition arises out of proceedings filed by respondent 1, Samuel Peters, by an application under S. 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Respondent 1 was an employee in the Central Railways as a train examiner and was at Ballarsha when he was suspended from service with effect from 13 December 1952. There was an enquiry against him and he was removed from service by order, dated 22 August 1953, with effect from 26 August 1953. Subsequently there was a suit filed by respondent 1 being Civil Suit No. 495 B of 1959, for declaration that his dismissal or removal from service was wrongful and claiming reinstatement and back-wages. This suit was said to have been filed on 9 April 1958. Soon after the filing of this suit the earlier order of removal from service passed on 22 August 1953, was set aside in appeal by order dated 17 April 1958, and respondent 1 was asked to join duty in view of the setting aside of the order of his removal. Respondent 1's claim in the civil suit so far as the claim for declaration regarding wrongful dismissal and back-wages was concerned, was decreed and a decree for Rs. 5,824 was passed in his favour. This decree was passed on 27 June 1960. By this decree he was ordered to be reinstated and paid back-wages. After this decree the respondent 1 was asked to join the duty which he joined on 27 October 1960. It appears that during the pendency of this suit a de novo enquiry was again started against respondent 1 and he was again removed from service by the order, dated 28 February 1962.

2. On 30 July 1962 respondent 1 moved the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act for payment of his wages and the claim made by him was for the period 13 December 1952, i.e the date of his suspension, till February 1962, when he was removed in the fresh enquiry. In the Court of the Payment of Wages Authority the claim of respondent 1 for the months of January and February 1962 was granted and the claim prior to it was held to be barred by limitation. The appeal filed by respondent 1 was dismissed by the Assistant Judge so far as the dismissal of his claim on the ground of limitation was concerned and the writ petition on the same point was also dismissed by the High Court.

3. Having failed to get his claim for the period prior to January 1962 from the Payment of Wages Authority, respondent 1 applied on 1 July 1965 to the Labour Court for the recovery of his claim under S. 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. After giving credit for the amount of the decree amounting to Rs. 5824 respondent 1 made a claim for Rs. 14,858.58. From the statement of claim in which the details have been given, it appears that the claim was for the period 13 December 1952 to 31 March 1961 less the decretal amount.

4. Before the Labour Court some preliminary objections were taken and the Labour Court framed two preliminary issues:

1. Are the claims cognizable by this Court under S. 33C (2)?

2. Are the claims beyond two years barred by limitation?

No evidence was adduced in the case and after considering the submissions made by the parties, the preliminary objections were overruled and the cases were set down for hearing on merits. This preliminary order is challenged by the present petitioner, the Union of India.

5. It has now been held by the Supreme Court that there is no limitation for making an application under S. 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. See: Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli [A.I.R 1969 S.C 1335.]

6. Though the only other question that was raised before the Labour Court was whether the claim made by respondent 1 could be entertained or was cognizable by the Labour Court under S. 33C (2), the learned counsel for the petitioner has also raised some more points and they being questions of law we permitted the learned counsel to argue those points.

7. So far as the first question that is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner and which was the only objection taken besides the question of limitation is concerned, the point has been well settled by now. The jurisdiction under S. 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is very wide and takes in within its scope a large number of cases regarding the recovery of claims and for that purpose the Court can also go into the questions which are incidental for the decision of those claims. Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act operates in cases where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money. It further provides that if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified. We may refer in this connexion to R.B Bansilal Abirchand Mills, Ltd. v. Labour Court, Nagpur [A.I.R 1972 S.C 451.] The earlier cases on the point have been referred to in this decision.

8. It is then urged, though for the first time by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the claim which respondent 1 made under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act could properly be made before the Payment of Wages. Authority under the Payment of Wages Act and in fact it was so made by respondent 1 and in view of this special Act, such as the Payment of Wages Act was, the general provisions of S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act would not be applicable to respondent 1 and the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court under S. 33C(2) of the Act would be barred. There cannot be any dispute that the claim, as in the present case, in the absence of anything could be made under the Payment of Wages Act as well as under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is, however, contended by Sri Palshikar that since this claim could be made under the Payment of Wages Act, which is a special Act, the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court under S. 33C(2) in respect of such a claim is barred by necessary implication. There is no provision in the Payment of Wages Act excluding the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court under S. 33C(2) and, therefore, the contention is raised that by necessary implication such a jurisdiction is barred. In fact in S. 22 of the Payment of Wages Act a specific provision has been made to exclude the jurisdiction of civil Court from entertaining a claim which could be made under the Payment of Wages Act. If it was intended to exclude the jurisdiction also of the Industrial Court under S. 33C(2), a similar provision could have been made in respect of this also. When a specific provision has been made expressly barring the jurisdiction of some Courts, there is no scope of any implication in respect of other Courts. We are, therefore, not in a position to accept the contention of Sri Palshikar that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court barred by necessary implication since there is a provision for determination of such claims under the Payment of Wages Act. This question in fact is also no longer open and has been decided by the several decisions of High Courts including this High Court. There is also a decision of the Supreme Court so far as the Minimum Wages Act is concerned. The Minimum Wages Act contains similar provisions to those of the Payment of Wages Act and the principles laid down in the decisions which considered the provisions of S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Payment of Wages Act and the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, would apply in the instant case also: See Balaram Abaji v. M.C Raghojiwalla [A.I.R 1961 Bom 59]; Ambica Tobacca Company, Gondia v. Labour Court, Nagpur [1968 — II L.L.J 353]; Ambica Mills Ltd. Ahmedabad v. Second Labour Court [1968 — II L.L.J 800]; Lal and Company v. K.N Kulkarni [1968 — II L.L.J 518] and Inder Singh v. Labour Court [A.I.R 1969 Punjab and Haryana 310.]

9. The next contention that was raised was that the decision of the Payment of Wages Authority operates as res judicata and the Industrial Court could not award the claim of respondent 1 which was made by respondent 1 before the Payment of Wages Authority and rejected by it though on the ground of limitation. The claim prior to January 1962 was rejected by the Payment of Wages Authority on the ground that the said claim could not be entertained as it was beyond a period of six months which was within the period of limitation and on that ground that claim was rejected. It is contended that since that claim has been rejected by the Payment of Wages Authority, the Industrial Court could not go into that question. Here no question of any res judicata can arise. The Payment of Wages Authority could not entertain a claim which was beyond the period of six months and could not exercise any jurisdiction so far as that claim was concerned unless it thought fit to condone the delay. Under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, there is no question of any limitation. Such a claim could be entertained at any time and in a proceeding under S. 33C(2) no issue could arise as to whether a particular claim is barred by limitation or not. The issue in the earlier case before the Payment of Wages Authority was whether the claim prior to January 1962 was barred by limitation. Such an issue could not be entertained in a proceeding under S. 33C(2). Therefore, there is no question of trying the same issue as was tried and decided in the earlier proceeding, even assuming that prior Court was a Court of exclusive jurisdiction. In the first place in order that a decision of an authority which is not the same as a subsequent authority (sic) that earlier authority must be the exclusive authority of competent jurisdiction. This is not the case here. As we have said earlier, the Payment of Wages Authority is not the exclusive authority but is an alternative and independent authority, but the Labour Court is an authority under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Secondly the issue which was tried in the proceeding before the Payment of Wages Authority does not arise in the proceeding under S. 33C(2) and in such a case the question of operation of the principles of res judicata cannot also arise. This ground, therefore, also must fail.

10. These were all the grounds which were urged on behalf of the petitioner and we do not find any substance in any of them. The petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.